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Abstract
In the second half of the twentieth century, the interest of the social sciences in the 
life sciences has intensified. This intensification might be explained through the idea 
that, as Michel Foucault puts it, what defines modem rationality is the entry o f ‘life’ 
into regimes of knowledge and power. I argue that this ‘entry’ can be traced back to 
the work of Immanuel Kant. He established the autonomy of reason by 
simultaneously including and excluding life from reason. Kant explained the 
emergence of reason by likening it to a biological process but then excluded such 
processes from reason through his notion of the ‘lawfulness of the contingent’. I 
argue that this two-pronged approach leads to a recurring negotiation of the relation 
between life and knowledge in the contemporary life and social sciences.
I argue that it was not Foucault who directly engaged with how the life sciences lie at 
the heart of modem rationality. Rather, it was the French philosopher and historian of 
science Georges Canguilhem. I argue that he questioned modem rationality by 
inquiring into some of its most fundamental epistemological or discursive forms. In 
order to illustrate this, I address his inquiry into the concepts of environment, 
individuality, knowledge or information, and normativity. The potential of these 
concepts to migrate across disciplinary boundaries is indicative of the fact that the 
productivity of Canguilhem’s work extends far beyond the life sciences.
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1. In t r o d u c t io n  - G e o r g e s  C a n g u il h e m : N o r m s  a nd
K n o w l ed g e  in  th e  L ife  S c ien c es
p a r t i
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 The thesis
Georges Canguilhem is one of the most productive thinkers for the contemporary life and 
social sciences. This may seem a strange statement when we consider that he is not, by any 
means, the most discussed theorist these days. He is usually regarded as a precursor to the 
more well-known and popular Foucault. Why is there no real engagement with 
Canguilhem’s work, except by a small group of enthusiasts,1 at a time when that work 
seems so distinctly relevant?
Even for those who generally dislike French philosophers, Canguilhem’s work should 
come as a pleasant surprise. He does not fit the profile of the self-professed French 
intellectual that is both loved and loathed abroad, most notably represented by 
Canguilhem’s former classmate Jean Paul Sartre.2 Nor does he form part of the younger 
generation of philosophers such as Foucault or Derrida. Canguilhem’s way of 
philosophizing is - by his own admission - rather unfashionable and his style of writing is 
rigorous,4 seemingly apolitical, and has an elegance from days long gone.
1 See e.g. contributors to Balibar, Cardot, Duroux et al. (Eds.) (1993); Bing, Braunstein & Roudinesco (Eds.) 
(1998).
2 Macey (1998), p. 172.
3 Canguilhem (1976), p. 71: ‘Everything “natural” is fashionable. Is this mere fact sufficient for the 
philosopher to reject these things as objects o f inquiry?... But to take as his object o f reflection a fashionable 
phenomenon does not oblige the philosopher in any way to philosophize in a fashionable manner. It is 
possible to proceed with a critical analysis o f such phenomena with a relentless rigor for which Kantian 
philosophy, in different times and regarding different questions, has served as an example. ’ (My translation).
4 Lecourt(1975),p. 163: ‘It does not invite reverie, it does not even urge meditation: it demands o f the reader 
that he set himself to work.’
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The influence of his thought has remained limited outside of France partly because his, 
arguably, most interesting work remains to be translated.5 But why have some of those who 
are aware of his work made so little of it? Canguilhem’s work has been portrayed as having 
merely general or residual significance; as if it offers no more than an open-ended
A 7invitation to think about the life sciences. His work on normativity in the life sciences, 
usually regarded as his main contribution, is thought to have become obsolete in light of 
recent developments in those sciences.8 It is suggested that the main merit of this work 
might be that it inspired Foucault’s discussion of normalizing practices.9 Not only do such 
interpretations miss out on some exquisite thinking about specific problems that straddle 
the life and social sciences, they also fail to recognize the wider significance of 
Canguilhem’s engagement with modem rationality.
Many writings in the social sciences that focus on the life sciences inquire into 
technological developments and the changing forms of biological entities or processes.10 
The effort to keep up with ‘molecularization’,11 fragmentation, and contingency seems to 
make a certain kind of theory obsolete. A theory that proceeds by means of concepts, 
regarded as preserved problems, rather than by analytic dissection. So why would 
Canguilhem’s work be relevant for the contemporary life and social sciences, especially 
since he wrote his last essays several decades ago? This question can only be answered 
through a short detour.
The interest of the social sciences in the life sciences has intensified from the second half of 
the twentieth century onwards. Perhaps this is simply because the life sciences did not exist 
as such until relatively recently.12 However, it could also be argued that the life sciences are 
definitive of the twentieth century,13 or - in Heidegger’s words - that they form part of ‘the 
phenomena that distinguish the age’.14 Whatever the case may be, there is little (self-) 
reflection within the social sciences on this recent interest in the life sciences. Nonetheless,
5 Canguilhem (2003) and (2002) have not been translated, although segments have been published in 
Canguilhem (1994a).
6 Rabinow & Caduff (2006), p. 330.
7 Canguilhem (2006).
8 N. Rose (1998), pp. 161-162; N. Rose (2001), pp. 15-16 and 21; Rabinow (1998), p. 199.
9 N. Rose (1998), pp. 164-165.
10 N. Rose (2007); Sunder Raj an (2006); Parry (2004a); Thacker (2005).
11N. Rose (2001), p. 13.
12 See, e.g., Chapter 2, para. 1.3.3 on the relatively recent origins o f ‘biology’ as a discipline.
13 Dagognet (1985), p. 29: Each century has a science that defines it and a philosopher most suited to address 
the questions that it gives rise to.
14 Heidegger (1977), p. 115.
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the effects of the life sciences on subjectivity,15 forms of capitalism,16 and notions of power
1 7and control have become important objects of discussion.
To the extent that some theoretical justification is sought for such recent interest, reference 
is often made to Foucault’s statement that modernity is defined by ‘the entry of life into 
history, that is, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the
1 ftorder of knowledge and power’. However, it is not entirely clear what this statement 
might mean. Foucault himself does not offer an explanation but presupposes a particular 
relation between modem rationality and the life sciences without inquiring in any detail 
into the origins and heritage of this relation.
In the last essay that he agreed to publish before his death, Foucault hints at the significance 
of Canguilhem’s work. He observes that Canguilhem’s ideas are very influential in French 
academic circles despite the fact that his exclusive focus on the life sciences seems to 
necessarily limit the range of his work. The philosophy of science does not normally attract 
much attention, as Foucault observes: ‘there have been noisier theatres: psychoanalysis, 
Marxism, linguistics, ethnology’.19 He notes furthermore:
[F]rom this, a paradox: this man, whose work is austere, intentionally and carefully limited to a
particular domain in the history o f science, which in any case does not pass for a spectacular
discipline, has somehow found himself present in discussions where he himself took care never 
. r  20 to figure.
How might this paradox be explained? Foucault’s work is not explored in this thesis, 
although specific references to it are made. However, I use his suggestion that the influence 
of Canguilhem’s work can be explained by the way in which that work engages with 
modem rationality (following a French tradition in the history and philosophy of 
science).21 Foucault would probably agree that Canguilhem is, at least in this respect, 
actually more interesting for the social sciences than Foucault himself. It must be pointed
15 N. Rose (2007); N. Rose & Novas (2004).
16 Sunder Raj an (2006); Franklin & Lock (2003).
17 Rabinow & Rose (2006); Kay (2000).
18 Foucault (1998), pp. 141-142.
19 Foucault (1978), p. ix.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, p. xi.
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out that the association of modernity with rationality is, of course, only one example of 
what Luhmann calls a ‘repertoire of societal self-descriptions’.
In this thesis, I explore how Canguilhem questions the relation between modem rationality 
- broadly defined as the particular idea of reason that is most often associated with the 
Enlightenment - and the life sciences. Heidegger observes that:
[M]etaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation o f what is and through a
specific comprehension o f truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed.
This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age. Conversely, in
order that there may be an adequate reflection upon these phenomena themselves, the metaphysical
23basis for them must let itself be apprehended in them.
I argue that the life sciences are not only a phenomena that distinguishes our age, but that 
these sciences in some way contributed to the formation of its ‘metaphysical basis’. I argue 
that the relation between knowledge and living processes that characterizes modem 
rationality was first formulated, or in any case expressed most clearly, by Kant. I do not 
seek to either question or presuppose the significance of Kant as an author or philosopher 
but to address the architectonic principle - the metaphysical basis - that seems to emerge 
from his work. I argue that Kant’s simultaneous exclusion and inclusion of living processes 
from his theory of understanding lays the basis for the negotiation of the relation between 
knowledge and living processes that characterizes most recent inquiries in the life and 
social sciences.
I argue, furthermore, that Canguilhem engages with this particular type of rationality by 
identifying and transforming some of the basic concepts through which it functions. I 
illustrate this by addressing some concepts or problems that play an important role in the 
life and social sciences: environment, individual, knowledge or information, and 
normativity. These concepts do not precisely map onto some of the specific concepts that 
Canguilhem ‘traces’ in his various essays. Rather, they can be regarded as ‘second-order’ 
concepts,24 ‘categories’,25 or ‘paradigms’26 around which Canguilhem structures his ideas 
and that resurface at different points in his work. They are not necessarily derived from
22 Luhmann (1998), p. 2: ‘In attempts to characterize modernity, features are employed that originate from the 
repertoire o f societal self-descriptions. This is true, for example, o f  the association o f the concept o f  
modernity with the conceptual world o f the rational Enlightenment.’
23 Heidegger (1977), p. 115-116.
24 Luhmann (1998), p. 7: these concepts allow Canguilhem to observe his own observing o f specific concepts; 
to trace such specific concepts and make them understandable by reference to a wider question or problem.
25 See Chapter 3, para. 1.1.2 on Canguilhem’s use o f that word.
26 See Chapter 2, para. 1.1.2 on Agamben’s use o f that word.
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either the life or social sciences, even if they are elaborated by Canguilhem with reference 
to these sciences.27 These concepts are the real actors in what follows rather than the 
philosopher Georges Canguilhem; Canguilhem functions as the ‘persona’ through which 
these concepts can be explored.
It has been suggested that the influence of the life sciences on the social sciences in the 
nineteenth century could be explained by reference to the ‘comprehensive, transferable 
character of biological concepts’. Such a ‘unilateral’ transgression of disciplinary 
boundaries by concepts from the life sciences to the social sciences is not explored here. 
Rather, I argue that Canguilhem questions - through the life sciences - some basic 
epistemological or discursive forms. These forms or concepts migrate and circulate free 
from the constraints of institutionally defined disciplines. They function irrespective of 
relatively recent disciplinary boundaries, biases, and epistemological frontiers.29 In the 
identification and discussion of these concepts, and the questioning of the rationality they 
propose, lies the unique significance of Canguilhem’s work for the contemporary life and 
social sciences.
1.2 A short biography
1.2.1 Canguilhem’s Vita activa’
Arendt’s discussion of the distinction between 'vita activa’ and 'vita contemplativd> that
*1 A
structured the understanding of life in ancient Greece can be used to understand the 
relation between Canguilhem’s life and work. Vita activa, also called 'biospolitikos’ by
A 1
Aristotle, signified a ‘life devoted to public-political matters’ while vita contemplativa 
referred to the life of the philosopher who distanced himself from active involvement in
27 Much has been made, too much I believe, o f Canguilhem’s distinction between the social and the vital in 
‘Dm social au vital’, Canguilhem (2006), pp. 175-191. This part o f his discussion proves Canguilhem’s 
continuous preoccupation with the mutual information o f the social and the vital (see Chapter 6, para. 3.2.2).
28 Foucault (1989), pp. 41. Foucault argues against this and says that such influence can be explained by ‘the 
fact that these concepts were arranged in a space whose profound structure responded to the healthy/morbid 
opposition ... one did not think first o f the internal structure o f the organized being, but o f the medical 
bipolarity ofthe normal and the pathological’, thereby implicitly affirming the significance of Canguilhem’s 
work 'Le normal et le pathologique’ (2006).
29 See Bachelard (1970) for a beautiful discussion of the notion ‘frontiere epistemologique’.
30 Arendt (1998), p. 7. It differs from the distinction between ‘zoe’ and 'bios’, ibid., p. 97; subsequently 
discussed by Agamben (1998), p. 1: 'zoe, which expressed the simple fact o f living common to all living 
beings... and bios, which indicated the form or way o f living proper to an individual or a group’.
31 Ibid., p. 12.
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worldly goings-on. Arendt argues that the beginning of the modem age, which she locates 
somewhere in the seventeenth century, was characterized by a ‘reversal of the hierarchical 
order’ between vita contemplativa and vita activa.
Whereas the latter previously had a slightly negative connotation (even before it lost its 
original meaning and came to signify mere activity or ‘business’),33 vita activa now became 
increasingly significant. Arendt observes: ‘the point was not that truth and knowledge were 
no longer important, but that they could be won only by “action” and not by 
“contemplation”’.34 She notes that the distinction was now one between thinking - rather 
than contemplation - and doing because contemplation ‘in the original sense of beholding 
the truth, was altogether eliminated’.35 One of the consequences of this reversal in 
hierarchy between vita activa and vita contemplativa was that experimentation and the use 
of instruments in the generation of knowledge became much more important. Another 
consequence, Arendt argues, was a rupture between philosophical and scientific ways of 
knowing.36
Canguilhem’s life and work challenge the distinction between vita activa and vita 
contemplativa and illustrate the entanglements of action and contemplation, as well as 
scientific and philosophical ways of knowing. Although Canguilhem regards philosophy as
 ^7contemplation in the traditional sense of ‘beholding truth’, he believes at the same time 
that seeking truth requires action. Not action as involvement in public life or as activity or 
business. Rather, action as active engagement which differs from the ‘witnessing’ of events 
that traditionally defines the engagement of the intellectual.38 Moreover, Canguilhem’s 
work shows how the importance of the use of instruments and experiments is not confined 
to scientific ways of knowing; it does not indicate a rupture between philosophy and 
science. Rather, by taking the role of instruments and experiments in knowledge formation 
seriously, Bachelard - and Canguilhem after him - demonstrate that the philosophy of
32 Ibid., p. 289.
33 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
34 Ibid., p. 290.
35 Ibid., p. 291.
36 Ibid., p. 290.
37 Foucault (2001), pp. 477 and 480-481. Canguilhem observes, however, that ‘there is no philosophical 
truth’. This does not mean that there is no truth in a specific philosophy or that philosophers are not concerned 
with the question of truth; it only means that the ‘norm’ o f truth does not apply to philosophy.; ibid., pp. 483- 
484: ‘I cannot say that Kant’s philosophy is true, that Nietzsche’s is false. There are ridiculous philosophies 
and rigorous philosophies. I don’t know a false philosophy nor, as a consequence, do I know one that is true’. 
(My translation).
38 Sirinelli (1994), p. 9.
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science is about material objects, particularities, and practices rather than about universal 
truths.39
Canguilhem (1904-1994) studied at the Lycee Henri IV  in Paris, one of the well-known 
‘ kdgnes’ or schools that prepare pupils for the entrance examinations of the Ecole Normale 
Superieure (ENS). His classmates at the ENS were Jean-Paul Sartre, Raymond Aron, and 
Paul Nizan, all of whom were destined to become famous twentieth-century philosophers.40 
After his studies, he taught at lycees across the country and - while teaching philosophy in 
Toulouse - began studying medicine. At the beginning of the Second World War, 
Canguilhem resigned from his teaching post because - as he said in his resignation letter to 
the rector of the university - he had ‘not passed his exams for the ‘agregatiorf in 
philosophy to teach Labour, Family, Fatherland’.41 In 1941 he replaced his friend and 
former fellow student Jean Cavailles at the University of Strasbourg because the latter 
became a professor at the Sorbonne in Paris.
Cavailles was not only a philosopher of mathematics and logic but also a militant activist in 
the French Resistance. He was executed by the Nazis in 1944 after having twice escaped 
captivity. His activism inspired Canguilhem personally as well as professionally;42 he 
observed that
[Cavailles] assigned, twenty years in advance, the task that philosophy is in the process o f accepting 
today - the task o f substituting for the primacy o f experienced or reflexive consciousness the 
primacy o f concepts, systems, or structures.43
In a memorial address, after Cavailles’ death, Canguilhem drew a polemical distinction 
between two groups of French philosophers. This distinction would, through its reiteration 
by Foucault,44 become well known in French intellectual circles. Canguilhem said that one 
group of philosophers focused on the subject and preached activism without practising it. 
The reference was to the existentialists represented by Sartre who ‘militate[d] in [his] 
writings’, 45 as Sartre himself once said, rather than by taking up arms. The other group, 
represented by Cavailles and including Canguilhem, focused on abstract concepts rather
39 Lecourt (1975), p. 164.
40 For this biography, I mainly draw on Sirinelli (1994): pp. 464-466 and pp. 595-599 and Macey (1998).
41 Sirinelli (1994), p. 598-599 (my translation).
42 Macey (1998), pp. 176-179.
43 Canguilhem (1994b), pp. 88-89/
44 Foucault (1985), p. 4.
45 Christofferson (2004), p. 27.
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than on the subject but could be found on the battlefields during the war. Canguilhem 
writes in a tribute to Cavailles:
[A]t the moment, some philosophers are squealing with indignation because certain other
philosophers have formed the idea of a philosophy without a personal subject. The philosophical
work o f Jean Cavailles can be invoked to support that idea. His mathematical philosophy was not
constructed with reference to some subject that could momentarily and precariously be identified
with Jean Cavailles. That philosophy, from which Jean Cavaill6s is radically absent, determined a
form o f action that led him, through the narrow paths o f logic, to a pass from which no one returns.
Jean Cavailles was the logic o f  the Resistance lived to the death. Let the philosophers o f existence
46and o f the person do as well next time, if they can.
The drawing of such a stark distinction between these groups of philosophers seems 
slightly out of character for someone who is usually more concerned with demonstrating 
the impossibility of maintaining rigid distinctions. What perhaps explains Canguilhem’s 
position is that, in this particular case, there simply was no ‘middle-ground’. The 
occupation of France ‘profoundly shaped the politics of French intellectuals’ in the years 
after the war and ‘the wartime division of friend and enemy, resistor and Nazi, between 
whom no middle ground was possible, brought intellectuals into a Manichaean world in 
which refusal to choose sides became a choice for an intolerable status quo.’47
While others believe that Cavailles’ double life as a professor in the philosophy of logic 
and as militant activist is inexplicable, Canguilhem observes how Cavailles’ activism was a 
direct consequence of his philosophical beliefs: ‘It is a simple deduction ... Nazism was 
unacceptable insofar as it was the negation - a savage rather than a scientific negation - of 
universality, and insofar as it portended and sought the end of rational philosophy’. 
Canguilhem notes that ‘before being the sister of the dream, action must be the daughter of
,  49ngor .
This commitment to ‘rigor’ also characterizes Canguilhem’s style of writing and his image 
of philosophy as a ‘metier’ that requires serious labor, rather than as some fanciful art.50 He 
had little patience for what he regarded as fluffy science and famously observed that many 
works in psychology give the impression of being a blend of ‘a philosophy without rigor, 
an ethics that makes no demands and a medicine without controls’.51 It was this apparently 
paradoxical idea of intellectual rigor culminating in resistance that probably attracted young
46 Macey (1998), p. 178; Canguilhem (1996), p. 38.
47 Christofferson (2004), p. 27.
48 Macey (1998), p. 177; Canguilhem (1996), pp. 36.
49 Macey (1998), p. 179; Canguilhem (1996), p. 32.
50 Macey (1998), p. 175.
51 Macey (1998), p. 174; Canguilhem (2002), p. 366.
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students in the French university to Canguilhem. As Bourdieu formulated it, Canguilhem 
did not represent
what is most commonly or frequently found in French philosophy and French universities. On the
contrary, what made him a kind o f reference point or touchstone for myself and, I think for many
others, was his dissonance, not to speak o f his resistance. Although holding the apparently most
conventional posts within the university system, he was not like the others. Simply, without pretence
or sham, with neither complacency nor pomposity, he fully fulfilled his function as a professor, as a
52professor o f philosophy (he never played the philosopher).
Although he was popular among students, Canguilhem did not position himself with regard 
to the student protests in 1968. His sympathy for these protests has, therefore, become the 
subject of some speculation. There are some who believe that he sympathized with - or at 
least understood - the protesters,53 while others believe that he found it difficult to come to 
terms with the protests.54 Foucault said in this regard:
[Tjhere were also people who did not follow [this] movement. I am thinking o f those who were 
interested in the history o f science ... Particularly around Canguilhem, an extremely influential 
figure in the French University - the young French University. Many o f his students were neither 
Marxists, nor Freudians, nor structuralists. And here I am speaking o f myself.55
Although some Marxist influences have been read into his work by Lecourt,56 Canguilhem 
never explicitly aligned himself with Marxism or communism and even argued against it on 
specific issues in much the same way as Foucault did. The petitions that Canguilhem signed 
while he was still at the Ecole Normale Superieur (ENS) show that his sympathies were 
with the ‘traditional or liberal left, but not the revolutionary left’ to which many of his 
students belonged.57 Canguilhem probably organized, for example, the petition against the 
Loi Paul Boncour; a law that was meant to prepare the country for wartime but was
f  o
regarded as stifling intellectual freedom.
As a student, Canguilhem was a pacifist, as many intellectuals were during the interwar 
period.59 Together with Sartre and other students he protested against mandatory military
52 Bourdieu (1998), p. 190.
53 Dagognet (1997), p. 11.
54 Bourdieu (1998), p. 191; Macey (1998), p. 173.
55 Gutting (1989), citing Foucault at p. 11.
56 Lecourt (1975).
57 Macey (1998), p. 173.
58 Sirinelli (1995), p. 326 and 465.
59 Ibid., Ch. 10, pp. 314-343; See ibid., Ch.13, pp. 427-496, on the influence o f Canguilhem’s teacher 
Alain who was a pacifist.
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training at the ENS.60 He gave up pacifism and joined the French Resistance,61 after the 
Gestapo entered the University of Strasbourg where he was teaching and deported two 
professors and a number of students. Canguilhem left the university to operate a field 
hospital for the Resistance in the mountains of Auvergne and received, after the war ended, 
the Croix de guerre and the Croix de la Resistance for evacuating that hospital under fire. 
He returned in 1945 to the University of Strasbourg and, ten years later, succeeded the 
famous French philosopher of science Bachelard (who had supervised Canguilhem’s thesis 
in philosophy) as Professor of the History and Philosophy of Sciences at the Sorbonne.
1,2.2 Canguilhem’s ‘vita contemplativa’
Canguilhem published both his thesis in medicine, Le normal et le pathologique, and his 
thesis in philosophy, La Formation du concept du reflexe aux XVII et XVIII siecles, as 
well as a book that he wrote together with a fellow lecturer while he was teaching in 
Toulouse entitled Traite de logique et de morale.6* Canguilhem’s other books, La 
connaissance de la v ie65 Etudes d ’histoire et de philosophie des sciences66 and Ideologie
fn
et rationalite dans I ’histoire des sciences de la 'vie, are collections of essays that had 
previously been published in a variety of French journals or that were delivered by 
Canguilhem as lectures. His writings have been grouped together in different ways by
A ftdifferent commentators; some group these writings by theme while others distinguish 
consecutive phases in his writing.69
There are several books that are exclusively dedicated to Canguilhem’s thought. Some of
7ftthese are monographs, such as Canguilhem et les normes which focuses - as the title
60 Ibid., pp. 326-328. Canguilhem wrote two songs for the end-of-year revue at the ENS (one together with 
Sartre) against the Loi Paul Boncour (about the use of intellectuals in wartime) and against mandatory 
military training.
61 Ibid., pp. 597-598; See Canguilhem & Planet (1939), pp. 297-299, on the necessity of choosing ‘between an 
attitude o f  submission to historical contingencies or necessities, that we believe are metaphysically or 
physically founded, and an attitude o f resistance or rather organization.’ (My translation). Canguilhem 
apparently decided to choose the latter: ‘that which we call peace remains a purely verbal negation o f war.’
6 Canguilhem (2006).
63 Canguilhem (1977).
64 Canguilhem and Planet (1939).
65 Canguilhem (1993).
66 Canguilhem (2002).
67 Canguilhem (2000).
68 Gayon (1998).
69 Dagognet (1985).
70 LeBlanc (1998).
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suggests - on his idea of norms and Georges Canguilhem: philosophe de la vie11 which 
takes a more holistic approach to his work. Other books are collections of papers presented 
at conferences dedicated to Canguilhem’s thought, such as Actualite de Georges
77Canguilhem - le normal et le pathologique which focuses on his thesis in medicine and
79Georges Canguilhem: historien, philosophe des sciences which addresses various aspects 
of his thought. Special editions of journals have been dedicated to Canguilhem, such as an 
issue of the Revue de metaphysique et de morale™ the famous French philosophy journal 
in which Canguilhem himself frequently published. This issue is introduced by Foucault 
and collects articles by former students on Canguilhem’s work, personality, and teaching 
style. The journal Economy & Society devoted a special issue to his thought and collects 
papers from a conference held on Canguilhem’s work in London.
A few books have been written on the epistemological lineage of Bachelard, Canguilhem 
and Foucault, and Bachelard and Canguilhem respectively.76 Apart from this, there are 
various articles, contributions to books, and book reviews that have been written about 
Canguilhem’s work.77 Much of his work has not been translated into English, although 
translations have been published of Le normal et le pathologique and Ideologic et
70
rationalite dans Vhistoire des sciences de la vie. A book has also been published in 
English that collects various fragments from Canguilhem’s essays and groups these 
together into various themes.79 However, by taking such fragments out of context it 
becomes almost impossible to appreciate Canguilhem’s particular style of writing and the 
substance of his ideas.
71 Dagognet (1997).
72 Bing, Braunstein, Roudinesco (Eds.) (1998).
73 Balibar, Cardot, Duroux (Eds.) (1993).
74 Revue de metaphysique et de morale 90 :1 (1985).
75 Economy & Society 27: 2&3 (1998).
76 Lecourt (1975); Hertogh (1986). See also Gutting (1989), pp. 9-54.
77 Most notably: Hacking (1998); Rheinberger (2005b).
78 By Reidel (1978) and MIT Press (1988), respectively.
79 Canguilhem (1994a). See the extensive bibliography by C. Limoges o f Canguilhem’s work (including 
essays he wrote as a student).
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1.3 Intellectual lineage
1.3.1 Canguilhem as *precursor' to Foucault
Some efforts have been made to establish the relevance of Canguilhem’s writing for
on
sociological inquiries into the life sciences and for an Anglo-American audience. 
However, I argue that such efforts have - at least in some respects - been counterproductive. 
Initial interest in Canguilhem’s work often follows from his role as mentor of Foucault. 
Most commentators seem to adhere to the idea of a linear and progressive history of 
thought that can only be charted by reference to consecutive individual thinkers. 
Canguilhem makes a point of rejecting the idea of the progress of knowledge and the
n 1
associated method of focusing on individuals and their theories. He believes that the idea 
of the ‘precursor’ defeats the purpose of a history of science because the historicity of the 
sciences themselves is not recognized.82
The intellectual complicity between Canguilhem and Foucault is obvious. To read the work 
of one through the work of the other may, therefore, be productive for certain purposes. 
However, I argue that to read Canguilhem exclusively through Foucault and attribute value 
to his work only to the extent that Foucault elaborates on it ‘dilutes’ Canguilhem’s thought. 
The potential of his work remains unrecognized by those who read it in order to make 
further sense of Foucault, rather than appreciate it on its own merit. Canguilhem’s work is
• • 83often described as too ‘organic’ or as being exclusively concerned with the life sciences; 
as if it has nothing to contribute to the social sciences without Foucault’s elaboration.
In what follows, the substance of Canguilhem’s ideas is sometimes briefly contrasted with 
the work of Luhmann. Luhmann’s social systems may seem far removed from the living 
processes that form the object of inquiry for Canguilhem. However, I argue that 
Canguilhem and Luhmann draw - to some extent - on the same intellectual heritage. Both 
were influenced by the German philosophers Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche and by the
80 N. Rose (1998); Gutting (1989) pp. 32-52.
81 Canguilhem (1998), p. 318, observes that Kant adhered to the progress theory o f the Aufldarung, even if his 
own Copemican Revolution arguably disrupted such a linear idea o f progress.
82 See Canguilhem (2002), pp. 20-23 on the ‘precursor’; ibid., p. 21: ‘The complacency o f researching, 
finding, and celebrating precursors is the most distinct symptom o f an inaptitude for epistemological critique.’ 
(My translation).
83 N. Rose (1998), pp. 162 and 164.
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twentieth century theories of cybernetics and autopoiesis. More importantly, I argue that 
Canguilhem and Luhmann share a common purpose even if their respective styles are very 
different and their ideas unfold in different environments. Both engage with and seek to 
question, through different theoretical methods, the particular rationality that was 
formulated in the German philosophical tradition - especially by Kant.
Luhmann’s systems theory represents a challenge to Kant’s theory of understanding, while 
at the same time remaining inextricably linked to it. Canguilhem’s inquiry into concepts 
can be regarded as preceding Luhmann’s transformation of the terms that were previously 
associated with ‘the social’. Luhmann refers to Canguilhem’s work in specific instances, 
most notably with reference to the concept of ‘environment’ (see Chapter 3). However, 
Canguilhem makes no explicit reference to Luhmann so that it cannot be assumed that he 
was aware or familiar with his work.
1.3.2 Countrymen: mentors and pupils
Canguilhem’s work is influenced by various writings in biology, medicine, and philosophy. 
One would perhaps - taking into account their shared subject matter - expect Bergson, who 
is often described as the ‘philosopher of life’, to represent the most important influence on 
his thought. However, Bergson’s philosophy and his interest in the life sciences differs 
from that of Canguilhem. Bergson, for example, questions specific aspects of Kant’s theory 
of understanding - most notably his ideas of space and time - in relation to living processes. 
However, Canguilhem questions the wider project of Enlightenment rationality by focusing
or
on the relation between knowledge and life.
A philosopher that arguably influenced Canguilhem’s work much more, and whom he 
writes about from an early age, is Comte.86 Comte’s contributions to the philosophy of 
biology, for which he is not specifically known, are explored by Canguilhem as well as his
84 Canguilhem (2002), p. 348, focusing on the original inspiration for autopoietic theory - i.e. Kant’s ideas on 
the self-organization o f living processes - by reference to the ‘self-containment o f organizational operations’ 
(my translation); Canguilhem (2000), p. 82, referring to cybernetics in his discussion on regulation in biology.
85 Canguilhem (2002), p. 348 : Canguilhem’s philosophy is one o f  concepts. He observes about Bergson’s 
notion o f ‘duree' in relation to living processes: ‘It is clear that a philosophy o f life thus conceived cannot be 
a philosophy o f  the concept.’ (My translation)
86 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 61-98; Macey (1998), p. 174: Canguilhem submitted an essay for entrance to the 
‘agregation’ in 1926 on Comte’s theory o f order and progress.
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ideas on progress. Canguilhem finds in Comte’s work many of the main themes that he 
addresses in biology and in the history and philosophy of science.
However, the philosopher who undoubtedly exercised the greatest influence on Canguilhem 
was Bachelard. He first recovered the concept of the norm for the sciences. Canguilhem 
takes this concept in an entirely different direction by elaborating the notion of 
‘normativity’ in the life sciences (see Chapter 6). Bachelard discusses the idea of
o 7
‘epistemological value’ mainly by reference to physics and mathematics. This idea, as 
Lecourt points out, is directed against two notions that dominated philosophy at the time.
First, it is directed against the idea that the notion of value is the exclusive domain of 
ethics. Bachelard claims that it is in fact epistemology and the philosophy of science where 
the question of value and normativity should be addressed, because - according to him - the
oo
most important value, i.e. truth, is the privileged subject of the sciences. Second, his idea 
of epistemological value challenges a predominantly positivist philosophy of science. 
Science, according to Bachelard, should not be regarded as delivering facts about the world 
but as the continuous emergence of a variety of epistemological values. The idea of 
‘epistemological value’ was inspired by Spinoza’s saying “‘veritas normasui” (the truth is 
its own measure)’.89
This does not mean that science describes certain truths about - or prescribes certain laws to 
- the world but that the sciences are distinguished by the way in which they give rise to 
different truths. This, in turn, gives rise to a continuous process of correction and 
rectification and leads to the idea that what lies at the heart of the sciences is not so much 
truth but error (see Chapter 5, para. 3.2.3).90 It is this focus on the generation of truths, on 
the importance of norms, and on the centrality of error that is subsequently taken up by 
Canguilhem.
Canguilhem was also inspired by Bachelard’s emphasis on the role that instruments and 
experiments play in the generation of knowledge.91 Bachelard proposes that the generation 
of knowledge does not take place in a vacuum or in someone’s mind (as Kant seemingly
87 Lecourt (1975), pp. 10-11.
88 See N. Rose (1998), p. 160 on scientific discourse as ‘veridical’.
89 Lecourt (1975), p. 12.
90 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
91 Ibid, p. 76: Bachelard refers to scientific instruments as ‘materialized theories’ and invented the notion of  
‘phenomeno-technics’ (on the latter notion, see Rheinberger (2005a)). Ibid., p. 137: traditional philosophy 
could only regard the role o f instruments in concept formation as ‘inessential “mediation” ’.
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suggested). Rather, it is mediated and constituted through a material world and through the 
instruments that are used to obtain knowledge. He does not believe in a ‘tranquil universe 
of the ideal problems posed by the philosopher about “science”’, but instead believes that 
the focus of the philosopher should be on the real problems that confront researchers and 
the historical conditions of the production of scientific knowledge. He does not inquire into 
the question of knowledge or understanding as such but into the particular kinds of 
knowledge generated by particular problems.
Not only is Canguilhem influenced by his mentor Bachelard, but also by the work of his 
former students; especially Foucault whose thesis he examined. He refers at times to the 
work of Simondon, Dagognet, and Lecourt, all of whom elaborate various themes of 
Canguilhem’s own work. Foucault focuses on the relation between normativity and life 
through his notion of ‘biopower’.94 Simondon develops his ideas on individuation in the 
sciences and on the relation between biology and technology.95 Dagognet’s work remains 
perhaps most closely to Canguilhem’s specific fields of inquiry: epistemology, reason, and 
the life sciences.96 Lecourt focuses especially on Canguilhem’s epistemology.97
However, Canguilhem was not only concerned with philosophy. He followed Bachelard’s 
advice of learning from the sciences and using these sciences to inquire into philosophical 
concepts.98 In the same way as Comte performs the role of one of Canguilhem’s - often 
invisible - philosophical interlocutors, the famous French physiologist Claude Bernard is 
his sounding board in matters of biology and medicine (as well as philosophy). These 
different disciplines can never be clearly distinguished in Canguilhem’s work. He notes, for 
example, in the introduction to his thesis in medicine that he has ceded perhaps a little too 
much to the ‘demon philosophique’.99 The impossibility of distinguishing between the 
sciences and philosophy is partly the result of his Bachelardian way of philosophizing. It 
implies that philosophy cannot merely accept the end result of scientific explorations as 
object of inquiry. Rather, philosophy needs to probe the different avenues of scientific
92 Ibid., p. 26.
93 See Canguilhem (1995) for his original comments on Foucault’s thesis; Canguilhem (2000), p. 10: for 
Canguilhem’s engagement with, and criticism of, Foucault’s work in L ’Archeologie du Savoir, Canguilhem 
(1984) co-edited a book on Dagognet.
94 Foucault (r998), pp. 135-145.
95 Simondon (1964) and (1958).
96 For example, Dagognet (1984) and (1988).
97 Lecourt (1975).
98 Ibid., p. 34. Bachelard calls this: ‘Se mettre a I ’ecole des sciences'
99 Canguilhem (2006), p. 5 (Introduction to the 2nd edition).
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practices and experiments in order to follow the formation of objects or concepts and 
determine their meaning and value.100
The main reason why Canguilhem was fascinated by Bernard was not simply because he 
was one of the most influential figures in the French life sciences, as Comte was in French 
philosophy, but because Bernard’s work contains a number of productive ambiguities. 
Although Bernard often professes his antagonism towards philosophy and history, he 
himself is prone to philosophical musings; hence Canguilhem’s description of him as a 
scientist ‘in love with philosophizing’ (‘feru de philosophemes’).101 One of the ambiguities 
of Bernard’s work arises from the fact that his declared aversion to what he regards as the 
loftiness of philosophical inquiries and the uselessness of historical inquiries into the 
sciences102 is paralleled by his use of philosophical and historical reflection. This enables 
him to develop a theory of experimental medicine that seeks to set the agenda of medical 
research for years to come.103
1.3.3 The German connection: scientists and philosophers
Canguilhem himself points to another, perhaps more unexpected, influence on his thought: 
the works of various German philosophers and scientists. Canguilhem observes that French 
philosophers, probably to their detriment, have not engaged much with the ideas of certain 
German philosophers.104 He makes an exception for Cavailles whom he describes in an 
obituary as despising Nazism but as having a great passion for ‘the Germany of Kant and 
Beethoven’ (despite the fact that the defence of German ‘Kultur’ was used as justification 
for the war).105 Many French philosophers of the interwar period, including Sartre and 
Aron, spent one or two years at German universities;106 Cavailles retained an interest in 
German philosophy from his studies in Heidelberg. However, it was (arguably) Kojeve’s 
presentation of Hegel that gave German philosophy a more permanent place in French
107philosophical thinking.
100 Canguilhem (2003), p. 165.
101 Canguilhem (1988), p. xi; Canguilhem (2000), p. 10.
102 See Petit (1987) for some o f Bernard’s contemptuous quotes.
103 Ibid. and Bernard (1865).
104 Canguilhem (2002), p. 347, mentioning the example o f a philosophy o f  the organic h la Hegel. See Fichant 
(1993), p. 41 for the influence on Canguilhem o f German philosophy.
105 Ferrteres (1982), p. 202: Cavailles said, under interrogation, how much his philosophy was influenced by 
German philosophers and how he appreciated the Germany o f Kant and Beethoven.
106 Judt( 1992), p. 76.
107 Ibid.
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Canguilhem makes reference to Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, but he refers to each in a quite 
different way. His most elaborate reference to Kant is with regard to the relation between 
the concept and life. He explicitly refers to Kant’s Critique o f  Pure Reason in order to shed 
light on the character of concepts and to the Critique o f  Judgment in order to explore the
t OSrelation between knowledge and the self-organization of living processes. At other times,
Canguilhem refers only briefly to Kant’s Critique o f  Pure Reason in order to clarify his 
own thoughts without engaging much with its contents.109 In only a limited number of 
paragraphs does Canguilhem refer explicitly to the limitations of Kant’s ideas on 
knowledge and understanding with regard to living processes.110
Some of Canguilhem’s most explicit references to Hegel are also with regard to the relation 
between knowledge and life. They demonstrate his belief that his own ideas on the subject 
most closely resemble Hegel’s views, rather than those of Kant or Bergson.111 However,
references to Hegel are specific and piecemeal and do not seem to form part of any
* • 112sustained engagement with Hegel’s philosophy.
Canguilhem’s engagement with Nietzsche is even more difficult to define.113 The influence 
of Nietzsche on his work is more obvious than that of either Kant or Hegel, although 
explicit references to Nietzsche are few and far between.114 It seems curious, as Stiegler 
points out, that Canguilhem - when he does refer to Nietzsche - seems to slightly 
misrepresent the latter’s arguments in order to contrast his own views with it.115 
Nevertheless, some specific thoughts of Nietzsche resonate quite clearly in Canguilhem’s 
work (see Chapters 4 and 6).
Canguilhem’s method of tracing concepts rather than individual protagonists forces him to 
engage with thinkers of different philosophical backgrounds. It is the intricacies of the
108 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 343-345.
109 Canguilhem (2006), p. 175.
110 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 351-352.
111 Ibid., pp. 345-348.
112 Gayon (1998), p. 323, n. 79, points out that Canguilhem’s references to Hegel seem to be inaccurate and 
that Canguilhem, while ‘borrowing’ some o f Hegel’s expressions, does not use Hegel’s philosophy to any 
great extent.
Foucault (1985), p. 14 observes that Canguilhem was at the same time close to - and removed from - 
Nietzsche. Canguilhem described himself once as lun nietzscheen sans cartes' Fichant (1993), p. 48 n. 4.
114 See Stiegler (2001) for references by Canguilhem to Nietzsche’s work; Fichant (1993), pp. 44-45 on 
Canguilhem’s engagement with Nietzsche’s philosophy.
115 Stiegler (2001), pp. 85-88: an example is the suggestion that Nietzsche follows Bernard’s argument about 
the homogeneity o f the normal and pathological; Canguilhem (2006), p. 16.
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paths of concepts that make it impossible to draw geographical lines between French and 
German philosophical traditions. However, Canguilhem does note a substantial difference 
between German and French writing on the life sciences specifically. He says that, whereas 
the Germans rationalize the means (‘moyens’) of life, the French do the same to its ends 
{'fins')}16 In other words, whereas the former accept the indeterminacy of the fin s' of 
living processes, they cannot come to terms with the indeterminacy of the functioning of 
living processes without rationalizing such functioning. The French, in turn, need to know 
where living processes are going or what their particular purpose is while they happily 
leave the functioning of such processes to intuition.
This comment seemingly refers to the particular style of thought of two philosophical 
traditions. At the same time, the distinction between ‘means’ and ‘ends’ is put into question 
by living processes themselves and by their technological manipulation. Kant characterized 
organisms as processes of self-generation where means and ends - or cause and effect - 
become almost indistinguishable: ‘with regard to its species the tree produces itself... it is
117both cause and effect, both generating itself and being generated by itself ceaselessly’. In 
Kant’s work on morality, the distinction between means and ends takes on a slightly
1 10
different significance through its association with the moral status of persons and things. 
The relation between means and ends in the life sciences is an important question that will 
not be addressed here in much further detail.
Apart from the work of German philosophers, the ideas of Goldstein - a neurologist - 
exercised great influence on Canguilhem’s work. Goldstein fled Germany before the war in 
fear of persecution, wrote his book Der Aufbau des Organismus119 in exile in The 
Netherlands, and subsequently emigrated to the United States where he became a professor 
at Columbia University. Two aspects of his method, both counterintuitive at the time, 
particularly inspired Canguilhem. First, Goldstein starts his inquiry into the organism by
17 nregarding it as a whole rather than by dissecting it into parts. Second, Goldstein’s study
is based on ‘pathological data’ that he had obtained while treating soldiers who suffered
116 Canguilhem (1947), pp. 325-326.
117 Kant (1987), p. 249, section 64, para. 370.
118 Kant (2004), p. 37,4:428: ‘Beings the existence o f which rests not on our will but on nature, if  they are 
beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things, whereas 
rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is, as 
something that may not be used merely as a means.’
119 Goldstein (1995).
120 Ibid., pp. 18 and 23-24.
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10 1brain damage during the First World War. Canguilhem follows Goldstein’s focus on 
normality and pathology and on the individual in his own writing. Canguilhem and his wife 
Simone translated some of Goldstein’s work on epistemology from English into French.122
PART II
2.1 A methodology not limited to method 
2, L I  The characteristics o f  concepts
The focus on concepts in Canguilhem’s work, and in the following chapters, requires some 
explanation or perhaps justification. Conceptual inquiry seems to be somewhat
unfashionable. Canguilhem notes in an introduction to one of his books that it is up to the
101reader to decide whether he should be regarded as a ‘fossile conceptualiste\ Many 
inquiries focus predominantly on the material world of objects and instruments. A focus on 
concepts only seems justifiable when the role played by instruments and experiments in the 
formation of such concepts is emphasized. As Bachelard observes: ‘a concept must from 
now on integrate into its constitution as a concept the technical conditions of its 
realization’.124
The idea that concepts are products of practices and of the material environment in which 
they are put to use, represents an alternative to Kant’s idea that a concept is primarily a tool 
of cognition that should necessarily be prior to the world that it seeks to make intelligible. 
One of the consequences of the idea that the ‘construction’ of concepts is ‘intertwined with 
the practices which operationalize them, give them empirical reference, and make them 
function as tools for the production of knowledge’125 is that concepts are indeterminate. 
This does not mean that they become useless as tools of cognition; quite the opposite: it
10Amakes them more useful because their ‘reference potential’ is greater.
121 Ibid., pp. 29-30; ibid., p. 15.
122 Canguilhem (1994a), see Limoges’ bibliography, pp. 385-454, p. 407.
123 Canguilhem (2000), p. 9.
124 Lecourt (1975), p. 138.
125 Lenoir (1988); Rheinberger (1997a), pp. 16-17.
126 Kitcher (1982), p. 340.
29
Indeterminacy plays an important role in Bachelard’s philosophy; such indeterminacy 
inspired subsequent references to, for example, ‘concepts in flux’ and ‘boundary 
concepts’.127 Canguilhem, following Bachelard, focuses not only on the emergence of 
concepts and their characteristics but also on the continuous rectification and 
transformation of concepts. Such rectification is regarded by him primarily as the result of 
experimentation rather than logical reasoning or the progressive development of 
knowledge.
Another characteristic of concepts is their ‘mobility’ or the way in which concepts tend to 
hover between practice and theory.129 This notion of the mobility of concepts differs from 
the traditional idea of the correspondence between a concept and the object it refers to. The 
mobility of concepts expresses a productive tension between thought and practice,130 
whereas the idea of correspondence relies on a separation between the empirical world and 
understanding. The representation of concepts as ‘mobile’ also differs from the idea that 
concepts migrate between disciplines or circulate freely irrespective of disciplinary 
boundaries.
The characteristics of concepts - their indeterminacy, the way in which they implicate the 
means of their own production, and their mobility - are well documented. However, 
concepts are still largely regarded in the Kantian sense as making objects possible; perhaps 
not as objects themselves but as objects of understanding or knowledge.131 Instruments are 
regarded as playing a significant role in concept formation, while concepts themselves are
1 XOregarded as instruments or tools that are necessary for the formation of knowledge.
127 Dagognet (1965), p. 83: Bachelard said ‘We must insist on the necessity o f reinstituting the “awareness of 
the non-rigorous” in order for a complete “awareness o f rigor” to be possible.’ (My translation); Rheinberger 
(1997a), p. 14: terms attributed to Elkana and LOwy respectively; Rheinberger (2000), p. 219: on the 
usefulness o f ‘an epistemology o f the imprecise’; Tiles (2005).
128 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 295-296 : ‘The nineteenth century did not invent the concept o f reflex, but it 
rectified it. This rectification o f the concept is not a thing o f logic, it is a thing o f experiment ... This 
rectification is, therefore, not linear, it is made up o f polemical situations that do not all represent progress.’ 
(My translation).
129 Rheinberger (1997a), p. 13.
130 Ibid., concepts shuttle back and forth between deriving an idea from practice and imposing one upon it.
131Ibid., p. 22: ‘What is at stake is the grand project o f modernity, the instantiation o f Kant’s rationalist credo 
that we understand only what we can make in terms o f our conceptualizations ... Meanwhile, the credo has 
taken on a very non-Kantian appearance. What we can ourselves make and accomplish, we always know in 
the form in which we locally do it, and not even this completely.’
132 Canguilhem (2002), p. 353: ‘the human invention o f the concept... goes hand in hand with the human 
invention o f the tool’.
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Canguilhem does not deny that a concept is, in many ways, an instrument that has cognitive
1 ^value to the extent that it functions as an ‘operator’ in the formation of knowledge. 
However, he chooses to focus on the values that a concept integrates in its form. This 
requires him to investigate the conditions under which a concept emerged. This particular 
method of inquiry contributes to the greater project, inspired by Bachelard, of revealing the 
normative in scientific discourse.134
The focus on concepts in the following chapters is not necessarily motivated by a desire to 
follow Canguilhem’s own method. Whereas Canguilhem charts the transformation of 
concepts through time and in different contexts, concepts are used here in order to show 
how Canguilhem engages with modem rationality through some of its most basic 
epistemological forms. While Canguilhem focuses on very specific concepts, the focus here 
is on some of the ‘second order’ concepts that underlie Canguilhem’s inquiries and allow 
him to structure his thought. As a consequence, I do not explore how such concepts may 
have been produced or transformed through certain practices, instruments, and experiments.
2.1.2 Acting through concepts or concepts as actors?
What role does Canguilhem fulfil in the following chapters; who or what does Canguilhem 
represent? He could be regarded as a centre of reference in which various ideas, concepts, 
and traditions can be ‘anchored’.135 More particularly, Canguilhem can perhaps be 
associated with the figure of the ‘ medecin-philosophe ’ that emerged in Europe around the 
middle of the eighteenth century. The ‘medecin-philosophe’ originated with the 
‘Montpellier school’ in France, most notably represented by the famous physiologist 
Bichat.136 It represented a school of thought whose most distinctive characteristic was a 
belief that medicine provides privileged entry into key philosophical issues.
Canguilhem could also be identified with the persona of the ‘intellectual’. The emergence 
of this persona is often attributed to the end of the nineteenth century and the Dreyfuss 
affair but has also been associated with the interwar period when writers developed a
133 Ibid., p. 360.
134 This does not mean that scientific discourse therefore becomes unscientific or unreasonable. On the 
contrary, reason itself is shown to be normative. See also N. Rose (1998), p. 159.
135 Hunter (2007), p. 583.
136 Zammito (2008).
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collective voice that was strongly influenced by pacifism.137 The intellectual emerged when 
writers and philosophers no longer expressed their opinions solely as representatives of 
their respective professions.
It seems as if the idea of the intellectual was ready for renewal almost from the time it 
emerged. Both Sartre and Foucault (the latter together with his philosophical accomplice 
Deleuze)138 sought to redefine the notion of the intellectual in the 1960s.139 The reason for 
this redefinition was partly the dissatisfaction to which the unfulfilled promise of the 
intellectual as a moral arbiter and representative of the people gave rise. Foucault observes 
that ‘[f]or the most part, I think that intellectuals have given up trying to be prophets - 
that’s if intellectuals still exist as a category, or should still exist, which isn’t certain or 
even perhaps desirable’.140 Deleuze formulates their project of redefining the intellectual as 
follows:
[F]or us the theorizing intellectual has ceased to be a subject, a representing or representative 
consciousness. Those who act and who struggle have ceased to be represented, be it by a party or 
union that unrightfully claims in turn the right to be their consciousness. Who speaks and who acts? 
It is always a multiplicity, even in the person who speaks and acts ... There is no more 
representation. There is only action, the action o f theory and the action o f practice in relay relations 
or in networks.141
The ‘refusal of representation’142 and the emphasis on the ‘action of theory’ is reminiscent 
of Canguilhem’s ideas that the subject should not be taken as the point of departure and that 
conceptual rigour inevitably leads to action. The action that Canguilhem, as well as 
Foucault and Deleuze, refer to can no longer be referred back to - or exclusively identified 
with - a particular individual or subject. Rather, it follows from concepts that together form 
- in Deleuze’s words - a kind of intellectual ‘multiplicity’. Canguilhem addresses the 
correspondence between action and theory when he emphasizes that Cavailles’ activism 
cannot solely be referred back to Cavailles as a subject. Rather, action is associated with the 
‘narrow paths of logic’ and Cavailles’ conceptual inquiry (see para. 1.2.1 above). This 
suggests that concepts represent more than just a methodology for Canguilhem.
137 Levy (1995), p. 55; Sirinelli (1988).
138 Pottage (1998b), p. 2, refers to ‘a sort o f ongoing conceptual complicity between Foucault and Deleuze’. 
See also Davidson (1997).
139 Christofferson (2004), pp. 70-71: Sartre talked about the ‘new intellectual’, while Foucault and Deleuze 
referred to the ‘specific intellectual’. Gutting (2005a): The latter was represented by the teacher or the 
engineer rather than by the intellectual who ‘speak[s] in the capacity o f master o f truth and justice.’
140 Levy (1995), p. 372.
141 Christofferson (2004), p. 71.
142 Ibid.
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In what follows, the focus is not on Canguilhem as a philosopher or intellectual; as a 
subject who acts through concepts. Rather, concepts are themselves regarded as actors. 
Together, they form an ‘intellectual multiplicity’ that is not reducible to - or exclusively 
representative of - the individual that is Georges Canguilhem. The concepts that he 
addressed do not refer back to Canguilhem - the subject, but to other concepts. As Deleuze 
observes:
In any concept there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts, which corresponded
to other problems and presupposed other planes... In fact, having a finite number o f components, every
concept will branch off toward other concepts that are differently composed but that constitute other
regions o f the same plane, answer to problems that can be connected to each other, and participate in a 
143co-creation.
Since concepts refer to themselves and to other concepts, they are at the same time absolute 
and relative. They are relative with regard to other concepts but absolute with reference to 
the situation in which they emerge and the values they envelop.144 The reference of 
concepts to other concepts implies that concepts ‘extend to infinity’.145 This is why 
Canguilhem is often regarded as tracing networks of concepts that seem to extend endlessly 
beyond any theory or individual.
The idea of the self-reference of concepts, and of the reference of concepts to other 
concepts, was also present in Kant’s work. He emphasized that concepts are tools of 
understanding that do not, in and of themselves, claim anything regarding the world of 
experience. This raises, at the same time, the difficulty of the distinction between 
understanding and experience. One of the main questions for Kant was how concepts can 
correspond with experience without deriving from it (see Chapter 2).
2.1.3 The vitality o f  concepts
Canguilhem’s method of divorcing concepts from theories makes it possible for concepts to 
become actors. Whereas theories are necessarily associated with an individual thinker, 
concepts extend beyond the theory as well as the individual. Theories are elaborated around 
concepts and, therefore, appear only ‘after the event’.146 The focus on concepts rather than
543 Deleuze & Guattari (1994), p. 18.
144 Ibid., p. 21.
145 Ibid., p. 19.
146 Lecourt (1975), p. 173.
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theories represents the greatest difference between Canguilhem’s work and Anglo- 
American philosophy of science. As Gutting observes:
[A]s long as concepts are regarded as functions o f theories, their history will be identical with that of
the development o f theoretical formulations. But for Canguilhem concepts are ‘theoretically
polyvalent’; the same concept can function in quite different theoretical contexts. This opens up the
possibility o f histories o f concepts that are distinct from the standard histories that merely trace a
147succession o f theoretical formulations.
Canguilhem’s method has influenced many writers who ‘do not propose, advocate, or 
refute theories of knowledge. They study epistemological concepts as objects that evolve
14ftand mutate. ’ This vitality of concepts - their evolution, mutation, and self-generation - is
expressed in Canguilhem’s idea that concepts are life forms and that the processes of 
knowing and living are intimately linked (see Chapter 5). It represents a challenge to the 
traditional separation between knowledge and life that characterizes Kant’s theory of 
understanding.
Deleuze explored the vitality of concepts further when he referred to the process of 
autopoiesis in relation to the formation of concepts:
But the concept is not given, it is created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself
- it is a self-positing (‘auto-position’). Creation and self-positing mutually imply each other because
what is truly created, from the living being to the work o f art, thereby enjoys a self-positing of itself,
149or an autopoetic (‘autopoietique’) characteristic by which it is recognized.
The idea that concepts are in some sense self-generative implies that they are creative or 
productive, rather than mere instruments or fabrications of knowledge. Deleuze observes 
that the formation of concepts does not cease after their initial emergence but that such 
formation is a continuing process: ‘although concepts are dated, signed, and baptized, they 
have their own way of not dying while remaining subject to constraints of renewal, 
replacement, and mutation.’150 This statement echoes Canguilhem’s view that a concept 
never remains the same in different times and contexts, even though the problem it 
envelops may persist throughout time. It is always a particular situation or question that 
gives rise to a concept and that this concept, in turn, formulates. This is why a concept is 
always normative; there is no such thing as an ‘innocent’ or neutral concept.151
147 Gutting (2005c), p. 8.
148 Hacking (2002), p. 9.
149 Deleuze & Guattari (1994), p. 11 ; Deleuze & Guattari (1991), p. 16.
150 Ibid., p. 8.
151 Duroux (1993), p. 49, observing that what he learned from Canguilhem was the ‘ non-innocence des 
concepts'.
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2.1.4 Concepts as problems
Canguilhem’s tracing of concepts is often described as one of the defining characteristics of 
his work. However, this work should not be read as a mere history of ideas that describes 
concepts and their formulations over time. I argue that Canguilhem uses concepts, the tools 
of modem rationality,152 in order to question this rationality. The concepts to be discussed 
perform two main functions in order to perform this task. First, they envelop problems - 
and second - they diversify, rather than unify, the values and intuitions that they integrate.
Canguilhem does not focus much on the pragmatic character of a concept ‘as a process to 
economize thought’.153 Rather, it is the inherently problematic nature of a concept that 
makes a concept productive. In other words, Canguilhem uses concepts because they 
‘preserve a problem’,154 not because they exclusively make knowledge possible - as Kant 
proposed. As Heidegger observes:
[B]y the retrieval o f a basic problem, we understand the opening-up o f its original, long-concealed 
possibilities, through the working-out o f which it is transformed. In this way it first comes to be 
preserved in its capacity as a problem. To preserve a problem, however, means to free and keep 
watch over those inner forces which make it possible ... as a problem.155
This does not mean that a problem is preserved in a concept and, therefore, remains 
identical through time. Concepts change according to how a problem is transformed and 
reformulated over time. Lecourt observes that Canguilhem not only focuses on the 
preservation of problems but also on the ‘conditions of appearance of concepts, i.e., 
ultimately on the conditions which make problems formulatable.’156 This means that when 
Canguilhem ‘traces’ a particular concept, he does not explore how something is known 
through that concept. Rather, he investigates what that concept envelops or integrates 
within itself; a diversity of problems, values, and intuitions.
152 Canguilhem (2002), p. 344: Canguilhem argues that Kant regards the concept primarily as a necessity o f 
reason.
153 Ibid.
154 Canguilhem (1978), p. xxv: Canguilhem notes in the Foreword to the 1966 edition that he sought to 
‘preserve a problem, which I consider fundamental, in the same state o f freshness as its everchanging factual 
data’. He believes that the role o f philosophy is to investigate such problems, ibid., p. 8: ‘we are yielding to a 
demand o f philosophical thought to reopen rather than close problems. L6on Brunschvicg said o f philosophy 
that it is the science o f solved problems. We are making this simple and profound definition our own; See 
also, ibid., p. 36: ‘the problem itself persists at the heart o f  the solution presumably given to it’.
155 Heidegger (1997), p. 143.
156 Lecourt (1975), p. 173.
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Canguilhem’s focus on concepts is inspired by Bachelard who observes that ‘it is at the
1 ^ 7level of each concept that the precise tasks of the philosophy of the sciences are posed’. 
Since Bachelard focuses on physics, chemistry, and mathematics, the question arises 
whether a focus on concepts is equally productive in the life sciences which seem much 
less ‘rational’. Canguilhem, however, believes that concepts are especially suitable for 
inquiry into the life sciences because the process of living and the formation of concepts are 
somewhat alike. Both processes involve a continuous confrontation of problems158 and are 
creative or productive.159 The character of living processes themselves renders much 
inquiry by ‘theory’ useless.
2,1,5 Concepts as *unification o f a manifold9
Canguilhem adopts a particular style of writing for his discussion of concepts. He uses 
common sense terms, but subsequently changes the relation between them. This ‘reversion’ 
is not a rhetorical trick.160 Rather, it is a way to challenge and reorder the usually accepted 
relation between terms, thereby transforming the understanding of a concept. These shifts 
can be difficult to detect in Canguilhem’s essays and therefore often go unnoticed.161
Something similar is at issue in Canguilhem’s apparently innocent recovery, but implicit 
reconstitution of meaning, of Kant’s original idea of the concept. Kant regarded a concept 
as a ‘unification of a manifold’.162 He suggested that concepts can ‘solve’ the problem that 
the diversity of the empirical world represents for knowledge or understanding. Concepts
gather empirical diversity within themselves and it is this unification that makes
»
understanding possible. Canguilhem focuses on the ‘flipside’ of this idea by regarding a 
concept not as a solution to a problem of understanding, but as itself enveloping a manifold 
of problems. Since a concept - according to Kant - represents a unification of a manifold, 
this means that it necessarily contains diversity within itself. As Canguilhem observed:
157 Ibid., p. 73.
158 Osbome (2003), p. 10: Canguilhem does not focus like Bergson on the ‘problem-solution composite’ but 
rather on the ‘open-ended provocation of the problematic; to scupper solutions in the name o f the re- 
evaluation o f values’.
159 Ibid., p. 7: Bergson observed: ‘stating the problem is not simply uncovering, it is inventing’.
160 Piquemal (1985), p. 81: the ‘inversion’ o f terms ‘concentrates’ the result o f a philosophical analysis.
161 Ibid.: Perhaps this is because Canguilhem never introduces new terms but only uses current vocabulary. 
Hacking (1998), performs a dissection o f one of Canguilhem’s most notable inversion o f terms (Canguilhem
(1993), pp. 129-164, '‘Machine et organisme’).
162 Heidegger (1997), p. 37; Zumbach (1984), p. 37 citing Kant: ‘Just as the understanding unifies the 
manifold in the object by means o f concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means o f ideas.’
36
[I]n other words, concepts are the synthetic and qualitative residues o f a recently embarked upon 
dissection o f experience: they do not have explanatory significance per se because they maintain 
diversity instead o f eliminating i t ... one understands that the ingenious effort o f the scholastics to 
attribute a theoretical virtue to them remains in vain.’163
What was initially presented as a solution by Kant has now been identified as a problem by 
Canguilhem. However, for the latter the realization that a concept preserves a problem or 
envelops a diversity of values is not problematic; quite the reverse, it is precisely what 
makes a concept productive.
Canguilhem also adopts Kant’s idea that a concept represents a ‘point of view’:164
[I]n short, when we begin to dissect the perceptual chaos by searching for the ‘genres’ o f things, we 
are lead - in order to understand things - to multiply not only these genres but the ‘points o f view’ 
from which they appear to us and this is how we constitute concepts. 165
Rather than referring these points of view back to a centre of cognition or understanding, 
such as a subject, Canguilhem emphasizes the necessary multiplicity of these points of 
view in accordance with the diversity of experience.
2.1.6 A manifold o f concepts
Since a concept functions by reference to itself and other concepts, it is never an isolated 
instrument of knowledge. For example, even if the social and life sciences sometimes refer 
to a singular and often undefined concept of ‘life’,166 this concept actually relies on a 
variety of concepts and their interrelation. The concepts to be discussed do not represent 
any particular function of ‘life’, in the way that Aristotle described life through its 
differentiated functions.167 Rather, these concepts - together with a manifold of other 
concepts - can be regarded as forming a patchwork or an ‘intellectual multiplicity’.
163 Canguilhem & Planet (1939), p. 95 (my translation).
164 Canguilhem (2002), p. 343.
165 Canguilhem & Planet (1939), p. 94 (my translation).
166 Agamben (2002), p. 26: it is precisely the indeterminate character o f this concept o f ‘life’ that enables its 
continuous articulation and fragmentation.
167 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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As Canguilhem observes: ‘science and philosophy presuppose the existence of a network or 
configuration of forms through which cultural productions are perceived’.168 Similarly to 
Foucault’s idea of ‘episteme’, such concepts enable us to consider the possibility of a 
particular science at a particular point in time.169 Canguilhem notes that
[T]o work a concept means to vary its applicability and meaning, to generalise it by incorporating its 
exceptions, to export it outside o f its original context, to take it as a model or - conversely - to seek a 
model for it, in short: to progressively attribute through certain transformations the function o f a 
‘forme’ to that concept.
I argue that the concepts to be discussed in the following chapters have come to represent 
‘forms’ through which the life and social sciences rehearse and repeat the particular relation 
between knowledge and living processes that lies at the basis of modem rationality since 
Kant. Whereas Kant described concepts as necessary constraints that enable the 
intelligibility of the processes they refer to, these concepts are discussed - following 
Canguilhem - in order to release (rather than unify) the diversity of problems and values 
that they integrate in their form.
2.1.7 A continuous concept: the ‘vivant’
A concept that is not addressed in a separate chapter, because it traverses Canguilhem’s 
entire work, is the ‘vivant’. The vivant cannot be regarded as a ‘concept among 
concepts’.171 It could perhaps be called ‘life’ if that term was not so laden with its own 
particular history and was not itself associated with the type of rationality that Canguilhem 
seeks to question. The word vivant is a commonly used French word that, at first sight, does 
not attract much attention. However, Canguilhem’s recurrent use of this word makes his 
ideas on the living resonate throughout his writing. Literally, the vivant means that which is 
alive.
168 Canguilhem (1994b), p. 76.
169 Ibid., p. 77: ‘This basis o f a possible science is what Foucault calls an episteme. As such it is no longer the 
primary code o f Western culture, and it is not yet a science like Huygens’s optics nor a philosophy like 
Malebranche’s system. It is what is required for us to even imagine the possibility o f that optics in Huygens’s 
day or that philosophy in Malebranche’s, rather than three-quarters o f a century earlier.’
170 Duroux (1993), p. 50, citing Canguilhem; Macey (1998), p. 172: this citation was used as a motto in every 
issue o f the Cahiers pour I ’analyse published by the ENS’s Cercle d ’epistemologie.
171 Canguilhem (2002), p. 344: ‘The conception o f concepts cannot be a concept among concepts.’ (My 
translation).
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Although the vivant is strictly speaking a noun, it has a different connotation. It is a verb 
turned into a noun which nevertheless continues to operate as a verb within the restrictions 
imposed upon it by language. The vivant cannot be regarded as an organism or as an 
identifiable living form, nor - and much less - as a living being. Rather, it denotes the 
ongoing process of life or living that defies traditional understandings of knowledge.
Canguilhem’s reference to the vivant is also a constant reminder of how he seeks to 
distinguish life from lived experience. He observes: ‘By life (‘v/e’), we can understand 
either the present participle or the past participle of the verb ‘to live’, the vivant or the
1 77‘vecu\ The second is, in my opinion, controlled by the first which is more fundamental.’ 
Canguilhem believed that insufficient philosophical interest had been shown for the vivant.
He notes how, since Descartes, the philosophy of biology became ‘a somewhat suspect
1 7^genre of speculation’. Philosophizing about ‘life’ was not only regarded as a rather 
dubious exercise but, more importantly for philosophers, living was regarded as 
7 ’experience du fa it de vivre\m  The philosophical focus was, therefore, on life as 
existence or lived experience in the sense that existentialists such as Sartre gave to this 
term. For these philosophers, life in the sense of the vivant rather than the vecu was simply 
not an issue. Canguilhem introduced the idea of the vivant in order to remedy this 
oversight.
The introduction of the notion of the vivant can be regarded as a break with the French 
tradition in the life sciences that, as Rabinow observes, ‘has never posited a,zoe it could not 
civilize’.175 The vivant is not a ‘civilized’ notion of life because it does not represent lived 
experience or any other qualified form of life. At the same time, it cannot be regarded as 
the ‘bare life’ that Agamben describes176 because, according to Canguilhem, all living 
processes are normative (see Chapter 6). It could be argued that the vivant is a
1 77transcendental form because of its distinction from experience. However, Canguilhem 
understands it as the practical process or techniques of living rather than as a transcendent 
form o f ‘Life’.
172 Ibid., p. 335 (my translation).
173 Canguilhem (1947), p. 324 (my translation).
174 Ibid.
175 Rabinow (1999), p. 109. V
176 Agamben (1998).
177 Cf. Foucault (2006), p. 264.
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2.2 W hat happens when life becomes subject?
2.2.1 The ‘vivant’ as subject
Although Canguilhem’s distinguishes between the vivant and the vecu and proposes a 
philosophy that centres around concepts rather than a subject, it has been suggested that the 
vivant represents a subject. Something like a subject, at least, seems to emerge from 
Canguilhem’s frequent references to notions such as ‘value’ (‘valeur’), ‘need’ (‘besoin’), 
and ‘meaning’ (‘sens’) and from his suggestion that a living process represents a centre of 
reference that is absolute.178 However, I argue that the traditional idea of the subject as it 
emerges - for example - from Kant’s philosophy cannot be compared to Canguilhem’s idea 
of the vivant. The vivant represents the process of living and is not used as the point of 
departure of a normative or epistemological theory (see Chapter 4).
Even if life cannot be identified with a subject in Canguilhem’s work, it can safely be said 
that it forms the subject matter of his work. However, the life sciences do not merely 
represent a field of inquiry. I argue that they provide the necessary environment in which 
Canguilhem’s arguments can unfold. In fact, his ideas could not be elaborated with 
reference to anything other than the life sciences because their particular subject matter 
seems uniquely capable of challenging reason. As Canguilhem observes: reason is ‘put to 
shame’ by life.179 Whereas reason calculates, adds, and subtracts, ‘life means production or, 
as has also been said, emergence’.180 Canguilhem’s work, I argue, is particularly effective 
in engaging with Kantian rationality because Kant and Canguilhem share a common 
interest: the life sciences. Kant elaborated his system of reason by reference to living 
processes (see Chapter 2). The life sciences should, therefore, be able to provide a means - 
perhaps the only means - of questioning Kant’s system.
178 Lecourt (1998); Badiou (1998) refers to the idea that a ‘virtuality o f the subject’ can be found in the 
‘knot o f centre, norm and meaning’.
179 Canguilhem (1947), p. 326 (my translation); Canguilhem refers to ‘La gene de la raison devant I’objet 
vie'.
180 Ibid., p. 327 (my translation).
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2.2,2 The significance o f the *reflex’
What are the consequences of choosing the life sciences as the environment for arguments 
to unfold? The life sciences are productive and, at the same time, challenging because their
101
subject matter continuously ‘questions its own propositions’. When the vivant is taken as 
subject matter, a continuous questioning or evaluation of assumptions is the necessary 
result. The most obvious reason for this is that living processes evolve, adapt, and 
transform continuously. As Dagognet observes, it is partly the focus on this particular field 
of inquiry that gives rise to one of the particularities of Canguilhem’s thought: the way in
1 09
which it constantly seems to question itself. Every theory raises its own obstacles, 
however, Canguilhem’s thought reflects on its own assumptions in a very particular way.
For example, as Dagognet points out, one of the main questions that concerns Canguilhem 
is whether ‘knowledge of life’ is possible. If the answer to this question is affirmative then 
it defeats his own argument that living processes defy modem theories of understanding. If 
the answer is negative then it puts his own work in danger of irrelevance.183 Another 
example of such a self-imposed challenge is Canguilhem’s elaboration of the concept of 
‘reflex’ in his thesis in philosophy.184 The concept of the reflex does not only represent the 
subject matter of his thesis but, at the same time, puts his thesis into question. As Dagognet 
observed: ‘In fact, even if he doesn’t address it explicitly, it is certain that his inquiry into 
the concept o f ‘reflex’ impacts on his philosophy. It becomes his Achilles heel because the 
concept of ‘reflex’ necessarily puts everything in question.’ In other words, while he 
addresses the phenomena of the reflex in living processes, Canguilhem introduces 
reflexivity - as epistemic idea - into his work.186 This implies a continuous change of 
perspective that necessarily gives rise to a reassessment of his own assumptions.
181 Dagognet (1997), p. 125 (my translation).
182 Ibid., p. 115: ‘In this way, the thought o f Georges Canguilhem does not cease to battle itself: it is in 
perpetual tension and reflection.’ (My translation).
183 Ibid., p. 119.
184 Canguilhem (1977).
185 Dagognet (1997), p. 91 (my translation).
186 See Hayles (1999), pp. 8-9 on reflexivity.
41
PART III
3.1 The negotiation of life in social science
3.1.1 Biocapital andfacts o f life that travel
Writings in the social sciences that focus on the life sciences take many different forms. 
The intention is not to provide an overview of all the work that is in some way or other 
related to this particular field of inquiry. Rather, the intention is to briefly represent some of 
the writing in the social sciences that engages either with Canguilhem’s work or with the 
concepts that structure his thought. More specific reference to such writings will be made, 
where necessary, in each of the chapters. A common characteristic of many writings is that 
they are framed in terms of technological change.187
The focus of inquiry is on the impact of technology on living processes; more specifically 
on how such processes behave, are represented, and are understood. Another, but related, 
focus of inquiry is how technological developments render living processes more 
susceptible - or susceptible in different ways - to human manipulation and intervention. 
Technology is, in this regard, usually represented as impacting upon living processes and - 
at the same time - as being implicated in such processes. The functioning of organisms 
themselves is often regarded as the primary form in which technology manifests itself.
One strand of writing focuses on the ways in which biological processes and entities have 
come to be defined and produced through the ways in which they travel. Such ‘travelling’ 
is regarded either as geographical displacement or represents the mediation of living 
processes through information technology. The unified notion of ‘life’ that some writing 
refers to is replaced by multiple diffracted objects and processes and their technological 
environments. An important focus of this type of writing is the distinction between 
information and matter; the traveling of living entities is thought to become possible only 
once such entities have shed their material form. These writings are particularly influenced 
by the information metaphor that dominated the life sciences at the end of the twentieth 
century (see Chapter 5).
187 See, for example, Parry (2004); Helmreich (1998); Thacker (2005).
188 Parry (2004a); Thacker (2004).
42
Another strand of writing focuses on the way in which modem technology facilitates the 
capitalization of living processes and how such processes come to be regarded as 
products.189 It also addresses the replacement of traditional notions of production in relation 
to living processes with the reproduction that such processes themselves represent.190 It is 
often argued that the possibility of control and manipulation of reproductive processes in 
the contemporary life sciences gives rise to the greater potential for capitalization of living 
entities.
This type of writing also focuses on the mutual information and transformation of forms of 
capitalism and the contemporary life sciences. This process of mutual informing has been 
called ‘biocapital’191 and is differentiated from other - seemingly similar - notions such as 
‘biovalue’.192 The latter is used to designate a kind of ‘added’ or surplus value that living 
processes are thought to represent. Biocapital, on the other hand, is used to address how 
terms traditionally associated with capitalism such as value, production, and distribution are 
changing partly through developments taking place in the life sciences.
3.1.2 *New epistemologies o f life1 - a change in scale
Other writing in the social sciences that focuses on the contemporary life sciences engages 
more directly with Canguilhem’s thought, albeit through the lens of Foucault. These 
writings refer to so-called ‘new epistemologies of life’ that are said to have emerged in the 
twentieth century.193 These ‘new epistemologies’ are mainly attributed to a change in scale. 
It is the ‘flattening’ of the life sciences - from the depths of the body to the immediately, if 
mediated, visibility of molecules-194 that gives rise to new forms of knowledge regarding 
the living.
This change in scale seemingly opens up the possibility of understanding processes that 
were previously deemed unknowable.195 What is at issue here is not so much whether or
189 Sunder Rajan (2006); Parry & Gere (2006).
190 Franklin & Lock (2003), pp. 8-11.
191 Sunder Rajan (2006); Franklin & Lock (2003), pp. 6-8.
192 Waldby (2002).
193 N. Rose (2007), p. 259.
194 N. Rose (2001), p. 13.
195 N. Rose (2007), p. 4: At the molecular level, ‘it seems, there is nothing mystical or incomprehensible about 
our vitality - anything and everything appears, in principle, to be intelligible, and hence to be open to
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not the functioning of living processes is actually understood. Rather, it concerns the 
opening up of the possibility of knowledge regarding living processes. The ‘appearance’ of 
intelligibility and the change in the possibility of knowledge regarding living processes are 
themes that can be traced back to Kant. The idea of a change in scale that holds out the 
promise of an increased intelligibility of living processes goes hand in hand with an 
increased possibility of intervention in such processes.
This type of writing seeks to move ‘beyond’ traditional epistemology and inquire into new 
ways in which living processes are known.196 However, in order to move beyond it, it is 
necessary to understand the foundations of such epistemology. It is not enough to recognize 
that it is historically and socially situated. I argue that the ‘new epistemologies of life’ are, 
in fact, not that new because they involve a change of scale rather than a change in how the 
relation between knowledge and living processes is envisaged. This type of writing, even if 
it engages most directly with Canguilhem’s work, does not take into account what is 
arguably the most productive part of that work: the way in which it questions modem 
rationality through some of its most basic concepts.
3.2 What to do with heritage?
3.2.1 The consequences o f heritage
Writings in the social sciences that focus on the contemporary life sciences tend to rely in 
one way or other on a traditional notion of ‘life’ as that which makes knowledge possible 
and at the same time eludes it. Although general reference is made to the ‘epistemological 
mutation that occurred in the nineteenth century’ that allegedly gave rise to this notion of
107life, the circumstances of this ‘epistemological mutation’ are rarely addressed. Instead, 
the main focus is on the fragmentation, mobilization, and capitalization of living processes
10Rwhich are themselves often described in terms of their ‘contingency’.
Contingency is usually represented as a particular characteristic of the twentieth and 
twenty-first century. However, Luhmann observes that a preoccupation with - or insistence
calculated interventions in the service o f our desires about the kinds o f people we want ourselves and our 
children to be.’
196 Rabinow (1996), p. 28.
197 N. Rose (2007), p. 42.
198 Parry (2004a); Thacker (2005).
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on - contingency is characteristic of modernity more generally.199 Foucault similarly refers 
to Baudelaire who defined modernity as ‘the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent’.200 In 
fact, Kant used the notion of contingency to distinguish living processes and exclude them 
from his theory of understanding.
Neither the traditional representation of life as that which grounds knowledge and escapes 
it, nor the references to ‘contingency’ can be understood without taking into account the 
intellectual heritage of these ideas. As Canguilhem observes: ‘in a theoretical fabric, certain 
threads can be entirely new, while others are taken from earlier weavings. The Copemican
*yc\ iand Galilean revolutions also involved the preservation of a heritage.’ According to 
Luhmann, the problem is not so much the maintenance of heritage as the ‘constant creation 
of otherness.’202 In other words, although heritage is necessarily preserved and repeated in 
contemporary theorizing, there is a constant necessity to differentiate contemporary ideas 
from such heritage.
I argue that it is necessary to recognize the heritage of particular ideas that inform the 
contemporary life and social sciences. Until this heritage is explored and understood it is, 
for example, impossible to appreciate how the relation between knowledge and life seems 
to be shifting from a unification of diversity to an appreciation of contingency. Whereas 
Kant suggested that it was necessary to unify the diversity or contingency of living 
processes in order to make them intelligible, the contemporary life sciences seem to 
epistemologically embrace contingency and diversity (see Chapter 6, para. 4.1.2).
199 Luhmann (1998), p. 44: ‘the reference to contingency is so instinctive that it is a part o f any search for 
necessity, for validity a priori, for inviolate values.’
200 Foucault (1984), p. 39. Foucault believed that ‘being modem does not lie in recognizing and accepting this 
perpetual movement; on the contrary, it lies in adopting a certain attitude with respect to this movement’.
Gutting (1989) citing Canguilhem, p. 40.
202 Luhmann (1998), p. 3.
203 Rheinberger (1997a), p. 227: ‘If ontical complexity has to be reduced in order to make experimental 
research possible, this very complexity is epistemically retained.’; see also Oyama (2000), p. 116, for the 
difference between ontological contingency (‘causal dependency’) and epistemological contingency 
( ‘unpredictability’).
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PART IV
4.1 An overview of chapters
4.1.1 Life sciences and modem rationality
This chapter addresses the main theme that runs through, and resurfaces in, all of the 
chapters, namely the relation between modem rationality and the life sciences. Each of the 
following chapters then addresses a particular concept that expresses that rationality and 
how Canguilhem explored it. This chapter addresses the way in which the life sciences 
have come to lie at the heart of modem rationality by reference to the work of Kant. He 
formulated the idea that living processes represent at once the condition of possibility and 
the limit of knowledge.
For Kant, it is this particular relation to knowledge that unifies the manifold living 
processes; it is that which they have ‘in common’ and what, from Kant’s explanation 
onwards, defines them as ‘living’. Foucault observes how, at a certain point in time, ‘Life’ 
became a ‘fundamental form of knowledge’.204 This statement could mean that ‘life’ 
becomes the concept around which research is organized and experiments are conducted. 
However, I argue that Foucault refers to the way in which Kant positioned living processes 
at the heart of knowledge and understanding.
I argue that the autonomy of reason that Kant’s system seeks to establish, and that comes to 
define modem rationality, is made possible through a two-pronged approach. It is 
established through a simultaneous reliance on, and exclusion of, living processes from the 
process of knowledge or understanding. The reliance on li ving processes is represented by 
Kant’s well-known epigenesis metaphor in the second edition of his first Critique, while 
the exclusion of living processes from knowledge is elaborated in his third Critique. The 
latter is effected through the regulative principle of purposiveness, also described by Kant 
as the ‘lawfulness of the contingent’.205 I argue that it this two-pronged approach that 
comes to represent the traditional figure of ‘life’, as discussed by philosophers from the 
nineteenth century onwards, as that which makes knowledge possible and at the same time
204 Foucault (2006), p. 275.
205 Ginsborg (1997), p. 339: refers to the different expressions that Kant used to designate this principle.
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escapes it. I argue that Canguilhem’s work can be read as a critical engagement with Kant’s 
particular idea of reason and the separation between knowledge and life on which it relies.
4.1.2 The problem o f Environment'
The idea of the environment and its relation to the individual organism is being rethought in 
the contemporary life sciences. The gene centrism that characterized the latter half of the 
twentieth century has given rise to a renewed focus on environment and development. 
However, the environment has always represented a somewhat problematic concept for 
philosophy and the sciences. I explore Canguilhem’s observation that a biological concept 
of environment does not exist. The original concept of environment is derived from 
physics. However, rather than abandon such a notion of environment in the life sciences - 
as has been suggested - 1 argue that Canguilhem’s work suggests a return to Newton’s 
concept of ‘milieu’ in physics. What can be recovered from that concept is the idea that 
‘milieu’ is inherently ambiguous and represents a medium that facilitates - what Luhmann 
calls - ‘action out of action’.206
Canguilhem begins his inquiry into the notion of ‘milieu’ by suggesting that it has become 
a ‘category of contemporary thought’.207 He asks what role this notion can fulfill within a 
‘philosophy of nature centred on the problem of individuality’. Since the focus in both 
the life and social sciences has traditionally been on the individual, whether in the form of 
the cell or the subject, the environment is not attributed the same significance. It is usually 
represented as a condition of possibility for the emergence of the individual, as resource, or 
as a geographical space. I argue that the concept of environment is much richer than 
traditional inquiries would suggest and explore this, following Canguilhem, through 
Newton’s idea of aether as milieu, the ‘internal milieu’ of Claude Bernard, and the 
associated milieu of von Uexkiill.
I argue that traditional representations of environment obscure the potential of the concept 
that lies in its introduction of a certain measure of contingency that destabilizes traditional 
centres of reference. The potential of environment is explored by reference to Luhmann’s 
use of the notion in his systems theory. To some extent, Luhmann’s ideas were inspired by
206 Luhmann (1996), pp. 110 and 118: this is a ‘“subject free” concept o f action’.
207 Canguilhem (2003), p. 165.
208 Ibid.
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Canguilhem’s discussion of ‘milieu’. I argue that the particular role that Canguilhem and 
Luhmann attribute to the notion of environment signifies a shift in rationality; from a 
Kantian focus on the subject to a focus on relations, forces, and action upon action. In this 
way, the concept of environment challenges the notion of the privileged centre of reference 
that characterizes modem rationality.
4.1.3 The problem o f individuality *
Whereas the environment has been largely neglected as a theoretical notion, the concept of 
the individual represents the traditional object of inquiry of both the life and social 
sciences. However, the individual - whether in the form of the ‘gene’ or the ‘subject’ - has 
come to be regarded as a concept that is too unrefined to address the developments in the 
contemporary life and social sciences. It is questionable whether the relations, networks, 
and pathways that define contemporary biology can still be understood by reference to 
individuality.
Although it has been argued that the introduction of the concept of information into the life 
sciences has fragmented the traditional individual, there seems to be a continuous 
preoccupation with individuality as evidenced through the proliferation of notions such as 
emergence, ontogeny, and autopoiesis. These notions seem to indicate a shift from the 
progressive development or identification of an individual entity to a variety of processes of 
individuation. This raises a number of questions: how has the notion of the individual 
transformed? And: what is the meaning of individuality in the contemporary life and social 
sciences?
These questions are explored through Canguilhem’s inquiry into the ‘problem of 
individuality’ that he discussed by reference to the history of the concept of the cell. I argue 
that the cell, in Canguilhem’s essay, represents at the same time the manifestation of 
biological individuality and the means to question the problem of individuality. 
Canguilhem describes how, even if a particular representation of individuality is contested, 
the problem of individuality itself persists. He explores the particular imagery of the 
individual form and the values and emotions that are associated with it in order to explain 
the recurrence of individuality as a question.
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His discussion is contrasted with the identity, unity, and autonomy that characterize the 
individual in Kant, as well as with the idea o f ‘self-overcoming’ described by Nietzsche. I 
argue that Canguilhem’s discussion of individuality, following Nietzsche, portrays the 
individual as a process, a mechanism, or a series of techniques rather than an actual form or 
identifiable entity. Canguilhem’s discussion resonates in the subsequent ideas about 
individuality of Simondon, who describes the individual as a temporal process; Foucault, 
who describes the ‘rapport a s o f209 as a fundamental historical form; and Luhmann who 
describes the unity of the system as a process of self-description and differentiation. The 
individual emerges as one of the main concepts of modem rationality; as a normative 
concept that expresses a certain ideological commitment.
4.1.4 The problem o f *information *
The notion of information dominated the life sciences during the second half of the 
twentieth century. However, the influence of this notion seems to be waning because its use 
has given rise to some unsatisfactory consequences. For example, the notion of information 
reinforced the distinction between genetic material and environment and its role as a 
metaphor was contested. Most inquiries associate information with control and, because 
information is often equated with a certain interpretation of Aristotelian form, it is regarded 
as enabling control of the very essence of living processes. Although the notion of 
information has been somewhat ‘overtheorized’, I argue that some important aspects have 
largely been left unexplored.
Most notably, the slippage between the ancient idea of form and the modem notion of 
information tends to go unquestioned. I argue that the identification of form and 
information relies on an oversimplified representation of Aristotle’s idea of form. 
Aristotle’s idea of form was not characterized by its distinction from matter. Rather, he 
elaborated the notion precisely to challenge this distinction. I argue that Aristotle’s notion 
of form has many forms but is primarily characterized by its meaning as an active principle 
and a process of actualizing potentiality.
It has been argued that Canguilhem did not explore the concept of information in the life 
sciences in any detail. I argue that his discussion of information is productive because it
209 Foucault (1984b), p. 12.
49
moves away from the debate about form and matter to an inquiry into the significance of 
the notion for the relation between knowledge and life. I argue that Canguilhem believes 
that the notion of information has the potential to transform the relation between knowledge 
and living processes established by Kant. Whereas Kant regarded knowing and living as 
separate processes that are subject to different principles and regimes, the understanding of 
living processes through the concept of information undermines this distinction. The notion 
of information also facilitates Canguilhem’s project of providing a central role to ‘error’ in 
relation to knowledge
4.1.5 The problem o f ‘normativity ’
Canguilhem’s idea o f ‘vital normativity’ is often regarded as obsolete. It has, for example, 
been regarded as describing the organic ontology of living processes and has been 
associated with vitalism - a mode of thought that has become largely irrelevant in the 
contemporary life sciences. Moreover, the distinction between the normal and pathological 
by reference to which Canguilhem elaborated his idea has arguably been complicated by 
notions such as risk, mutation, and enhancement. To the extent that Canguilhem’s peculiar 
notion of normativity retains some significance, this is largely attributed to the inspiration it 
provided for Foucault’s subsequent idea of ‘biopower’.
I argue that the original intention and significance of Canguilhem’s notion of normativity 
have been overshadowed by traditional interpretations of the normative as moral or ethical 
and later associations of the normative with normalization and control. I argue that his idea 
is significant for the social sciences because, although he discussed ‘vital normativity’ with 
regard to living processes, Canguilhem in fact devises a new theoretical instrument. His 
idea of normativity provides an alternative to traditional connotations of the normative with 
the norm/fact distinction and makes an appreciation of contingency possible.
I argue that Canguilhem elaborated his notion of normativity in response to Goldstein’s call 
for a biological concept of the norm. The latter believed that traditional interpretations of 
the normative could not accommodate living processes. There was no idea of normativity 
available in the life sciences other than the understanding of the norm as ideal or average. 
According to Goldstein, what was required was a concept of the norm that was generally 
valid, could - nevertheless - account for the individual, but was not subjective. Canguilhem
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elaborated his idea of normativity with reference to the distinction between the normal and 
pathological in medicine and by making use of the inherent ambiguity of the norm.
This chapter describes the genealogy of Canguilhem’s idea through Kant’s and Nietzsche’s 
respective ideas of the normative in relation to living processes. I argue that two types of 
normativity can be distinguished in Kant’s work. First, the norm as principle of 
understanding or rule of judgment employed by a subject. Second, a normativity at the 
level of the living process. However, Kant probably did not wish to recognize this second 
type of normativity because it would result in the impossibility of unifying the diverse. 
Subsequently, I explore Nietzsche’s idea of life as a manifestation o f‘will to power’ and its 
influence on Canguilhem’s notion of vital normativity.
I argue that Canguilhem’s normativity is not a concept like other concepts. Rather, it 
envelops and expresses his critique of Critique and the project of ‘rationalization’ that it 
gives rise to. His notion of normativity is not moral or ethical. Rather, it signifies the 
diverse techniques of living; the processes of confronting the predicaments of life. I explore 
how this notion of normativity influenced Foucault’s ideas of ‘biopower’ and 
‘normalization’ and how it corresponds with other theories, such as that of Luhmann, that 
rely on a certain measure of contingency. I argue that Canguilhem’s normativity represents 
an alternative to the traditional understanding of the normative that informs modem 
rationality.
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2. L ife  S c ien c es  a n d  M o d e r n  R a t io n a l it y
p a r t i
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 The ‘threshold o f modernity *
Much recent engagement of the social sciences with the life sciences has been 
motivated by Foucault’s observation that
[F]or millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional 
capacity for a political existence; modem man is an animal whose politics places his existence as 
a living being in question.1
Foucault attributes a central role to ‘life’, irrespective of the many ways in which that 
notion may be defined. What is in question is Foucault’s notion o f ‘biopower’, the question 
of how modernity can be defined by the way in which life occupies the heart of regimes of 
knowledge and power. We will inquire in Chapter 6 into Canguilhem’s notion of ‘vital 
normativity’ and how it influenced Foucault’s notion o f ‘biopower’. For now, however, it 
suffices to say that Foucault was concerned to identify a turn or a transition to a different
kind of knowledge and power that emerged at a particular moment in time, when ‘life and
0 *1 its mechanisms’ entered into the realm of knowledge and politics. For Foucault, this event
marks the ‘threshold of modernity’.4
The statement and its suggestion that the transition which is identified represents the 
‘foundational event’5 of modernity have been echoed by many writers.6 In a sense this is 
surprising because the meaning of the statement is not entirely clear. In particular, it does
1 Foucault (1998), p. 143.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., pp. 141-142: ‘the entry o f life into history, that is, the entry o f phenomena peculiar to the life o f  
the human species into the order o f knowledge and power, into the sphere o f political techniques’.
4 Ibid., p. 143.
5 Agamben (1998), p. 4.
6 Rose (2001), p. 1; Rabinow (1998), p. 194. Agamben (1998), pp. 8-9: Agamben, however, believes that 
this ‘Foucauldian thesis will then have to be corrected or, at least, completed’, because the 
‘“politicization” o f bare life’ has always defined (sovereign) power.
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not clarify how living processes - which were apparently initially regarded as just that - 
came to be associated with politics or knowledge. How exactly did this transition come 
about and why did it come about at this particular moment in time? Foucault does not 
answer these questions when introducing his idea of ‘biopower’. He refers only briefly to a 
shift in regimes of knowledge, which he described in his earlier work, from what he called
n
the classical episteme of representation to modem rationality. However, in that earlier 
work the shift from one episteme to another was described rather imprecisely;8 Foucault 
only loosely refers to the Kantian Critique as the basis of modem rationality.9
In a different essay, Foucault observes with regard to Kant’s essay on the meaning of the 
Enlightenment:
[I]t seems to me that it marks the discreet entrance into the history o f thought o f a question that 
modem philosophy has not been capable o f answering, but that it has never managed to get rid of, 
either. And one that has been repeated in various forms for two centuries now.10
I argue that in order to understand what motivates Canguilhem’s work, and what brings 
about the transformation or transition Foucault is referring to, it is necessary to go back to 
this defining moment in the eighteenth century: Kant’s elaboration of his theory of 
understanding. Foucault argued that the transformation of the role of life should be sought 
in
the new mode o f relation between history and life: in this dual position o f life that placed it at the 
same time outside history, in its biological environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by 
the latter’s techniques o f knowledge and power.11
I argue that the ‘dual position of life’ that Foucault describes can be traced back to the 
particular way in which Kant formulated the relation between life and knowledge in his 
first and third Critique.
Foucault believed that the significance of Canguilhem’s work extended beyond its strictly 
delineated field of inquiry because of the way in which it engaged with modem
7 Foucault (1998), p. 143.
8 Foucault (2004), Chapter 7. See for criticism on Foucault’s grasp o f history: Flynn (1994), p. 44;
Gutting (1994), pp. 48-49 and 65; Megill (1987), pp. 128-129.
9 Foucault (2004), pp. 155. See ibid, pp. 154-156, for references to the role o f the Kantian Critique; Norris
(1994), p. 184, argues that Foucault treats Kant’s project as ‘just another episode in the history o f bygone 
discursive formations’.
10 Foucault (1984), p. 32.
11 Foucault (1998), p. 143.
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rationality.12 He hints at the idea that Canguilhem’s work proposes a transformation of 
knowledge because it focuses on the relation between knowledge and life rather than on the 
traditional triangle of knowledge, truth, and subject - a transformation that Kant himself, 
perhaps inadvertently, suggested.13 However, Foucault did not elaborate on his ideas. In 
what follows, I explore Foucault’s suggestions.
I argue that Kant established the relation between knowledge and life through a two­
pronged approach. On the one hand, he establishes his idea of pure reason by reference to 
living processes. More specifically, through an analogy between the process of 
understanding and the biological process of epigenesis. On the other hand, Kant excludes 
living processes from his theory of understanding through the idea of a ‘lawlikeness of the 
contingent’.14 I go on to identify what Kant was getting at through this particular
description of the relation between life and knowledge. I also address briefly why this
relation, which was established by Kant more than two centuries ago, still seems to be 
negotiated in the contemporary life and social sciences. Finally, I argue that while Foucault 
elaborates his work against this background it was not Foucault who engaged with the 
Kantian Critique. Rather, it was Canguilhem who explored the particular rationality that 
Kant’s system gave rise to through the concepts that he addressed. I argue that, even if 
Canguilhem does not often challenge Kant explicitly,15 he reveals the problematic nature of 
the rationality that Kant proposes and of the ‘dual position’ that characterizes living 
processes in Kant’s work.
1.2 A curious analogy
1.2.1 The origin and the analogy
The origin of modem rationality is undoubtedly impossible to establish. Not only is it 
debatable what modem rationality exactly consists of - as has been said: ‘Modernity itself
12 Foucault (1978), p. xii: ‘Works such as those o f Koyr6, Bachelard, or Canguilhem could indeed have had as 
their centers o f  reference precise, ‘regional’, chronologically well-defined domains in the history o f science 
but they have functioned as important centers o f philosophical elaboration to the extent that, under different 
facets, they set into play this question o f the Enlightenment which is essential to contemporary philosophy.’
13 Ibid., p. xx: Foucault refers to Kant’s Critique o f  Judgment and to Hegel’s The Phenomenology o f  
Spirit.
See, e.g.,Kant (1987), p. 405, section VI, para. 217’: ‘purposiveness is a lawfulness that [something] 
contingent [may] have [insofar] as [it] is contingent’.
15 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 351-352: the most explicitly formulated criticism o f  Kant’s Critique.
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... cannot be taken as a blanket state of affairs, a social a priori that is not itself embedded 
in the shifting sands of history’16 - but it would be difficult to reduce all the various aspects 
associated with it to one particular cause or origin.17 The ‘origin’ is a contested notion in 
itself because it, perhaps paradoxically, seems to lack a beginning. An origin always ‘refers
1 ftback’ without giving rise to an origin in retrospect. Moreover, searching for an origin at a 
particular point in time leads to the disregard of various historical particularities and 
eventualities.19 Although the circularity or paradox of the origin is unavoidable, it 
nevertheless invites an effort to somehow ‘break into’ this circularity in order to inquire 
into the beginnings of modem thought.
At one particular beginning of Western rationality, then, lies not a definition - not even a 
category or a concept - as one would perhaps expect. Rather, what lies there is a curious, 
and some would even say dubious, analogy. Although it is impossible and perhaps 
undesirable to anchor the emergence of modem rationality in one particular time or place, 
few would dispute that it was elaborated in its most programmatic form by Immanuel Kant 
in his Critique o f  Pure Reason (Kritik der Reinen Vernunff) in 1781.21 The analogy that lies 
at the core of this work, i.e., there where the most important part of his theory is elaborated, 
compares - simply put - the emergence of reason with a biological process. Kant, who is 
known more as a moral philosopher than as a philosopher of science, compares the 
emergence of the categories of understanding to the biological process of epigenesis.
The text of this analogy reads as follows:
Now there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony o f experience with the conceptions o f  
its objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or the conceptions 
make experience possible. The former o f these statements will not hold good with respect to the 
categories (nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are a priori conceptions, and therefore 
independent o f experience. The assertion o f an empirical origin would attribute to them a sort of 
generatio aequivoca. Consequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second alternative (which
16 Jasanoff (2004), p. 28.
17 Cf. Agamben (2008), p. 35.
18 Casey (1984), p. 601: Jacques Derrida said, with reference to the origin o f Western thought: ‘everything 
begins by referring back, that is to say, does not begin’. See Winthrop-Young (2003), p. 312 on Luhmann’s 
rejection o f the origin.
19 Agamben (2008), pp. 95-96: Foucault elaborates his ‘geneology’ on the basis o f Nietzsche’s dismissal o f  
‘ Ur sprung
20 Ibid., p. 30: As Heidegger says, ‘the important thing is not to break the circle, but to access it in the 
right way’ (my translation).
21 Kant (2003).
22 This distinction is only a recent one and is more prevalent in Anglo-American philosophy than in 
‘continental’ philosophy. Many philosophers, from Aristotle to Kant and Hegel, wrote about morality as well 
as the sciences.
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presents us with a system, as it were, o f the Epigenesis o f  pure reason), namely, that on the part o f  
the understanding the categories do contain the grounds o f the possibility o f all experience ...
It is quite possible that someone may propose a species o f praeformation-system  o f pure reason - a
middle way between the two - to-wit, that the categories are neither innate and first a priori
principles o f cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought
implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our
Creator, that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws o f nature which regulate experience.
Now, not to mention that with such an hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop
in the employment o f predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this case entirely
lose that character o f necessity which is essentially involved in the very conception o f them, is a 
23conclusive objection to it.
This analogy has generally been overlooked by commentators on Kant’s work. Recently, 
however, interest in the analogy has increased.24 This change can perhaps be explained by 
the recent expansion of interest in Kant’s writings on the life sciences in general.25 The 
different scenarios for the emergence of pure reason that Kant discusses in his first 
Critique, each of which he compares with a biological process, raises many questions: what 
does this analogy mean? Why does Kant resort to epigenesis? What effect does the use of 
this analogy have? Before we address these questions, some further background is required 
concerning the project that Kant elaborates in the Critique o f  Pure Reason.
1,2,2 The justifications for critique
The project that Kant elaborates in the Critique o f  Pure Reason was strongly influenced by 
the political situation and the intellectual climate of the time. For purposes of clarity, Kant 
promoted the relevance and urgency of his project by situating it - and providing 
justification for it - at three different levels: the political, the philosophical, and the 
scientific. Each of these levels neatly intertwine to provide his philosophy with its critical 
edge. The meaning o f ‘critical’ is explained by Kant when he says ‘I do not mean by this a 
criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason’. Such a 
‘critical inquiry’ means an inquiry into the faculty of reason ‘with reference to the
23 Kant (2003), pp. 95-96, ‘Of the Deduction o f the Pure Conceptions o f the Understanding’, Section II.
24 Wiibnig (1969); Genova (1974); Ztiller (1988); Ingensiep (1994); Mtiller-Sievers (1997), p. 3; Sloan 
(2002); Zammito (2003).
25 Most recent publications focus on Kant’s Critique o f  Judgment: Lenoir (1980); Zumbach (1984); Ginsborg 
(1997) and (2001); Richards (2000); Sloan (2006); Zuckert (2007); McLaughlin (2007); Huneman (2007b); 
Zammito (1992), (2003), and (2007). None o f these recent publications explore the relation between modem 
rationality and the life sciences as such.
26 Kant (2003), p. ix, Preface to the first edition.
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cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid o f  experience\27 This statement is 
explained below, when we discuss the text of the analogy.
The political relevance of, and motivation for, his work is addressed in his essay entitled 
‘What is Enlightenment?’.28 In this essay, he describes the Enlightenment as the release of 
man from his ‘self-incurred tutelage’. This tutelage is ‘self-incurred’, according to him, 
because man does not lack reason, but merely lacks ‘resolution and courage to use it 
without direction from another’ ,29 He rebels, therefore, against the predominant situation of 
his time where man subjected himself to the instructions and opinions of various 
professionals - ‘experts’ as they could be called today - such as doctors, teachers, and 
members of the clergy. The desirable situation envisaged by Kant can only be realized if a 
thorough explanation is offered of how reason functions; what its potential is and what its 
limits are.
Kant addresses the philosophical relevance of his work in the introduction to the Critique o f 
Pure Reason, where he describes the troubled history of scholarship on metaphysics. He 
sets himself the task of rescuing metaphysics, which he calls the ‘queen of all the 
sciences’,30 from an unfortunate move from dogmatism, to anarchy, to an almost studied - 
but ultimately implausible - ‘indifference’.31 His work is meant, in his own words, to 
provide once and for all ‘the solution of the question regarding the possibility or 
impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent 
and limits of this science.’32
The scientific justification for his work lay in the ambition to address metaphysics with the 
kind of scientific rigour displayed by the physical laws that Copernicus and Newton had 
proposed, without at the same time committing the errors that they had committed.33 This 
ambition was most famously formulated in Kant’s representation of his work on pure 
reason as a ‘Copemican revolution’ in metaphysics:
We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines o f Copernicus’ primary hypothesis. Failing of 
satisfactory progress in explaining the movements o f the heavenly bodies on the supposition that 
they all revolve around the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if  he made
27 Ibid.
28 Kant (1963).
29 Ibid., p. 3.
30 Kant (2003), p. vii.
31 Ibid., p. viii.
32 Ibid., p. ix.
33 MUller-Sievers (1997), p. 2.
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the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in 
metaphysics, as regards the intuition o f objects. If intuition must conform to the constitution o f the 
objects, I do not see how we could know anything o f the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of  
the sense) must conform to the constitution o f our faculty o f intuition, I have no difficulty in 
conceiving such a possibility.34
With this brief background of the motivations that lie behind the Critique o f Pure Reason, 
we now turn to the substance of his ideas before addressing the text of the analogy itself.
1.2.3 The first Critique
In the Critique o f  Pure Reason Kant was concerned to inquire into the possibility of 
understanding without recourse to our experience of the world. Kant was not an empiricist: 
he did not believe that reason or understanding could be deduced from experience. As Kant 
says: ‘though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all
*5 c
arises out of experience.’ Kant proposes that we, as humans, know the world - or rather 
that we ‘cognize’ it, which does not mean that we actually know it - through principles of 
understanding that are prior to experience. This reason is described by Kant as ‘pure 
reason’. He says: ‘Our ability to cognize from a priori principles may be called pure 
reason, and the general inquiry into the possibility and bounds of such cognition may be 
called critique of pure reason.’36 According to Kant, it is therefore not experience that 
makes reason possible, but the other way around. It is reason that makes our experience of 
objects in the world possible.
In order to establish his idea of pure reason, Kant seeks to provide an answer to the 
question ‘whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even 
of all sensuous impressions?’37 He calls this kind of knowledge ‘a priori, in 
contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in 
experience’.38 The question that guides him in his inquiry is therefore not ‘how is the 
faculty o f  thought itself possible’.39 Rather, the question is how can a reason exist that is 
prior to experience and that nevertheless corresponds to it? This idea of correspondence can 
be regarded as a ‘thin’ one, since Kant believes that our concepts do not actually determine
34 Ibid., p. 1, citing Kant.
35 Kant (2003), p. 1.
36 Kant (1987), p. 3.
37 Kant (2003), p. 1.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. xi.
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objects in the world. Although we need concepts in order to ‘cognize’ objects in the world, 
we cannot actually know these objects through them. As Kant sees it, there are two possible 
explanations for the existence of this correspondence:
[T]here are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation and its objects can coincide 
with and relate necessarily to each other, and, as it were, meet together. Either the object alone 
makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible. In the 
former case, the relation between them is only empirical, and an a priori representation is impossible 
... In the latter case - although representation alone ... does not produce the object as to its 
existence, it must nevertheless be a priori determinative in regard to the object, if  it is only by means 
o f the representation that we can cognize anything as an object.40
This idea of the existence of correspondence between thought and objects in the world 
would be challenged in the twentieth century. As Heidegger pointed out, it was Kant who 
first gave this idea its philosophical grounding.41 Although Kant represents the work he 
elaborates in the three Critiques as concerning the ‘cognitive powers’,42 i.e. understanding 
(addressed in the Critique o f  Pure Reason), reason (addressed in the Critique o f  Practical 
Reason), and judgment (addressed in the Critique o f Judgment), it would be a mistake - 
according to Heidegger - to represent his work as a ‘theory of knowledge’.43 Heidegger 
points out that Kant’s theory necessarily implies the question of the possibility of ontology 
and the question of anthropology, even if Kant does not elaborate much on either.44
1.2.4 The appearance o f the analogy
The analogy in question appears in the chapter of the Critique o f Pure Reason entitled ‘Of 
the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding’.45 This is the most important 
part of the Critique because it is here that Kant explains the foundations of his philosophy 
of understanding. Kant proposes the idea of the ‘categories’ as a priori principles of 
understanding. The categories are, simply put, the intellectual tools which exclusively make 
the world intelligible to us. This does not mean that they make the world knowable for us. 
Rather, it means that any experience and thought that we have of or about the world is
40 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
41 Heidegger (1997), p. 8.
42 Kant (1987), p. 4.
43 Heidegger (1997), p. 11.
44 Ibid., pp. 8-11 and 144.
45 Kant (2003), pp. 68-96.
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necessarily made possible by, and mediated through, these categories. Kant took the idea of 
the categories from Aristotle but revised them to suit his own purposes.46
How do we have access to these categories; where do they come from? Kant said that his 
own mind provided him with his research object:
[I] confine myself to the examination o f reason alone and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek
far for the sum-total o f its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind. Besides, common logic47presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue o f all the simple operations o f reason.
Although Kant’s own mind represents the ‘raw material’ for his study of reason, this does 
not mean that the categories should be regarded as subjective or specific to one’s own 
cognition. Kant sought to offer an absolute and universal description of the functioning of 
reason; his categories are both a priori and necessary. Therefore, although reason is present 
in each human being, and defines human beings as such, it is not particular to each 
individual with regard to its functioning.
Kant must establish the categories, or conceptions of understanding, as existing prior to 
experience and independently of it precisely because they make experience possible: ‘The 
whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a priori conceptions is to show that these 
conceptions are a priori conditions of possibility of all experience.’48 His effort to 
somehow ‘deduce’ the categories, but not from experience, can be regarded as an effort to 
give his theory scientific credibility.49 It is at this point, the point where he must explain the 
appearance or deduction of the categories, that the analogy appears.
1.3 Different scenarios
1,3,1 Three biological processes
Kant proposes three different scenarios for the emergence of the categories as a priori 
principles that can, nevertheless, make the world intelligible to us. First, the categories 
originate from experience. Second, the categories did not originate from experience but
46 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
47 Ibid., p. x.
48 Ibid., p. 73.
49 Muller-Sievers (1997), p. 2.
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make experience possible. Third, there is a natural harmony or correspondence between the 
world and the categories. Kant explains these three scenarios with reference to three 
different biological processes.50
The first is generatio aequivoca; a theory that proposes that life emerges spontaneously 
from inert matter. Kant compares this to the emergence of the categories from experience. 
Such an emergence would explain the correspondence between the categories and 
experience. However, it necessarily follows that the categories would not be a priori. Kant 
believes that experience is made possible by understanding. This means that understanding 
cannot possibly emerge from experience because it exists prior to - and separate from - it. 
Since generatio aequivoca was already regarded as an antiquated theory at the time of 
Kant’s writing he probably used this analogy to represent the ideas of empiricists as 
obsolete.51
The third scenario is preformation. Kant describes this as the ‘middle way’ between 
epigenesis (discussed below) and generatio equivoca. The correspondence between the 
categories and the world is explained through the idea of a natural harmony between 
understanding and experience. Such pre-existing harmony can only be explained by 
reference to a Creator. However, this scenario cannot account for the necessary and a priori 
character of the categories. More importantly, Kant seeks to avoid references to the 
‘supernatural’52 because they negate the necessity and possibility of his own project: the 
inquiry into reason by reason. This explanation of the emergence of the categories would 
undermine Kant’s idea of reason as autonomous.
The difficulties of both the first (generatio aequivoca) and third (preformation) scenarios 
lead Kant to choose the second scenario. Kant compares the emergence of pure reason with 
‘as it were, ... the Epigenesis of pure reason’.53 In order to understand this seemingly 
curious analogy, it is necessary to notice what Kant understands by epigenesis. This 
biological theory was very much in development at the time of Kant’s writing. Although its 
precise meaning remains unclear, both in Kant’s work and in the life sciences,54 it seems 
that epigenesis was generally regarded as a process of self-generation and gradual 
development. One strand of thought, represented by the earlier works of the German
50 See para. 1.2.1 above for the text o f the analogy.
51 Mttller-Sievers (1993), p. 50, n. 77.
52 Kant (1987), p. 311, section 81, para. 424.
53 Kant (2003), p. 95.
54 Zammito (2007), p. 52.
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scientist Blumenbach, regarded epigenesis as a process developing out of ‘germs’ or 
‘predispositions’ (see para. 1.3.6. below). Another, represented by the later works of 
Blumenbach, described epigenesis as a rather unbridled self-generative force.55
1.3,2 Between clarification and distraction
The use of models and metaphors in - and from - the life sciences is well known. However, 
the significance attributed to such metaphors or models differs according to how metaphors 
in general are regarded. Roughly, some believe that metaphors are a means to describe 
certain phenomena in a way that makes these phenomena more understandable without 
having any effect on the phenomena described. Others believe that metaphors are more 
significant, since they not only translate certain beliefs of a particular period in time but 
also give further content to the phenomena of which they merely seem to provide a 
description.
There are numerous examples of research that propose the latter and discuss specific 
metaphors in detail in order to explore what they facilitate, represent, and make possible.56 
The potential meaning and effect of the epigenesis analogy is conditioned by the use of 
analogy in Kant’s work more generally. Kant himself regarded the use of metaphors and 
analogies as involving a ‘transference of reflection’.57 By this he meant that a metaphor or 
analogy can be useful in the situation where a concept does not directly correspond with a 
certain object. A metaphor or analogy can provide clarification by reflecting on such an 
object laterally, so to speak.
The analogy that is at issue only appeared in the second edition of the Critique o f Pure 
Reason. Perhaps Kant resorted to this analogy in order to respond to criticisms, raised by 
readers of the first edition, with regard to the intelligibility of his remarks on the emergence 
of the categories.58 However, such an explanation may not be satisfactory. His rather 
obscure analogy to biological processes without any further elaboration defeats any 
intention of clarification that he might have had. After all, it can be assumed that not all of 
his readership was as well versed in the life sciences of his time as he was. It is clear,
55 Sloan (2002), p. 247.
56 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 305-318; Fox Keller (1995), (2000a), and (2002); Kay (2000); Tauber (1994).
57 ZOller (1988), p. 71, citing Kant.
58 Ingensiep (1994), p. 386; ZOller (1988), p. 75.
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however, that Kant was disappointed by the muted response to the first edition of the 
Critique o f  Pure Reason. He attributed the apparent difficulty that readers had in grasping 
his ideas to his own ‘lack of stylistic elegance’.59
It is also clear that he struggled most with the writing of this particular section of the work. 
As he himself says in the introduction:
[I] know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the nature o f the faculty which we 
call understanding, and at the same time for the determination o f the rules and limits o f its use, than 
those undertaken in the second chapter o f the Transcendental Analytic, under the title o f  Deduction 
o f  the Pure Conceptions o f  the Understanding; and they have also cost me by far the greatest 
labor60
Not only did the elaboration of his ideas in this particular part of the work cost him ‘by far 
the greatest labor’, he also struggled with how best to clarify his ideas. In the same 
introduction he addresses, rather extensively, his doubts and deliberations on whether or 
not - and if so to what extent - to resort to illustrations and examples. He says:
[A]s regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in the first place, discursive or logical 
clearness, that is, on the basis o f conceptions, and secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clearness, by 
means o f intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes o f illustration in concreto. I have done what 
I could for the first kind o f intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose; and it thus became the 
accidental cause o f my inability to do complete justice to the second requirement. I have been almost 
at a loss, during the progress o f this work, how to settle this question.
Examples and illustrations always appeared to me necessary ... But I very soon became aware o f the 
magnitude o f my task, and the numerous problems with which I should be engaged; and, as I 
perceived that this critical investigation would ... be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to 
enlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point 
of view ... For explanations and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the 
comprehension ofparts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and 
stand in the way o f his forming a clear conception o f the whole.61
With this in mind, it could be argued that the necessity of making the core of his theory 
understood made him overcome his initial reluctance to resort to analogy. Perhaps it was 
his fear of enlarging his work too much and o f ‘dissipating the mental power of the reader’ 
by distracting him from the systematic structure of his work, that prevented him from 
further elaborating on his chosen analogies.
It is perhaps interesting to briefly contrast Kant’s anxiety over the use of metaphors and 
analogies with Nietzsche’s statement: ‘What, therefore, is truth? A mobile army of
59 Zammito (1992), p. 9.
60 Kant (2003), p. xi.
61 Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.
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metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms’.62 Nietzsche says that ‘ [e]very idea originates 
through equating the unequal’.63 In other words, metaphors and analogies should not 
merely be regarded as ‘examples’ or ‘illustrations’ as Kant suggested. Rather, they give rise 
to - and shape - the actual substance of a theory. The irresistible attraction that analogy and 
metaphor represented for Kant, and which he apparently fought to resist, is for Nietzsche an 
expression of a ‘fundamental impulse’ of the intellect: ‘that impulse towards the formation 
of metaphors, that fundamental impulse of man, which we cannot reason away for one 
moment - for thereby we should reason away man himself.64
1.3.3 The life sciences at the time
Regardless of Kant’s motivations for including the analogy, what should we make of it? 
Was the analogy merely meant to provide an illustration of his ideas, or does it give 
additional substance to what it was supposed only to elucidate? Many commentators have 
debated the plausibility and significance of the epigenesis analogy.65 Most argue that it 
should be seen only as a means of explanation. It is emphasized that no parallels can, or 
should, be drawn between Kant’s philosophical ideas and the biological theory of 
epigenesis. To attribute any substantial significance to the analogy would be misguided, 
because it would confuse the two distinct realms of biological ontology and the ‘ontology’ 
of reason.66 This criticism seems obviously correct when one remains faithful to Kant. No 
one, it seems, would truly dispute that the realms of biology and reason are distinguished. 
This distinction is, after all, what defined Kant’s philosophy.
However, there are reasons for attributing more significance to the analogy, if only because 
it appears at such a crucial stage in his theory. Although it is regarded as ‘merely’ an
£*J
analogy and its precise meaning remains elusive, this does not foreclose the possibility 
that the choice for this analogy is itself indicative of the kind of theory that Kant sought to 
establish.68 Therefore, no matter what opinion one holds, and no matter how dubious one
62 Derrida (1997), cited in the translator’s Preface, p. xxii.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 See n. 24 above.
66 Most clearly formulated by Ingensiep (1994), p. 385.
67 Mtiller-Sievers (1997), p. 13, that Kant uses the words ‘as it were’ shows that it is for him ‘nothing 
more, but also nothing less, than an analogy’.
68 Zammito (2006), p. 761: ‘can this matter be left at the level o f mere analogy? Logically, analogy postulates 
at least some common concept under which two quite different matters can be subsumed, some 
correspondence at least in terms o f a relation*.; Sloan (2002), p. 252.
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deems the analogy to be, its use seems to illuminate Kant’s ideas about the relation between 
reason and life.
Kant’s references to biological processes may seem unusual. However, references to the 
life sciences are scattered throughout his work; it seems that he was rather well informed of 
developments in the sciences of his time. Particular importance has been attached to the 
apparent mutual influence between Kant and Blumenbach.69 Opinions diverge on whether 
or not Kant’s ideas actually influenced the scientists of his period. Views also differ on how 
Kant made use of certain theories; some believe that he adapted them to suit his own 
ends.70
Biology as a discipline particularly concerned with life or living processes was very much
in development at the time when Kant wrote his three Critiques. It was only at the end of
71the eighteenth century that a ‘unified theory of life and its history’ was first envisioned. 
Foucault famously remarked that the notion of ‘life’ did not exist before that time; only 
beings that were the subject of classification.72 The tentative theory was given many 
different names, such as ‘zoologie generale\ ‘zoonomie’, ‘organology’, and - finally - 
‘biologie’; it was only in 1802 that the term ‘biology’, proposed by Jean Baptiste Lamarck 
and Gotthelf Reinhold Treviranus, emerged. The focus of the new discipline was on ‘the 
different forms and phenomena of life, the conditions and laws of their existence as well as 
the causes that determine them’.74 But almost from the moment of the emergence of 
biology as a discipline various specialized subdisciplines developed. Since each of these 
disciplines focused on different aspects of living processes, the initial project of a ‘unified 
theory of life’ arguably remained elusive from its very beginning.
69 Lenoir (1980) believes there was a genuine mutual influence; Richards (2000) speaks o f a ‘common 
misunderstanding’, p. 12; Steigerwald (2002), pp. 98-100.
70 Richards (2000), p. 32. Another subject o f disagreement is whether or not Kant’s writings have anything to 
contribute to the contemporary life sciences. Some argue for Kant’s relevance: Walsh (2006), specifically 
with regard to Kant’s idea o f organisms as ‘natural purposes’. Others argue against: Zammito (2006), p. 749 
and p. 755 discussing Kant’s ‘epistemological “deflation” ’ o f the life sciences and referring to Kant’s 
statement that there will never be a ‘Newton o f the blade o f grass’; Richards (2000), pp. 26-27.
71 Lenoir (1982), p. 1.
72 Foucault (2004), pp. 139 and 173.
73 Lenoir (1982), p. 1; Jacob (1976), p. 87.
74 Lenoir (1982), p. 1, citing Treviranus.
75 Ibid., p. 1.
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1,3.4 The meaning o f the analogy
Although there is disagreement as to the meaning that should be attributed to the epigenesis 
analogy, most authors agree that it was not Kant’s intention to ‘naturalize’ the categories or 
give them a biological foundation. Kant probably used epigenesis to avoid the other two 
origin scenarios that he considered implausible. However, he also recognizes the 
productive characteristics of the theory of epigenesist; as he observed in the Critique o f  
Judgement:
[C]onsider, on the other hand, epigenesis ... reason would from the start be greatly in favor o f the
kind o f explanation [it offers]. For in considering those things whose origin can be conceived only in
terms o f a causality o f purposes, this theory... regards nature as itself producing them rather than as
merely developing them; and so it minimizes appeal to the supernatural, [and] after the first
77beginning leaves everything to nature.
Kant seems to associate the characteristics of epigenesis with the characteristics of his 
particular idea of Pure Reason. He describes this reason as not originating in, or dependent
<70
on, either experience or God. Rather, reason includes its own origin. This idea of an 
autonomous, and to a certain extent self-sufficient, reason is shaped through the analogy to 
epigenesis. Mtiller-Sievers suggests that the self-generative character of epigenesis
70probably appealed to Kant because it enabled him to represent reason as autonomous.
If this line of argument is followed, then the analogy to epigenesis can be regarded as 
playing a significant role in the justification of his philosophy and as supporting the claim 
to its universal validity. It has been pointed out, in this respect, that Kant intentionally 
draws upon the particular appeal of the organic which - traditionally - carries with it its own 
justification or at least a certain measure of inevitability.80 In these terms, the epigenesis 
analogy was instrumental in establishing the unity and self-sufficiency of the pure reason 
that Kant is proposing.81 It has been pointed out that, even if Kant appeals to the organic to 
benefit his theory, this theory itself and the structure of the Kantian system as a whole 
‘remains architectonic, not organic’.82 What does the term ‘architectonic’ mean in relation 
to Kant’s philosophy?
76 Mtiller-Sievers (1993), p. 55.
77 Kant (1987), pp. 310-311, section 8, para. 424.
78 Mtiller-Sievers (1993), p. 56.
79 Ibid., pp. 55-56; Mtiller-Sievers (1997), p. 4.
80 Mtiller-Sievers (1997), p. 4.
81 Foucault (1984), p. 36: This self-sufficiency is described by Foucault as ‘a use o f reason in which reason 
has no other end but itself: rasonieren is to reason for reasoning’s sake’.
82 Muller-Sievers (1997), p. 13.
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1.3.5 The architectonic and the organic
The term ‘architectonic’ itself did not originate with Kant, but has a long philosophical 
history that dates back to Leibniz and Aristotle.83 It has been suggested that Kant’s specific 
use of the term was influenced by Lambert and, indirectly, Baumgarten. The latter used it 
with reference to ontology while the former proposed that it could be used to solve 
‘methodological problems’ to which the relation between metaphysics and the sciences
fid.gives rise. The philosophical tradition of the term is important. It does not merely 
represent an analogy to architecture or construction, although Kant likens the structure of 
his philosophy at times to that of a building.85 As Aristotle pointed out:
the true object o f architecture is not bricks mortar or timber, but the house; and so the principal 
object o f natural philosophy is not the material elements, but their composition, and the ° f
the form to which they are subservient, and independently o f which they have no existence.
Kant emphasized the architectonic structure of his philosophy in order to represent it as a 
purposeful ‘whole’: ‘By the term Architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system. 
Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will be an aggregate,
on
and not a system. The idea of the ‘system’ and the ‘whole’ are important in Kant’s 
philosophy. The representation of his philosophy as an integrated ‘whole’ can be regarded 
as representing the German philosophical tradition of the philosophia generalis that was 
meant to defend philosophy as a discipline in its own right from other disciplines such as
fifilaw, medicine, and the natural sciences.
More importantly, the representation of his philosophy as a systemic unity that is self- 
organizing and self-contained mirrors Kant’s description of the organism. In other words,
fiOpure reason and the organism are both represented as integrated ‘systems’. Kant refers 
more frequently to the empirical diversity of nature than to the ‘organic’ as such. Although 
the architectonic and the organic can be distinguished in Kant’s philosophy, they are 
representative of the same systemicity. It is interesting to observe, at this point, that 
Heidegger associated the notion of the system with the emergence of the particular
83 Caygill (1995), pp. 84-85.
84 Manchester (2003), p. 195.
85 Manchester (2003), p. 189-191.
86 Aristotle (1987), p. 17,1.5, para. 645a.
87 Kant (2003), p. 466 ( ‘The Architectonic o f Pure Reason’).
88 Caygill (1995), p. 85.
89 Zammito (2006), p. 761.
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metaphysics that characterizes modernity (referred to by Heidegger as ‘the age of the world 
picture’).90 After this brief interlude we now turn to the potential consequences of the 
epigenesis analogy.
1,3.6 Unintended consequences
If Kant used the analogy to epigenesis, as has been suggested, in order to allow his theory 
to benefit from its self-generative character then the use of the analogy also had some 
unintended consequences. One is that the representation of reason as an autonomous or 
self-sufficient process suggests a reason that is both dogmatist and despotic, as Foucault 
suggested.91 However, perhaps the most important unintended consequence of the use of 
the analogy is that - although epigenesis helps to establish the autonomy of reason - the 
idea of self-generation associated with it also threatens this autonomy and ultimately 
undermines the conceptual coherence of Kant’s system.92 If epigenesis is regarded as a 
productive, self-generative process, it is necessarily immune to the distinction between 
experience and cognition that Kant proposes. Indeed, it could potentially cause such 
distinctions to dissolve.
It has been argued that Kant foresaw these consequences and therefore limited the creative 
force of epigenesis by describing the categories as developing somehow from pre-existing
Q l
‘germs’ (iKeime'>) and ‘dispositions’ (‘Anlage’). In a passage that precedes his
introduction of the analogy and which addresses a priori concepts, Kant observes that ‘the 
pure concepts of the understanding are to be “followed to their first Keime undAnlagen in 
the human understanding where they lie prepared’” .94 It has been suggested that his 
reference to both germs and predispositions represents a kind of ‘middle way’ between 
preformationism and epigenesis.95
Kant liked Blumenbach’s idea of the Bildungstrieb, which he acknowledged as having 
influenced his own idea of epigenesis, to the extent that it represented an ‘epigeneticism
90 Heidegger (1977), p. 141.
91 Foucault (1985), p. 7.
92 Zammito (2003), pp. 96-97; Sloan (2002), p. 245; Huneman (2006), p. 654.
93 Sloan (2002), p. 238.
94 Ibid., p. 241.
95 Ibid., p. 238.
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within the limits of simple reason’ ,96 However, Blumenbach - at least in his later work - did 
not impose any limits on epigenesis as a formative power. It can, therefore, be argued that 
Kant restricted the self-generative capacities of reason in his first Critique with the aim of
07safeguarding the architectonic and systematic structure of his theory of pure reason.
Perhaps the potential negative effects of the epigenesis analogy for Kant’s theory are 
neutralized by the very nature of the theory that he proposes. He is, after all, not 
introducing life or epigenesis into his system. Rather, the process of epigenesis that he 
refers to remains an object of the understanding and cannot be identified with the biological 
process itself.98 However, even if this is the case, the epigenesis analogy still seems to 
reveal a problem at the heart of Kantian theory, that is, how can the boundary between 
experience and understanding or between life and the knowledge of life be maintained?
Above, we discussed how Kant refers to biological processes in order to establish his 
system of pure reason. However, this only represents one part of the relation between 
reason or knowledge and life that Kant proposes. The other part, I argue, is represented by 
what Kant calls the ‘lawfulness of the contingent’.99 In what follows, the meaning of this 
idea and its effects are discussed. I argue that it is the combination of these two parts of his 
theory - the epigenesis analogy and the lawfulness of the contingent - that have come to 
define the relationship between life and knowledge that still haunts writings in the life and 
social sciences today.
96 Huneman (2006), p. 655, citing Blumenbach.
97 See n. 92 above.
98 Ingensiep (1994), p. 393.
99 For example, Kant (1987), first Introduction to the Critique o f  Judgment, p. 405, section VI, para. 217’: ‘a 
lawfulness that [something] contingent [may] have [insofar] as [it] is contingent’; p. 432, section XI, para. 
243’: ‘a lawfulness that is contingent objectively but necessary subjectively’; p. 417, para. 228’: ‘the 
lawfulness o f  an intrinsically contingent connection ofthe manifold in the object’. See also Ginsborg (1997), 
p. 339 and Zuckert (2007), pp. 5-7.
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PART II
2.1 The third Critique
2.1.1 The ‘lawlikettess o f the contingent*
It was discussed above that Kant relied on an analogy to a biological process not only to 
explain his idea of pure reason but also to further shape the autonomous and self-generative 
character of this reason. However, this use of the life sciences in order to establish 
knowledge or reason represents only one part of Kant’s system. The other part can be found 
in his third Critique: the Critique o f Judgment (Kritikder Urteilskraft) written in 1790.100 
Having set out his system of theoretical cognition by addressing the first two cognitive 
powers in the first two Critiques, Kant now seeks to complete his inquiry into theoretical 
cognition by addressing what he regards as the third cognitive power: judgment.
The third Critique fills the gap that was left by the first two, or - in Kant’s own words - 
‘judgment, which in the order of our [specific] cognitive powers is a mediating link 
between understanding and reason’.101 However, the power of judgment is not merely a 
‘link’ but represents a necessary element of Kant’s system:
[T]he categorical principles are laws governing all o f nature, necessarily, and are such because they
are necessary conditions for our knowledge o f nature and for the possibility o f  experience. B u t...
they are not sufficient conditions for either: they do not provide knowledge o f the given, particular
character o f objects, nor do they guide us as to how we ought to discern some order in nature with
respect to those characteristics. And yet, unless we have some way o f ordering the diversity in102nature, we will have no knowledge o f nature beyond that the categorical principles apply to it.
The Critique o f  Judgment consists of two sections, namely the ‘Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment’ and the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’. The former deals with judgment 
regarding beauty, while the latter addresses judgment in relation to natural processes. Most 
of the commentaries that have been written on the third Critique focus on aesthetic 
judgment. The Critique o f  Judgment is often regarded as the least doctrinal and, perhaps for 
that same reason, as the most interesting of the three Critiques. It also seems to put Kant’s 
project, which he elaborated in the first two Critiques, into question. The focus on 
judgment and on the reflective, rather than constitutive, principle of purposiveness that
100 Kant (1987).
101 Ibid., Preface to the first edition, p. 5, para. 168.
102 Zuckert (2007), p. 12.
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makes judgment possible introduces or reveals a measure of contingency that was obscured 
by the abstract and universal character of the categories.
As opposed to the epigenesis analogy, which can be located quite specifically within the 
first Critique, the idea of the ‘lawlikeness of the contingent’ or a ‘lawlikeness without a 
law’ (‘ Gesetzmassigkeit ohne Gesetz’) traverses the entire Critique o f  Judgment}0* In fact, 
it has been argued that it is the principle of purposiveness, more generally, that unites the 
two parts of the Critique o f  Judgment and makes it into a ‘whole’.105 The principle of 
purposiveness is specific to the third Critique and differs from the principles set out in the 
Critique o f  Pure Reason, because it is subjective and reflective whereas the principles of 
understanding are objective and universal. As Kant said of the principle of purposiveness: 
‘This concept belongs to reflective judgment, not to reason, because the purpose is not 
posited in the object at all, but is posited solely in the subject: in the subject’s mere power 
to reflect.’106
It is important to note that the principle of purposiveness, contrary to what its name would 
suggest, does not have a purpose. It performs a certain role, of course, but it cannot be 
regarded as having a specific goal. Kant proposes this principle specifically as an 
alternative to the traditional idea of a teleological principle. The principle of purposiveness 
must lack purpose in order to perform its function of making living processes intelligible:
[I]n order to explain how the subject can represent a unity o f diversity, the subject must be 
understood as judging purposive/y without a purpose, or ... as engaged in a future-directed 
anticipation o f an indeterminate, non-conceptually ordered whole.107
It has been noted that the attribution of a sense of anticipation to the judging subject 
necessarily introduces contingency and temporality into the notion of the subject itself that 
was previously regarded, in the first two Critiques, as a largely ‘atemporal’ form that
10ftanchored the principles of understanding. We will now inquire further into the character
of the principle of purposiveness in order to unveil how living processes are included in the 
Kantian system by excluding them from reason.
103 Ibid., pp. 6-7 and 11.
104 G. Rose (1984), p. 17.
105 Zuckert (2007), pp. 4-5.
106 Kant (1987), p. 404, section V, para. 216’.
107 Zuckert (2007), p. 5.
108 Ibid., p. 16.
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2.1.2 Including through excluding
Canguilhem observed the following with regard to Kant’s third Critique’.
[I]n the eighteenth century, Kant identified the conditions o f possibility o f physical science with the
transcendental conditions o f knowledge in general. This identification found its limit, at the time o f
the Critique o f Judgment (second part: Critique o f Teleological Judgment), in the recognition o f the
fact that organisms are totalities whose analytic decomposition and causal explanation are
109subordinated to the use o f a certain idea o f finality that determines all research in biology.
As Canguilhem suggests, Kant seeks to account in the third Critique for living processes 
that cannot be cognized through the categories. Kant needs to include such processes in his 
theory of understanding in order to ensure the completeness of his system and does so - 
perhaps paradoxically - by excluding them from the idea of reason that he set out in his first 
Critique. The reason for such exclusion is that, according to Kant, natural processes (as 
well as beauty) cannot be understood through the constitutive principles of the categories. 
They can only be judged through regulative or reflective principles of judgment. Such 
principles of judgment serve at least two specific purposes in Kant’s system:
they serve, in part, to restrain the understanding’s arrogant claims, namely, that (since it can state a 
priori the conditions for the possibility o f all things it can cognize) it has thereby circumscribed the 
area within which all things in general are possible; in part they serve to guide the understanding, in 
its contemplation o f nature, by a principle o f completeness - though the understanding cannot attain 
this completeness - and so further the final aim o f all cognition.
Kant explains the difference between determinative or constitutive principles of reason and 
regulative or reflective principles of judgment as follows:
Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If the 
universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is 
determinative... But if  only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then 
this power is merely reflective.'
It must be pointed out that Kant’s reference to ‘law’, whether regarded as universal in the 
sense of the categories or as empirical with regard to living processes, does not necessarily 
refer to a law with a juridical character (although he describes his project in the Critique o f  
Pure Reason initially through a legal metaphor).112 Rather, laws are regarded - simply put -
109 Canguilhem (2002), p. 148 (my translation)
110 Kant (1987), p. 4, paras. 167-168. 
in Ibid., pp. 18-19, para. 179.
112 Kant (2003), p. ix: ‘It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the most laborious o f  all tasks - that of  
self-examination, and to establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims, while it 
pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its
72
as regularities that make cognition possible or as that which signals the potential ordering 
of that which is empirically diverse or contingent. The categories are not applicable to 
natural processes, because there is no given rule or law under which such processes may be 
subsumed. There are only empirical particularities in nature that are not always regularities 
(and even if they are, this does not automatically render them subject to the categories of 
understanding). Living processes are, therefore, necessarily interpreted through a reflective 
principle that opens up a ‘space’ for judgment.113
Kant proposes that judgment itself provides us with the principle that makes it possible for 
us to judge - rather than cognize - living processes: ‘so judgment itself must provide a 
concept, a concept through which we do not actually cognize anything but which only 
serves as a rule for the power of judgment itself.114 This self-reflexive principle of 
judgment enabling judgment is the principle of ‘purposiveness’.
At first glance, it seems to resemble the traditional idea of teleology proposed by Aristotle. 
However, whereas traditional teleology attributes a purpose or telos to natural processes 
themselves, Kant’s principle of purposiveness does not presume anything regarding the 
character of living processes. It is merely a principle that allows us to judge such processes: 
‘although we thus speak of nature as i f  the purposiveness in it were intentional, we are not 
attributing an intention to nature.’115 He continues:
[T]here is clearly a big difference between saying that certain things o f nature, or even all o f nature, 
could be produced only by a cause that follows intentions in determining itself to action, and saying 
that the peculiar character o f  my cognitive powers is such that the only way I can judge [how] those 
things are possible and produced is by conceiving, [to account] for this production, a cause that acts 
according to intentions, and hence a being that produces [things] in a way analogous to the causality 
o f an understanding. If I say the first, I am trying to decide something about the object, and am 
obliged to establish that a concept I have assumed has objective reality. If I say the second, reason 
determines only [how I must] use my cognitive powers commensurately with their peculiarity and 
with the essential conditions [imposed by] both their range and their limits. Hence the first is an 
objective principle for determinative judgment, the second a subjective principle for merely 
reflective judgment and hence a maxim imposed on it by reason.116
The notion of ‘purposiveness without a purpose’ (‘Zweckmdssigkeit ohne Zweck’), unlike 
teleology, does not include the idea of an external purpose or vital force:
own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than the Critical Investigation o f  Pure 
Reason.’ Heidegger (1997) discusses why the Transcendental Deduction takes the form o f a ‘quaestio ju r is \  
pp. 60-62; G. Rose (1984), p. 11.
113 Steigerwald (2002), p. 82.
114 Kant (1987), p. 6, para. 169.
115 Ibid., Translator’s Introduction, p. lxxx.
116 Ibid., p. 280, section 75, para. 398.
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[P]urposiveness without a purpose is an order of means-ends relations without an external purpose; it 
comprises reciprocal means-ends relations, in which each part is both means and end, in relation to 
the other ^ arts. Thus purposiveness without a purpose is the form o f fully systematic, internal 
relations.
It is this particular idea of an almost self-contained purposiveness that makes it possible for 
us to regard an organism as a ‘whole’ or a ‘system’; it also inspires later theories of 
cybernetics and autopoiesis (see Chapter 5, para. 2.2.2).
2.2 The unification of the manifold
2.2.1 The principle o f purposiveness
It is the regulative or reflective principle of purposiveness that, according to Kant, makes 
natural processes intelligible to us. Purposiveness is not attributed to the living process 
itself but is merely used by the subject in order to judge such a process (or work of art). 
However, we still do not know how the principle of purposiveness operates. Kant explains 
this by describing purposiveness as ‘the lawfulness o f  an intrinsically contingent 
connection o f  the manifold in the object’.118 Although this perhaps sounds rather 
contemporary, it is obviously a very obscure statement. What does he mean by this 
‘lawfulness of the contingent’?
What Kant means is that the principle of purposiveness allows us to represent the diversity 
of nature’s processes as a lawlike unity. In other words, it allows us to judge natural 
processes ‘as i f  we were able to subsume them under a universal law through the 
categories. Or, again differently put, it allows us to judge natural processes as if they were 
not living processes at all but any other kind of object in the world that we can rationally 
understand. We, therefore, cannot know the living as vivant - in Canguilhem’s terms - but 
only as a ‘rational analog’ of the living.119 However, just as the categories do not make it 
possible for us to know an object, so the principle of purposiveness does not make it
possible for us to know or understand living processes. In that sense, the regulative
117 Zuckert (2007), p. 15.
118 Kant (1987), p. 417, para. 228’.
119 Zammito (2003), p. 98.
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principle and the categories function alike: both form part of theoretical cognition and 
neither claims anything with regard to the objects of cognition.
Perhaps the main function of the principle of purposiveness is to account for the particular 
and the contingent in a system that excludes such contingency and particularity from 
knowledge.120 It also provides our only hope of somehow making sense of nature’s 
diversity. As Kant says:
we need only consider the magnitude o f the task ... o f making coherent experience out o f given
perceptions o f nature even though this nature could contain an infinite diversity o f empirical law s...
there is required ... that nature also have a certain order in its particular rules - rules that the
understanding can come to know only empirically and that, as far as it is concerned, are contingent.
[But since] without these rules there would be no way for us to proceed from the universal analogy
of a possible experience as such to the particular one, the understanding must think o f these rules as
laws (i.e., as necessary) - even though it does not cognize, nor could ever see, their necessity - for
otherwise such laws would not form an order o f nature. Hence, though the understanding cannot
determine anything a priori with regard to these (objects), still it must, in order to investigate these
empirical so-called laws, lay an a priori principle at the basis o f all reflection on nature: the principle
121that a cognizable order o f nature in terms o f these laws is possible.
When Kant speaks about the principle of purposiveness as the lawlikeness of the 
contingent, he does not mean that the contingent - i.e. the empirical diversity of nature - has 
an inherent law. Nor does he mean that we should impose a law on nature, as traditional 
teleology does, by ascribing a purpose to nature itself. As Kant says: ‘we are neither 
prescribing a law to nature, nor learning one from it by observation.’122
For Kant, the lawlikeness only exists for the subject. It is the subject who must presuppose
191a unity of nature in order to make coherent experience of it possible. Therefore, even 
though the ‘lawfulness of the contingent’ sounds like a paradox, it is not: the lawfulness 
refers to the level of the subject whereas contingency refers to the level of the object. The 
lawfulness is a normative lawfulness because it describes a living process as it ‘ought’ to 
be, thus enabling the subject to judge it.124
The principle of purposiveness also provides a solution to Kant’s question of how 
something can be at the same time contingent and necessary. The principle provides us with 
‘the concept of a lawfulness that is contingent objectively but necessary subjectively (for
120 Zuckert (2007), p. 6.
121 Kant (1987), p. 24, paras. 184-185.
122 Ibid., p. 25, para. 186.
123 Ibid., p. 23, para. 184.
124 Ginsborg (2001), p. 249.
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our cognitive power)’.125 It is contingent objectively because it concerns the particular 
empirical laws of biological processes. However, it is necessary subjectively for our ability 
to judge such processes. It is the only way in which living processes can be included in the 
cognition of humans, even if this does not mean that such processes can actually be known 
or understood through this principle.
2,2,2 The living subject to judgment
As described above, a living process can only be regarded as ‘lawlike’ or ‘lawful’ in the 
Kantian system to the extent that it conforms to - or deviates from - the normative laws of 
the subject. The living is judged in terms of
what an organ should do, or is supposed to do, or will do if it works correctly. We also speak of  
organisms and their parts as defective or malformed, o f organic processes as going wrong, and of  
external circumstances as interfering with this or that aspect o f an organism’s proper functioning or 
development. These ways o f speaking imply a commitment to normative standards governing the 
structure and behavior o f organisms, standards that may or may not be met in a given case.12
Normativity is, therefore, not ascribed to living processes themselves. It is the normative 
judgment of a subject that determines whether or not a living process conforms to the norm. 
However, at the same time, Kant’s idea of organisms as self-generative wholes that 
function independent of external purpose suggests a kind of ‘immanent normativity’ of the 
living.127 This idea of immanent normativity, which is implicit in Kant’s theory, is 
elaborated by Canguilhem in his notion of ‘vital normativity’ (see Chapter 6). A similar 
idea of normativity is relied upon in theories of self-generation and autopoiesis where 
normativity is usually represented as the functioning of a system or its self-organization.
• • # p o
Any connotation of value in relation to the normative is usually avoided in such theories, 
contrary to Canguilhem’s notion of normativity which implicitly retains this connotation.
125 Kant (1987), p. 432, sectionXI, para. 243’.
126 Ginsborg (2001), p. 251.
127 Zammito (2006), p. 753.
128 Ibid.: noting that even technical ‘function talk’ in the life sciences ‘cannot get away from the question o f  
“welfare” or “benefit”’.
76
2.2.3 The unity o f diversity
The idea of a ‘lawlikeness of the contingent’ makes it possible to unify the diversity of 
living processes in order to make them intelligible. According to Kant, neither teleology 
nor mechanism succeeds in this because both theories make claims regarding the nature of 
living processes themselves. An organism can be made intelligible by regarding it as a 
‘unity of diversity’.130 The unification of the ‘manifold’, as Kant sometimes calls it, can be 
achieved through the concept. It is the concept of the organism that makes it possible for an
i-ii
organism to be grasped as such.
It is important to emphasize that the unification of diversity that is effected through a 
concept unifies the diverse as diverse and differs, therefore, from subsuming diversity
1 T)under a universal concept or principle (as happens in understanding). It can even be said
that for a unity to exist in the first place, the diverse or contingent must be maintained as 
such precisely because ‘parts ... must have the specific, empirical, diverse, contingent 
characters that they do, in order for each to serve its particular function towards the end of 
the object, to play its part in the whole’.133
Kant’s unification of the manifold, perhaps paradoxically, gives rise to the reinforcement or 
acknowledgement of diversity and contingency. It could even be said that the ensuing unity 
is as much the result of differentiation as it is of unification. Nevertheless, Kant’s emphasis 
on the unification of the diverse can easily be mistaken as referring to the substantial or 
ontological unity of an individual entity. It can, therefore, come to undermine Kant’s initial 
intention of understanding the diverse as such. Although Kant recognizes that the diversity 
and contingency of living processes is unavoidable, he nevertheless regards it as a constant 
‘threat’ to his system of pure reason.134
It should be pointed out that the idea of the ‘unity of the diverse’ did not emerge for the 
first time in Kant’s work. It forms part of a German rationalist tradition where it is used to 
express the ‘superior, paradigmatic order or unity, i.e., “perfection”’ that was traditionally
29 See also Kant (1987): Translator’s Introduction, p. lxxx.
30 Zuckert (2007), p. 5.
31 Ginsborg (2001), p. 235; Kant (1987), p. 417, para. 228’; Heidegger (1997), p. 37.
32 Zuckert (2007), pp. 13-14.
33 Ibid., p. 15.
34 Ibid., pp. 25 and 48.
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attributed to God.135 So, even before Kant organisms were often regarded as ‘harmonies of 
multiplicity’.136 Kant, however, transformed the notion of the ‘unity of diversity’ so that it 
could accommodate the contingency of a subject’s judgment (rather than the perfection 
associated with a supernatural force).
Luhmann observes with regard to the idea of ‘unity of diversity’:
[I]t is worth remembering Kant at this point. Kant started with the assumption that plurality (in the 
form o f sense data) is given and that unity must be constituted (synthesized). Only separating these 
aspects, thus posing complexity as a problem, makes the subject into a subject - indeed, into a 
subject o f the connection between plurality and unity, not only into a producer o f synthesis. Systems 
theory breaks with Kant’s point o f departure and therefore has no need for a concept o f the subject. 
It replaces it with the concept o f self-referential systems.137
Although Luhmann suggests that his own systems theory ‘breaks with Kant’s point of 
departure’, he might be seen as continuing the German rationalist tradition through his 
reliance on the notion of a ‘ unitas multiplex’. Indeed, Luhmann regards autopoiesis as 
providing an answer to the question of how a unity of diversity can be conceived: ‘there is 
no other possibility of seeing unity in plurality, of synthesizing a multiplicity, of reducing
1 'XQcomplexity to unity’. However, Luhmann’s unity is not a unification of diversity but a 
‘unity of self-reference and external reference’.140 He, therefore, focuses on the process of 
differentiation that necessarily underlies unification.
Kant’s idea of the unity of the diverse as diverse is echoed in Luhmann’s statement that the 
‘unity of distinction is understood as the unity of the imaginary space of its own 
combination potentials’.141 Similarly to Kant, Luhmann emphasizes that unity ‘must be 
produced and that it does not exist in advance as an individual, a substance, or an idea of its
, 142own operation .
35 Ibid, p. 7.
36 Ibid, p. 8.
37 Luhmann (1996), p. 28.
38 Ibid, p. 18.
39 Ibid, p. 483.
40 Luhmann (1998), p. 10.
41 Ibid.
42 Luhmann (1996), p. 33.
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2.3 Identifying what Kant is identifying
2.3.1 Negotiating the a priori
I have discussed above Kant’s elaboration of a particular relation between knowledge or 
understanding and living processes, arguing that he adopted a two-pronged approach of 
inclusion and exclusion of such processes from knowledge or understanding. I have argued 
that Kant, on the one hand, sought to explain the correspondence between understanding 
and experience without deriving the former from the latter. On the other hand, he sought to 
portray reason as autonomous and his own theory as a systematic ‘whole’. But what was 
Kant identifying when he elaborated this problematic relation between knowledge and life? 
And what exactly does this relation signify?
The particular form that the relation between knowledge and life takes in Kant’s work can 
be questioned from a variety of perspectives and through a number of different theoretical 
figures. For example, Kant’s elaboration of this relation in the form of an inclusion through 
exclusion represents what Agamben calls an ‘exception’.143 The effect of such an exception 
is that whatever is excluded, i.e. living processes, comes to lie at the heart of that from 
which it is being excluded: knowledge.
With regard to knowledge or understanding itself, the relation that Kant elaborates can 
perhaps be regarded as an ‘epistemological obstacle’144 or ‘epistemological boundary’.145 
It, then, either stands in the way of knowledge but at the same time produces it, or it 
represents a ‘false’ limit of knowledge that stimulates thought. The relation between 
knowledge and life could, furthermore, be regarded as the ‘environment’ (in Luhmann’s 
terms) of Kant’s system; as that which must somehow be integrated or continuously 
referred to in order to maintain the structure of his system. Finally, the relation that Kant 
establishes can be regarded as a Foucauldian ‘diagram’ because it seems to impose a new 
kind of truth or reality.146
143 Agamben (1998), p. 9.
144 Lecourt (1975), pp. 135-136; Gutting (1989), pp. 16 and 41: a Bachelardian concept that was refined by 
Canguilhem. Whereas Bachelard portrayed it as an obstacle for the development o f knowledge, Canguilhem 
regarded such obstacles at the same time as productive (see Chapter 5, para. 3.2.3).
14 Bachelard (1970), p. 80 : ‘The scientific boundary is not so much a limit as a zone o f particularly active 
thought, a domain o f assimilation.’ (My translation); Canguilhem (2003), p. 120.
146 Deleuze (1999), p. 30.
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Although all of these figures may be productive to analyse the relation that Kant 
establishes, I argue that it signifies Kant’s negotiation of his a priori. As discussed above, 
Kant regards the a priori as that which is divorced from experience and represents the 
condition of possibility of understanding.
Foucault refers in his own work to the idea of an ‘historical a prio ri\147 He uses the notion 
of ‘episteme’ in order to inquire into the historical conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of various ways of knowing (rather than - as Kant did - to inquire into the 
condition of possibility for knowledge as such). The historical a priori does not represent 
the historical origin of knowledge. Although the very notion may seem paradoxical, 
Foucault regards the episteme - through which he inquires into this a priori - as an 
historical practice; it represents the discursive regularities of a particular period in time.
He proposes the idea of an historical a priori as a method for his own inquiries rather than 
using it to question the nature of Kant’s a priori.
I argue that - even if Kant represented the a priori as necessary, universal, and distinct from 
experience - he himself negotiated the historicity and vitality of his a priori through his 
elaboration of the relation between knowledge and life. The exclusion of living processes 
from his theory of understanding in order to establish the a priori leads to his subsequent 
renegotiation of this exclusion in the third Critique. The only way in which the a priori can 
survive is by limiting its application to processes or objects that are susceptible to reason 
and understanding. The third Critique provides a means of judgment or intelligibility of 
living processes that the a priori cannot offer because of its a-historical and ‘a-vital’ nature.
What are the implications of Kant’s negotiation of the a prioril One of its consequences, I 
argue, is a recurrence of the negotiation of the relation between knowledge and life in the 
life and social sciences. Although efforts are made to articulate this relation anew, the 
representation of living processes - or ‘life’ - as that which grounds knowledge and at the 
same time escapes it has characterized philosophy and the sciences since the nineteenth 
century. When the relation between knowledge and life that Kant elaborated is regarded as 
indicative of his own (re)negotiation of the a priori, then it becomes possible to question 
this a priori that lies at the basis of modem rationality. The historicity and vitality that it
147 Foucault (2006), p. xxiii; Agamben (2008), p. 107: Agamben believes that it was Mauss, rather than Kant, 
who inspired Foucault’s idea o f the historical a priori (which seems very unlikely); Deleuze (1999), p. 51.
148 Agamben (2008), p. 108.
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excludes can form part of a new articulation of the relation between knowledge and life; 
one that is, I argue, undertaken by Canguilhem (see Chapter 5, para. 3.2).
PART III
3.1 Opening up the question for questioning
3.1.1 The articulation o f a relation
In the introduction to an issue of the Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale dedicated to 
Canguilhem, Foucault observed that in France the question of the meaning of the 
Enlightenment is debated in the history of science.149 It is scientific knowledge that is 
regarded as ‘the origin and threshold of rationality’.150 According to Foucault, the same 
question is debated in Germany in a different arena: through historical and political 
reflection on society. Nevertheless, both debates share a common object: the autonomy of 
reason and its history of ‘dogmatisms and despotisms’.151
The latter is a reference to Kant’s attempt to distinguish himself from his predecessors. 
Kant noted, with regard to metaphysics, that ‘[a]t first, her government, under the
1 S9administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism’. Foucault turns Kant’s
words against him by accusing him, despite his efforts to rehabilitate metaphysics, of the
very sin of which Kant himself had previously accused his predecessors. He suggests that
Kant’s reason can only be rid from its despotic character and that reason ‘has the effect of
1emancipation only on the condition that it succeeds in freeing itself of itself.
In a different essay, Foucault identifies Kant’s work as the source of the idea of reason as 
autonomous.154 Kant’s project sought to liberate man from his self-incurred tutelage and 
this led him to describe how reason could be exercised independently. Foucault also 
focuses on the importance of Kant’s reflection on ‘the contemporary status of his own
149 Foucault (1985), p.6. This essay appeared earlier, in a slightly different version, as introduction to the 
English translation o f  Le normal et lepathologique (Foucault (1978)).
150 Foucault (1978), p. xi.
151 Ibid., p. xii.
152 Kant (2003), p. viii; Kant (1987): Translator’s Introduction, pp. xxxi-xxxii, on Kant’s relation to these 
dogmatists.
153 Foucault (1978), p. xii.
154 Foucault (1984), p. 36.
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enterprise’ and on the way in which Kant’s work, perhaps paradoxically, gives rise to a 
focus on the historically contingent rather than on universal truths and limits of 
knowledge.155 However, it is more significant for our purposes that Foucault observes how 
it was Kant (and Hegel) who formulated for the first time the question of the relation 
between truth and life rather than truth and subject.156
This statement of Foucault seems to go against the commonly held view that Kant 
established the subject for the first time as an autonomous entity and placed it at the centre 
of his theory of cognition. However, he seems to say that - even if Kant focused on the 
subject as the centre of knowledge and understanding - there was something else, a relation 
between reason and life, that ran through his work and perhaps complicated his philosophy. 
Foucault believes that this ‘undercurrent’ of Kant’s philosophy opens up the question of 
whether the knowledge of life should be regarded as another instance of knowledge that 
functions within the triangle of truth, subject, and knowledge, or whether the knowledge of 
life leads to a reformulation of the question of knowledge itself.157
Foucault, therefore, identifies Kant’s work as that which establishes the autonomy of 
reason and at the same time suggests how it might be questioned. I argue that Foucault at 
the end of his life - the essay in the Revue was the last publication before his death -158 
identified not only a tension in Kant’s work but also in his own. It is commonly held that 
Foucault elaborates his work within the triangle of truth, subject, and knowledge. However, 
at the same time there is a preoccupation with life that traverses this triangle and 
continuously stretches it. For example, Foucault’s idea o f ‘biopower’ does not ground his 
notion of subjectivity, as some commentators would suggest. Rather, it questions it 
fundamentally; it threatens to either break with the traditional triangle or reformulate it 
(something that - in the end - is never fully accomplished).
It has been noted that Foucault’s work can be regarded as a ‘self-critical continuation of the 
Enlightenment project’ in the sense that he ‘appropriates’ Kant’s focus on reason in his 
striving for freedom and autonomy.159 Deleuze pointed out some neo-Kantian aspects of
155 Ibid., p. 38.
156 Foucault (1978), p. xx: He refers to the Critique o f  Judgment and the Phenomenology o f Spirit.
157 Ibid.
158 Agamben (1999), p. 220: it was the last essay for which Foucault gave his consent to publish.
159 Gutting (1989), pp. 262 and 1-2; Norris (1994), p. 169 and 184.
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Foucault’s thought.160 Foucault agrees with Kant that critique must take the form of 
questioning limits; the difference is that Foucault’s work is concerned with the ways in 
which reason itself can become constraining, limiting, and despotic rather than 
liberating.161
3.1.2 The modem representation o f Hife ’
I argued that the autonomy of reason that Kant’s system establishes, and that comes to 
define modem rationality, is made possible through a simultaneous reliance on - and 
exclusion of - living processes from knowledge. The reliance on living processes is 
represented by Kant’s well-known epigenesis metaphor in the second edition of his first 
Critique, while the exclusion of living processes from knowledge is elaborated in his third 
Critique. The latter is effected through the regulative principle of purposiveness, also 
described by Kant as the ‘lawfulness of the contingent’. It is this two-pronged approach that 
comes to represent the traditional figure of ‘life’, discussed by philosophers from the 
nineteenth century onwards, as that which makes knowledge possible and at the same time 
eludes it.
Foucault describes in his book Les mots et les choses how the emergence of modem 
rationality corresponds with the moment when life comes to lie at the heart of 
knowledge.162 More specifically, he describes how a notion o f ‘life’ emerges at the end of 
the eighteenth century that did not exist before.163 This notion o f‘life’ represents, according 
to him, the condition - and the limit - of knowledge: it concerns a ‘limiting and conditional 
position (that without which and beyond which one cannot know)’.164 Before this 
emergence of the notion o f ‘life’, living entities formed the subject matter of natural history 
but there was no inquiry into the common trait that united such entities. Natural history was 
concerned with the classification of living organisms; it sought to draw up an inventory of 
the world that could be unlocked and explored through the conceptual tools of identity and 
difference.
160 Deleuze (1999), pp. 51 and 104-105. Foucault inquires, like Kant, into the conditions o f possibility o f  
knowledge. However, Foucault regards these conditions as historical and particular rather than universal. 
Also, Foucault takes the ‘finitude’ o f man - often associated with Kant - as object o f inquiry.
161 Gutting (1989), pp. 262.
162 Foucault (2004), p. 264.
163 Ibid., p. 173.
164 Foucault (2006), p. 77 (with regard to resemblance rather than life, but the figure is the same).
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Without explaining in much detail why this might be the case, Foucault argues that - at this 
particular point in time - the need arose to inquire into what links different natural entities 
rather than what separates them. This link or identifiable ‘trait’ of life was found in the idea 
that natural entities have an internal order or organization that defines them as such, as 
opposed to the external ordering represented by classification.165 It is this particular notion 
of ‘life’ that subsequently comes to traverse the classificatory categories of knowing. 
According to Foucault, since the emergence of the concept of ‘life’ at the end of the 
eighteenth century it has taken on the specific form of condition and limit of knowledge; as 
that which gives rise to knowledge but itself remains inscrutable. It is this connection 
between the limits and the possibility of knowing that, according to Foucault, characterizes 
modem rationality.166
The resonance of Kant’s philosophy is obvious in Foucault’s description of the emergence 
of the concept of ‘life’ and its association with modem rationality. Both in terms of the 
substance of the idea of self-organization as an identifying trait of living processes and in 
terms of the attribution of this particular shift in episteme to the end of the eighteenth 
century. However, Foucault does not refer to Kant in much detail. He observes that Kant’s 
Critique marks the foundation of modernity because of its questioning of the mode of 
thought that defined the sixteenth and seventeenth century: representation.167 Foucault also 
notes that the Kantian Critique, by rehabilitating metaphysics
opens up at the same time the possibility o f another metaphysics ; one whose purpose will be to 
question, apart from representation, all that is the source and origin o f representation ; it makes 
possible those philosophies o f Life, o f the Will, and o f the Word, that the nineteenth century is to 
deploy in the wake o f criticism.168
Kant’s Critique, therefore, opens up the possibility for philosophies o f ‘Life’ (i.e., life as a 
transcendent form) such as - arguably - those of Bergson and Canguilhem (see Chapter 6).
165 Foucault (2004), p. 250. Rheinberger (1997a), p. 20, notes how Foucault (and Jacob) focus a little too 
much on organization as the identifying trait o f the ‘living’ and as the defining concept o f the emerging 
discipline o f biology without taking into account the ‘interindividual and intraspecific dimensions that most 
... concepts gained around 1800. Instead o f referring, as in earlier times, to individual bodies, organic 
functions like generation, growth, development, nutrition, and sensation were increasingly perceived as 
reproductive functions physically constituting the unity o f species’ .
166 Mathiot (1993), p. 194: notes that the problem o f the living knowing itself as living is not particularly 
modem but goes back to Aristotle. Aristotle regarded it as a privileged position o f knowledge, rather than as 
an obstacle to knowledge. The difference is that in Aristotle’s day ‘life’ was not regarded as a concept in 
itself.
167 Foucault (2004), p. 255.
168 Foucault (2006), p. 264.
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I argue that the representation of ‘life’ as condition and limit of possibility can be traced 
back to Kant’s inclusion and exclusion of living processes from reason. Kant introduced the 
idea that living processes represent the boundary between the knowable and the 
unknowable; this is what unifies the manifold living processes. It is this that these processes 
have ‘in common’ and what therefore, from Kant’s explanation onwards, defines them as 
‘living’. Most philosophers since Kant have represented life or living processes both as 
engendering knowledge and as limiting, escaping, or overflowing it.169 According to 
Foucault, it is the impossibility of knowing life through reason or through lived experience 
that motivates the search for 7a connaissance de la vie’ and the discipline of biology as 
such.170
Agamben also points out the particularity of the modem notion of ‘life’. He contrasts it 
with how Aristotle explored life without ever proposing a definition of it and without ever 
representing life as a concept as such. Rather, Aristotle ‘decomposed’ life (which, of
171course, is in itself a modem reading of Aristotle) into its various functions. According to 
Agamben, it was Aristotle’s representation of life as a variety of functions that could be 
distinguished and combined that made the subsequent emergence of a unitary conception of 
life possible.172 What characterizes the modem concept of ‘life’ is its indeterminacy and 
lack of definition that - arguably - provides it with its multidisciplinary relevance and
1 71strategic potential.
The modem notion of ‘life’ was still prevalent at the beginning of the twentieth century, but 
perhaps less prominent. In order for the discipline of biology to develop it was necessary to 
focus on specific questions regarding living processes rather than on biology’s self­
justification as a discipline through reference to a unified notion of ‘life’.174However, the 
notion of ‘life’ was revived after the Second World War this time with a more specific aim: 
to assess the character and contribution of ‘new’ disciplines such as biochemistry and 
molecular biology and attribute a place to them in relation to biology. However, apart from 
the political or strategic role that the notion of ‘life’ fulfilled during that time, it seemed - in
169 Dagognet (1997), p. 175: a ‘vitality that overflows intelligence (like Nietzschean normativity with its 
fringe o f insubordination)’.
170 Ibid., p. 120.
171 Agamben (2002), pp. 26-27.
172 Ibid., p. 28.
173 Ibid., p. 26.
174 Lenoir (1982), p. 1.
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its traditional form - no longer very productive for addressing the various aspects of living
1 75processes. Research no longer, or perhaps had never, required a unified notion of life.
Nevertheless, discussions on the possibility and ways of knowing living processes in the 
contemporary life and social sciences still seem to rely on the modem concept o f ‘life’ and 
on the particular relation between knowledge and life that it depends on. Such discussions 
often focus on the irreducibility of biological processes and on the inability of analytical 
thought to adequately capture such processes. The empirical diversity and contingency of 
living processes that Kant referred to in order to explain why such processes are ‘beyond 
reason’ are often referred to in recent discussions in terms o f ‘contingency’, ‘emergence’, 
and ‘complexity’. As Bergson observed:
[I]n fact, we do indeed feel that not one o f the categories o f our thought - unity, multiplicity, 
mechanical causality, intelligent finality, etc. - applies exactly to the things o f  life: who can say 
where individuality begins and ends, whether the living being is one or many, whether it is the cells 
which associate themselves into the organism or the organism which dissociates itself into cells? In 
vain we force the living into this or that one o f our molds ( ‘cadres^. All the molds crack. They are 
too narrow, above all too rigid, for what we try to put into them.1 6
Kant himself said that living processes cannot be captured through the categories but 
require their own regulative principle of judgment. Although the modem concept o f ‘life’ 
seems to be productive because it creates a domain of knowledge specifically for living 
processes, knowledge is at the same time put beyond reach of such processes. The notion of 
‘life’ itself represents a particular relation, or rather an ongoing articulation and negotiation 
of a relation, between knowledge and life. How does Canguilhem confront this Kantian 
problematic that has come to define the modem life sciences?
175 Cf. Goldstein (1995), p. 26.
176 Bergson (1975), p. xx.
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PART IV
4.1 Canguilhem’s lateral engagement
4.1.1 The French critique o f  Critique
Canguilhem is not the first or the only French philosopher to engage critically with the 
ideas that Kant elaborated in his three Critiques.177 The form that various criticisms take is 
very much determined by the particular interests of the respective philosophers. Bergson, 
for example, focuses mostly on Kant’s notions of space and time in relation to living 
processes with which he contrasts his own idea of ‘duree\ characterizing living processes
1 na
as inherently temporal.
Bachelard addresses two different aspects of Kant’s theory. First, he argues - more 
generally - that any philosophy is necessarily only adequate in a particular historical and 
scientific context. This argument limits the relevance of Kant’s own system to the time in
170which he wrote, thereby undermining the universal validity that Kant aspired to. Second, 
Bachelard points out how the mind’s constitution of objects is mediated through 
instruments rather than through categories. These instruments can themselves transform a
1 SOtheory of knowledge or understanding when they are regarded as ‘theories materialized’.
Foucault, similarly to Bachelard, focuses on how conditions of knowledge are not universal 
a priori, but contingent and historical. He, furthermore, focuses on ‘transgression’ rather 
than on the ‘limitation’ that characterizes Kant’s work.181 More importantly, Foucault 
emphasizes that modem rationality promotes the autonomy and universality of reason while 
it depends on contingent processes in order to establish that reason.182 He also argues that 
concepts do not necessarily introduce a distance between knowledge and life. Rather,
I O'!
concepts should be regarded as representing a certain way of living through knowing. 
This idea of the concept as a form or technique of living can be traced back to Canguilhem.
77 See Gutting (2005b), pp. 3-6, for Kant’s influence on French philosophers generally.
78 Bergson (1908), pp. 222-237. For Kant’s understanding o f  space, see Chapter 3 (para. 2.2.3).
79 See Lecourt (1974), p. 49.
80 Lecourt (1975), pp. 137-138; ibid., p. 120; see also Rheinberger (2005a) on the notion o f  
phenomenotechnique’ and the epistemic function o f technology in Bachelard’s philosophy.
Foucault (1984), p. 45. Kant’s work does not focus on limitation as such, but on the functioning o f reason.
82 Foucault (1978), p. xii.
83 Ibid., p. xviii.
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Foucault hinted at the idea that the significance of Canguilhem’s work lies in the way in 
which it engages with modem rationality. More specifically, Canguilhem seems to expose 
and follow through on the ‘undercurrent’ of the relation between knowledge and life that 
runs through Kant’s work through his idea of a ‘connaissance de la vie’ (see Chapter 5, 
para. 3.2.1). I argue that Canguilhem’s work can be read as an effort to, in Foucault’s 
words, let reason ‘free itself from itself. Canguilhem does not dismantle or deconstruct the 
rationality proposed by Kant. This would only be possible through an employment of 
reason and would, therefore, not challenge reason itself. Canguilhem’s approach is much 
more unconventional and inconspicuous.
4,1.2 The *possibility o f possibility'
In Chapter 1 ,1 pointed out how Nietzsche receives very little mention in Canguilhem’s 
work even though he - arguably - represents one of the greatest influences on Canguilhem’s 
thought. He only refers to Nietzsche a few times and, when he does, seems to attribute a 
way of thinking to him that runs contrary to his own. Similarly, although Kant’s thought 
clearly represents Canguilhem’s biggest challenge, he mostly refers to Kant with regard to 
the latter’s idea of the self-generation of organisms. Such ‘lateral’ engagement with the 
philosophers that influenced his work seems slightly confusing. However, it can be argued 
that Canguilhem’s focus on self-generation in Kant’s work performs a particular function.
Rather than focusing on the subject of Kant’s theory of understanding - i.e. not the subject 
of knowledge but the autonomy of reason - and seeking to challenge that autonomy, 
Canguilhem focuses on that which makes such autonomy possible. As Heidegger would 
say, Canguilhem does not focus on the possibility of the autonomy of reason but on the 
possibility of that which makes that autonomy possible.184 Canguilhem does not discuss the 
epigenesis analogy specifically but by addressing the idea of self-generation reveals the 
way in which Kant’s rationality already contains within itself the conditions for its own 
dismantling.
Whereas Kant excludes life from knowledge in order to establish the autonomy of reason, 
Canguilhem includes life in knowledge - or rather knowledge in life - by representing
184 Heidegger (1997), p. 7: Heidegger says that one should not focus on the possibility o f  knowledge, but on 
the possibility o f that which makes knowledge possible.
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knowledge as one, and the most privileged, of life’s forms.185 Although Canguilhem argued 
that knowledge is a form of life, this does not make him an empiricist in the sense that he 
derives knowledge from life or from experience. Canguilhem does not reason from a 
distinction between experience and understanding, or life and knowledge, at all. Indeed, he 
does not reason from reason. Rather, he argues that the living can only be known through 
living and not through reason or judgment.187 This points towards the political motivation 
behind Canguilhem’s work.
4.1,3 Canguilhem’s vital politics
The political motivation for Kant’s project was, as described above, the liberation of man 
from his self-incurred tutelage through the autonomy of reason. The justification for this 
idea was very much linked to the political situation of the time. It is unlikely that 
Canguilhem, writing almost two centuries later, would have had the same political 
motivation as Kant. Rather, Canguilhem - like Bachelard before him - sought to challenge 
the rationality that Kant proposed; something that had been topical in French philosophy,
1 98and French philosophy of science, for at least a few decades. Bachelard, who sought to 
question reason through physics rather than the life sciences, said that no matter how much
1 8Qwe try to become rationalists, ‘la vie se met en trovers'. Bachelard did not elaborate on 
this statement, although he probably realized that it could be taken quite literally.
Bergson pointed to the necessity of inquiring into life when questioning knowledge or 
reason:
[T]his amounts to saying that theory o f  knowledge and theory o f  life seem to us inseparable. A theory 
o f life that is not accompanied by a criticism o f knowledge is obliged to accept, as they stand, the 
concepts which the understanding puts at its disposal: it can but enclose the facts, willing or not, in 
pre-existing frames which it regards as ultimate... On the other hand, a theory o f knowledge which 
does not replace the intellect in the general evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames of  
knowledge have been constructed nor how we can enlarge or go beyond them. It is necessary that
185 See Bowker & Latour (1987), pp. 740-741, on the French emphasis on epistemology in relation to the 
sciences.
186 Lecourt (1975), p. 185, suggests that Canguilhem’s identification oflife and concept puts him ‘in the camp 
o f empiricist theories o f knowledge’.
187 Goldstein (1995), p. 22: Canguilhem was probably inspired by Goldstein’s realization that “‘biological 
knowledge is a form o f biological being.” Biological knowledge is possible because of the similarity between 
human nature and human knowledge’.
188 Judt (1992), p. 76: ‘A skeptical rejection o f both conventional rationalism and the optimistic neo-Kantian 
heritage o f the academic French tradition had already marked a generation o f young thinkers.’
189 See Dagognet (1985), p. 38.
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these two inquiries, theory o f knowledge and theory o f life, should join each other, and, by a circular 
process, push each other on unceasingly.190
Kant complied with Bergson’s statement by referring to life in order to explain the 
constitution of his categories and their correspondence to the world. However, he 
subsequently sought to limit the role that life plays in his theory by formulating the 
epigenesis analogy and by representing this analogy as a mere illustration that is otherwise 
inconsequential. In this way, Kant undoubtedly sought to avoid the risk that Bergson was 
referring to, namely that his carefully construed moulds (‘cadres' ) of thought - or 
categories of understanding - would be stretched or surpassed.
In contrast to Bachelard, Canguilhem addresses reason or rationality through the life 
sciences and therefore confronts the problematic core that lies at the heart of modem 
rationality directly. He focuses on reason not in order to condemn it but in order to 
‘mobilize’ or ‘derigidify’ it.191 Canguilhem himself is in many ways a rationalist, even if he 
does not agree with the distinction between life and knowledge upon which Kant’s 
particular rationality is based.192 When Foucault said that the rationality that threatens life 
is the same rationality as that of life itself, Canguilhem responded: ‘But let’s say there is 
rationality and rationality’.193
Canguilhem only wishes to call himself a rationalist ‘if one understands by reason not so 
much the power to perceive essential aspects of the reality of things or of thought, as the 
power to determine normative aspects of life experience’.194 In other words, reason is not 
so much - as it is traditionally regarded - about perceiving order in the world as it is about 
the power to institute norms regarding lived experience. Reason is not primarily about 
knowledge, understanding, or cognition. Rather, it is a normative project that functions 
through the imposition of norms on life and living processes. It is this imposition of norms 
that makes knowledge possible; knowledge is, therefore, only a consequence of a project of 
rationalization and normalization (see Chapter 6, para. 3.2.2).
190 Bergson (1975), p. xxiii-xxiv.
191 Dagognet (1985), p. 37.
192 Ibid.: Dagognet speaks o f  lun vitalisme rationneV or ‘un rationalisme applique vivant’. Cf. Canguilhem 
(1994a): this probably inspired the title o f this book; Bowker & Latour (1987): pp. 725 and 740-741.
193 Canguilhem (2002), p. 340 (my translation).
194 Canguilhem (1947), p. 332, referring to Bachelard’s statement: ‘Rationalist? We are trying to become it 
. . . ’ (My translation).
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Although in Kant’s system living processes cannot be known, they can be judged according 
to their conformity to a norm or concept. It is this necessary subjection of the living to 
normative standards that Canguilhem finds objectionable. The political motivation of 
Canguilhem’s project is not the liberation of man from his self-incurred tutelage, as it was 
for Kant. It is the liberation of reason from itself, as Foucault said.195 The consequence of 
this liberation of reason is the liberation of vivants from normative judgment and 
anthropological scrutiny. Canguilhem challenges the relation between life and knowledge 
that Kant proposes, because it makes it impossible for an organism to be regarded on its 
own terms. For Kant, the organism is compared to what it ‘ought to be’ thereby enabling a 
subject to judge it.196 This institutes the idea of the ‘normal’ in relation to the living, a term 
that has become central in medicine and that Canguilhem questions in his thesis in 
medicine.197
However, Canguilhem does not merely ‘liberate’ vivants from normative judgment. Rather, 
I argue that he radically transforms the understanding of the ‘normative’. His notion of 
‘vital normativity’ does not concern normativity from the perspective of a subject 
exercising normative judgment (see Chapter 6). I argue that Canguilhem’s idea of ‘vital 
normativity’ corresponds with a contemporary focus on contingency and emergence. It no 
longer seems necessary to unify the manifold living processes in order to make them 
intelligible. Rather, the manifold represents its own normativity and in order for it to be 
known, it is this normativity or contingency that must be understood. This raises the 
question of whether this normativity can still be understood by reference to a traditional 
understanding of knowledge (see Chapters 5 and 6).
CONCLUSION
It has been argued that the recent engagement of the social sciences with the life sciences 
revolves around the suggestion that modem rationality is defined by the way in which life 
has come to lie at the basis of knowledge. I have argued that the particular representation of 
life as that which grounds knowledge and at the same time eludes it can be traced back to 
the work of Kant. His idea of the autonomy of reason was established by reference to the 
idea of an ‘epigenesis of pure reason’ and a subsequent exclusion of life from reason
195 Foucault (1985), p. xii.
196 Ginsborg (1997), p. 340; Ginsborg (2001), p. 251.
197 Canguilhem (2006).
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through the idea of the ‘lawlikeness of the contingent’. I have explained the reason for the 
recurring negotiation of the relation between knowledge and life that Kant established with 
reference to Kant’s own negotiation of the historicity and vitality of his a priori.
I have subsequently argued that, as Foucault suggested, the significance of Canguilhem’s 
work must be sought in how it engages with modem rationality. Canguilhem’s work can be 
read as an effort to let reason ‘free itself from itself by introducing the idea of knowledge 
as a form or technique of life and the idea of a ‘vital normativity’ - to be addressed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. Canguilhem’s engagement with some of the most basic 
forms of modem rationality is further explored in the following chapters. The first concept 
to be addressed is that of ‘environment’.
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3. T h e  E n v ir o n m e n t
p a r t i
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 The problematic notion o f *environment'
In a footnote in his book Social Systems, Niklas Luhmann observes:
[T]he length o f time required to learn [the concept o f environment] testifies to the difficulty o f  
the idea. Ever since the sixteenth century, word compounds containing ‘se lf  and ‘Selbsf have 
proliferated in Europe. Yet a good two hundred years were needed before anyone noticed that 
this presupposes an environment.1
The footnote refers to Canguilhem’s work on the notion of ‘milieu’. The question that - 
at least indirectly - informs both the inquiries of Luhmann and Canguilhem is: why does 
Western rationality find the concept of the environment so problematic? Different 
disciplines, including - perhaps most instructively - the life sciences, have sought to 
come to grips with this notion through continuous efforts to rethink the concept of 
environment.
Recently, there has been a critical inquiry into the relation between individual and 
environment in the life sciences. Such inquiry is guided by the question, as formulated 
by Bateson, ‘what sort of thing is this, which we call “organism plus environment”?’. 
In ‘developmental systems theory’,4 for example, the traditional relation between 
individual and environment is reconsidered through notions such as that of ‘system’ and 
‘constructivist interaction’.5 The objective is to ‘replace conventional wisdom’s 
“interaction” between separate and independently defined organisms and environments’ 
with the idea that ‘organisms and their environments define the relevant aspects of, and 
can affect, each other. This is called the “interpenetration” of organism and
1 Luhmann (1996), pp. 537-538 (Ch. 5, n. 2 ). Luhmann often addresses important issues in footnotes, see 
e.g. Winthrop-Young (2003), pp. 311 and 333.
2 Canguilhem (2003), pp. 165-197 (‘Le vivant et son milieu’).
3 Bateson (2000), p. 455.
4 Oyama (2000), p. 2.
5 Ibid., p. 6 and 3.
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environment.’6 Furthermore, a shift in focus is proposed from ‘“genes and environment” 
to a multiplicity of entities, influences, and environments’.7 The notion of the 
environment as a singularly defined entity, or as one term in the individual/environment 
relation, is at the same time contested and repeated. The rejection of the traditional 
notion of environment seems to make any inquiry into the concept irrelevant.
I argue that Canguilhem’s discussion of the ‘milieu’ reveals how the concept of 
‘environment’ cannot be rethought if the problem that this concept preserves is left 
unaddressed. If one wishes to challenge the traditional relation between environment 
and individual, then the notion of environment should not be rejected or transcended. 
Rather, Canguilhem turns ‘environment’ into a concept - or a ‘category of contemporary 
thought’8 (see para. 1.1.2 below) - in order to probe its problematic character.
Canguilhem observes that a biological theory of environment has yet to be formulated.9 
The notion of environment was originally elaborated in physics. Most disciplines, 
including the social sciences, continue to rely on the idea of environment as a ‘physical 
fact’. Canguilhem observed : ‘the environment is considered as a physical fact, not as a 
biological fact, as an already constituted fact and not as a fact to be constituted’.10 The 
assumption of the environment as fact stands in the way of the elaboration of a genuine 
biological concept of environment.
Paradoxically, however, Canguilhem seems to suggest that in order to develop a 
biological concept of environment the physical notion of environment should not be 
dismissed. Rather, we should return to its origins. He shows how the idea of ‘milieu’ 
introduced into physics by Newton did not resemble the ‘physical fact’ that the 
environment has since come to represent. In fact, Canguilhem argues that it was only 
the introduction of the notion of ‘milieu’ into the life sciences that lead to its 
transformation into a ‘physical fact’. He describes the surprising subtlety of Newton’s 
original notion of ‘milieu’, implicitly suggesting that its inherent ambiguity and
6 Ibid., p. 3, referring to Lewontin.
7 Ibid., p. 3.
8 Canguilhem (2003), p. 165.
9 Ibid., p. 123: ‘But a general theory o f the milieu, from an authentically biological point o f view, remains 
to be elaborated ... as von Uexkull has sought to do for the animal and Goldstein for the ill.’ (My 
translation)
10 Canguilhem (1978), p. 177.
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association with action might be productive for the elaboration of a biological concept 
of environment.
1.1,2 A  ‘category o f contemporary thought*
Canguilhem wrote as an introduction to his essay ‘Le vivant et son milieu':11
[T]he notion o f milieu is in the process o f becoming a universal and obligatory mode o f grasping
the experience and existence o f living beings and one could almost speak o f  its constitution as a12category o f contemporary thought.
In this essay, he traces the formation of the concept of environment and assesses its
11significance for ‘a philosophy of nature centred on the problem of individuality’. The 
environment is often represented as differentiated from - and as the precondition for the 
emergence of - the individual. In spite of that function, or perhaps because of it, the 
question of environment has never been as central as the question of the individual. 
Canguilhem shows how the life sciences tirelessly shift emphasis from one term of the 
individual/environment relation to the other.14 The significance of ‘environment’ as a 
concept in itself and the consequences of its use, however, remain largely unexplored.
What might Canguilhem’s statement, cited above, mean? What potential is attributed to 
the concept of ‘milieu’ as ‘category of contemporary thought’? It may not be entirely 
coincidental that the term ‘category of thought’ seemingly refers to the Kantian notion 
of the category as a principle of understanding (Chapter 2). However, whereas the 
Kantian category represents a condition of possibility of understanding, the 
characterization of ‘milieu’ as a category of contemporary thought locates the 
emergence of that concept in a particular time and a particular rationality.15
The ‘milieu’ can also be regarded as a medium through which different rationalities are 
negotiated. For example, Kant’s focus on the subject as the centre of his theory of 
understanding necessitates a particular interpretation of environment as ‘space’ (see 
para. 2.2.3 below). The recognition of the significance of environment by Canguilhem
11 Canguilhem (2003), pp. 165-197.
12 Ibid., p. 165 (my translation).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., pp. 182-184.
15 See, e.g., Foucault (2004), p. 13. It might be that this idea inspired Foucault’s notion o f Episteme’.
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and, subsequently, Luhmann opens up a different rationality in which any privileged 
centre of reference becomes either impossible or provisional (see para. 4.1 below).
1.1.3 The ambiguity o f *milieu *
Canguilhem’s identification of the concept of ‘milieu’ as an important theoretical notion 
is of renewed relevance at a time when the relation between individual and environment 
is being thoroughly reconsidered. In what follows, ‘milieu’ is to be understood as a 
‘category’ or a kind of meta-concept that manifests itself in various ways and migrates 
across disciplines.161 argue that its intrinsic ambiguity contributes to its potential as a 
theoretical notion.
This ambiguity is, first of all, linguistic. The French word imilieu> is indeterminate and 
ambiguous: it can mean middle or centre, medium, and surroundings.17 The English 
translation of ‘environment’, as well as the German ‘Umgebung’, is less ambiguous and 
usually refers to external surroundings. In the following paragraphs, the words 
‘environment’ and ‘milieu’ are used interchangeably; the use of either term will be 
emphasized when it has particular theoretical significance.
The ambiguity of the ‘milieu’ is also conceptual. The environment can be regarded as 
external surroundings with reference to a centre and as a relative medium that calls such 
centres of reference into question. The notion of ‘milieu’, furthermore, calls into 
question the traditional distinction between inside (organism) and outside (environment) 
(see para. 2.2.1 below).
1.1.4 Consequences o f conceptualizing Environment’
Lack of attention for the environment as a concept might indicate its relative lack of 
significance or it might be attributed to the difficulty of engaging with its inherent
16 Canguilhem (2003), p. 165, referring to the various usages o f ‘milieu’ in geography, biology, 
psychology, technology, and economic and social history.
Deleuze & Guattari (1999), p. xvii, also make use o f this ambiguity.
elusiveness.18 The intention here is not to argue that the environment is just as 
important, or more important, than the individual.19 Rather, I argue that the notion itself 
is representative of a particular rationality and that the different ways in which it is 
deployed has significant consequences for a theory.
There is little point in asking what the environment ‘is’. First, the concept of the 
environment tends to dissolve, or at least destabilize, ontological entities and centres of 
reference. Second, the notion represents many different things in many different 
instances. So the better question is what the environment does as a figure of thought and 
what the specific consequences are of its use. Three potential difficulties arise in 
addressing this question.
The first is that the question itself suggests the existence of a coherent theoretical notion 
that lends itself to discussion.20 Any discussion of a concept runs the risk of identifying 
certain usages and manifestations at the expense of others. Canguilhem addressed the 
use of the notion of environment in different periods and contexts, but he also believed 
that its productivity or its potential could transcend these different usages.
The second difficulty is that ‘environment’ is usually represented as one term of the 
individual/environment relation. The focus of inquiry tends to shift towards the 
individual while the environment is merely regarded in relation to, and as constitutive 
of, this individual. To avoid this drift to the individual is not to see the environment as 
something separate from - and opposed to - the individual; it is only to explore the 
potential of the concept in its own terms.
The third difficulty is that foregrounding the environment risks turning it into an 
absolute notion thereby causing it to lose one of its most important characteristics: its 
relativity or ambiguity.21 However, as Canguilhem recognized, it is only by means of
18 Schiitz (1997), p. 275: ‘[T]he very notion o f an environment o f the social system is in constant danger 
o f retreating back into invisibility and o f lapsing back into in its habitual dwelling place o f unsolved 
(unproblematized) complexity: the onto-epistemological trap, or the limbo o f knowledge that swallows 
and holds captured those phenomena which are too general and too present to be perceived’.
19 See Oyama (2000), p. 18, refers to arguments taking the form o f ‘the environment is important, too’.
20 Hage (1978), p. 103: attempts have been made ‘to find some general variable such as stability or 
turbulence or complexity. Most o f these studies have emphasized a single variable which is then used to 
characterize the entire environment’.
21 Canguilhem (2003), p. 167.
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such a foregrounding that one can reveal the potential of ‘milieu’ as a ‘category of 
contemporary thought’.
1.2 Traditional representations of ‘milieu’
1.2.1 The environment as resource or ‘conditions o f life ’
One of the most common understandings of environment is that it constitutes a 
resource; something that enables or sustains the development of an organism and its 
characteristics. This understanding of environment represents it as a more or less 
accessible ‘outside’ to an organism. However, inquiry into the historical formulation of 
the interrelation between organism and environment in relation to heredity shows how
[t]he organic processes o f transmission, development, nutrition, and adaptation were not
distinguished in early modem theories o f generation, nor were, in consequence, inherited,
connate and acquired properties o f  organisms. Nature and nurture, or heredity and environment,
22were not yet seen as oppositions.
Apart from the distinction between organism and environment, the role of environment 
in relation to the organism has been subject to significant change. Foucault described, 
with reference to Cuvier, how differences between species were initially explained by 
reference to variations in classification rather than by reference to the influence of 
external factors on living beings. Differentiation was only later linked to the external 
environment:
[EJxtemal factors are no longer, as for natural history, mere occasions for the appearance o f  
species whose natures and interrelations are already determined by their place in the system of  
representation. For modem biology, the nature o f a species is causally dependent on the 
environment in which its members exist.23
How did these shifts in thinking the relation of environment to organism come about? 
First, how did environment come to be regarded as distinct from organism? And second, 
how did environment come to be regarded as a resource sustaining life, as a potential 
danger or threat, and - only subsequently - as a necessary component in the creation and 
transformation of different life forms?
22 MUller-Wille and Rheinberger (2007), pp. 3-4.
23 Gutting (1989), p. 191.
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It could be argued that contemporary biology still relies on, and struggles to overcome, 
the relation between organism and environment that Darwin elaborated.24 Darwin was, 
arguably, the first to formulate a distinct difference between internal and external 
processes.25 Contrary to Lamarck, he represented the variation of organisms as a process 
that did not primarily rely on an environment. The organism and environment were 
represented as having two separate histories; their only interaction was through the 
process of selection.26
Darwin discussed environment by reference to, what he called, ‘physical conditions of 
life’. However, he did not explore these conditions in detail; the most prominent
examples he gave were that of climate and food. Rather, his focus was on the ‘co­
adaptations’ of organic beings to each other and to these external conditions:28
How have all those exquisite adaptations o f one part o f the organisation to another part, and to 
the conditions o f life, and o f one distinct organic being to another being, been perfected? We see 
these beautiful co-adaptations most plainly in the woodpecker and mistletoe; and only a little less 
plainly in the humblest parasite which clings to the hairs o f a quadruped or feathers o f  a bird; in 
the structure o f the beetle which dives through the water; in the plumed seed which is wafted by
the gentlest breeze; in short, we see beautiful adaptations everywhere and in every part o f the
29organic world.
Apart from these adaptations, Darwin argued that it is ‘preposterous’ to attribute 
variation solely to the various conditions of life. Since he believed that the ‘direct
q 1
effects’ of external conditions on variation were negligible, he focused mainly on the 
relation between organic beings and their effects upon each other. In other words, the 
environment of an organism is mostly represented by other organic beings rather than 
by the physical conditions of life. Despite Darwin’s focus on organisms, it has been 
argued that the organism in fact merely represents a ‘passive medium’ or a ‘passive 
nexus of independent external and internal forces’ in his work, that allowed him to
qq
explain the processes of adaptation and evolution.
24 Lewontin (2000), p. 43.
25 Ibid, p. 42.
26 Ibid.
27 Darwin (1998), p. 5.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, pp. 48-49.
30 Ibid, p. 4.
31 Ibid, p. 10.
32 Canguilhem (2003), pp. 175-176.
33 Lewontin (2000), pp. 44 and 47; See also Lewontin (1991), p. xv.
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Lewontin observes that Darwin’s distinction between organism and environment, or 
inside and outside, has been productive:
Darwin’s alienation o f the outside from the inside was an absolutely essential step in the 
development o f modem biology. Without it, we would still be wallowing in the mire o f an 
obscurantist holism that merged the organic and the inorganic into an unanalyzable whole.34
Although Darwin’s representation of the ‘conditions of life’ as a variety of external 
factors anticipated the role of environment with reference to a particular organism, it did 
not yet explain it. The physical conditions of life merely represented the raw material 
‘from which environments may be built’; environment being ‘the penumbra of external 
conditions that are relevant to [an organism]’.35 His discussion of external conditions 
also reinforced and facilitated the idea of environment as a place or space that exists 
separately from the individual organism and influences its existence.36
1,2.2 The environment as space or location
Another traditional understanding of environment represents it as a space, a location, or 
a technological medium that living forms inhabit or through which they travel. This 
spatial connotation of the notion of environment can be productive. For example, it calls 
into question the largely artificial and conceptual limits and boundaries between entities 
through the contingency of the inside/outside distinction. However, this distinction must 
itself not be regarded as referring to actual locations. It is merely a useful tool to discuss 
the functioning of living processes (see para. 2.2.1 below). Nevertheless, the 
environment can take the form of a geographical space or location in a particular 
instance. The environment understood as a space is only one of many ways in which 
thought about the environment manifests itself. It is illustrative of a kind of thinking that 
relies on reference to individual entities or centres.
34 Ibid., p. 47.
35 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
36Ibid., p. 53. However, ‘it is, in general, not possible to understand the geographical and temporal 
distribution o f  species if  the environment is characterized as a property o f the physical region, rather than 
of the space defined by the activities o f the organism itself.
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The interest in the environment as space is influenced and reinforced by a recent focus 
on the transmission, distribution, and translation of objects.37 Although such processes 
perhaps presuppose a certain notion of ‘space’, this notion does not correspond with 
traditional ideas of space as ‘territory’. As Luhmann says: ‘territoriality is an entirely 
atypical, rather exotic bounding principle, one that tends to disturb normal societal 
mobility’.38 Space is no longer regarded as geographical, but as an active factor (or 
actor) in the transformation and mobilization of entities. Nevertheless, the interpretation 
of environment as space continues to rely on the identification and location of entities 
circulating in that space.
Canguilhem points out that the traditional notion of space does not fit comfortably with 
living processes in particular. Reference should be made instead to a ‘topology’, 
because traditional notions of space and distance are put into question by the self- 
generative character of ‘vivants’. Canguilhem observes:
[T]o understand the ‘vivant’ one needs to refer to a non-metrical theory o f space, this means a
science o f order, a topology ... A biological form, says Aristotle, is not a schema, it is not a
geometrical form. This is true. Within an organism, considered in and for itself, there is no distance,
the whole is everywhere present to its pseudo-parts. That which distinguishes the ‘vivant’ is precisely
39this, to the extent that it is ‘vivant’, it is not at a distance from itself.
The different notions of ‘milieu’ that will be addressed in the following paragraphs - 
Bernard’s ‘milieu interieur\ von Uexkull’s ‘UmweW, and Luhmann’s ‘environment’ - 
can easily be mistaken for representations of space. However, I argue that Bernard used 
the contingency of the inside/outside distinction in order to describe the self-regulation 
of organisms. Von Uexkull described the Umwelt not as space but as a set of signals 
whose existence and meaning depends on the value those signals have for a particular 
living being. Luhmann’s notion of environment does not represent the ‘in which’ 
differentiation takes place. Rather, the environment ‘takes place’ itself because it is an 
effect of the continuous differentiation between system and environment. I argue that 
Luhmann’s notion of environment does not rely on a centre of reference which it
37 Thrift (2006). Thrift describes a relatively recent ‘spatial turn’ by reference to Latour’s actor-network 
theory and Deleuze and Guattari’s idea o f  ‘plane’. However, Latour’s ideas are arguably more about 
networks and processes o f translation than about space, while Deleuze and Guattari’s idea o f ‘plane’ 
precisely challenges what they call ‘territorialization’.
Luhmann (1996), p. 195.
39 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 362-363 (my translation).
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surrounds but that the notion is used precisely to unseat such centres of reference. 
Besides, his theory is temporal rather than spatial.40
Other theorists, such as Deleuze and Guattari, also refer to spatial notions such as the 
‘plane’. However, this notion is precisely employed to get away from what they call a 
‘territorialization of milieus’.41 Deleuze and Guattari use the notion of ‘milieus’ in order 
to focus on acceleration rather than location 42 How can the notion of environment be 
associated with action or movement rather than location?
1.2.3 The environment and action
According to Nietzsche, the life sciences of his time focused too much on the 
environment as a set of external conditions. He observed:
[T]he influence o f  external circumstances is overestimated by Darwin to a ridiculous extent: the 
essential thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force 
working from within which utilizes and exploits ‘external circumstances’.
It was these forces that required explanation rather than the idea of the environment as 
an amalgamation of external circumstances that influenced the individual organism. 
Nietzsche elaborated his own ideas on these forces by reference to Newton’s notion of 
force in physics:
[T]he victorious concept ‘force’, by means o f which our physicists have created God and the 
world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as ‘will 
to power’, i.e. as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of  
power, as a creative drive, etc. Physicists cannot eradicate action at a distance from their 
principles; nor can they eradicate a repellent force (or an attracting one) ... In the case o f an 
animal, it is possible to trace all its drives to the will to power; likewise all the functions of  
organic life to this source 44
Nietzsche developed his ideas on forces through his notion of ‘will to power’. He 
represented this notion as an alternative to the forces in physics that, according to him,
40 Luhmann (1996), p. 41, systems theory begins with ‘the fact that nothing remains as it is’; ibid., p. 385: 
‘Space is constituted ... by the assumption that two things cannot occupy the same space at the same 
time.’
41 Deleuze & Guattari (1999), p. 314.
42 Ibid., p. 25: ‘The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. 
Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to another and back again, 
but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away.’
43 Nietzsche (1968), p. 344.
44 Ibid., pp. 332-333.
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lacked motivation and creative potential. What Nietzsche calls ‘will’ can never be 
imagined as singular or as corresponding to the intention of a subject.45 Rather, it 
signifies ‘will upon will’ or forces acting upon other forces.46 Deleuze describes this as 
follows:
Every force is thus essentially related to another force. The being o f force is plural, it would be 
absolutely absurd to think about force in the singular ... A plurality o f forces acting and being 
affected at distance, distance being the differential element included in each force and by which 
each is related to others - this is the principle o f Nietzsche’s philosophy o f nature. The critique o f  
atomism must be understood in terms o f this principle. It consists in showing that atomism 
attempts to impart to matter an essential plurality and distance which in fact belongs only to 
force.47
The influence of Newton’s physics on Nietzsche’s ideas of force will become apparent 
in para. 2.1 below.
Foucault, in turn, was undoubtedly influenced by Nietzsche when he elaborated his 
notion of ‘dehors'.4* Deleuze notes how this idea should be distinguished from space or 
exteriority.49 It enables Foucault’s idea of power as forces acting on, and affecting, other 
forces. Deleuze describes this as ‘a physics of action, it is a physics of abstract action’.50 
The environment, once distinguished from its association with space or location, can 
now be interpreted as ‘a set of actions upon other actions’.51
In a similar way, Luhmann employs the notion of environment in order to represent 
autopoietic reproduction as ‘action out of action’, thereby introducing a ‘“subject- 
free” concept of action’.53 In Nietzsche, Foucault, and Luhmann action can no longer be 
traced back to an individual. Their particular use of the notion of environment or 
‘milieu’ is instrumental; it is no longer regarded as surroundings with reference to a 
centre but as a medium that facilitates action.
45 Ibid., pp. 369 and 335: ‘We cannot think o f  an attraction divorced from an intention. - The will to take 
possession o f a thing or to defend oneself against it and repel it - that, we ‘understand’: that would be an 
interpretation o f which we could make use. In short: the psychological necessity for a belief in causality 
lies in the inconceivability o f an event divorced from intent.’
46 Ibid., p. 347; See Pottage (1998b) for an exploration o f this idea in Foucault and Luhmann.
47 Deleuze (1983) pp. 6-7.
48 Foucault (1986).
49 Deleuze (1999), p. 72.
50 Ibid., p. 60.
51 Ibid., p. 59, citing Foucault.
52 Luhmann (1996), p. 110.
53 Luhmann (1996), p. 118.
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As Deleuze says: ‘But when there are only environments and whatever lies between 
them (‘milieux et des entre-deux’) ... there is a liberation of forces which come from the 
outside and exist only in a mixed-up state of agitation, modification and mutation.’54 
While the environment as a physical space can be easily imagined, the environment 
understood as ‘action out of action’ or as forces that act upon other forces is more 
difficult to grasp.55
PART II
2.1 A history of aether
2.1.1 The dynamic origins o f ‘milieu *
It would be difficult to claim that the notion of ‘milieu’ has always existed, or, by 
contrast, that it did not exist at all until a certain identifiable point in time.56 However, it 
can at least be said that no particularly coherent concept of it existed before the 
eighteenth century. The question then is what made its subsequent emergence as a 
concept necessary or inevitable.57 Canguilhem begins his inquiry by observing that the 
idea of ‘milieu’ was imported into the life sciences from mechanical philosophy, where 
it was first developed.
The thought that guided the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century, most 
famously elaborated by Descartes, was that reality was made up of material particles in 
motion; ‘[t]he moving particle was the ultimate term of explanation’.58 However, certain 
phenomena - such as gravity, the cohesion of bodies, and ‘capillary action’59 - could not 
be explained solely by reference to individual particles. In traditional mechanical 
philosophy, therefore, such phenomena were ‘explained away by some imagined 
mechanism’.60 Although the workings of this mechanism remained unclear,
54 Deleuze (1999), p. 73.
55 Ibid., p. 62: with regard to relations o f power or force, ‘they are not ‘localized’ at any given moment... 
they evade all stable forms o f the visible and the articulable’.
56 Cf. Mtiller-Wille and Rheinberger (2007), p. 8, with regard to heredity.
57 Cf. Hacking (2002).
58 Westfall (1971), p. 377.
59 Ibid., p. 334.
60 Ibid., p. 332.
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explanations could avoid having to rely on notions such as attraction, which was 
regarded as ‘occult’ until Newton gave it scientific credibility.61
Newton first introduced the idea of forces of attraction and repulsion that did not 
emanate from a material particle and could not be identified with its motion, but could 
instead be regarded as ‘external’ to such a particle and as affecting its motion. Newton’s 
shift in emphasis from the idea of force as a ‘property of a body’ or individual particle
67to an external force that impacted upon it, was achieved by what Luhmann would call 
a ‘second-order’ shift of perspective: ‘In impact, the force of one body’s motion 
functions in relation to the second body as the “external cause” ... Newton made the
fS\perspective of the second body his primary one’. It should be noted that Newton’s 
philosophy was still a traditional mechanical philosophy in the sense that he considered 
physical reality to be made up of particles in motion. However, his philosophy was 
revolutionary because it introduced the idea of forces of attraction and repulsion that 
acted upon each other and that affected the motion of individual particles.64
The forces that Newton imagined and the processes that he sought to explain required a 
concept other than that of the individual material entity. As Canguilhem observes, this 
innovation was not required by the mechanical philosophy of Descartes for which 
particles acted directly upon each other.65 Newton’s idea of forces of attraction and 
repulsion was premised on the idea of ‘aether’, which was already in use in the 
mechanical philosophy of the time.66 Newton gave the idea a central role in his natural 
philosophy. It allowed him to shift focus from the individual particle to the idea of 
active forces. Moreover, the idea of aether allowed him to explain specific processes 
such as ‘electrical attraction, gravitation, the cohesion of bodies, elasticity, sensory
67perception, animal motion, heat, and, of course, optical phenomena’.
61 Ibid., p. 377.
62 Ibid., p. 323.
63 Ibid., p. 344.
64 Ibid., p. 378 and 323: Leibiz’ idea o f  'vis viva’ preceded Newton’s ideas: ‘Not matter in motion, but 
force is the fundamental category o f being.’
65 Canguilhem (2003), p. 166.
66 Westfall (1971), p. 336.
67 Ibid., p. 364.
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2.1.2 The aether as ‘milieu’
At least initially, Newton regarded aether as the material fluid or substance from which
/Q
all particles were formed. He represented it as a material environment and as a 
medium that both surrounded particles and pervaded them.69 I shall return to this 
ambiguity below, because - according to Canguilhem - it came to constitute an 
important characteristic of the notion of ‘milieu’ itself. It should be pointed out that the 
aether as medium did not represent the space in which processes were thought to take 
place; Newton’s notion of aether as milieu should be distinguished from his notion of
7 nspace. He regarded the latter as a more static notion that did not contribute in the same 
way as aether to the functioning of processes themselves.
Westfall notes that Newton’s philosophy changed around 1679, specifically with regard
71to the existence of - and the role fulfilled by - aether. Indeed, Newton came to reject 
the existence of aether after performing an experiment that led him to the conclusion 
that the substance of aether was so thin that it provided no resistance at all. He
77concluded that, even if it existed, the notion was not much use to him. He went on to 
claim that aether did not exist, but that ‘[bjodies act on each other at a distance,
7*3
attracting and repelling, as he put it, “with a certain large force’” . He refers here to 
forces between particles without referring to aethereal fluids as mediating such forces, 
thereby ‘abstracting the concept of force from the question of its ultimate causation’.74
Years later, however, the notion of aether reappeared in his work, albeit in a slightly 
different form. He still left the question of ultimate causation of forces open, but said - 
more generally - that attractions and repulsions can be caused, for example, through ‘the 
impulses of an intervening medium’.75 The reason for giving aether a place in his 
philosophy once again was that Newton did not wish to be perceived as attributing
68 Ibid., p. 365.
69 Canguilhem (2003), p. 167.
70 Iliffe (2007), p. 64.
71 Westfall (1971), p. 391.
72 Iliffe (2007), p. 93.
73 Westfall (1971), p. 377, citing Newton; ibid, p. 378, the ‘central proposition’ o f Newton’s dynamic 
mechanical philosophy is described in Query 31 o f Opticks: ‘Have not the small Particles o f Bodies 
certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a distance, not only upon the Rays o f  Light for 
reflecting, refracting, and inflecting them, but also upon one another for producing a great Part o f  the 
Phaenomena o f Nature?’; Latour (2002), p. 222, recovers the idea o f ‘action at a distance’: ‘a cycle o f  
accumulation that allows a point to become a centre by acting at a distance on many other points’.
74 Westfall (1971), p. 398.
75 Ibid., p. 386.
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certain processes to individual particles themselves: ‘to shew that I do not take Gravity 
for an essential property of Bodies, I have added one Question concerning its Cause’.76
Newton justified the reintroduction of aether as the milieu that made ‘action at a 
distance’ possible in the following terms:
Tis unconceivable that inanimate brute matter should (without ye mediation o f something else 
wch is not material) operate upon & affect other matter without mutual contact... That gravity 
should be innate inherent & essential to matter so yt one body may act upon another at a distance 
through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else by & through wch their action or force 
may be conveyed from one to another is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who 
has in philosophical matters any competent faculty o f thinking can ever fall into it.77
Aether was now regarded as immaterial rather than material; it was ‘an infinite and
7 0
omnipresent spirit in which matter is moved’. It has been noted that this notion of 
aether has some affinities with Newton’s conception of God as a ‘Divine Medium who 
moves bodies as though they attract each other according to exact mathematical laws’.79 
Canguilhem picks up on the sense in which the medium represents a kind of ‘mystical
o0
intuition’ of how a force could be central and omnipresent at the same time.
For Newton, aether made the cohesion of bodies and their action at a distance 
possible.81 Canguilhem only focuses on Newton’s reinterpretation of aether and 
describes it as ‘that fluid vehicle of action at a distance’.82 However, aether cannot be 
regarded as a mere ‘vehicle of action’, rather - as Westfall observes - ‘the aether 
embodied the very problem of action at a distance which it pretended to explain’.83
The notion of aether as milieu was used by Newton in order to explain and make action 
at a distance possible. More specifically, it was introduced in order to explain how 
action could be transmitted, how it could act, and how it could affect. Nowhere in 
Newton’s work is the notion of action precisely defined. The idea of action was 
associated with the idea of forces as ‘active principles’.84 In other words, action was not 
attributed to an individual entity in the way that motion was previously attributed to the
76 Ibid., p. 392.
77 Ibid., p. 396.
78 Ibid., p. 399, citing Newton.
79 Ibid., p. 400.
80 Canguilhem (2003), p. 195.
81 Westfall (1971), p. 394.
82 Canguilhem (2003), p. 167.
83 Westfall (1971), p. 395.
84 Ibid., p. 548.
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individual particle. Newton emphasized activity rather than a traditional idea of action 
with reference to a centre or interaction between particles.85
The notion of aether came to account for processes or actions where individual material 
particles did not come into direct contact and yet affected each other or acted upon each 
other. Since Descartes, action had been explained only in terms of some sort of direct 
contact or collision of individual entities so there was no real understanding of how 
bodies might interact or communicate without colliding. Once the idea of ‘action at a 
distance’ was introduced, it became increasingly difficult to explain action with 
reference to individual entities or particles in isolation. Action or interaction at a 
distance could not be explained by imagining an entity drawing its own force, and the 
capability to transmit it, entirely from itself.
Newton found an explanation for the possibility of indirect action in the notion of 
aether. Although the existence of aether was questioned by Newton himself and by the 
scientific community, this did not prove to be an obstacle to the survival of the concept 
of the ‘milieu’ as medium. Without' such a concept it was difficult even to begin to 
imagine forces acting upon each other.
2.1,3 *Milieu9 as medium
Here, we return to the essential ambiguity of the notion of ‘milieu’ as signifying both 
medium and environment. Canguilhem observes that this ambiguity might be traced 
back to Newton and his representation of aether.86 Although the idea of ‘milieu’ was 
introduced by Newton, the term first emerged - according to Canguilhem - in the 
Encyclopedie of Diderot and D’Alembert87 They translated Newton’s original notion of 
‘medium’ into the French ‘milieu’ and described it as ‘a material space in which a body
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 167: ‘The fluid is the intermediary between two bodies, it is their milieu; and insofar as it 
penetrates all these bodies, these bodies are situated at its centre.’ (My translation)
Ibid., p. 166: Canguilhem notes how the term emerged in literature; Feldhoff (1980), p. 1394 cites 
Balzac from the Preface to the '‘Comedie humaine’ (1842): ‘Does society, on the basis o f the Milieux 
where his actions develop, not turn man into as many different men as there are zoological varieties?’ 
(My translation).
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is placed’. Canguilhem believes that this interpretation of ‘milieu’ as distinct from the 
individual leads to an erosion of the notion’s relativity.89
Imagined as a ‘vehicle for action’, aether was primarily regarded as somehow 
transporting or mediating the action of individual particles. According to Newton’s 
original description, the medium surrounded individual particles and its main function 
was to act as an intermediary between entities. This seemed to suggest that the existence 
of the medium was distinct from that of the individual particles. But how would the 
medium have a distinct existence and at the same time be able to transport action and 
affect a particle’s motion? The answer was to say that the medium pervaded the entities 
for which it was the medium. As Newton put it, aether is ‘interwoven with bodys ... & 
promotes their actions being a tender ferment’.90 He also said ‘it is the most commonly 
held opinion of philosophers in this age that there is a certain aethereal medium 
extremely rare and subtile, which freely pervades the pores of all bodies’.91
Physical entities were now seen as immersed in the medium rather than merely 
surrounded by it. Only in this way could one explain how the medium enabled 
interaction between entities. But if aether pervaded bodies, how was action generated in 
the first place? It was no longer clear that action could be directly attributed to an 
individual entity or its particles in isolation, since action was no longer identified with 
motion generated by individual particles. The medium as vehicle for action did not 
merely prompt or stimulate a potential for action that was innate to the individual. I 
argue that it was the notion of the medium itself that made action - and action at a 
distance - possible.
Although Newton never identified the cause of forces and processes that could not be 
explained by traditional mechanical philosophy, it was clear that aether as a medium did 
not merely represent the inert space in which action was acted out or where forces 
exerted themselves. In seeking to explain the formative and transformative impact of 
individuals on each other by reference to the notion of forces and action at a distance, I 
believe that the medium gradually came to be regarded as representing such action 
rather than merely transporting it.
88 Feldhoff (1980), p. 1393.
89 Canguilhem (2003), p. 167.
90 Iliffe (2007), p. 60.
91 Westfall (1971), p. 376, citing Newton.
109
The ambiguity of aether as milieu arose from the fact that Newton, as a mechanical 
philosopher, still reasoned from individual particles as centres of reference and that he 
understood aether as relative to such centres. At the same time, however, he introduced 
aether as an omnipresent medium without any fixed points of reference. Quite simply, 
aether was meant to explain how action acted between individuals and how action acted.
Canguilhem emphasizes the ambiguity of ‘milieu’ by observing: ‘one must choose 
between two theories of milieu ... [it is either] a centred and qualified space where the 
“mi-lieu” is centre; or a decentred and homogeneous space where the “mi-//ew” is an
Q'y
intermediary field’. The former represents ‘milieu’ as environment and the latter 
represents it as medium. ‘Milieu’ as environment refers to, and relies on, an individual 
entity. It is already differentiated from the individual and structured with reference to it. 
The relation between individual and environment is represented as being one of 
differing degrees of interdependence.
However, the idea of milieu as medium paints a different picture. It does not represent 
an outside in relation to an inside or surroundings with reference to a centre. Rather, the 
milieu is characterized by its relativity and potential for action rather than by its 
location. This is Newton’s medium represented as forces acting upon other forces 
without relating such forces or action back to centres or individual particles. As 
Canguilhem says, this idea of ‘milieu’
can only be interpreted as that which is indefinitely negated by exteriority. The now refers back 
to the before, the here refers back to the there, and so it^oes on without interruption. The milieu 
is truly and purely a system o f ‘rapports sans supports'.
This notion of ‘milieu’ as medium introduced dynamics, activity, force, and 
contingency into physics and unseated the privileged role of individual particles in 
motion that previously characterized mechanical philosophy. However, according to 
Canguilhem, the idea of ‘milieu’ was subsequently employed in physics in order to 
dissolve organic individuals in ‘the anonymity of universal elements and movements’.94 
The notion of ‘milieu’ as medium, therefore, seems to challenge biological specificity 
rather than contribute to a biological concept of environment.
92 Canguilhem (2003), p. 193.
93 Canguilhem (2003), p. 172 (my translation).
94 Ibid.
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2.1.4 ‘Milieu* as environment
The original notion of ‘milieu’ was purposefully described by Newton as dynamic in 
order to explain and enable action at a distance. However, when the notion was 
introduced into biology it gradually lost its dynamic and ambiguous character. The 
milieu was no longer associated with forces acting upon other forces but was, instead, 
recruited to sustain the notion of the individual organism. Canguilhem attributes the 
introduction of the notion of ‘milieu’ into biology to Lamarck.95 However, he also 
observes that it might have been Newton himself who first applied the notion of 
‘milieu’ to organic processes.96
Newton employed the notion of aether in order to explain the physiological phenomena 
of muscles contracting in the eye when exposed to* a source of light. He believed that 
muscles contracted and dilated in accordance with the varying densities of the aether
07that pervaded them. Since aether as medium or milieu pervaded all material bodies, it
Qg
did not distinguish between the organic and the inorganic.
Lamarck was influenced by Buffon in his elaboration of the notion of ‘milieux’, to 
which he always referred in the plural form.99 Buffon was well known for reformulating 
biological problems by employing Newton’s physics.100 Newton represented the milieu 
as being directly involved in the functioning of processes rather than as a mere external 
influence on such processes. However, Lamarck represented ‘milieux’ - such as water, 
air, and light - as external circumstances to which an organism had to adapt if it was to 
survive.101 The milieu was represented as distinct from the individual organism and as 
indifferent to it.102
According to Canguilhem, Comte first characterized the milieu as an abstract and 
singular notion. He also represented the relation between organism and milieu as a
95 Ibid., p. 166.
96 Ibid., p. 167.
97 Iliffe (2007), pp. 63, 64; Canguilhem (2003), p. 167.
98 Canguilhem (2003), pp. 167-168. However, Canguilhem believes that Newton regarded this as the first 
example o f  the effect o f the physical milieu on an organic process.
99 Ibid., pp. 166-168.
100 Casini (1992).
101 Canguilhem (2003), p. 168.
102 Ibid., p. 174.
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dialectic or as a ‘conflit de puissances'.103 Canguilhem believes that Comte took his 
inspiration from Newton’s ideas on action and reaction.104 At the same time, Comte 
used the relation between organism and milieu to negotiate the boundaries of biology as 
a discipline. The concept of ‘milieu’ implicitly signified the impossibility of isolating 
biology from other disciplines, most notably the social sciences, while the concept of 
organism signified the autonomy of biology.105
Comte described the environment as neither hostile to the organism nor as determining 
it completely.106 However, despite the subtlety of his notion of ‘milieu’ as environment, 
it still represented a collection of external circumstances that supported the existence of 
the individual. The role of milieu was reduced to that of a source of information or 
energy, rather than a medium enabling action. The milieu came to be referred to as 
‘cirConstances' or ‘ambiance’, both terms corresponding to the notion of environment 
as surroundings with reference to a centre.107
The abstraction and reduction of ‘milieu’ as environment coincided with the emergence 
of the image of the individual as a more or less self-contained centre. Action was 
attributed to individual entities themselves. Such entities no longer relied to any 
significant extent on a milieu that surrounded and pervaded them for their action, 
transformation, and communication with other individuals. The interpretation of 
‘milieu’ as medium or as a relative ‘entre-deux centres' shifted to the idea of ‘milieu’ as 
environment or centre in itself; its most prominent characteristic being its reference to
1ORthe privileged centre of the individual.
In conclusion, the emergence of the concept of ‘milieu’ was a response to the 
dissatisfaction with the focus on distinct physical entities and the lack of explanation for 
their potential to act at a distance. From the moment of its emergence, the notion of 
‘milieu’ relied for its dynamic character on a certain ambiguity and relativity. Rather 
than undermining the concept by compromising its clarity, I believe that this ambiguity 
explains the resilience and productivity of the concept. Although the notion of ‘milieu’ 
initially emerged to explain the interaction between individual entities, paradoxically, it
103 Ibid., 170.
104 Ibid.
105 Canguilhem (2002), p. 65.
106 Ibid.
107 Canguilhem (2003), p. 172.
108 Ibid., p. 167.
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made the association of action with individual particles in isolation less plausible. 
Instead, a central role was attributed to the milieu as medium that not merely facilitated 
action but explained and constituted it; the milieu did not represent a definable space 
‘between’ entities that was otherwise passive.
The notion of ‘milieu’ underwent a significant transformation two centuries later. 
Claude Bernard enriched the notion by developing his idea of a ‘milieu interieur'. A 
few decades later, the Estonian biologist Jacob von Uexkull described the ‘milieu’ as a 
series of links, signals, and perceptions linked to other signals. Bernard and von Uexkull 
not only altered the notion of ‘milieu’ conceptually; they also reintroduced ambiguity 
and activity. These transformations of the notion of ‘milieu’ also had significant 
consequences for how the relation between individual and environment was imagined.
2.2 New ways of imagining ‘milieu’
2,2,1 The ‘internal milieu*
After Comte, the dominant view of ‘milieu’ was that of a combination of external 
circumstances in relation to an individual. In the middle of the nineteenth century, 
Bernard introduced a new idea of ‘milieu’. Although his notion of the ‘milieu interieur’ 
was revolutionary - it would even inspire writers and social scientists - the significance 
and productivity of the concept seems to have ‘almost completely escaped his 
contemporaries’.109 It seems that some regarded the notion as nothing more than a 
‘picturesque expression’; it was not included in the list of Bernard’s great achievements 
that were remembered at his funeral ceremony.110
Bernard’s notion of an ‘internal milieu’ first emerged in 1855 with his characterization 
of the glycogenic function of the liver as ‘internal secretion’.111 The term ‘milieu liquide 
interieur’ appeared for the first time in his notebooks a few years later. Bernard 
claimed: ‘I believe that I am the first to have expressed this idea clearly and to have 
insisted on it in order to make the exercise of experimentation on living beings more
109 Halpem (1967), p. 5. (My translation).
110 Ibid.
111 Canguilhem (2002), p. 287.
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understandable’.112 So the notion of the ‘internal milieu’ was introduced not only as a 
means of explaining the functioning of organisms; it provided a means of investigating 
the inner sanctum of such organisms through the new experimental method that Bernard 
proposed. As Canguilhem observes: ‘Let us insist on this point: it is the concept of the 
“milieu interieur” that serves as the theoretical foundation for the technique of
| n
physiological experimentation’. Bernard recorded, in his notebook, his dream of 
‘strolling, cain in hand, in the blood’ - in the liquid internal milieu - to watch up close 
how cells live.114
The concept of an interior milieu was a response to what Bernard saw as an extensive 
focus on the milieu as exterior environment, for the simple reason that the external 
milieu was immediately visible.115 Bernard argued - against the prevailing view - that 
the milieu as exterior environment does not explain or determine the functioning of the 
individual.116 In seeking to understand living organisms, it would be a mistake to focus 
on how organisms live ‘in’ an exterior environment which regulates their functions. 
Bernard believed that the external environment is, nevertheless, indispensable for the 
manifestation of an organism.
According to Bernard, the conditions of life are neither located in the organism or its 
internal milieu, nor in the external environment. Rather, these conditions continuously 
emerge through the interaction of both ‘milieux’:
The elementary parts o f beings, the constitutive elements that are truly endowed with life, the 
histological cells are not abandoned and left bare in a world that surrounds them. They are 
submerged in the ‘milieu interieur’ which envelops them, separates them from the outside, and 
which serves as an intermediary between them and the cosmic milieu.117
Bernard describes this process of interaction, made possible by the ambiguity of the 
notion o f ‘milieu’ itself, as a ‘double condition of existence’.118
112 Bernard (1865), p. 129 (my translation).
113 Canguilhem (2002), p. 148 (my translation).
114 Bernard (1965), p. 24 (Introduction M.D. Grmek).
115 Bernard (1865), p. 107: ‘We suppress the internal milieu in our explanations, only to see the external 
milieu which is right under our eyes.’ (My translation)
116 Halpem (1967), p. 6, citing Bernard: ‘that which we call the surrounding world is not the real place 
where their existence is immediately accomplished’. (My translation).
117 Ibid. (my translation)
118 Bernard (1865), p. 129.
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His idea of an internal milieu fulfilled another function: it allowed him to maintain an 
ambiguous position with regard to vitalism. On the one hand, Bernard refuted vitalism 
by demonstrating that there was a milieu inside the living organism.119 This meant that 
such an organism was ruled by the same physical laws as the external milieu. On the 
other hand, however, the internal milieu was specific to living beings and had its own 
particular characteristics. It could, therefore, not be regarded as the extension of the 
external milieu within the individual.
The particularity of living processes was affirmed by Bernard’s statement that although 
one could investigate matter by considering only one milieu (the external milieu), an 
investigation into living organisms required the consideration of two milieus: one
i onexternal and one internal. So the idea of the internal milieu promoted the autonomy of
biology as a discipline by distinguishing biological milieus from the ‘milieu-as-aether’ 
101of physicists. As Bernard observed in promoting his technique of vivisection:
‘Ancient science could only conceive of an external milieu; but it is necessary, in order
1 00to found an experimental biological science, also to conceive of a “milieu interieur”’.
The notion of an internal milieu was made possible by the ambiguity that characterized 
the notion of ‘milieu’ ever since its use by Newton. The distinction between an internal 
and an external milieu is drawn within the notion of ‘milieu’ itself. Although the idea of 
an ‘internal milieu’ seems paradoxical, the external environment is not somehow 
‘integrated’ into the organism. Rather, the internal milieu is the organism’s own 
interpretation of the external environment within itself. The organism functions through 
this continuous self-reference and external reference, even if the distinction between 
‘self and ‘external’ is drawn within - and by - the organism itself.
This is what Luhmann describes as the ‘reentry of the form into the form’.123 The 
distinction between system and environment is drawn by the system, rather than by the 
environment. This explains Bernard’s argument that the main difference between the 
internal and external milieu is that, whereas the external milieu is absorbed and
119 Ibid., p. 108.
120 Ibid, p. 110; Bernard (1965), pp. 243-247: M. Drazen Grmek on Bernard’s conflicting thoughts on 
vitalism.
121 Prochiantz (1993), p. 271.
122 Canguilhem (2002), p. 148.
123 Luhmann (1998), p. 32.
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represented within the internal milieu the latter is not absorbed in the former.124 The 
organism maintains a representation within itself of the external environment without 
losing its self-containment and self-regulation. As Luhmann points out, the reentry of 
form into form leads to the paradox that ‘the external can only be attained from 
within’.125 In other words, the organism only has indirect access to the external 
environment by reference to its internal milieu.
The idea of the internal milieu makes it possible for a living process to be regarded as a 
self-regulating ‘whole’ or unity. As Canguilhem describes, with reference to the 
example of blood, it is this ‘through which the organism applies to itself, is turned in on 
itself, is in relation to itself. And as Bernard himself says: ‘All vital mechanisms, 
however varied, have but one objective, that of maintaining the unity of life functions in
197the internal medium’. Bernard, therefore, reconceptualizes the organism through his 
idea of the internal milieu that makes self-regulation possible.
Whereas Comte represented the organism as being regulated through an abstract
external environment, Bernard represents the organism as being regulated through its
own internal milieu. Canguilhem believes that an intellectual lineage can be traced from
Bernard’s notion of the internal milieu to the cybernetics of Wiener that relies on the
notion of the feedback mechanism.128 Bernard called the internal milieu ‘a true product 
1 00o f the organism’. Whereas the external milieu was common to all creatures, the
internal milieu was created by the organism itself and was therefore particular to it.
2,2,2 T h e‘associatedmilieu*
The idea of a milieu that is particular to an individual was given renewed impetus by 
von Uexkull in 1934. Deleuze and Guattari observe how ‘the milieu assumes a third 
figure here: it is no longer an interior or exterior milieu, even a relative one, nor an 
intermediate milieu, but instead an “annexed or associated milieu”’.130 In his work
24 Bernard (1865), p. 130.
25 Luhmann (1998), p. 34.
26 Canguilhem (2002), p. 148 (my translation).
27 Jacob (1976), p. 189, citing Bernard.
28 Canguilhem (2000), p. 82.
29 Bernard (1865), p. 110.
30 Deleuze & Guattari (1999), p.51.
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‘Streifziige durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen\ von Uexkull challenged 
the dominant view of the functioning of organisms, of milieu as environment, and of the 
relation that was presumed to exist between organism and environment. At the time, the 
organism was often represented as a machine - in the strictly mechanical sense - that 
responded to external influences through reflexes, while the environment was regarded 
as the combination of external influences determining the existence and functioning of 
the organism.
The recent interest in von Uexkull’s work is noteworthy in itself. Philosophers such as 
Agamben and Deleuze refer to his ideas at various instances in their work.132 This 
suggests that his ideas, with their rather specific object of inquiry - living beings and 
their environments - represent a new perspective whose productivity is not necessarily 
limited to the life sciences. Although reasons for referring to von Uexkull’s work may 
differ, the interest that philosophers share in his work can perhaps be attributed to two 
of its main characteristics.
First, his theory is radically non-anthropomorphic. As Agamben says, von Uexkull’s
well-known description of the tick and its particular milieu - as well as the illustrations
of the particular perspectives of animals and their worlds included in his book -
1represent a ‘high point of modem antihumanism’. Second, von Uexkull breaks with 
the traditional idea that there is one world, one space, and one time that all species 
inhabit. Rather, he represents the image of an infinite variety of worlds that are all 
linked harmoniously - the analogy is made to a musical symphony - but that are at the 
same time reciprocally exclusive.134
Von Uexkull did not refer to the notion of ‘milieu’ as such. Rather, he developed his 
own notion of ‘Umwelf , 135  Although he called his theory iUmweltlehre\ von Uexkull’s 
focus was initially on the individual organism. He emphasized that “‘Umweltlehre” is a 
kind of externalized study of the soul that is performed from the point of view of the
131 J. von Uexktill (1957); for a short biography, see T. von Uexktill (1982), p. 1 and Agamben (2004), p. 
39.
132 For example: Deleuze & Guattari (1999), pp. 51, 257 and 314; Deleuze (1988), p. 185 (n.33); 
Agamben (2004), pp. 39-47.
133 Agamben (2004), p. 45.
134 Deleuze (1988), p. 185 (note 33): Deleuze finds this especially productive and compares von 
Uexktill’s ideas to Leibniz’s ‘monads’.
135 J. von Uexkull (1909).
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1 ' lAobserver. It is not an analysis of the “I”’. Von Uexkull focuses on the ‘Umwelf 
because an individual organism can only be identified as such by an observer, or rather, 
through its Umwelt.
An organism cannot be regarded as an isolated entity that responds to an external 
environment through reflexes. The behaviour of living beings should not be regarded as 
‘mere movements or tropisms, but they consist of perception (Merken) and operation
1 ^ 7(Wirken); they are not mechanically regulated, but meaningfully organized’. In other 
words, the individual organism cannot be explained by reference to mechanical 
philosophy. When the receptor organs of the individual react to a signal from its 
Umwelt, this does not constitute a reflex but a certain sensibility guided by a need.138
Von Uexkull distinguishes between the ‘ Umwelt9 of the individual and the ‘ Umgebung’.
The latter represents the physical environment and, according to von Uexkull, merely
translates the human belief that there exist objective realities in the world. Such a belief
1 ^ 0is necessary for the individual to function. Von Uexkull says:
[N]o longer does man move together with a space that loyally follows him, as seemed to be the 
case. Rather, man moves in a space that is at rest and that has completely severed itself from him
140
and has its own centre. Space, then, has become autonomous like the objects in it.
If an external environment seemingly exists, it is only because of the similarity of the 
SinnesphdrerC of different individuals.141 The environment as Umwelt or ‘associated 
milieu’ cannot be equated with this exterior environment, because no such physical 
environment is thought to exist. Rather, the world is made up of subjective realities.142 
These milieus, or iUmwelten\ co-exist and perhaps in certain instances overlap but they 
never entirely coincide.
136 J. von Uexktill (1936), p. 25 (my translation).
137 J. von Uexktill (1982), p. 26.
138 Canguilhem (2003), p. 197: Canguilhem explores this by referring to '‘sens' and ‘besoin’.
139 J. von Uexktill (1936), pp. 16-17.
140 Ibid., p. 16 (my translation).
141 Ibid., pp. 14-15: ‘Because the “Sinnesphareri’ o f individuals are alike in all main aspects, the objects 
in their particular “Umwelten” are also alike. From this, man has too hastily concluded that the objects are 
themselves realities that exist independently o f the subject ... This presupposition is ... incorrect’. (My 
translation).
142 Ibid., pp. 18-20: von Uexktill describes how he himself believed in the existence o f an objective 
environment until, while on holiday in his Italian villa, he heard three entirely different descriptions o f  the 
Bay o f Naples: one from a guidebook, one from a native to the area, and one from a ‘bored American 
tourist’. This occurrence made him doubt the existence o f a single objective environment.
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Von Uexkull describes how these Umwelten themselves do not exist objectively; the 
aspects of - and objects in - them are only actualized when they are ‘transformed into 
perceptual cues or perceptual images and invested with a functional tone’.143 The 
Umwelt is, therefore, not a place but a set of signals that enables the perception and 
action of individual organisms (that are themselves - in turn - regarded as a 
combination of perception and operation). The Umwelt is a conjunction of the 
perceptual and operational world because it combines signals with the actions that are 
triggered by the perception of those signals.144
Deleuze and Guattari point to the ‘active, perceptive, and energetic characteristics’ of 
the ‘associated milieus’ described by von Uexkull.145 Rather than constituting places or 
parts of a physical environment, these milieus only exist as senses, signals, and cues. As 
von Uexkull says, the Umwelt is a “‘SinnesinseF that envelops every human being like 
a piece of clothing ... it fragments into different “Sinnespharert” . 14 6  It is constituted by 
a reduced set of signals or sensibilities, namely the ones that matter for the organism.
Von Uexkull observes with regard to his famous example of the life of the tick, who 
only responds to specific signals in its environment rather than to the forest in its 
entirety: ‘the very poverty of this world guarantees the unfailing certainty of her 
actions’.147 The complexity of the Umwelt is necessarily reduced because ‘[e]ach 
Umwelt forms a closed unit in itself, which is governed, in all its parts, by the meaning 
it has for the subject.’148
2.2,3, The influence on - and o f - the * associated milieu*
The idea that the Umwelt can only be understood through the meaning that it has for a 
particular individual was inspired by the philosophy of Kant. Von Uexkull observes:
143 J. von Uexktill (1957), p. 72.
144 J. von Uexktill (1982), pp. 31 and 33: von Uexkull refers to a ‘functional circle’; Cobley (2001), p. 
281.
145 Deleuze & Guattari (1999), p. 51.
146 J. von Uexktill (1936), p. 12 (my translation).
147 J. von Uexktill (1957), p. 12. See also Canguilhem (2003), pp. 186-187; Agamben (2004), pp. 45-47; 
Deleuze & Guattari (1999), pp. 51 and 257; Deleuze (1988), p. 122.
148 J. von Uexktill (1982), p. 30; Cobley (2001), p. 280, 281: von Uexktill is regarded as the founder o f  
bio-semiotics.
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without a living subject, there can be neither space nor time - with this, biology has ultimately
established its connection with the doctrine o f Kant, which it intends to exploit in the Umwelt
149theory by stressing the decisive role o f the subject.
Von Uexkull observes how Kant regarded space as a human ‘Anschaungsform’ } 50 This 
means that space only appears in a form particular to the individual; von Uexkull takes 
from this the idea that there is not one world and one time for all living beings. Kant 
described space as that which cannot be derived from experience but makes experience 
possible. However, space is not a category or a concept but an intuition, because ‘no 
conception, as such, can be so conceived, as if  it contained within itself an infinite 
multitude of representations’.151 The notion of space, as Kant represents it, depends on 
the intuition of the subject.
The thematization of the environment as a static space that exists in relation to a subject 
is often attributed to Kant. It could be argued that, when the subject became the centre 
of reference, the role of milieu as facilitating action - described above in relation to 
Newton - was neutralized. Bergson criticized the Kantian idea of space in relation to
1 Oliving beings. However, von Uexkull makes productive use of Kant’s notion of space 
in relation to the subject by taking the subjective structuring of the milieu seriously.
Von Uexkull’s ideas about individual and environment have significant consequences 
for the relationship that was previously thought to exist between them. Living 
organisms do not interact with an objective external environment, or with animals and 
objects in that environment. Rather, they respond to certain signs or ‘Merkmale’ of its 
Umwelt. The idea of a milieu that is construed by the organism itself and to which it 
continuously refers can be likened to Bernard’s idea of the internal milieu. Indeed, the 
interaction between Umwelt and Umgebung is similar to Bernard’s ‘double condition 
d ’existence’ (see para. 2.2.1 above). If neither individual nor environment can be clearly 
distinguished as isolated entities, then the relation between individual and environment 
cannot exist in any traditional sense.
Von Uexkull regards milieu or environment as links or networks between signals and 
perceptual organs. As such, it is not the environment that gives rise to - or determines -
149 J. von Uexkull (1957), p. 13.
150 J. von Uexktill (1936), p. 16; see T. von Uexktill (1982), p. 9, on Kant’s influence.
151 Kant (2003), p. 24.
152 Bergson (1908), p. 222; see also Gayon (2005), p. 54.
1 2 0
the living organism. Rather, the organism gives rise to itself and - in doing so - to its
particular environment. As von Uexkull says: ‘As the spider spins its threads, every
subject spins his relations to certain characters of the things around him, and weaves
1them into a firm web which carries his existence.’ So one can say of von Uexkull’s 
example of the tick that ‘the tick is this relationship; she lives only in it and for it’.154 
Agamben points out that this relation between organism and Umwelt is much more 
intimate and rich than the traditional idea of a relation between organism and 
environment.
The influence of von Uexkull’s notion of Umwelt can be distinguished in Canguilhem’s 
observation that
the environments in which the living beings find themselves are carved out by them, centered on 
them. In this sense the organism is not thrown into an environment to which he must submit, but 
he structures his environment at the same time that he develops his capacities as an organism.155
Goldstein was critical of von Uexkiill’s ideas in his work Der Aufbau des organismus
and refined them in two significant ways.156 First, Goldstein clarifies that there is no
pre-existing Umwelt for each organism. Rather, the Umwelt emerges only as the
organism lives and asserts itself. So the environment is ‘by no means something definite
and static but is continuously forming commensurably with the development of the
1organism and its activity’. Goldstein refers to this continuous process of development
1 f Qand differentiation as ‘Auseinandersetzung’. Varela describes the simultaneous
emergence of organism and environment as ‘mutual definition’.159
153 J. von Uexktill (1957), p. 14.
154 Agamben (2004), p. 47.
155 Canguilhem (1978), p. 177.
156 Canguilhem (2003), p. 184 (n. 1), describes Goldstein’s criticism as follows: ‘By not wishing to 
distinguish the vivant from its environment, every inquiry into relations becomes in a way impossible. 
Determination disappears and is replaced by reciprocal penetration; taking account o f the totality kills 
knowledge’. (My translation).
157 Goldstein (1995), p. 85.
158 Canguilhem (2003), p. 187. Goldstein possibly used this term in the manner in which Heidegger 
employed it in the mid 1930s in his lectures on Nietzsche. Gaschd (2007), p. 104: Heidegger said ‘As 
Heraclitus thinks it, struggle first and foremost allows what essentially unfolds to step apart in opposition 
[lasst im Gegeneinander das Wesende allererst auseinandertreten] ... In such stepping apart 
[.Auseinandertreten], clefts, intervals, distances, and joints open themselves. In con-frontation 
[Auseinandersetzung], world comes to be.’
159 Varela (1991), p. 85: ‘the important distinction between the environment o f  the living system as it 
appears to an observer and without reference to the autonomous unity - which we shall call hereafter 
simply the environment - and the environment fo r  the system which is defined in the same movement that 
gave rise to its identity and that only exists in that mutual definition - hereafter the system’s w orld'
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Second, for Goldstein the question of the direction of action - that was also raised by 
Nietzsche - as the ‘essential characteristic of every vital phenomenon’ remains.160 The 
question is, then, whether such action is directed by the environment or whether it is 
‘effected through a certain determination and force issuing from the organism itself.161 
Goldstein observes:
[0]ne could say that the environment emerges from the world through the being or actualization 
o f the organism. Stated in a less prejudiced manner, an organism can exist only if  it succeeds in 
finding in the world an adequate environment - in shaping an environment.’162
The central problem is that the environment exists by virtue of the activity of the 
organism and the organism can only exist as such with reference to an environment. 
Deleuze and Guattari address this question when they observe that ‘the associated 
milieus are closely related to organic forms. An organic form is not a simple structure 
but a structuration, the constitution of an associated milieu.’163 The idea of a constitutive 
relationship in which no clear centre of action can be distinguished demonstrates how 
action is not always easily attributable to a centre.
The ideas of Bernard, von Uexkull, and Goldstein changed the ways in which ‘milieu’ 
was envisaged. Some of their ideas were taken up by Luhmann in his theory of social 
systems, notably the idea of an internal environment and an environment that is relative 
to the individual. Luhmann also represents individual/environment not as a relation but 
as a continuous process of differentiation that relies on signals, irritations, and 
communication. The perception of a relation between system and environment is 
continuously recreated through self- and external reference. Luhmann’s theory is 
innovative because it attributes a central role to the environment rather than regarding it 
as secondary to the individual.
160 Goldstein (1995), p. 84.
161 Ibid.
162 Goldstein (1995), p. 85.
163 Deleuze & Guattari (1999), p. 51.
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PART III
3.1 The ‘environment’ in Luhmann’s social theory
3.1.1 Autopoiesis and Environment9
Although the main protagonist of Luhmann’s theory seems to be the system, I argue that 
what makes his theory innovative is his particular use of the notion of ‘environment’. 
Luhmann’s systems theory draws on the idea of autopoiesis as developed by Maturana 
and Varela. In their original theory of autopoiesis, represented as the particular 
organization of living systems,164 no particular role is attributed to the environment with 
regard to the process of autopoiesis itself. The environment is represented as the 
‘domain of observation’ to which such notions as purpose and teleology are 
attributed.165 Similarly to Kant (see Chapter 2), purpose is not attributed to the 
autopoietic process itself but merely regarded as part of the discourse and description of 
such a process.
The environment does not represent physical space. Space plays a significant role in 
autopoietic theory because ‘without unity in some space an autopoietic system is not 
different from the background in which it is supposed to lie, and, hence, can only be a 
system in the space of our description where its unity is conceptually stipulated’.166 
However, both the environment as domain of the observer and as physical space remain 
excluded from the process of autopoiesis itself - even if they make the description and 
emergence of an autopoietic system possible.
Maturana and Varela, contrary to Bernard and Luhmann, do not believe that the system 
requires a representation of the environment within itself:
[T]o talk about a representation o f the ambience, or the environment, in the organization o f a 
living system may be metaphorically useful, but it is inadequate and misleading to reveal the 
organization o f an autopoietic system.167
164 Maturana & Varela (1980), pp. 76 and 78-79.
165 Ibid., p. 78.
166 Ibid., p. 94.
167 Ibid., p. 99.
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This is because an autopoietic system is precisely defined by the way in which it relies 
on its own operations. Maturana and Varela ‘distinguish ] two structures that are going 
to be considered operationally independent of each other: living being and 
environment’.168 The relation between system and environment is represented as one in 
which there are no ‘instructive interactions’.169
It can be argued that the environment came to represent the ‘blind spot’ of autopoietic 
theory. Maturana and Varela’s idea of the ‘blind spot’ represents the epistemological
1 70problem that ‘we do not see that we do not see’; or, as Luhmann would say, an
observer cannot observe himself observing. The ‘blind spot’ is explained through an 
optical experiment but is meant to make an epistemological argument, namely, it 
challenges the separation of understanding and experience that Kant proposed.171
Luhmann specifically incorporates the idea of the environment as ‘blind spot’ into his 
systems theory by referring to it as ‘unmarked space’.172 Like Maturana and Varela, 
Luhmann distinguishes between the autopoietic system and the environment. However, 
whereas the former represent the environment as a descriptive domain that is separate 
from the autopoietic process itself, Luhmann attributes a central role to the environment 
in the process of autopoiesis.
3,1.2 Traditional characteristics o f *milieu ’
Although the notion of environment is obviously present in Luhmann’s work, its 
character and function are often misunderstood. The environment is not a thing in the 
world, an actual geographical space, or a relation (between it and a system). The 
distinction between system and environment, which represents the absolute premise of
168 Maturana & Varela (1992), p. 95.
169 Ibid., p. 101.
170 Ibid., p. 19.
171 Ibid., p. 23: ‘These experiences ... show how our experience is moored to our structure in a binding 
way. We do not see the “space” o f the world; we live our field o f vision. We do not see the “colors” o f the 
world; we live our chromatic space. Doubtless ... we are experiencing a world. But when we examine 
more closely how we get to know this world, we invariably find that we cannot separate our history o f  
actions - biological and social - from how this world appears to us’.
172 Luhmann (1998), p. 27; see Hayles (1999), p. 10 refers to the ‘second wave o f  cybernetics’ that 
incoporated reflexivity by attributing a more prominent role to the observer.
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1 71Luhmann’s theory, does not represent a relationship between two terms. Rather, the
environment represents the difference between it and the system or that by virtue of 
which such a difference may come about. The distinction that Luhmann maintains 
between a relation and a difference is that the former represents an ontological view of 
the world whereas the latter supposedly avoids or subverts it.174 What is crucial here, is 
that a difference is not an absolute either/or but that it is relative to the system and each 
time created anew. Luhmann does not focus so much on the idea of difference as such, 
but on the process of differentiation.
It is interesting to note that he draws on Darwin and evolution in order to elaborate his 
notions of environment and differentiation. It has been argued that Luhmann 
intentionally represents Darwin’s description of environment as strictly deterministic, in
175order to contrast it with his own representation of environment. Luhmann also 
observes:
[I]f systems theory is formulated in radical fashion as a theory o f the production and 
reproduction o f a difference between system and environment, then it makes little sense to retain 
this division into internal (variation) and external (selection) factors.176
This is why he adds a third term to Darwin’s notions of variation and selection, namely
1 77‘restabilization’, which reinforces the idea of the system as an autonomous process. 
Despite the apparent differences between Darwin’s and Luhmann’s representation of 
environment, it has been suggested that Luhmann’s process of differentiation - which 
gives rise to both system and environment - can be regarded as a kind of evolution of 
systems. This would reveal a problematic aspect of Luhmann’s theory because the 
particular temporality of systems seems irreconcilable with the idea of ‘becoming’ that
1 78characterizes evolution.
In developing his particular idea of environment, Luhmann makes productive use of 
certain characteristics that have traditionally been associated with the milieu. Its original 
ambiguity is explored through the simultaneous reliance on the idea of environment as 
surroundings with reference to a centre and environment as medium. The former is
173 Luhmann (1998), p. 33: ‘The theory proceeds by assuming the distinction between system and 
environment.’
174 Badiou (1998).
175 Winthrop-Young (2003), pp. 333-334.
176 Ibid., pp. 336-337.
177 Ibid., p. 331.
178 Ibid., pp. 313-314.
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represented in the system’s distinction between outside and inside and in the asymmetry 
between system and environment itself. The latter is represented in the idea that 
environment enables differentiation, thereby negating the idea of privileged centres.
The contingency of the inside/outside distinction was previously emphasized by 
Bernard through his notion of the internal milieu (see para. 2.2.1 above). Luhmann, 
similarly, describes how the distinction between system and environment is drawn 
within the system itself. He describes how the system has no direct access to the 
external world and how the ‘internal environment’ represents an ‘already-domesticated, 
already-pacified environment’.179 As with Bernard, the reference to an ‘internal 
environment’ does not mean that Luhmann denies the existence of a physical 
environment.180
Similarly to von Uexkiill’s notion of Umwelt, Luhmann represents the environment as 
being constructed by a system. Luhmann’s environment can be regarded as an 
‘associated milieu’ because each environment is relative to a system. He also describes 
the behaviour of systems in terms of ‘orientation and expectations’ rather than reflexes 
to an existing external environment.181 Goldstein’s identification of the question of the 
direction of action, whether it should be attributed to organism or environment, is only 
apparently resolved by Luhmann through the idea that the system is constitutive of 
itself. This is, after all, only the case because it relies on the difference between it and its 
environment. Action is, therefore, in the end not attributed to either system or 
environment but is represented through the process of differentiation itself
There is a necessary asymmetry between system and environment because of a
I 09
‘difference in degree of relative complexity’. The environment appears to the system 
as differentiated into a multiplicity of system/environment relations. The system must 
maintain itself against this ‘overwhelming complexity’ of its environment; it does so by
1 Rlregarding the environment as resource or as information. The asymmetry between
179 Luhmann (1996), pp. 188-189.
180 Ibid., p. 178: ‘The difference between system and environment practised by a system presupposes and 
overlies a continuous reality. Thus the magnetic field o f the earth is significant for organisms and their 
environment, even if, as a magnetic field, it “takes no heed” o f  the boundary between organism and 
environment.’
181 Ibid., p. 110.
182 Ibid., p. 182.
183 Ibid., pp. 182 and 184: ‘The difference in relative degree o f complexity [between system and 
environment] is thereby grasped and thematized within the system primarily as the contingency o f its
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system and environment is evidenced by the fact that the system has a potential for 
operation and generation that the environment lacks. In Luhmann’s words: ‘The 
environment is only a negative correlate of the system. It is not a unity capable of
1 Sdoperations; it cannot perceive, have dealings with, or influence the system.’ This 
means that the environment ‘fails to be elevated to a corresponding plenitude of
>ri — _  _  . ^ ^ * 9  185power .
Any reference to power seems to be, at first sight, slightly out of place with regard to a 
theory that does not seem particularly interested in power relations. However, it has 
been noted how the difference between environment and system that Luhmann 
introduces leads to a change in the interpretation of power. The introduction of 
environment apparently leads to a ‘bipolar’ situation with two actors: system and 
environment.186 Traditional representations of power rely on precisely this bipolar 
situation. However, in Luhmann’s theory bipolar conflict between system and 
environment is lacking because they are in a continuous relation of mutual dependence. 
The environment does not dominate or determine the system, nor the other way around. 
According to Schtitz, the introduction of the notion of environment - and the continuous 
differentiation between system and environment - renders the ‘whole agonistic account
187of power, resistance and overcoming, etc.’ irrelevant.
Although the environment in Luhmann’s systems theory often seems to represent a 
passive space of expression or manifestation of the system - or a space from which a 
system differentiates itself - he emphasizes that
[t]he concept o f the environment should not be misunderstood as a kind o f residual category.
Instead, relationship to the environment is constitutive in system formation. It does not have
merely ‘accidental’ significance, in comparison with the ‘essence’ o f the system. Nor is the
environment significant only for ‘preserving’ the system, for supplying energy and information.
For the theory o f  self-referential systems, the environment is, rather, a presupposition for the
188system’s identity, because identity is possible only by difference.’
environmental relations. This thematization can assume two forms, depending on how the environment is 
viewed. If the environment is interpreted as a resource, then the system experiences contingency as 
dependency. If it is interpreted as information, then the system experiences contingency as uncertainty.’
18* Ibid., p. 181.
185 Schtitz (1997), p. 261.
186 Ibid., pp. 258-259.
187 Ibid.
188 Luhmann (1996), pp. 176-177.
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IThe environment is described as a presupposition or as a condition of possibility for the 
system’s unity. It is strange that, although the environment is constitutive of the identity
1 SOof the system, it appears to lack an identity of its own.
3.2 The central role of ‘environment’
3.2.1 Consequences o f ‘environment’ as centre
Since Luhmann called his theory ‘systems theory’, thereby immediately privileging one 
side of the system/environment distinction, the central role fulfilled by the environment 
is easily overlooked. Although the system itself is only the difference between it and its 
environment, it remains the case that the system is explained with reference to 
environment rather than the other way around. Luhmann observes: ‘all this does not 
mean, however, that the environment is merely a built-in opposition, pure appearance. 
Instead, one must distinguish “the environment” from systems within the 
environment’.190 In other words, the environment has as much reality as a system itself 
has. Ultimately, however, the notion is left largely unexplained.
The lack of an appropriate account of environment becomes inexplicable when 
Luhmann recognizes that it in fact constitutes the non-foundational fundament of his 
theory.
[T]he environment, not ‘the subject’, ‘underlies’ social systems, and ‘underlies’ means only that
there are preconditions for the differentiation o f  social systems (e.g., persons as bearers o f
191consciousness) that are not differentiated with the system.
A precondition is easily assumed as a necessary assumption that does not require further 
elaboration. However, the use of environment as fundamental presupposition has 
significant consequences. First, the use of the notion of environment destabilizes the 
role of the individual as privileged centre.192 Second, the notion of environment 
explains and allows for the introduction of differentiation, communication, and 
contingency.
189 Schtitz (1997), p. 261.
190 Luhmann (1996), p. 181.
191 Ibid., p. 178.
192 Schtitz (1997), p. 263, refers to environment as the ‘constitutive imperfection’ o f systems which 
affects the traditional idea o f systems as ‘autonomous entities that control their conditions’.
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With regard to the first consequence, the revolutionary impact of attributing a central 
role to the environment is revealed by Luhmann in a footnote where he refers to 
Canguilhem’s work on the ‘milieu’ (the same footnote referred to at the beginning of 
this Chapter):
[T]he ontology o f substance and essences therefore has no concept o f environment at all. The
eighteenth century began to rethink this in reflections on the significance o f ‘milieus’ for the
specification o f genuinely indeterminate forms (e.g., human beings). The change can be seen in
193the concept o f ‘milieu’ (which originally meant ‘middle’).
Luhmann observes elsewhere with regard to the difference between system and 
environment:
[T]his abandons, but does not simply dismiss, the traditional constitution o f the world around a 
‘center’ or a ‘subject’. The center is replaced by the pivot o f difference, or, more precisely, o f  
system/environment differences that are differentiated in the world and that thereby constitute 
the world. Every difference becomes the center o f the world.194
Systems theory and the notion of autopoiesis that it relies on concerns a process of 
differentiation and (self-)generation. In other words, there is no longer a reliance on 
ontological entities.195 According to Luhmann, the idea of the system is ‘more suitable 
[than the subject] to the centerless world picture of contemporary science.’196 As 
Canguilhem observed, the interpretation of ‘milieu’ as medium has been employed by 
the physical sciences to dissolve all centres of reference thereby negating the biological 
specificity of the individual form (see para 2.1.3 above).
The motive behind Luhmann’s use of the notion of environment is clear from the 
citations above: he seeks to move from an ontological view of the world to a focus on 
processes of differentiation. However, it can be asked whether his use of the notion of 
environment is counterproductive. In other words, does the system not come to 
represent a centre? Luhmann would say that the system represents a difference, not a 
centre. Nevertheless, because of the emphasis on the system rather than on the 
environment, the environment can easily be mistaken for the mere condition of 
possibility for the emergence of the system. In this case, the environment is again
193 Luhmann (1996), p. 537 (Ch. 5, n. 2).
194 Ibid., p. 208.
195 Pottage (1998b), p. 2: Luhmann performs a ‘theoretical shift from “substance” to “emergence”.’
196 Luhmann (1996), p. 439.
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relegated to the role it plays in many traditional theories that take the individual as 
centre of reference.
The second consequence of regarding environment as a fundamental presupposition is 
that it enables differentiation, communication, and contingency. Just as the action 
between particles in Newton’s time could not be explained by reference to individual 
particles themselves, so systems cannot account for their own autopoietic reproduction. 
The environment makes autopoietic reproduction, or what Luhmann calls ‘action out of
107action’ or ‘a “subject-free” concept of action’, possible. He tries to get around the 
traditional focus on the intentional actions and interactions of subjects by introducing 
the idea of a continuous process of differentiation. The interaction between system and 
environment is described by Luhmann in a similar way to von Uexkull’s representation 
of the communication between signals and perceptual organs, namely as ad hoc, blind, 
and reliant upon a reduction of complexity tailored to the specific needs of a system.
3.2.2 Maintenance o f purposeful obscurity
What makes Luhmann’s theory innovative is not his idea of autopoietic systems, but the
1 Q ficentral role attributed to the environment. However, he does not elaborate much on 
the importance and specifics of the environment. It has been suggested that his systems 
theory demonstrates an ‘inability to grasp the significance of the context of 
distinctions’.199 The question that must be addressed is: why does Luhmann fail to 
attribute more attention to what makes his theory innovative? The observations he made 
in a footnote, cited above, demonstrate that he was fully aware of the revolutionary 
consequences of the use of environment as a fundamental presupposition. After all, 
Luhmann uses the environment precisely because of this revolutionary potential.
There are several reasons that can be given for this lack of consideration. Perhaps 
Luhmann regarded the environment primarily as the condition of possibility for the 
emergence of the system. In other words, although his social theory is ‘subject-less’, the 
focus on the system betrays a reliance on an individual centre of reference. It could also 
be argued, as Canguilhem observed with reference to Goldstein’s criticism of von
197 Ibid., pp. 110 and 118.
198 Schtttz (1997), p.261; Schulte (1993), p. 24.
199 Kjaer (2006), p. 74.
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Uexkull, that ‘in order for knowledge to remain possible, it is necessary that from this 
totality organism-environment emerges an unconventional centre from which a range of 
relations may be investigated’.200 This leads to a necessity to focus on a centre of 
reference in the form of the system, even if that centre is conceived of as a difference. 
Another reason why Luhmann does not explore the environment further could be that it 
represents the intellectual ‘context’ of his theory, as suggested by Kjaer. In this case, 
‘environment’ can be read as representing the intellectual heritage of German Idealism 
from which Luhmann seeks to distance himself while - at the same time - remaining 
firmly indebted to it.201 This represents him as struggling to give the environment a 
place within his theory, metaphorically speaking.
If Luhmann was aware of the significance of the notion of ‘environment’ and chose not 
to question or clarify it, then such lack of clarification must be intentional. Indeed, he 
observes: ‘one is today disquieted by the futility of attempts to achieve clarity on the
on*}relationship between social systems and the environment’. He seems to maintain a 
purposeful obscurity surrounding the notion of environment. In order to understand 
what benefit is gained by such obscurity, it must be recognized that obscurity lies at the 
heart of Luhmann’s social theory.
/
By this is not meant that the theory itself is obscure, although it is at times certainly 
rather inaccessible, but rather that obscurity as a notion is central to his ideas on 
‘society’ (or lack thereof). In his acceptance speech ‘Abklarung der Aufklarung* - a play 
on the literal meaning of Enlightenment - for the professorship he was offered in 1967, 
Luhmann argued that maintenance of obscurity is not only inevitable but often more 
productive and even more rational than pursuing Enlightenment.
Maintenance of obscurity is, furthermore, inevitable because the only way in which 
something can be enlightened is by creating another ‘unmarked space’ somewhere else: 
‘every observation causes one side of a distinction to be designated and, consequently, 
for the other side to remain unmarked’.204 Obscurity is productive, and ‘transparency is
200 Canguilhem (2003), p. 184, n. 1 (my translation).
201 Kjaer (2006), pp. 71 and 74.
202 Luhmann (1998), p. 81.
203 Schulte (1993), pp. 9-10; see Luhmann (1998), p. 78, on the ‘ecology o f ignorance’ as ‘ecology o f  
knowing’; and McGoey (2007), pp. 220-221, on Luhmann’s and Nietzsche’s emphasis o f  the 
unconscious and ‘will to ignorance’ in contrast with a ‘will to truth’ and ‘will to power’.
204 Luhmann (1998), p. 79.
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unproductive’, because it is precisely ///transparency that lies at the basis of social 
order. Luhmann observes: ‘society develops figures of thought with which it can endure 
the unobservability of the world and allow intransparency to become’. The 
environment can be regarded as such a figure of thought.
His argument for intransparency grounds Luhmann’s criticism of traditional social 
theories that presuppose a value consensus or shared symbolic system as the foundation 
of social order.207 He employs intransparency to propose his alternative social theory:
[T]he maintenance o f social order [can be based] neither on nature nor on norms or values that 
are valid a priori. What is there to take their place? Since the seventeenth century, it has been 
believed the basis o f order must lie in what is concealed and unknowable. Latency is a necessary 
requirement o f order.208
Rather than a value consensus, it is intransparency - and the figure of thought that 
allows such intransparency to be thought: the ‘environment’ - that lies at the basis of 
social order.
Obscurity is a necessary correlate of knowledge, or rather is itself a form of knowledge, 
but it also fulfills another function in Luhmann’s systems theory. As Schulte suggests, 
the introduction of the notion of ‘unmarked space’ or environment prevents a situation 
where systems ‘oscillate helplessly’ or do not emerge at all by mere tautology and 
paradox.209 Obscurity, in the form of the ‘blind spot’, is necessary for systems theory to 
function because it allows for the stifling effect of the foundational paradox of the self-
910reproducing system to be neutralized. It can also be argued that the maintenance of 
ignorance regarding the concept of environment contributes to its role as a fundamental 
presupposition. In other words, its move to the background (its latency) enables it to 
fulfill its important role of making differentiation possible.
Nevertheless, some negative consequences can be identified of the lack of clarification 
of the notion of environment. First, such lack of clarification makes systems theory 
vulnerable to criticism. The environment, employed as metaphor, comes to stand for the 
defects or latent anxieties of the theory itself. Second, lack of recognition of the central
205 Ibid., p. 108.
206 Ibid., p. 112.
207 Luhmann (1996), p. 123: Luhmann refers to Weber and Durkheim.
208 Ibid.
209 Schulte (1993), p. 24.
210 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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role of environment causes systems theory to ‘turn in on itself. To some extent this is 
inevitable for a theory that focuses on autopoietic systems. However, one can wonder 
whether it is desirable. Inevitably, it means that systems are turned into privileged 
centres - at least with regard to the environment. The latter is then once again regarded 
as mere condition of possibility. Third, the purposeful obscuring of the revolutionary 
potential of the concept of environment in a theory which exploits that potential to the 
full deprives this theory of its critical potential. As Schtitz observes, Luhmann’s 
maintenance of obscurity regarding the environment leaves that notion
in constant danger o f retreating back into invisibility and o f lapsing back into its habitual 
dwelling place o f unsolved (unproblematised) complexity: the onto-epistemological trap ... that 
swallows and holds captured those phenomena which are too general and too present to be 
perceived.’211
PART IV
4.1 The ‘environment’ and modern rationality
4.1.1 *Environment ’ and the state o f man
Canguilhem, contrary to Luhmann, singles the environment out for discussion. His 
identification of ‘milieu’ as a category of contemporary thought should not be 
understood as a methodological manoeuvre that allows Canguilhem to merely ‘trace’ 
the concept of environment. Rather, he suggests that the emergence and articulation of 
this concept can be associated with a particular rationality. This idea was later repeated 
by Luhmann in his statement cited at the beginning of this chapter.
Canguilhem links the emergence of the modem notion of environment to a shift in 
world views. He describes how, in ancient Greece, the cosmos was regarded as an 
integrated whole with man at its centre. It represented the ‘habitat of man that was 
centred on man and seemed to be made for him exclusively’.212 The Copemican 
revolution changed this world view and led to the idea of a universe where ‘the centre is
211 Schtitz (1997), p. 275.
212 Canguilhem (2002), p. 33.
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everywhere and the periphery nowhere’.213 Man was no longer situated at the centre of 
the world. The state of man that emerges from this disintegration of the ancient world 
view is described by him as follows:
Man is no longer at the centre ( ‘aw milieu’) o f the world; he is now ‘un milieu’ himself ... the 
milieu is the state in which nature has placed us; we roam a vast milieu; man is proportionate 
with different elements o f  the world, he is related to everything he knows.214
As discussed in Chapter 2, Kant elaborated his theory of understanding in the image of 
the Copemican revolution in physics. Man, as a subject of knowledge, no longer 
represents the centre of the cosmos but the centre of his own understanding. Kant 
introduces a distinction between the subject’s understanding and the world of 
experience. For Canguilhem, the Copemican revolution implies that man is only one 
‘milieu’ among many. He does not mean to say that man is a subject among subjects; 
rather that there is no definitive distinction between man and world.
Canguilhem, contrary to Kant, does not focus on the question of ‘being’ or ‘subject’ but 
on the idea of a ‘milieu de vie’.215 His contemporaries, many of whom were 
existentialists - such as Sartre (see Chapter 1), could only conceive of the ‘milieu de vie’ 
by regarding it as a ‘situation’ in relation to a subject. It has been suggested that 
Canguilhem’s essay ‘Le vivant et son milieu’ represents a critique of the ‘naive 
geographical philosophy’ that many of his colleagues seemed to espouse.216
His identification of ‘milieu’ as a ‘category of contemporary thought’ indicates the shift 
from a rationality that reasons from a privileged centre of reference, where the 
environment represents the unquestioned external surroundings of that centre, to a 
rationality where no privileged centre can be identified and the environment is regarded 
as enabling ‘subject-free’ action. Luhmann’s use of the notion o f ‘environment’ enables 
him to shift from an ontological world view with a focus on singular entities to a 
different rationality that relies on differentiation and the idea of ‘action out of action’.
213
214
Ibid.
Canguilhem (2003), p. 193 (my translation).
215 Piquemal (1985), p. 68.
216 Ibid., p. 69.
Bourdieu gives an insight into the force of ‘milieu’ as a concept or category and its 
potential to question modem rationality while discussing his own notions of ‘field’ and 
‘habitus’. He describes how
the notion o f habitus expresses first and foremost the rejection o f a whole series o f alternatives 
into which social science (and more generally, all o f anthropological theory) has locked itself, 
that o f consciousness (or of subject) and o f the unconscious, that o f Finalism and of 
Mechanicalism, etc..217
He goes on to say:
[A]t the time the notion of habitus allowed me to break away from the structuralist paradigm 
without falling back into the old philosophy o f the subject or o f consciousness ... I wished to 
react against structuralism and its odd philosophy o f action ... I wished to put forward the 
‘creative’, active, and inventive capacities o f habitus and o f  agent (which the word usually does 
not convey) but to do so b^ recalling that this generative power is not one o f  a universal mind, 
nature or o f human reason.
Bourdieu notes how many theorists subsequently used similar notions in order to get 
away from the focus on the subject and consciousness as the ultimate terms of 
explanation in social theory.219
4.1.2 A biological concept o f environment
So how can a biological concept of environment be imagined? Canguilhem’s 
observation that ‘milieu’ can only be understood in the life sciences as a fact to be 
constituted {fa it a constituer’) indicates not only that the biological concept of 
environment has yet to be formulated, but also that the biological milieu itself must be 
understood as continuously developing. This is because it does not represent, as the 
traditional notion of environment does, a combination of physical laws. Rather, the 
biological milieu is made up of events. Canguilhem observes:
[B]ut isn’t the cosmic environment, the animal environment in general a system o f mechanical, 
physical and chemical constants, made o f invariants ? Certainly this environment, which science 
defines, is made o f laws but these laws are theoretical abstractions. The living creature does not 
live among laws but among creatures and events which vary these laws ... Because the qualified 
living being lives in a world o f qualified objects, he lives in a world o f possible accidents.
217 Bourdieu (1985), pp.12-13.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid., p. 14.
220 Canguilhem (1978), p. 177; Canguilhem (2006), p. 214.
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Nothing happens by chance, everything happens in the form o f events. Here is how the221environment is inconstant. Its inconstancy is simply its becoming, its history.
How can this biological concept of environment, which no longer refers to a privileged 
centre of reference, be made to fit within ‘a philosophy of nature that is shaped by 
reference to the problem of individuality’? Canguilhem observes that milieu as 
‘category of contemporary thought’ does not render individuality irrelevant in the life 
sciences. If anything, the focus on environment only sharpens the need to discuss what 
the notion of the individual has come to signify in the contemporary life sciences. 
Canguilhem observes: ‘But we have ended up disovering that, in order for there to be an 
environment, there must be a centre.’ In the next chapter, the changing role of the 
individual in the contemporary life sciences is discussed by reference to Canguilhem’s 
inquiry into - what he called - the ‘problem of individuality’.224
CONCLUSION
The notion of environment has proved to be a somewhat problematic concept; it is often 
not thought as a notion in itself but is usually regarded by reference to an individual. 
The environment emerged as a notion in physics and is most often interpreted as a 
resource, as external conditions of life, or as a geographical space. Such interpretations, 
as well as the traditional relation between environment and individual, have come to be 
regarded as unsatisfactory. I have argued that, rather than dismissing the notion of 
environment altogether, it is more productive to probe it as a concept or - as 
Canguilhem called it -  as a ‘category of contemporary thought’. Canguilhem, and 
subsequently Luhmann, associated the emergence of the notion of environment with 
modem rationality. The environment enabled the emergence of the individual or 
subject, but at the same time signalled the potential to dissolve privileged centres of 
reference.
Canguilhem pointed out that no biological concept of environment exists. In order to 
conceive of such a concept, he seemingly suggested a return to the original notion of 
‘milieu’ in physics. He discussed the original ambiguity of Newton’s notion of aether as
221 Canguilhem (1978), p. 116.
222 Canguilhem (2003), p. 165.
223 Ibid., p. 122.
224 For example, ibid., pp. 91, 94 and 165.
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‘milieu’ or medium that made ‘action at a distance’ possible. I have further explored the 
richness of this notion of milieu through Bernard’s idea of the ‘milieu interieur’ and von 
Uexkiill’s notion of ‘Umwelf. Newton, Bernard, and von Uexkull all associated the 
milieu with action or communication that could not be traced back to a subject. I have 
argued that Luhmann relies on the traditional characteristics of the milieu, notably its 
ambiguity and relativity, to elaborate his own notion of ‘environment’. The attribution 
of a central role to environment in systems theory contributes to the destabilizing of 
centres of reference through the introduction of differentiation and contingency.
Only now can the question be addressed that remained implicit in the introduction to 
Canguilhem’s essay on the ‘milieu’, namely, what effect does the notion of environment 
as ‘category of contemporary thought’ have on the notion of the individual in the life 
sciences? Although the individual has not exactly been replaced by the environment, the 
recognition of the significance of the concept of environment does raise the question of 
how the individual comes to be represented. This is addressed in the next Chapter.
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4. Th e  In d iv id u a l
p a r t i
1.1. Introduction
1,1.1 Individuality in the life sciences
In the last chapter, I explored the implications of Canguilhem’s proposition that the milieu 
has come to constitute a ‘category of contemporary thought’.1 One implication is perhaps 
that the individual, which usually figures as the other term in the relationship individual - 
environment, has lost its privileged and central role. Similarly to Canguilhem, who 
described how the Copemican revolution and the associated shift in rationality gave rise to 
the idea of the individual as ‘milieu’ among ‘milieux’, Atlan observes that ‘one of the 
elements of the great rupture called the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century is a 
change in the model of reference or privileged object from which generalizations are 
made’.3
The common perception seems to be that the individual, usually understood as an 
ontological or self-contained entity, was finally ‘exploded’ in the latter half of the twentieth 
century through developments in technology and the introduction of the notion of 
information into the life sciences.4 Whereas individuality was previously associated with a 
distinct living being that could be identified by reference to its material unity, the individual 
came to be regarded as fragmented or as a kind of ‘continuity of pattern’ that could be 
abstracted from its material instantiation.5 Molecular biology gave rise to a multitude of 
‘new’ biological processes that almost made the individual form, as previously understood,
1 Canguilhem (2003), p. 165 (my translation).
2 See Chapter 3, para. 4.1.1.
3 Atlan (1995), p. 266.
4 Greco (2005), p. 15; Lecourt (1998), pp. 218 and 223: ‘Information, with its discrete structure, replaces the 
signifying totality o f  form. ’
5 Kay (2000), pp. 88-89, citing Wiener: ‘The earlier accounts o f individuality were associated with some sort 
o f  identity o f  matter, whether of the material substance o f the animal or the spiritual substance o f the human 
soul. We are forced nowadays to recognize individuality as something which has to do with continuity o f  
pattern, and consequently with something that shares the nature o f  communication’.
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disappear.6 Meanwhile, the individual as a concept was often regarded as either too 
capacious or too unrefined to adequately grasp the subtlety and the variety of processes and 
entities that formed the objects of inquiry of contemporary biology.
•j
Rose believes that what is at issue is a transformation of ‘the living being itself :
For a long time, our ‘enlightened’ image o f the body consisted in an apparent ‘recognition’ o f its 
systematic, bounded and self-regulatory character. Canguilhem and Foucault have both helped us 
understand the conditions -conceptual, institutional, technical - under which this organic image of  
the body was formulated. The visualization o f the body on the dissection table, at least to a vitalist 
clinical gaze, revealed its wholeness as a living system, and as each layer was stripped away itg
appeared to reveal, at another level, the coherence o f systems within systems.
He argues that technological developments, and the change of scale they make possible, 
lead to ‘new formulations of the problem of life’9 and observes:
[W]hat seemed unitary at one scale o f magnifications is fragmented by electron microscopes, CT 
scans, PET scans, MRI ... The hierarchical, localized, organic unity o f the body-organism is 
fractured, fragmented. Heterogeneity seems to rule rather than order and harmony.10
I argue that the alleged disappearance of the traditional individual form in the contemporary 
life sciences has led to the absence of a theory about individuality. The social sciences now 
inquire, in relation to the life sciences, into the transformation of subjectivities and the 
increased capitalization of fragmented biological entities.11 However, the ways in which the 
concept of the individual - which arguably underlies such changing notions of subjectivity 
and fragmentation - itself has transformed is usually left unexplored. Similarly, in the life 
sciences gene centrism has given way to a focus on systems, networks, and pathways with 
sometimes little consideration for the ways in which such forms perpetuate or transform the 
notion of individuality in the life sciences.
6 See, e.g., Atlan (1995), p. 266. This alleged disappearance raises difficulties in instances where some sort of 
identification is relied upon. See, e.g., on the identification o f  the legal and biological person: Iacub (2002) 
and Pottage (2002).
7 N. Rose (1998), p. 162.
8 Ibid., p. 161.
9 Ibid., p. 162.
10 Ibid.
11 With regard to the latter, the focus is on the shift from production - which characterized the rise of  
industrialization and the early critiques o f capitalism - to reproduction as that which enables the exploitation 
of the self-generative potential o f living processes. See, e.g., Franklin & Lock (2003), pp. 8-11.
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However, perhaps paradoxically, the preoccupation with processes of individuation
persists.12 While different manifestations of individuality have become subject to
negotiation and contestation, individuality as such represents a recurring question. For
example, the life and social sciences continuously seek to account for processes of
‘emergence’, ‘ontogeny’, or ‘autopoiesis’ and the proliferation of individual forms that
11such processes give rise to. Although Luhmann, for example, seeks to eliminate the 
individual - as previously understood - as the main social category, his theory is concerned 
with the emergence of a unity that only ‘exists’ by virtue of processes of differentiation and 
self-reference.14 I argue that such ‘narratives of individuation’15 can be regarded as 
manifestations of a need to theorize what ‘individuality’ has come to signify or encompass 
in the contemporary life and social sciences.
It is often assumed that the emergence of a ‘multiplicity of individuals where once there 
was just the human organism and its constituent parts and functions’16 is distinctive of the 
contemporary life sciences. However, this emergence of individuals - or different ‘degrees
1 *7of individuality’ - facilitated by technologies that make the isolation, identification, and 
visualization of such individuals possible, is not necessarily characteristic of the twentieth 
century. One only needs to think of the role played by the microscope in the
1 ftconceptualization of the cell as the privileged individual form in the eighteenth century.
Rose argues that the work of Foucault and Canguilhem has only limited relevance for the 
contemporary life sciences because both rely on an ‘organic’ image of life that has become 
obsolete. I argue, to the contrary, that Canguilhem’s discussion of the ‘problem of 
individuality’19 - which he addressed through the history of the concept of the cell - has 
great significance for the contemporary life and social sciences. It is not enough to assume 
the irrelevance of the traditional notion of the individual. Rather, the question becomes: 
how does individuality remain relevant and how has the notion of the individual been 
transformed? What is the meaning of individuality when the contemporary life and social
12 Lewontin (1991), p. xiii: ‘While physicists may have come to regard a human individual as a mere speck of  
jelly on a mole o f  dust circling a pinpoint o f fire in a minor galaxy o f  a vast universe, the whole development 
o f social theory in the last 300 years has been characterized by the progressive apotheosis o f the individual as 
causally primary and as central to our concerns. Nor has scientific biology been formed differently.’
13 See, e.g., Emmeche (1997); Oyama (1985); Maturana & Varela (1980).
14 Luhmann (1996).
15 Pottage (2002), p. 284.
16 Ibid.
17 Canguilhem (2003), p. 77.
18 See Hacking (1983), pp. 186-209 on the role o f the microscope in knowledge production.
19 Canguilhem (2003), p. 79.
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sciences seem to reveal it as an ‘illusion’?20 In Atlan’s words: ‘what becomes, then, of the
 ^1
“reality” status’ of the individual; and to what extent have we moved beyond it?
1.1.2 The individual as *paradigm ’
The individual represents a common theme in Canguilhem’s essays. However, his most 
elaborate discussion of the individual can be found in an essay published in 1945 entitled 
‘La theorie cellulaire\ 22 This essay is often regarded as addressing the ontology of the 
individual, i.e. ‘what individuals consist o f 23 or what counts as an individual form.24 
However, I argue that Canguilhem’s discussion of what he calls the ‘problem of 
individuality’ is not limited to an inquiry into the ontological form of the individual or a 
description of different degrees of individuality. I believe that Canguilhem asks a different 
question; one that is similar to Atlan’s. He asks: ‘In the name of the cell, it is biological 
individuality that is in question. Is the individual a reality? An illusion? An ideal?’,
No one science, not even biology, can answer this question. And whilst all the sciences can and must 
contribute to its elucidation, it is doubtful that the problem is truly scientific, in the usual sense o f  
that word.26
So what is Canguilhem doing in this essay? Is he strictly inquiring into the biological 
concept of the cell and its ontology? Is he merely discussing cell theory or is he, in fact, 
addressing a bigger philosophical question? Canguilhem provides the answer to such 
questions when he observes that ‘ [t]he history of the concept of the cell cannot be separated
onfrom the history of the concept of the individual’.
In other words, to discuss the emergence and history of the concept of the cell means to 
explore the emergence, the various representations, underlying theories, imageries, and 
emotions that are associated with the notion of the individual. It is not so much the cell that
20 Ibid., p. 99; Atlan (1995), p. 274.
21 Atlan (1995), p. 274.
22 Canguilhem (2003), pp. 53-101. This first appeared in ‘ Melanges', a publication o f  the Faculte des lettres 
of the University o f Strasbourg.
23 Gayon (1998), p. 308
24 Ibid., p. 317: Gayon notes that whereas most contemporary American philosophers would regard ‘genes, 
proteins, cells, organisms, populations’ and so on as ‘individuals’, Canguilhem only considers the cell, 
organism, and society as potential individual forms.
25 Canguilhem (2003), p. 99.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid, pp. 78 and 88, citing Prenant: ‘7/ is the character o f  individuality that dominates the notion ofthe cell, 
it even suffices as its definition.’ (My translation).
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Canguilhem is concerned with. Rather, it is the category of the individual as it migrates and 
is exchanged between biology, philosophy, and anthropology and that often represents their 
preferred entity of analysis and centre of reference.
Canguilhem begins his inquiry by questioning the apparently most unquestionable of 
biological individuals, i.e. the cell. The cell provides the framework for his 
‘problematization’28 of individuality; it is the cell or organism that allows for the unfolding 
- rather than the containment - of the individual. Canguilhem does not equate the various 
manifestations of individuality as they appear in different contexts and disciplines. It is 
clear that different forms of individual require different methods of investigation. However, 
I argue precisely this: that Canguilhem does not primarily inquire into what an individual is 
in a particular discipline. Rather, he inquires into the concept of the individual or the 
‘problem of individuality’. In other words, the individual as it is replicated and rehearsed 
irrespective of its particular manifestations - even if he uses the biological individuality of 
the cell in order to perform this task. As Canguilhem observes in his essay on the history of
<JA
the concept of the cell, ‘[i]t is the entire problem of the individual that is at issue here’.
How might this peculiar approach be explained? Without recognizing Canguilhem’s 
influence on Foucault’s methodology, Agamben discusses Foucault’s use of what Agamben 
calls a ‘paradigm’.31 Foucault used such signifiers as ‘confession’, ‘asylum’, ‘state’ and 
‘power’ as paradigms that are abstracted from any particular use and that are only given 
specific meaning in a particular context. Agamben observes that Foucault may have 
described particular historical phenomena but that such phenomena are at the same time 
used to manifest and render intelligible a wider historical and problematic context.32
In order to perform this double function, these phenomena represent singular 
manifestations that render their wider context visible and intelligible precisely through 
their singularity. Agamben explained this by reference to the notions of ‘exemplar’ and 
‘exemplum’. He argued that the Foucauldian paradigm performs both functions
28 See Foucault (1992), p. 11, with regard to his own method: ‘It was a matter o f analyzing, not behaviors or 
ideas, nor societies and their “ideologies”, but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, 
necessarily, thought - and the practices on the basis o f which these problematizations are formed.’
29 Atlan (1995), p. 274: It would be a ‘confusion’ to ‘identify... the molecular and cellular self defined by an 
individual’s immune system with the self o f which we have subjective consciousness ... There is an 
irreducible difference between how we become aware o f the two phenomena, even if, relying on analogy, we 
designate them by the same name’.
30 Canguilhem (2003), p. 78 (my translation).
31 Agamben (2008), p. 18.
32 Ibid, pp. 18-19.
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simultaneously; it serves as a model or manifestation and - more importantly - it gathers 
various practices and understandings into ‘a new “contexteproblematique’” . Phenomena 
are abstracted from specific use, as Agamben says, ‘not to be placed in another domain, but 
- on the contrary - to demonstrate the canon of its use which is impossible to present in any 
other way’.341 argue that the cell, in Canguilhem’s essay, represents at the same time the 
exemplar - or manifestation - of biological individuality and the exemplum: the moral and 
intellectual questioning of the problematic of individuality itself.
1,1.3 The *problem o f individuality *
I argue that Canguilhem’s main object of inquiry in his essay on the history of the concept 
of the cell is not the cell as biological or ontological entity. Rather, Canguilhem questions 
the way in which individuality represents the primary object of inquiry in the life sciences. 
The cell, therefore, performs a double function in his essay: it is the exemplar of the cell 
that makes reflection on the concept of the individual in the life sciences possible. Whereas 
the individual as object of inquiry is mostly assumed as an existing entity whose 
characteristics and functioning are to be explained and explored, Canguilhem explores the 
constant preoccupation of the life sciences with individuality - or with the individual form - 
as such.
He does not regard the individual as either the ‘ultimate (indivisible) term that marks the 
end of the analysis’35 or as the starting point of analysis. Rather, the individual is not 
presupposed at all; it is questioned. Such questioning is ultimately unavoidable because any 
‘philosophy of nature that is centred on the problem of individuality’ cannot proceed 
without interrogating the individual that represents its privileged centre of reference.
I argue that Canguilhem speaks of the ‘problem’ of individuality for a variety of reasons. 
First, the individual not only represents an object of inquiry but also, at the same time, an 
obstacle to it. In fact, Canguilhem believes that this is the case with any object of inquiry in
37the sciences. The concept of the cell does not merely represent an existing unit, an 
analytical tool, or a mere simplification that allows further research into life’s processes.
33 Ibid., p. 20.
34 Ibid., p. 19 (my translation).
35 Lecourt (1998), p. 219.
36 Canguilhem (1993), p. 165 (my translation).
37 Ibid., p. 203: ‘the obstacle to science and the object o f science are one and the same’ (my translation).
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Rather, Canguilhem observes that: ‘the value of [cellular] theory lies as much in the 
obstacles that it has given rise to as in the solutions that it has provided’.
Second, regarding individuality as a ‘problem’ is a critical move methodologically. It 
indicates that individuality represents a question that gives rise to further questioning rather 
than a question that requires an answer. It also indicates a different approach to 
epistemology: Canguilhem inquires into specific philosophical problems rather than into 
theories.39 Finally, I argue that the focus on individuality as such - and on a particular 
understanding of the individual as autonomous - represents something of a problem for 
Canguilhem in normative terms. Following his own belief that there is no such thing as an 
‘innocent’ concept,40 the individual as privileged centre of reference expresses a certain 
ideological commitment.41
PART II
2.1 The individual in Kant
2.1.1 Identity, unity, autonomy
In order to appreciate the originality of Canguilhem’s discussion on individuality, and the 
object of his critique, it is necessary to return to the history of the modem notion of the 
individual. The idea that informs both the life and social sciences is that there exists a 
‘profound incommensurability between the objective, centerless physical world and the 
subjective, perspectival world of the se lf.42 This incommensurability is often attributed to 
the particular rationalities of the physical and chemical sciences on the one hand, and the 
life and social sciences on the other. It concerns the consequences of the Copemican 
revolution in physics and the Copemican revolution in metaphysics that Kant sought to
38 Ibid., p. 99.
39See Osbome (2003); Deleuze (2000), p. 211, n. 1: ‘One o f the most original characteristics o f modem 
epistemology is the recognition of this double irreducibility o f the “problem” (in this sense, the use o f the 
word problematic as a noun seems an indispensable neologism to me).’ (My translation). Deleuze refers to 
Canguilhem’s distinction between problem and theory in ‘Le normal et le pathologique'.
40 Duroux (1993), p. 49.
41 Canguilhem (2003), p. 96, notes, with regard to ideas inspired by the ‘Marxist-Leninist dialectic’, that the 
history o f biology ‘has indeed been written by the bourgeois’ (my translation); Lewontin (1991), p. xiii: 
‘Nothing better characterizes bourgeois thought than its obsessive concentration on individuals.’; Greco 
(2005), p. 20.
42 Tauber (1994), pp. 203-204.
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establish (see Chapter 2). In the former the milieu, rather than the ancient cosmos, comes to 
dominance while in the latter the individual becomes centre (even if it is the centre of his 
own universe rather than of the physical universe as such).
The centrality of the individual, divorced from its surroundings, was reinforced by 
Descartes’ construction of the thinking and doubting T  as ‘a separate entity’.43 This 
reveals how the individual has historically been regarded first and foremost as a problem of 
- and for - knowledge. Kant consolidated the idea of the individual as a problem of 
understanding, as well as many characteristics that are traditionally associated with 
individuality. He elaborated the idea of the individuality of the subject as the 
‘transcendental unity of apperception’44 and as the centre of reference of his theory of 
understanding. He also developed the corresponding idea of the identity or ‘unity of 
diversity’ of objects of experience.
Kant referred to the subject in his first Critique as the ‘unity of consciousness which 
precedes all data of intuition, and without reference to which no representation of objects is 
possible. This pure, original, and unchangeable consciousness I shall call transcendental 
apperception,’45 The individuality of the subject and the unity of the object of experience 
are intimately connected. The subject only emerges as the centre of reference of its own 
reason and experience when it unifies the diversity of the empirical world, thereby 
constituting the objects of its own reasoning and judgment.
The Kantian representation of the individuality of the subject and the identity and unity of 
the object gives rise to the three main characteristics that, arguably, still determine how 
individuality is thought: identity, unity, and self-consciousness. I draw here on the work of 
Tauber who wrote, more specifically, about the development of a notion of ‘self in 
immunology discourse 46 However, these characteristics are also often associated with 
other kinds of individuals in the life and social sciences. The individual subject is identical 
because it is a ‘transcendental supposition’, i.e. it is a condition distinguished from the 
empirical world and is - therefore - not wholly subject to change 47 The unity of the
43 Ibid., p. 144.
44 Ibid., p. 237.
45 Ibid., citing Kant; see also Kant (2003), pp. 77-79.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 237, citing Kant: ‘The consciousness o f on eself... is ... empirical only, and always transient. 
There can be no fixed or permanent self in that stream o f internal phenomena. What is necessarily to be 
represented as numerically identical with itself, cannot be thought as such by means o f empirical data only. It
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individual emerges as a consequence of the process of unification of diverse experience. 
The autonomy of the subject is constituted by, and reflected in, its self-consciousness. This 
self-consciousness, as opposed to the transcendental structure of the ‘unity of apperception’ 
itself, is empirical. It ‘refers to the capacity to reflect on its own unity and identity’. I 
believe that Luhmann used this idea of autonomy or self-consciousness, i.e. the reflecting 
upon one’s own reflection or reasoning, in his idea of the ‘observer’ (see Chapter 3).49
2.1.2 The * unity o f diversity ’ or *system9
Kant’s particular form of the ‘unity of diversity’ (see Chapter 2, para. 2.2.3) combines the 
aspects of identity, unity, and autonomy that determine most contemporary accounts of 
individuality. The form of the unitas multiplex50 has, more recently, influenced 
understandings of individuality in both the life and social sciences. Kant believed - 
paradoxically - that it is only by regarding a living process as a unity of diversity that its 
contingency or diversity can be recognized. The organic individual as ‘unity of diversity’ is 
to be distinguished from the mechanistic individual that represents a mere material 
aggregate of parts. The notions of ‘system’ and ‘whole’ are intended to reflect this 
difference in complexity. However, such notions potentially give rise to the 
misunderstanding of diverse processes as clearly identifiable ontological entities.
Heidegger pointed out that the ‘unity of diversity’ or the ‘system’ is a figure of thought that 
is particular to a certain era and rationality that he characterized as ‘the age of the world 
picture’.51 According to Heidegger, whereas philosophy in the Middle Ages was 
characterized by a ‘ranked order of correspondences’,
what belongs properly to the essence o f the picture is standing-together, system. By this is not meant 
the artificial and external simplifying and putting together o f what is given, but the unity o f structure
in that which is represented [im Vorgestellten] as such, a unity that develops out o f the projection o f
53the objectivity o f whatever is.
must be a condition which precedes all experience, and in fact renders it possible, for thus only could such a 
transcendental supposition acquire validity.’; See also Kant (2003), p. 81.
48 Ibid.
49 Luhmann (1998), p. 7.
50 Luhmann (1996), p. 18.
51 Heidegger (1977), p. 141: ‘where the world becomes picture, the system, and not only in thinking, comes to 
dominance’.; Ibid., pp. 129-130: Heidegger describes what is characteristic o f ‘the age o f the world picture’: 
‘What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent 
that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth.’
52 Ibid., p. 141.
53 Ibid.
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The representation of a living process as a system makes it possible to turn that process into 
an object of knowledge and judgment. However, Heidegger noted that ‘where the system is 
in the ascendancy, the possibility always exists also of its degenerating into the 
superficiality of a system that has merely been fabricated and pieced together’.54 The 
particularity of the ‘unity of the diverse’, then, goes unnoticed when the system is regarded 
as a mere material aggregate. Heidegger believed, probably because of this, that ‘the 
uniqueness of the systematic in Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling - a uniqueness 
that is inherently diverse - is still not grasped’.55
Although its philosophical heritage is not always recognized, ‘systems-thinking’ has had a 
significant impact on contemporary biology. Jacob, for example, observes that ‘every 
object that biology studies is a system of systems’.56 He argues: ‘whatever their level, the 
objects of analysis are always organizations, systems. Each of them is used as an ingredient 
by the one above. Even that old irreducible protagonist, the atom, has become a system.’57 
Jacob coins the word ‘integrorf in order to make further sense of this hierarchy or 
juxtaposition of different systems.58
The idea of the system has recently been taken up by developmental biology where ‘system 
implies some degree of self-organization, in which ‘self is not some privileged constituent 
or prime mover, but rather an entity-and-its-world’.59 This means that the idea of the 
system is now used to straddle the distinction between individual and environment. 
Theories of autopoiesis have also adopted the idea of the system in order to inquire into the 
particular organization and individuality of living processes (see para. 4.1.3 below).
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Jacob (1976), p. 307.
57 Ibid., p. 323.
58 Ibid, p. 302; Rheinberger (2000), pp. 234.
59 Oyama, (2000), p. 119.
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2.2 Kant’s influence
2.2,1 The individual as subject
The association of individuality with identity, unity, and autonomy has been perpetuated by 
inquiries in the social sciences that focus on the life sciences. This is most apparent where 
the object of inquiry is the influence of the life sciences on the creation and transformation 
of subjectivities. Rose, for example, argues that the contemporary life sciences give rise to 
a particular form of ‘subjectification’;60 not in the sense of ‘subjection’ but in the sense of 
‘the creation of subjects’.61 Drawing on Foucault’s discussion o f ‘techniques of the self 62 
(see para. 4.1.2 below) and - perhaps inadvertently - reconnecting this idea with its Kantian 
heritage, subjectification regards the different ways in which individuals ‘relate to 
themselves’ through a “‘somatic ethics” - ethics not in the sense of moral principles, but 
rather as the values for the conduct of a life - that accords a central place to corporeal, 
bodily existence’.
Such inquiries, therefore, focus on the transformation of the particular forms that 
subjectivities take. They do not consider the ways in which subjectivity or individuality 
itself is put into question by the contemporary life sciences. It is, for example, left 
unquestioned how this proposed ‘relation to self - which Foucault proposed - represents a 
particular form that implies a transformation of the traditional understanding of 
individuality (in relation to regimes of knowledge and power).64 Rather, the identity, unity, 
and autonomy of emerging subjectivities is emphasized by reference to familiar notions 
such as ‘responsibility’ and ‘freedom’ that also dominated Kant’s political agenda more 
than two centuries ago (see Chapter 2, para. 1.2.2).65
For example, Rose and Novas propose that ‘rather than seeing these practices of genetic 
subjectification in isolation, we suggest that they intersect with, and become allied to,
60 N. Rose (2007), p. 6 .
61 Ibid., p. 110.
62 Foucault (1992), p. 11.
63 N. Rose (2007), p. 5.
64 Ibid., p. 25: Rose himself observes: ‘Social theorists have recently focused on historical transformations in 
the self, often analyzing these in terms o f increasing individualization and reflexivity ... My focus is related 
but different.’
65 Though these notions obviously have a different significance in different historical periods. Kant (1963), p. 
3: Kant sought to release man from his ‘self-incurred tutelage’; he wrote the first Critique so that man could 
use reason ‘without direction from another’. Rose focuses on self-empowerment through information and 
communication.
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contemporary norms of selfhood that stress autonomy, self-actualization, prudence, 
responsibility, and choice.,66 Rose suggests that what is distinctive about the ‘contemporary
fnpolitics of life’ is a ‘complex of marketization, autonomization, and responsibilization’. 
The main aspect that distinguishes these references to autonomy and responsibility from 
previous ones is perhaps the ‘centrality accorded to the soma, to the flesh, the organs, the
zo
tissues, the cells, the gene sequences’. I argue that it is perhaps more interesting to discuss 
how the notion of the individual itself is being reconceptualized in the life and social 
sciences in ways that diverge from Kant’s emphasis on identity, unity, and autonomy.
2,2,2 The identity and integrity o f the organic 'self
The identity and integrity of the ‘self, which is often closely associated with Kant’s 
representation of the individuality of the subject, has been repeated in immunology 
discourse; the field of inquiry where the identification of the individual and the 
determination of its boundaries form the main object of inquiry. The problem of 
individuality is revealed when the distinction between biological ‘self and ‘non-self is of 
immediate and vital importance.69
Immune discourse relies to a large extent on biological notions of organismic integrity and
70identity, even if such notions are far from unambiguous themselves. The emergence and 
development of the biological notion of ‘self can be regarded as closely intertwined with 
the construction of ‘self in social and political theory:
Because bourgeois economic and social ideology, and by extension, biological theory as well, had
placed the individual at the causal and analytic center, the chief ideological preoccupation o f the 19th
and 20th centuries has been the problems o f the self. How does the individual know itse lf,... how
does it protect its privileged self-hood not only from the invasive attacks o f other selves, but from
the engulfing collective that threatens to consume and digest the self, assimilating it with other71selves into an undifferentiated mass?
The difference between previous and more recent conceptions of ‘self in immunology 
discourse is that the former represent the immune process as ‘an activity protecting
66 Novas & Rose (2000), p. 502.
67 N. Rose (2007), p. 4.
68 Ibid., p. 105.
69 Cf. Haraway (1991), p. 204.
70 Chernyak & Tauber (1991), p. 109; Ibid., p. 111: the concepts o f integrity and identity do not necessarily 
coincide in relation to the organism.
71 Lewontin (1991), p. xv.
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TJorganismic integrity’, while the latter regard it as a process ‘constituting that integrity’. 
This indicates a shift from the traditional focus on the identity and autonomy of the 
biological individual to
an understanding o f the indeterminateness o f organismal integrity, maintained and perpetuated 
through an ongoing process o f self-definition. The self could no longer be clearly delineated as a 
given entity. The ‘boundaries’ o f the organism are constantly being reestablished under the assault 
o f temporal change and environmental challenge.73
Such a shift from the notion of the individual as an existing entity to its understanding as a 
process is discussed below with reference to the thought of Nietzsche and Canguilhem.
2.2.3 The individuality o f the \gene9
The traditional characteristics associated with individuality also came to determine the 
description of the ‘gene’. Whereas the cell previously figured as the prototypical individual 
in biology, the gene arguably fulfilled that role from the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The comparison is often made between the gene as the dominant individual form in 
classical genetics and the atom in physics or the molecule in chemistry.74
Jacob observes that as a ‘product of reason, the gene seemed to be an entity with no body, 
no density, no substance’. In other words, the gene did not only represent a substantial or 
ontological being but was perhaps primarily a manifestation of a particular form of reason. 
The individuality of the gene corresponded to the idea of the individual as active agent that 
became prominent through Kant’s philosophy and the role of the subject in it. If this 
particular representation of the gene has been productive to the extent that it has provided 
popular and scientific discourse with a seemingly identifiable ‘actor’, the productivity of 
the concept is nowadays largely attributed to how it calls the traditional characteristics of 
individuality into question.
When it first emerged, the gene was regarded as a singular and substantial unity - although 
vaguely defined - to which all hereditary potential was ascribed. It was subsequently
72 Chernyak & Tauber (1991), p. 110.
73 Tauber (1994), p. 230, with reference to Metchnikoff s thought in immunology.
74 Rheinberger (2000), p. 220.
75 Jacob (1976), p. 226.
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represented by molecular biology as a ‘material entity’ and a ‘carrier of information’. 
However, more recently the concept of the gene has been regarded as lacking a determinate 
referent. The ‘gene’, it is said, does not refer to a clearly identifiable entity or unity. Rather, 
it can be regarded as a ‘boundary object’ whose primary contribution is how it organizes 
and focuses research and makes the production of knowledge possible.77
Whereas the gene was previously regarded as separate from the material environment in 
which its hereditary material was expressed, it gradually came to represent the difficulty 
itself of maintaining a distinction between individual and environment. The gene-centric 
view with its emphasis on identity, unity, and autonomy seems to have given way to an 
exploration of the seemingly impossible maintenance of the boundaries of the gene as 
individual form. This is accompanied by a shift in focus from the ontology of the gene to 
the many different processes that define it, such as ‘regulation, expression, and 
transcription’.78
2.2.4 The individuality o f th e ‘system'
The emergence of systems biology represents another example of the negotiation of 
individuality in contemporary biology. Here, the focus is not so much on the individual 
understood as the singular entity or organism. Rather, the biological ‘system’ is taken as the 
theoretical tool through which an understanding of various processes is sought. The idea 
behind the emergence of systems biology is that traditional biology, by focusing on the 
specific functions of a singular entity or process, necessarily only ‘yield[s] relatively
70limited insights’.
The rise of systems biology can be regarded as a shift in theoretical focus, as much as a 
practical response to the enormous amounts of information that have been generated by 
genome mapping exercises. The information generated makes a more integrated approach 
both possible and desirable. The ‘system’ of systems biology can be regarded as a model 
that makes research into the many interactions, networks, and relationships between 
biological processes possible.
76 Rheinberger (2000), p. 222 (reference to Sarkar).
77 Ibid., p. 220.
78 N. Rose (2007), p. 46.
79 Institute for Systems Biology (2009): http://www.svstemsbiology.org (Intro - Systems Biology: the 21st 
century science) (25 February 2009).
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The question is whether this more integrative approach represents a new kind of holism, so 
that the ‘system’ can be understood as a new type of biological individual. It would then be 
regarded as either the material combination or the conceptual ‘container’ for a variety of 
entities and processes and would represent individuality on a different scale. However, the 
system does not replace - or disregard - the traditional individual. It should not be regarded 
as an alternative object of inquiry, as the name ‘systems biology’ seems to suggest.80 
Rather, it represents an
integrated and interacting network o f genes, proteins and biochemical reactions which give rise to 
life. Instead o f analyzing individual components or aspects o f the organism, such as sugar 
metabolism or a cell nucleus, systems biologists focus on all the components and the interactions 
among them.81
Systems biology, therefore, represents a shift of focus from the entity as singular unity to a 
focus on networks and interrelated processes. However, such networks are still largely 
regarded as a way to represent interactions between existing individual entities.
2,2,5 Networks and path ways
A focus on the individual living form is often regarded as that which distinguishes biology 
from the physical and chemical sciences. Biology has, in fact, been defined as the 
‘investigation of the processes leading to the development of individuality in every
SOrespect’. Jacob observes that one of the main strategies of biology as a discipline is 
individualization: ‘it tries to arrange the problems in series, to individualize the objects and 
formulate questions that can be answered by experiments. ’ However, the emergence and 
identification of an individual has perhaps more to do with the requirements of research and 
experimentation than with the existence of a clearly delineated entity. As Goldstein said:
In our cognitive procedure we halt with the individual as a preliminary whole, simply because we 
here arrive factually at a relatively satisfactory result; at least, at a much better result than if  we 
started in the customary manner from the parts.84
80 Henry (2003), citing Westerhoff: ‘Systems biology is not the biology o f systems.’ Available at: 
http://pubs.acs.0rg/cen/coverstorv/8 120/8120biology.html (25 February 2009).
81 Institute for Systems Biology (2009 http://www.svstemsbiology.org (Intro -  Systems Biology: the 21st 
century science) (25 February 2009).
82 Lenoir (1982), p. 277.
83 Jacob (1976), p. 305.
84 Goldstein (1995), p. 393.
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Despite the apparent significance that is often attributed to the individual, it often remains 
somewhat elusive as an object of inquiry. It has been said, for example, with regard to the 
individual organism:
[W]e then have the curious irony that although Darwinism is a theory o f individual survival and 
reproduction, o f individual adaptation, the organism as organism plays no role at all. There is no 
unique domain o f forces that are seen at the level o f the organism ... the critical role o f the 
individual is threatened and contradicted by its placement at the boundary between autonomous 
internal and external forces. The contradiction is a very deep one, for if there is no boundary 
between the internal and the external, if  they flow continuously into each other as the premodem 
natural philosophers thought, then how do we locate the individual at all?85
In fact, the life sciences often focus on processes that extend or move beyond the individual
form. In relation to heredity, for example, ‘the generation of organisms is regarded as a
domain regulated by structures or forces extending beyond the momentous act of
on
generating an individual being’, while the emphasis was - historically - on ‘a fascinating 
lawfulness, a seemingly mathematical regularity by which forms come and go, appear and
on
disappear’. The focus on particular individuals and their ‘organization’ may, therefore,
QQ
obscure the importance of a multitude of different processes.
What characterizes more recent inquiries is how the category of the individual is no longer 
called upon to conceptualize a single organism or process. Rather, the question is: how can 
heterogeneous processes be conceptualized?90 In the contemporary life and social sciences, 
reference is made to networks, relationships, and pathways. The idea of a network is 
usually employed to signify the interaction or connection between various entities and 
processes.91 The notion of the network relies to a large extent on traditional understandings 
of individuality because it represents the interconnection between, or the enumeration of,
85 Lewontin, (1991), p. xv.
86 Goldstein (1995), p. 392: ‘Many phenomena o f the organism point beyond the individual’.
87 MUller-Wille & Rheinberger (2007), p. 6 .
88 Pames (2007), p. 322.
89 Rheinberger (1997a), p. 20: ‘Both Michel Foucault and Francis Jacob have identified “organization” as the 
key concept constitutive o f the “new” science o f biology... But it seems pertinent for a full understanding of  
what constituted biology to recognize the interindividual and intraspecific dimensions that most o f its 
concepts gained around 1800. Instead o f  referring, as in earlier times, to individual bodies, organic functions 
like generation, growth, development, nutrition, and sensation were increasingly perceived as reproductive 
functions physically constituting the unity o f species.’
90 Strathem (1996), p. 521, referring to Latour’s idea o f the network: ‘The concept o f network summons the 
tracery o f hetereogeneous elements.’
91 Ibid., p. 522: ‘The network is an apt image for describing the way one can link or enumerate disparate 
entities without making assumptions.about level o f hierarchy. Points in a narrative can be of any material or 
form, and network seems a neutral phrase for interconnectedness.’
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existing individual entities. As a notion, it does not necessarily question or transform the 
category of the individual as such.
A separate question is whether the network itself represents a new type of individual. In 
other words: ‘what kind of unity characterizes networks?’. It has been argued that 
‘associative action suggests a form of multiplicity that eludes the distinction between whole 
and part.’94 The network is, then, likened to the form of the unitas multiplex or ‘unity of 
diversity’. Regarded in such a way, it represents a kind of Kantian epistemological 
construct that enables us to grasp a variety of interconnected processes that would 
otherwise remain unintelligible. The problem with the identification and location of a 
network remains similar to that of any individual form. However, a network is potentially 
even more ‘limitless’ in the absence of - what seem to be - natural boundaries.95
2.3 The individual in Nietzsche
2.3.1 The process o f  *self-overcoming'
The difference between the notion of individuality most often associated with Kant and 
recent references to systems and networks in the contemporary life sciences, is that the 
former is characterized by reference to the characteristics of identity, unity, and autonomy 
and the latter signify various processes that may or may not give rise to the emergence of 
individual forms. The identifiable individual no longer seems to represent a presupposition 
or centre of reference, nor is it necessarily the point of departure or point of application of a 
normative or epistemological theory.
Tauber addresses how this shift from the association of the individual with an entity to its 
association with a process can be found in the work of Nietzsche. Nietzsche challenged 
Kant’s representation of the individuality of the subject as the ‘centrality of action and the 
activity of willing’ 96 He did this by elaborating the idea of an ‘active self, and more
92 Pottage (2001), p. 132.
93 Ibid., p. 130.
94 Ibid.
95 Strathem (1996), p. 523: ‘However, the power o f such analytical networks is also their problem: 
theoretically, they are without limit.’
96 Tauber (1994), p. 232.
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• 07profoundly of the self striving for self-definition in a constant process of overcoming’. 
Nietzsche’s inspiration for this particular representation of the individual can be traced 
back to his early interest in the organism (see Chapter 6, para. 2.1.2) and his later
• ORelaboration of the process of living as a manifestation of a ‘will to power’.
He observed: ‘life itself confided this secret to me: “Behold”, it said, “I am that which must 
always overcome itself” .99 Unlike Kant, Nietzsche did not assume the self as a 
transcendental condition or presupposition of knowledge or morality. Rather, it is 
represented as that which needs to be ‘actualized in its struggle, in the self-definition of its 
world’.100 Nietzsche described the organic individual as a dynamic and polemical activity 
that signified a constant overcoming, rather than a maintenance of identity or an effort of 
self-preservation:
Spinoza’s law o f ‘self-preservation’ ought really to put a stop to change: but this law is false, the 
opposite is true. It can be shown most clearly that every living thing does everything it can not to 
preserve itself but to become more101
He continues:
Life, as the form o f being most familiar to us, is specifically a will to the accumulation o f  force; all
the processes o f life depend on this: nothing wants to preserve itself, everything is to be added and102accumulated.
The preservation of identity cannot, therefore, be regarded as the main characteristic of 
living processes:
Physiologists should think again before positing the ‘instinct o f preservation’ as the cardinal drive in 
an organic creature. A living thing wants above all to discharge its force: ‘preservation’ is only a 
consequence o f this -  Beware of superfluous teleological principles! The entire concept ‘instinct o f  
preservation’ is one o f them.103
Goldstein influenced Canguilhem’s work and has been regarded as a possible ‘link’ 
between Canguilhem and Nietzsche.104 He repeats Nietzsche almost literally when he 
observes that ‘a drive towards self-preservation may appear as an essential trait of the 
organism, whereas, actually, the tendency towards self-preservation is a phenomenon of
97 Ibid.
98 Nietzsche (1968), p. 333.
99 Nietzsche (1971), p. 124.
100 Tauber (1994), p. 233.
101 Nietzsche (1968), p. 367.
102 Ibid., p. 368.
103 Ibid., p. 344.
104 Stiegler (2001), p. 101, n. 30, regards Goldstein as the ‘bridge’ between Nietzsche and Canguilhem
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disease, of “decadence of life’” .105 Rather, what defines living processes is what Nietzsche 
calls ‘will to power’ and what Canguilhem calls ‘vital normativity’ (‘normativite vitale’)106 
(see Chapter 6). Both notions imply the overcoming of self rather than self-preservation. 
However, self-overcoming and self-definition or self-description are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, Luhmann would say that these processes are implicated in one another 
(see para. 4.1.3 below). Nietzsche believed that self-definition remains a requirement for 
any living form.107
His idea of organic self is not identifiable with Kant’s representation of the individual. 
However, it could be argued that Nietzsche’s description of life as a ‘multiplicity of 
forces’108 is derived from Kant’s description of living processes by reference to a 
‘formative force’:
Hence an organized being is not a mere machine. For a machine has only motive force. But an 
organized being has within it formative force, and a formative force that this being imparts to the 
kinds o f matter that lack it (thereby organizing them). This force is therefore a formative force that 
propagates itself -  a force that a mere ability [of one thing] to move [another] (i.e., mechanism) 
cannot explain.109
Kant represented biological individuality by reference to this ‘formative force’ that causes 
it to continuously evolve, rather than by reference to the idea of an unchanging identity that 
he employed to establish the transcendental unity of apperception. The idea of an ever- 
evolving self was reinforced by the subsequent development of evolutionary theory in 
which ‘the organism is not given, but evolves; it is always adapting, always changing. Thus, 
the very core issue of identity is for the first time raised as a problem.’110 Nietzsche also 
seems to have been influenced, at least to a certain extent, by evolutionary theory. He 
referred to Darwin occasionally in his work, although he perhaps had only a superficial 
understanding of his ideas.111
Although Nietzsche elaborated a distinctly different notion of individuality than Kant, it 
could be said that he fulfils Kant’s critical project of striving for autonomy and ‘self­
105 Goldstein (1995), p. 337.
106 Canguilhem (1978), p. 76; Canguilhem (2006), p. 84.
107 Nietzsche (1983), p. 63: ‘And this is a universal law: a living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only 
when bounded by a horizon; if  it is incapable o f drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same time too 
self-centered to enclose its own view within that o f another, it will pine away slowly or hasten to its timely 
end.’
108 Nietzsche (1968), p. 341.
109 Kant (1987), p. 253, section 65, para. 374; See also Canguilhem (2002), p. 326.
110 Tauber (1994), p. 3.
111 Ibid., p. 253. See, e.g., Nietzsche (1968), p. 344.
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actualization’ (see Chapter 2).112 The main difference is that Nietzsche does not presuppose 
an existing unity or subject that can be ‘freed’ through an exercise of reason that relies on 
the assumption of such a unity. For Nietzsche, a self is only actualized or ‘freed’ by its self-
|  IT
overcoming (Selbstuberwindung).
He does not accept the prior existence or assumption of an ‘I’.114 Perhaps this is because his 
main preoccupation, unlike Kant, was not to provide a definitive theory of understanding or 
morality. Rather, Nietzsche elaborated his idea of a ‘will to power’ in order to question 
such theories.115 More importantly, he did not associate reason with a priori categories but 
with life:
‘I’ you say, and are proud o f the word. But greater is that in which you do not wish to have faith - 
your body and its great reason: that does not say ‘I’, but does ‘I’. 116
Nietzsche, therefore, regarded the individual not as an existing being or an 
epistemological/moral construct. Rather, ‘I’ - and reason itself - only emerge from the
117process of living and can only be understood through living. Since this process 
necessarily involves a self-overcoming it simultaneously implies the overcoming of the 
particular idea of self that Kant established.
112 Tauber (1994), pp. 232 and 290; Deleuze (1983), pp. 1 and 91: An important inspiration for Nietzsche’s 
work was his idea that ‘Kant had not carried out a true critique because he was not able to pose the problem of 
critique in terms o f values’. This meant that Kant did ‘not realize his project o f immanent critique’ in his 
Critique o f  Pure Reason. Nietzsche sought to take Kant’s critique beyond itself to its logical conclusion, i.e.: 
freedom through self-overcoming.
113 Nietzsche (1971), pp. 122-126.
114 Tauber (1994), p. 249.
115 Ibid., p. 259: ‘Nietzsche persistently seeks to declare the vital immediacy o f being, the need for the full 
acceptance o f the here and now and of the matrix o f experience. The layers o f morality and rationality that 
hide or encumber that primary encounter are stripped away’.
116 Ibid., p. 249, citing Nietzsche.
117 Ibid., p. 258, citing Nietzsche in relation to Being: ‘Being - we have no idea o f it apart from the idea o f  
“living”’.
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PART III
3.1 The history of the concept of the cell
3.1.1 Subjectivity and ontology
In what way does Canguilhem engage with Kant’s and Nietzsche’s respective 
representations of individuality? Different phases and aspects have been distinguished in 
his discussion on individuality. Lecourt, for example, describes three different phases in his 
work.118 First, he argues that Canguilhem represented the individual as a biological and 
ontological form. Second, he believes that Canguilhem abandoned this ‘biologism’119 after 
the rise of molecular biology and came to identify the individual with a human being; 
especially in relation to medicine where the individual came to represent the suffering 
patient. Third, Lecourt believes that the notion of the individual was ‘desubstantialized’ by 
Canguilhem and became characterized by ‘definitely Nietzschean overtones’.120 Gayon 
differentiates three aspects of Canguilhem’s discussion on individuality: normative,
191ontological, and epistemological.
Although the multi-faceted nature and complexity of Canguilhem’s discussion on 
individuality requires clarification, I argue that it is somewhat problematic to distinguish 
progressive phases and corresponding aspects that seem almost mutually exclusive. More 
specifically, with regard to Lecourt’s account, I believe that Canguilhem’s discussion on 
individuality should not be confused with subjectivity or with the role played by particular 
subjects in his work. I also believe that Canguilhem was not ‘force[d] ... to abandon his
199attempt to elaborate a philosophical notion of individuality’ as a consequence of 
developments in the life sciences. Rather, molecular biology and the introduction of the 
concept of information into the life sciences transformed the notion of the individual and 
made the ‘problem of individuality’ even more pressing (see Chapter 5).
With regard to Gayon’s account, I believe that the representation of the individual as 
normative (understood in the specific sense that Canguilhem gives to that term)
118 Lecourt (1998), pp. 218 and 222.
119 Ibid., p. 218.
120 Ibid., p. 222: ‘its normativity is now its unrivalled capacity to create new norms within a balance of power 
that traverses it’.
121 Gayon (1998), p. 308.
122 Lecourt (1998), p. 218.
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immediately and necessarily affects its ontological and epistemological status. In fact, I 
argue that the main objective of Canguilhem’s notion o f‘vital normativity’ was precisely to 
transform the particular ontology and epistemology that had been associated with living 
processes since Kant (see Chapter 6).
Canguilhem’s discussion of the individual resembles that of Kant only in the sense that 
both represent the ‘problem of individuality’ primarily as a problem of - and for - 
knowledge. Kant represented the reflective individuality of the ‘unity of diversity’ and the 
rational individuality of the subject as an answer to the question of how experience might 
be rendered intelligible. However, for Canguilhem individuality does not represent an 
answer or a solution. Rather, it represents a problem that precisely emerges from the 
impossibility of mapping a concept onto an identifiable entity. Canguilhem accepts that the 
conceptualization of an individual is never completely successful because the individual 
consists precisely of the negotiation of its boundaries. For him, the Kantian idea of the 
individual is immediately challenged by the impossibility of separating knowledge from 
life (or understanding from experience).
Before exploring the more original - and less discussed - aspects of Canguilhem’s 
discussion on individuality, two of the most common misinterpretations of his notion of the 
individual are addressed. First, the idea that the individual represents a subject. Second, the 
idea that it represents an ontological entity. The search for a subject in his work is perhaps 
largely motivated by a desire to confront Canguilhem’s own thought with itself. If a subject 
would form the centre of reference of his work, then this would confront Canguilhem with 
his own assertion that the subject is merely an expression of a certain type of rationality 
that he himself does not subscribe to.
The role of the subject has been associated with the patient that appears in Canguilhem’s 
earlier work on medicine.123 However, I argue that there is a difference between 
individuality and subjectivity in Canguilhem’s work. This can be explained by reference to 
Goldstein’s work Der aufbau des Organismus124 which influenced Canguilhem’s 
discussion on individuality and normativity. Goldstein’s neurological patients and their 
pathologies inspired him to formulate his ideas on normality, pathology, and the individual
123 Badiou (1998a), p. 229; Lecourt (1998), p. 222.
124 Goldstein (1995).
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norm.125 However, his idea of the individual cannot be mapped onto any of his patients or 
any human subject. He himself says that his focus ‘is of course not “individualistic” in the 
sense of being egocentric. Our problem is not the person as an individual, but 
individuality’. In other words, Goldstein’s patients inform his ideas and provide him with 
his data in much the same way as the patients in Canguilhem’s work on medicine inform 
the latter’s work. However, this does not mean that their respective theories of individuality 
should be identified with particular individual subjects.
Others believe that there is no subject at the centre of Canguilhem’s work. Rather, his work 
challenges the very notion of subjectivity. Badiou, for example, argues that Canguilhem’s 
idea ‘that the living prescribes the thought of the living is explicitly opposed to the 
assumption of a transcendental subject.’127 Canguilhem’s suggestion that only the process 
of living can give rise to knowledge of life128 echoes Nietzsche’s suggestion that reason can 
only be found in life. The consequence of this idea is that Kant’s subject and his a priori 
categories of understanding become almost irrelevant, or in any case inadequate, for the 
understanding of living processes. This argument also emerges as the main theme in
I 00Canguilhem’s book of essays appropriately entitled La connaissance de la vie. 
Canguilhem observes that ‘to define life as a meaning inscribed in matter is to acknowledge
i onthe existence of an a priori objective that is inherently material and not merely formal’. 
The idea of a material a priori or an a priori that is to be found in life is reminiscent of 
Aristotle’s idea of a material form (see Chapter 5). Although Canguilhem does not reason 
from subjectivity in the way that Kant does, Badiou notes how Canguilhem’s work does 
contain ‘a sort of formal schema or virtuality of the subject’ on the basis of which a fully- 
fledged subject may arise. This ‘virtual subject’ can be found, according to Badiou, in 
the ‘knot’ that is made up of ‘the three essential notions of centre, or centring, norm, and
1 ^ 9meaning’ that Canguilhem associates with individuality.
125 Ibid., p. 15: ‘The intention to write this book goes back many years. It dates to that time o f the world war 
when it became my special task as a physician to take under my medical care a great many patients with 
lesions o f  the brain. As the director o f a hospital for brain-injured soldiers, my experiences compelled me to 
broaden the medical frame o f reference to a more biological orientation’.
126 Ibid, p. 338.
127 Badiou (1998a), pp. 230-231.
128 Canguilhem (2003), p. 16: ‘The thought o f the vivant must take the idea o f the vivant from the vivanf. (My 
translation).
129 Ibid.
130 Canguilhem (1994a), p. 317; See also Badiou (1998a), pp. 230-231.
131 Badiou (1998a), p. 226.
132 Ibid.
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1
Canguilhem’s individual has also been regarded as an ontological entity; either as a 
being or a relation (between individual and environment).134 The idea that the individual 
represents a relation rather than a singular entity has been derived from Canguilhem’s 
statement that ‘the individuality of a ‘vivant’ no more ends at its ectodermic boundaries 
than it begins with the cell’.135 Lecourt notes how Canguilhem’s representation of the 
individual as, at the same time, an absolute centre and a term in a relationship gives rise to 
a certain tension in his account of individuality. However, Canguilhem’s reference to the 
individual as centre performs a particular function. He observes:
Biology must, therefore, first understand the ‘vivant’ as a meaningful being and individuality not as
an object, but as a character in the order o f values. Living is lrcryonner\ it is to organize the milieu137from a centre o f reference that cannot itself be referred to without losing its original meaning.
Canguilhem regarded the individual as centre and as normatively absolute, not because it 
represents an ontological entity, but because the individual can only be explored by 
reference to itself. The living can only be understood through living, not through the 
Kantian principles of understanding or judgment:
Since in the knowledge of life there is a centre o f reference that cannot be disputed, a centre of  
reference that one could call absolute. The ‘vivant’ is precisely a centre o f reference. It is not 
because I am a thinking being or a subject, in the transcendental sense o f that word, but because I am 
‘vivant’ that I must seek the meaning o f life in life.138
Similarly, Canguilhem’s representation of the individual as a term in a relationship 
performs a specific function. Such a representation of the individual is productive because 
it suggests that an individual is never identical to itself. Its identity shifts and changes in 
accordance with the changing relationship between it and its milieu.139 However, 
Canguilhem observed that it is difficult to identify and separate the two terms - ‘individual’ 
and ‘milieu’ - in a relationship or interaction where such terms continuously change place:
133 Lecourt (1998), p. 223; Greco (2005), p. 20: ‘a vitalist ontology cannot but be an ontology o f the 
contingent, o f what is permanently suspended between being and non-being’.
134 Gayon (1998), p. 308.
135 Canguilhem (2003), p. 184 (my translation).
136 Lecourt (1998), p. 220.
137 Canguilhem (2003), p. 188 (my translation).
138 Canguilhem (2002), p. 352 (my translation).
139 Canguilhem (2003), p. 90: Gobineau does not ‘conceive o f individuality as a reality that is always identical 
to itself; he conceives o f  it as one term in a mobile relation’. Ibid, p. 184: ‘The biological relation between a 
being and its milieu is a functional, and therefore mobile, relation in which the terms successively exchange 
roles’. (My translation).
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[I]t is not without great difficulty, and by abstracting from a multitude o f life’s conditions, that we 
manage to detach, isolate, and consider the cell separately... and even then it must itself be regarded 
as a milieu because it continues to represent a duality.1 0
Too much emphasis on either individual or environment can lead to the representation of 
either term as an ontological entity rather than as something that emerges from that relation 
or interaction itself:
[I]n short, individuality is not a term if one understands by that word a limit. Rather, it is a term in a 
relation. One must not understand as a term in a relation, a term that is used in an inquiry that 
represents such a term as a being.141
We will now turn to some of the less addressed aspects of Canguilhem’s discussion of 
individuality. These aspects together inform his questioning of the centrality of the 
individual as privileged centre of reference in the life sciences.
3.2 Aspects of individuality
3.2.1 Continuity and discontinuity
Canguilhem describes how the history of the concept of the cell has been animated by the 
continuous debate between two traditional strands of thought on the character of living 
processes. One strand of thought regards such processes as characterized by a certain 
continuity, while another regards them as characterized by discontinuity.142 As Canguilhem 
sees it, the concept of the cell arises from - and continues to envelop - this debate. The idea 
of the individual form emerges as a kind of ‘discontinuous continuity’, in the sense that 
particular individual forms disappear and re-appear while individuality itself continues to 
represent a problem or a question.
It is undoubtedly difficult, if not impossible, to identify the chronological priority of these 
two ideas of continuity and discontinuity in biology.143 However, according to Canguilhem, 
the idea of living processes as continuous - often represented through a primordial tissue or 
membrane - is usually regarded as preceding the association of the living with 
discontinuity. Cellular theory is regarded as the primary example of a theory of
140 Ibid., p. 91, citing Gobineau (my translation).
141 Ibid., p. 90 (my translation).
142 Ibid., p. 61.
143 Ibid., p. 62: Canguilhem notes that it is only since Schwann that the two theories are thought o f  as distinct.
162
discontinuity regarding the living. As Canguilhem says, it represents life as ‘a composition 
of parts, of organized atoms or grains of life’ rather than ‘a fundamental and continuous 
plastic substance’.144
The difference between ideas of continuity and discontinuity has also been associated with 
the difference between the physical or chemical sciences and the biological sciences. 
Biologists inevitably, at some point, have to have recourse to discontinuity in order to 
demarcate the beginning of an individual organism. Jacob notes how this can be 
distinguished from the situation in the physical or chemical sciences where there is a 
general focus on the continuity of structures and substances:
For the chemist, in contrast, it is somewhat arbitrary to make a demarcation where there can only be 
continuity. Every organism contains a panoply o f structures, functions, enzymes, membranes, 
metabolic cycles, energy-rich compounds and so on. Whatever the beginning assigned to what is 
called a living system, it is^ossible to envisage its organization only in an environment already 
prepared well in advance.
However, for biologists too it is often far from obvious how to approach the question of 
individuality. As Canguilhem’s discussion on the problem of individuality shows, the 
demarcation or isolation of an individual is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. The limits of an 
individual cannot be easily determined or drawn between it and its environment because 
individuality extends beyond the imagined boundaries of an existing entity. As Canguilhem 
says:
The individual necessarily presupposes within itself its relation to a greater being, it calls for, it 
demands ... a background o f continuity against which its discontinuity stands out. In that sense, 
there is no reason whatsoever to restrict the ‘pouvoir’ o f  individuality to the limits o f the cell.146
The question is, then, precisely how or where to enter or interrupt a certain process. In other 
words: what should be regarded as the starting point of the individual and what as its 
end?147 And if the individual is itself regarded as a process - whether as a normative 
process, a temporal process, or a process of emergence or differentiation - then how can 
such a process ‘individuate’ or be distinguished from other processes? This question is
144 Ibid., p. 61 (my translation).
145 Jacob (1976), p. 304.
146 Canguilhem (2003), p. 89 (my translation); Canguilhem seems to have copied Bergson (1975), p. 5: 
‘Discontinuous though they appear, however, in point o f fact they stand out against the continuity o f a 
background on which they are designed, and to which indeed they owe the intervals that separate them.’
147 Bateson (2000), p. 318, argues, by reference to the example o f a blind man and his stick, that the question 
of where the self begins and ends is ‘nonsense’: ‘because the stick is a pathway along which differences are 
transmitted under transformation, so that to draw a delimiting line across this pathway is to cut o ff a part o f  
the systemic circuit which determines the blind man’s locomotion’.
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evoked by the frequent references in the contemporary life sciences to concepts such as 
‘system’ and ‘network’ (see paras. 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 above).
Canguilhem loosely associates the distinction between theories of continuity and 
discontinuity with the French and German intellectual traditions, respectively. The reason 
for the comparatively late arrival of cellular theory in France is attributed by him to the 
long lasting influence of Bichat, who envisaged living matter as flexible tissue rather than 
as constituted by singular elements.148 Canguilhem notes how the imagery that 
accompanies ideas about living processes as either continuous or discontinuous reinforces 
the apparent difference between the two strands of thought:
[T]he cell, endowed with its canonical hexagonal form, is the image o f a whole closed in upon itself.
But tissue represents an image o f a continuity where every interruption is arbitrary, where something149originates in an activity that is always open to continuation.
Whereas Bichat adhered to the idea of a ‘continuite du fa it vital9,lso cellular theory relied 
on the idea of a largely self-sufficient or ‘closed’ individual entity. Cell theory represented 
the cell as the ultimate term of explanation or as ‘biology’s atom’. 151
Although the difference between the two theories seems apparent and cellular theory is 
regarded as the primary example of a theory that represents living matter as discontinuous, 
Canguilhem believes that the concept of the cell is in fact a product of both theories. The 
conceptualization of the cell as primary individual form is characterized by how it holds 
discontinuity and continuity in tension. This is illustrated by how the cell has been 
regarded, since its emergence, as at the same time a primary material element (of all living
1 ^9organisms) and a cause (a cell generates another cell).
It is at the same time an instance or a manifestation of life - a discontinuity - and the
continuous process of the formation and transformation that characterizes all living
processes. It is this double meaning or ambiguity that the concept of the cell integrates 
1within itself. According to Canguilhem, what made the emergence of the concept of the 
cell possible was not the prior identification through the microscope of the cell as an
148 Canguilhem (2003), p. 79.
149 Ibid., p. 80 (my translation).
150 Ibid., p. 81.
151 Jacob (2004), p. 136 : ‘With the cell, biology has found its atom.’ (My translation).
152 Canguilhem (2003), p. 85; Jacob (2004), p. 132.
153 Canguilhem (2003), p. 63: ‘a living unity which plays the role o f  principle in biology, in the double 
sense o f primordial existence and reason o f intelligibility’ (my translation).
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existing unity but precisely this - paradoxical - need for ‘an element that is at the same time 
simple and ‘ vivanf ’.154
3.2.2 The imagery o f the individual
Another aspect of Canguilhem’s inquiry into the history of the concept of the cell that can 
be used to shed light on his representation of individuality is his discussion of the imagery 
of the cell. Canguilhem argues that this imagery, and the values and emotions associated 
with it, contribute to the creation of a particular interpretation of individuality. He describes 
how the individual has come to be regarded as an identifiable and singular unity through 
the various ways in which it has been represented. He believes, however, that this 
representation can also be understood differently so that the individual emerges as a 
cooperative effort or a negotiation of boundaries rather than as a unity.
He begins by describing how the image of a monk’s cell or the structure of a honeycomb 
that Hooke first observed through the microscope has become iconic:
[W]ith the cell, we are in the presence o f a biological object whose affective over determination is 
incontestable and considerable ... Everyone will remember o f their lessons in natural history the 
image o f the cellular structure o f living beings. This image has an almost canonical constancy.155
The cell is often represented as a sphere because the sphere represents the typical organic 
form as distinguished from the ‘crystalline units’ that dominate imagery in the physical and 
chemical sciences.156 However, the sphere perhaps also represents what Canguilhem refers 
to as the ‘circularity’ of the traditional representation of the biological individual by
1 ^ 7reference to the distinction between whole and parts. He argues that Bernard was the first 
- through his concept of the ‘milieu interieur’ - to break this circular representation, 
thereby opening up the possibility of a richer interpretation of biological individuality (see 
Chapter 2, para. 2.2.1).
154 Ibid., pp. 90 and 59.
155 Ibid. (my translation); Lecourt (1975), p. 135, referring to ‘overdetermination’ as ‘an accumulation o f  
contradictions’.
156 Haraway (1976), p. 12: referring to Schleiden, the cell has even been referred to as an ‘objectification of 
organic form’.
157 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 328-329.
158 Ibid., p. 329.
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Although the traditional image of the cell represents it as a singular entity, Canguilhem asks 
the question of whether we do not - perhaps subconsciously - associate the image of the cell 
with cooperation rather than with isolation and autonomy:
[W]ho knows if  by consciously borrowing the term ‘cell’ from the beehive to designate the element 
o f the living organism, the human mind has not also borrowed from it - almost unconsciously - the 
notion o f the cooperative work o f which the honeycomb is the product? 159
He observes how the cell was, initially, not associated at all with notions such as the ‘self. 
Such associations developed only later, Canguilhem implies, with the emergence of a 
particular idea of the individual in eighteenth-century philosophy and political theory.160
3.2.3 Political philosophy and biology
Rather than assuming the particular notion of individuality as it emerged in the eighteenth 
century, Canguilhem provides an alternative reading of the history of the concept of the 
individual. He focuses instead on the way in which Oken’s representation of the cell was 
influenced by his Romantic political philosophy.161 Oken, a German scientist-philosopher 
who played an important role in the elaboration of cell theory, did not associate the 
individuality of the cell with identity, unity, or autonomy. Rather, he envisaged the cell, as 
Canguilhem says, ‘in the image of society, but this society is not the association of 
individuals conceived by the political philosophy of the “Aufklarung”, it is the community 
conceived by the political philosophy of romanticism’.
Contrary to the image of the individual that was proposed by philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, Oken regarded the cell as a singularity that could only exist as such by 
virtue of some form of cooperation or dependence on a greater whole. Whereas the cell was 
previously envisaged as a singular active agent, he emphasized the precarious nature of the 
cell as individual. Oken, it could be argued, announced the demise of the traditional notion 
of the autonomous individual and the simultaneous emergence of a different conception of
1 fkXindividuality.
159 Canguilhem (2003), p. 60 (my translation).
160 Ibid. (my translation).
161 Ibid., pp. 77-78; Jackson (1999).
162 Ibid., p. 77 (my translation).
163 Ibid., p. 76. Klein citing Oken: ‘No individuality is spared here, it is quite simply ruined. But that would be 
a misinterpretation; the reunited individualities together form another individuality, they are destroyed and 
other individualities only appear through their destruction.’ (My translation).
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Gayon believes that Canguilhem’s discussion of political philosophy in relation to the 
concept of the cell fits within his description of two ‘metaphorical models’ through which 
the whole/part relationship has historically been thought: a technological model and a 
political model.164 Although Canguilhem’s discussion sheds light on the whole/part 
relationship in relation to the individual, I argue that this is not Canguilhem’s main 
concern. I believe that Canguilhem refers to political philosophy for a much more 
significant reason; he uses it to illustrate two aspects of the problem of individuality.
First, individuality - understood as autonomy - is part of Enlightenment philosophy and 
can, therefore, also be understood otherwise. In order to understand individuality 
differently, or not focus on the individual as privileged centre, he uses the reference to 
Oken in order to repeat and affirm his previous argument (made in relation to the image of 
the cell as honeycomb) that ‘what is certain is that emotional and social values of 
cooperation and association have a direct or indirect effect on the development of cellular 
theory’.165 In other words, he questions the idea of the individual as an autonomous entity.
Second, Canguilhem shows how the emergence and transformation of the concept of the 
cell cannot be dissociated from the changing roles that the individual plays in political 
theory and philosophy.166 This illustrates his idea that the ‘problem of individuality’ is 
indivisible and, therefore, not exclusive to any discipline. Analogies between 
sociological conceptions of individuality and biological theories are valid because the 
political philosophy of the nineteenth century was inspired by a certain conception of life. 
Canguilhem argues that, at least in France, the proposal of the idea of a ‘social contract’ 
was accompanied by a particular idea of life as resistant to analytic dissection or 
individualization. In other words, biological theory inspired a political philosophy that - in
1A8turn - effected how biological individuality was conceived.
I argue that Canguilhem’s own ideas about the focus on individuality in biology, and about 
the centrality of a certain type of individual, surface in his discussion of the history of the 
concept of the cell - for example, when he mentions how Novalis believed that universal
164 Gayon (1998), p. 318.
165 Canguilhem (2003), p. 61 (my translation) ; Ibid., p. 78, Canguilhem repeats: ‘That has already authorized 
us to affirm that social and emotional values have an effect on the development o f cellular theory.’ (My 
translation).
166 Ibid., p. 78.
167 Ibid., p. 79.
168 Ibid.
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suffrage ‘atomized popular will and did not recognize the continuity of society or, more 
precisely, of community’.169 He also refers to the idea espoused by Hegel - among others - 
that the State represents ‘a fact that goes beyond the reason of the individual and to which 
the individual must sacrifice itself.170 Through such references, Canguilhem seems to want 
to provide an alternative to the focus on individuality - and on the individual as autonomous 
entity - in the life sciences. His discussion of the relation between Oken’s political 
philosophy and his ideas on the biological individuality of the cell reveal how the 
traditional notion of the individual is an extension of Enlightenment philosophy that is open 
to questioning.
3.2.4 The indivisible individual
Canguilhem repeatedly observes that ‘the problem of individuality is itself indivisible’.171 
What does he mean by this statement? It seems out of place when, with the arrival of cell 
theory, a multitude of individuals emerged where previously there was only a single 
organism:
[T]his highly influential doctrine [Schwann’s doctrine that attributed ‘biological agency’ to a single 
cell], combined with rapid improvement in the resolution and magnification power o f microscopes, 
brought about an upheaval in the understanding o f organismal individuality. Suddenly a whole new 
spectrum o f potential individuals opened up.
The French biologist Prenant,173 who is often cited by Canguilhem, observed that cellular 
theory gave rise to a situation where ‘du haut en bas existe I ’individualite’.174 Every 
individual was regarded as being made up of other individuals, and so forth, leading to a 
kind of infinite regress of individuality. The cell not only signified a single biological entity 
but implied an ever-extending individuality that reached well beyond the single individual 
cell. To some extent, the proliferation of individuals was represented as a necessary 
condition of life. As Prenant said: ‘life is not possible without the individuation of the 
living’.175
169 Ibid., p. 78.
170 Ibid., p. 79.
171 Ibid., pp. 79 and 89.
172 Pames (2007), p. 321.
173 Prenant (1935): Prenant was a professor o f zoology at the Sorbonne and Communist Party member, who 
wrote a book on biology and Marxism.
174 Canguilhem (2003), p. 89, citing Prenant.
175 Ibid. (my translation).
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Although many different degrees of individuality may have become visible and thinkable, 
Canguilhem repeats that the problem of individuality itself remains indivisible. The 
meaning and wording of this statement seem to differ slightly according to the context in 
which it is used. However, it is usually understood as a return to classic holism or to an 
Aristotelian idea of form.176 Lecourt, for example, says that the introduction of the concept 
of information into the life sciences undermines the notion of such an indivisible 
individual:
[A] 11 biochemists knew from this point on that the problem o f individuality was eminently divisible. 
The notion o f the individual therefore never again plays the central and totalizing role it had in 
Canguilhem’s early works.177
However, I believe that Canguilhem’s reference to the indivisibility of the individual 
performs a different function. This can be explained by reference to his discussion of 
individuality in relation to the distinction between form and matter. The individual is, 
traditionally, either regarded as the ultimate material element that can no longer be 
divided178 or as the form or ‘whole’ that is beyond all division:
[T]he individual is that which cannot be divided with regard to its form, although one senses the
possibility o f its material division. In certain cases, the indivisibility that is essential to individuality
only reveals itself with the division o f a being that is materially more vast, but is it only a limit to the
>179division embarked upon, or is it rather a priori transcendent to every division ?
Canguilhem’s statement regarding the indivisibility of the ‘problem of individuality’ can be 
read more productively when it is regarded as primarily aimed at the conceptual schema 
that underlies the traditional idea of the individual as ontological entity. It proposes that the 
individual cannot be grasped through the traditional distinction between form and matter or 
the traditional relationship between whole and parts. In other words, that the problem of 
individuality cannot be divided is not because the individual represents the ultimately 
indivisible material part or the formal whole, but because it represents the impossibility of 
understanding processes of individuation through these traditional frameworks. The
176 Aristotle (1998), Book Eta 3 (1043b), p. 240:‘Rather, if  we take these latter to be the material components, 
there must be some additional entity, neither an element nor composed o f an element, but just that very thing 
the removal o f which leads to a purely material account. But if  this entity is the cause o f being and substance 
for the object, then it is the account of this that is the account o f the substance itself.’
177 Lecourt (1998), p. 222.
178 Haraway (1991), p. 216, referring to Dawkins discussing Huxley who ‘defined individuality in biological 
terms as “literally indivisibility - the quality o f  being sufficiently heterogeneous in form to be rendered non­
functional if  cut in h a lf ’; Luhmann (1996), p. 257.
179 Canguilhem (2003), p. 78 (my translation); This is probably inspired by Aristotle discussing form in 
relation to ‘natural entities’. Aristotle (1998), Book Zeta 8 (1034a), p. 196: ‘this sort o f form in this very flesh 
and bones that is Callias or is Socrates. They differ materially (their matter is different), but they are formally 
the same (indivisibility o f the form)’.
169
individual cannot be understood by reference to the traditional characteristics of unity or 
identity. Rather, it should be understood as process; as Nietzsche would say, a process of 
‘ self-overcoming’.
This idea is productive at a time when the focus on individuality in contemporary biology is 
at the same time contested and repeated in different forms. The individual is no longer 
regarded as part, as a whole or sum of parts, or as something that is more than the sum of 
parts. Such traditional representations of individuality relied on, and could still be 
understood through, the relationship between whole and parts. Individuals could be 
identified as such as long as reference was made to the original ‘whole’ that they were
1ROdivorced from or that they were thought to form in combination. Contemporary biology 
seems to rely less and less on such representations of the individual and more on systems, 
networks, pathways, and contingent processes. Nietzsche and Canguilhem’s respective 
interpretations of individuality as a process, therefore, regain significance.
PART IV
4.1 The individual as process
4.1.1 Simondon: Tindividu n’est pas un etre mais un acte’
This statement by Simondon181 expresses most clearly what remains to some extent implicit 
in both Nietzsche’s and Canguilhem’s work: the individual is not a being or an actual form 
that persists through time but a mechanism or a process. The reference to ‘acte’ is not to be 
understood as the intentional action of a subject but as a process of individuation. 
Simondon is often referred to as the first philosopher to have developed a specific 
philosophy of individuation. His work became known to a larger audience through
1 S')references to it by Deleuze. His work entitled ‘L ’individu et sa genese physico-
1 S'?biologique (I ’individuation a la lumiere des notions de forme et d ’information) ’ adresses 
processes of individuation in physics and biology. The most significant aspect of this work
i8° pottage (2002), p. 293: ‘The ‘original’ contiguity o f person and biology is maintained either by 
referring to body parts as parts, thereby re-iterating the process o f detachment so as to maintain the sense of  
an original unity.’
181 Simondon (1964), p. 197. Simondon was a former student o f Canguilhem and a professor o f psychology at 
the Sorbonne.
182 Deleuze (1997), p. 26; Deleuze & Guattari (1999), pp. 408-409 and p. 555 (note 33).
183 Simondon (1964).
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is how it seeks to move beyond the traditional notions that have dominated most 
discussions on individuality, namely the distinction between form and matter (the 
‘hylomorphism’ that Simondon attributes to Aristotle) and the idea of the individual as 
ontological entity.184
Canguilhem refers to Simondon’s work in a footnote in the second edition of ‘La 
Connaissance de la vie’, apparently without exploring his ideas on individuation further.185 
According to Lecourt, Canguilhem sought to 'import’ Simondon’s ideas on individuation 
into his own concept of the individual in order 4to rid the notion of the individual of its 
Aristotelian ontological ballast’. However, it often goes unnoticed that Simondon’s 
exploration of individuation is in fact a further elaboration of Canguilhem’s discussion of
187individuality as a problem.
Most notably, Simondon took his main argument that 'the individual emerges only as the
result of a process of individuation, and it is futile to look for the principle in the form taken 
1 88by the result’ from Canguilhem who said that the individual can only ever be regarded as
a consequence or a product rather than a principle.189 Although the similarities between 
their respective theories are more apparent than their differences, these differences exist 
nonetheless. For example, it has been noted that whereas the location of individuality 
represented a question for Canguilhem it is no longer relevant for Simondon.190 However, I 
believe that this puts too much emphasis on a supposed localization of the individual in 
Canguilhem who was - arguably - more interested in the process of normativity than in the 
localization of either individual or environment as substantive unity.191
The most prominent difference between Canguilhem and Simondon is perhaps that the 
former’s discussion of individuality is influenced by his notion of ‘vital normativity’, 
whereas Simondon describes the individual as a predominantly temporal process.
184 See, e.g., for commentary on Simondon’s contribution: Stiegler (1998); Combes (1999); Barthdldmy 
(2005).
185 Canguilhem (2003), p. 99 (n. 1): ‘Since these lines were written, the thesis o f Mr. Gilbert Simondon, 
L 'individu et sa genesephysico-biologique, Paris, P.U.F., 1964, has fortunately contributed to the elucidation 
of these questions.’ (My translation).
186 Lecourt (1998), p. 222.
187 Barth616my (2005), p. 159, notes Canguilhem’s references to Simondon and the latter’s references to 
Canguilhem, but does not explore the substance o f their ideas and their mutual influence in any detail.
188 Lecourt (1998), p. 222.
189 Canguilhem (2003), p. 70.
190 Barth616my (2005), p. 177.
191 See para. 3.2.1 above for his reference to the individual as ‘centre’ and Chapter 3, para. 1.2.2, for the idea 
o f environment as localizable space.
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According to Simondon ‘the relation between “actes” does not take place at the abstract 
level of norms’.192 However, his observation that ‘being is not entirely contained in its 
principle, or rather in its principles; being develops from its principles but its principles are 
not given in its system’193 can be regarded as explaining the difference between Aristotelian 
form and Canguilhem’s idea of normativity. Whereas the former is often regarded as a form 
that is inherent in living processes, the latter signifies processes or techniques of living that 
are not prior to their execution or actualization. Simondon, therefore, seems to agree with 
Canguilhem’s notion of normativity as the normative order of an organism that 
continuously transforms to meet the demands of a particular situation (see Chapter 6). His 
reference to the individual as ‘acte’ is not as far removed from Canguilhem’s discussion of 
the ‘norme’ as one would think.
What drives Simondon’s theory of individuation is the recognition of the problem, 
previously identified by Canguilhem, that most theories assume the existence of the 
individual that they seek to explain.194 He tries to avoid this problematic point of departure 
by according no primary significance to the individual. Rather, Simondon focuses on the 
idea that individuation is a temporal process in which the individual merely represents a 
phase or a moment.195 Because the individual cannot be presupposed as object of inquiry, 
the process of individuation itself cannot be understood through the individual. Rather, the 
individual must be understood through the process of individuation.196 This process is 
purely potential, in the sense of unspecified or undifferentiated, because it gives rise to both
1 Q7
individual and environment.
Since the individual is not assumed from the outset, it cannot be regarded as an ontological 
entity that progresses or transforms through time. Rather, the individual is, as Simondon 
says, ‘contemporary of its own becoming’.198 He avoids the idea, most often associated 
with Hegelian dialectics, of ‘devenir’ as a future or goal that is to be obtained and that 
exists separate from the individual.199 Time is not prior - or posterior - to the process of
192 Simondon (1964), p. 297 (my translation) ; Barth£l£my (2005), p. 40: Simondon proposes the ‘hypothesis 
according to which the living being is an individuation understood as phase and no longer as regime’. (My 
translation).
193 Simondon (1964), p. 197 (my translation).
194 Combes (1999), p. 8.
195 Simondon (1964), p. 273.
196 Ibid., p. 4.
197 Ibid., pp. 281-282.
198 Ibid., p. 277.
199 Ibid., p. 278.
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individuation. Rather, time itself comes into being through individuation.200 Nevertheless, 
Simondon seems - at first glance - to embrace a linear notion of time because he describes a 
development in phases from the ipre-individuelle\m  which he describes as the principle of 
the process of individuation, to the individual as end result. His description of the process 
of individuation can, therefore, be misread as a progressive process of identification.
Similar to Canguilhem’s approach to individuality as a problem, Simondon regards the 
individual as enveloping ‘an internal problematic’.202 This is because an individual never 
represents ‘the whole being’ but always retains an ‘incompatibility in relation to 
itself.204 In other words, the individual never entirely coincides with itself or with its 
concept, because it ‘conserves within itself an activity of permanent individuation’. The 
idea of the individual as an ongoing process of individuation or self-formation also 
indicates, as it did in Canguilhem’s work, that individuality recurs as a question. As
A A /J
Simondon observes, ‘the individuated being is not substance but being put into question’.
In a remark that echoes Canguilhem’s idea that the individual is at the same time object of - 
and obstacle to - inquiry, Simondon says that the individual represents at the same time a 
question and its ‘provisional solution’. Like Canguilhem, Simondon does not focus on
AAO
the identity of the individual because the individual is ‘richer than its own coherence’ 
and exceeds its own limits.209
4.1.2 Foucault: ‘techniques de soi*
Foucault, following Nietzsche and Canguilhem, elaborates a particular idea of individuality 
(if it can still be called by this name) by reference to ancient Greek Stoicism. Some have 
regarded Foucault’s idea as a return to - or reinvention of - the subject, after he had 
previously challenged the notion of the self and subject that existentialists such as Sartre
200 Barth616my (2005), p. 57, notes the significance o f the idea that ‘genesis is not in time but that which 
gives rise to time’ (my translation).
201 Simondon (1964), p. 2.
202 Ibid., p. 11 (my translation).
203 Ibid., p. 4 (my translation).
204 Ibid., p. 5 (my translation).
205 Ibid., p. 9 (my translation).
206 Ibid., p. 277 (my translation).
207 Ibid., p. 272 (my translation); Combes (1999), p. 13.
208 Simondon (1964), p. 284.
209 Ibid., p. 285: it is ‘simultaneously coupled to itself within a system that exceeds unity, which is more than 
one’ (my translation).
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relied on.210 It is certainly true that subsequent interpretations of Foucault’s work have
taken his discussion of ‘the relationship of self with self 211 to refer to a subject and its self-
01 0formation. Foucault’s original idea of the ‘rapport a soV and ‘techniques de soV is 
taken literally, for example by Rose, in order to imagine the ‘self-techniques by which 
human beings should judge and act upon themselves to make themselves better than they 
are’.214
To a certain extent, such interpretations are understandable because Foucault speaks about
0 \  c
the ‘rapport a soV in relation to the ‘forming of oneself as a subject’. The relation of self
0 1 f.
to self, or the ‘principle of the care of the se lf , is constituted by practices and techniques
onrather than laws or moral codes. However, before the significance of such practices and
their historical particularity can be assessed, it is necessary to appreciate the form of
individuality that underlies these practices or techniques and makes them possible. It is
necessary, Foucault believes, to take ‘such a form into account’;218 a form that he believes
^ 1 0
has a long history that can be traced back to ancient Greece.
The form that Foucault describes as the ‘rapport a soV cannot be identified with 
subjectivity, nor can it be identified with the traditional idea of individuality. He begins his 
inquiry with the suggestion that ‘we may wonder about the reality of that individualistic 
upsurge’220 and goes on to say that ‘“individualism” ... is so frequently invoked, in 
different epochs, to explain very diverse phenomena. Quite often with such categories 
entirely different realities are lumped together.’221 The relation of self to self that Foucault
focuses on should be distinguished from the individualism where the individual is regarded
000as a singular and autonomous entity or subject.
210 Hacking (2004), p. 288.
211 Foucault (1992), p. 6.
212 Foucault (1984b), p. 12.
213 Ibid., p. 17.
214 N. Rose (2007), p. 27, in relation to what he calls ‘ethopolitics’.
215 Foucault (1992), p. 6.
216 Foucault (1990), p. 43.
217 Ibid., p. 45: ‘It also took the form of an attitude, a mode o f behaviour; it became instilled in ways of living; 
it evolved into procedures, practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught’.
218 Ibid., p. 41.
219 Ibid., p. 43.
220 Ibid., p. 41.
221 Ibid., p. 42.
222 Ibid.: Foucault mentions three interpretations o f ‘individualism’ that should be distinguished (the 
autonomous individual, private life and family relationships, and relations to self); although connections 
between these forms are possible, they are not necessary.
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I believe that there is a significant difference between the ‘self of the existentialists or the 
Kantian subject and Foucault’s discussion of a relation of self to self. Deleuze also argued 
that Foucault did not seek to reinvent the subject with his discussion of the techniques of 
the self.223 Rather, Foucault’s ‘rapport a soV represents a particular form or - as Deleuze 
calls it - a ‘nouvelle dimension,224 that signifies the escape from, or transformation of, 
traditional accounts of knowledge and power.
Foucault associated the ‘rapport a soV with reason, freedom, and the resistance to regimes 
of knowledge and power. Although he refers to the Greeks rather than to Kant, Foucault 
comes close to Kant when he says that
because the god [Zeus] deemed it right that he be able to make free use o f himself; and it was for 
this purpose that he endowed him with reason... it is this absolutely singular faculty that is capable 
o f making use o f itself, for it is capable o f ‘contemplating both itself and everything else’... It is 
insofar as he is free and reasonable that man is the natural being that has been committed to the care 
o f himself.225
However, Foucault believes that Kant’s reason - because it is necessary and a priori - 
ultimately turns into the dogmatism and tyranny it sought to oppose (see Chapter 2). 
Deleuze argues that, although the ‘rapport a soV runs the risk of being integrated into 
traditional regimes of knowledge and power, its redeeming feature is that it is not a 
transcendent form (like Kant’s a priori principles) but that it continuously changes form.227
4.1.3 The autopoietic ‘system’; individuality as differentiation
Autopoietic theory is primarily concerned with ‘the organization of the individual as the 
central question for the understanding of the organization of living systems’. This means 
that, like Kant, the individuality of the system or organism is primarily described as an 
epistemological problem. It is important to note that organization is regarded as a process, 
rather than a structure, from which the system emerges. This understanding of biological 
individuality as an ‘on-going activity’ is somewhat different from the organization of the
223 Deleuze (2004), p. 113.
224 Ibid.
225 Foucault (1990), p. 47, citing Epictetus.
226 Deleuze (2004), p. 110.
227 Ibid.,p. 111.
228 Maturana & Varela (1980), p. 87.
175
living that was described by Kant when he observed that the individual is its own cause and 
effect.229
Heidegger describes ‘poiesis’, in relation to artistic creations and living processes, as a
process: ‘the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis'P® He
argues that living processes represent poiesis in the ‘highest sense’, because they bring
1
forth themselves while artistic creation relies on an external agent. Varela describes how 
this process of bringing-forth implies a continuous process of differentiation: ‘a living 
system makes itself into a entity distinct from its environment through a process that brings
o'X'y  .  tforth, through that very process, a world proper to the organism’. The idea of autopoiesis
as a process of differentiation is explored by Luhmann who turns the distinction between 
system and environment into the central presupposition of his social theory.
It has been noted how the founders of autopoietic theory sought to ‘preserve the central 
features of autonomy and individuality while still wrenching them out of the Cartesian and 
Enlightenment frameworks in which they are embedded’.234 The idea of individuality as a 
central question is maintained, but the notion of individuality is transformed. Although the 
autonomy of the system is regarded as central, autopoietic theory does not assume an 
already existing autonomy. Rather, it is concerned with the mechanisms through which 
such autonomy is constituted and can be understood. This means that autonomy always 
remains that which is in need of explanation: ‘autonomy, although continuously revealed in 
the self-asserting capacity of living systems to maintain their identity through the active 
compensation of deformations, seems so far to be the most elusive of their properties’.235 
Autopoietic theory ultimately seeks to provide
a proper account o f the constitution o f an autonomous s e l f ... We need to avail ourselves o f more
powerful explanatory devices to see how such a self can, at the same time, be a virtual point with no
localized coordinates, and yet provide a mode o f identity through which an interaction can
, 236happen.
229 Tauber (1991), pp. 30 and 27; Kant (1987), p. 249, section 64, para. 370.
230 Heidegger (1977), p. 10.
231 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
232 Varela (1991), p. 79.
233 Luhmann (1998), p. 33: ‘The theory proceeds by assuming the distinction between system and 
environment.’
234 Hayles (1999), p. 132 ; ibid., p. 143: ‘liberal subjectivity is both contested and reinscribed in autopoietic 
theory.’
235 Maturana & Varela (1980), p. 73.
236 Varela (1991), p. 79.
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The autonomy of the system as centre of reference is regarded as a necessity, as 
Canguilhem previously noted, for relations, processes, and networks to be understood. He 
described how the individual represents an absolute centre of reference that, nevertheless, 
cannot be localized or referred to without losing its function (see para. 3.1.1 above). Varela 
also discusses this ‘apparent paradox of non-localization liable to designation as a 
totality’.237
Varela refers, in relation to immunology discourse, to the need for a ‘selfless self as an 
alternative to the self/non-self distinction that traditionally dominated immunology 
discourse (see para. 2.2.2 above). He describes how the unity of the autopoietic system 
is not defined against something else but is a ‘self-referential, positive assertion of a 
coherent unity’.239 The unity of the system represents the process of differentiation rather 
than an ontological entity; it is an ‘operative notion’.240 This means that unity is only the 
consequence or effect of a mechanism or process of self-definition and description. 
Nevertheless, the existence or emergence of unity is a requirement for the reproduction of a 
system241 and its maintenance is an organizational necessity 242 This does not mean that the 
unity or identity of a system remains stable. The maintenance of a unity inevitably requires 
transformation and this is what the ongoing process of autopoiesis represents.
This idea of the autopoietic individual as an ongoing process of self-definition begs the 
question of how an individual form emerges in the first place:
‘[T]he true problem is not how an organism and its environs interact or connect but, rather, the 
opposite one: how does a distinct self-identical organism emerge out o f its environs? How does a 
cell form the membrane that separates its inside from its outside? The true problem is thus not how 
an organism adapts to its environs but how it is that there is something, a distinct entity, that must 
adapt itself in the first place 243
However, Luhmann describes how traditional origin scenarios are purposefully avoided in 
autopoietic theory. The question is not how a system comes into being - it is not an
237 Ibid., p. 100.
238 Ibid., p. 95.
239 Ibid., p. 88.
240 Maturana & Varela (1980), p. 96: ‘Unity distinction [the distinctiveness and distinguishing of unity], then, 
is not an abstract notion o f purely conceptual validity for descriptive or analytical purposes, but it is an 
operative notion referring to the process through which a unity becomes asserted or defined.’
Ibid.: ‘reproduction requires the existence o f a unity to be reproduced, and it is necessarily secondary to 
the establishment o f such a unity’.
242 Ibid., p. 97: ‘autopoiesis implies the subordination o f all change in the autopoietic system to the 
maintenance o f its autopoietic organization, and since this organization defines it as a unity, it implies total 
subordination o f  the phenomenology of the system to the maintenance o f its unity’.
243 Zi2ek (2003), p. 116.
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ontological entity that exists within a linear conception of time - but how it operates 
through mechanisms of differentiation.244
Similarly to Canguilhem, Luhmann questions the traditional notion of the individual as a 
social category through his idea of the ‘system’. In his theory, the tension between Kant’s 
traditional representation of individuality by reference to identity, unity, and autonomy and 
Nietzsche’s and Canguilhem’s idea of individuality as a process of self-overcoming 
becomes apparent. Luhmann, like Kant and his idea of a ‘unity of diversity’, regards the 
notion of the ‘system’ as a response to a primarily epistemological problem. He does not 
claim that the world is made up of individuals called systems. Rather, the system represents 
an epistemological tool through which certain processes can be understood.
As opposed to original autopoietic theory and Kant’s understanding of the unity of 
diversity, he does not limit the applicability of the notion of the ‘system’ to either living 
processes or artistic creation. In Luhmann’s systems theory, the unity and individuality of 
the system is perceived as such through the external perspective of the observer who 
perceives the individual as an actual form (or a unity of difference) rather than a technique 
of differentiation. Although the idea of unity represents somewhat of a theme in Luhmann 
and unity is replicated across systems, it never comes to represent an actual form but only 
denotes a process of differentiation or self-description.
Similarly to Canguilhem, Luhmann addressed how the relation between whole and parts is 
an unsatisfactory model through which to explore the ‘indivisibility’ or systematic 
character of the individual.245 He replaces this schema of whole and parts with the primary 
difference between system and environment. This means that a system is not a unity 
composed of parts but ‘is composed of a relatively large number of operationally 
employable system/environment differences’.246 This means that, similarly to Nietzsche, 
Goldstein, and Canguilhem, Luhmann regards the individuality of the system as a process
244 Winthrop-Young (2003), p. 312: ‘Given that autonomy is the prerequisite as well as the effect o f  
differentiation, it makes little sense to ask how something autonomous evolved from non-being into being. 
From Luhmann’s point o f view this is a useless chicken-and-egg question, and rather than “search for the egg 
from which it emerges, the chicken should lay another and cackle”.’ (Citing Luhmann); Ibid., p. 323: 
Moreover, ‘the beginning/end distinction defines a period, the before/after distinction defines an event’. 
Luhmann’s theory does not follow a linear conception o f time but operates through events.
245 Luhmann (1996), p. 27: ‘The questions accompanying this - for example, How is a “whole” composed of  
“parts”? and Where in this is the “more than the sum o f its parts” to be found? -  are replaced by a completely 
different understanding o f complexity, one that must be formulated entirely as difference in complexity.’; see 
also ibid., p. 5.
246 Ibid., p. 7.
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of self-overcoming through continuous differentiation and distinction rather than as a 
process of self-preservation.
CONCLUSION
The individual, or individuality, represents the traditional object of inquiry in both the life 
and social sciences. However, for some time now, the individual - understood as 
ontological entity - has been regarded as an unsatisfactory concept to address recent 
developments in these fields. In particular, the introduction of the concept of information 
has allegedly rendered the idea of the ontological individual obsolete, while a focus on the 
environment seems to indicate that the individual has lost its role of privileged centre.
The focus on the fragmentation of the traditional individual form through technological 
developments has, I have argued, given rise to an absence of theory regarding individuality 
in the life and social sciences. The individual is only thought in relation to the 
transformation of subjectivities and the emergence of new biological entities. However, at 
the same time, individuality persists or recurs as a question through the emergence of 
various narratives of individuation and through reference to notions such as ‘system’ and 
‘network’.
Canguilhem inquired into, what he called, the ‘problem of individuality’ which he 
discussed through the history of the concept of the cell. I have argued that he turns the 
individual into a paradigm; he uses the notion of the cell as a manifestation of individuality 
in order to elucidate the wider historical and social problematic associated with 
individuality. The individual is shown to be a category that flips over between biology and 
the social sciences; informing both notions of organism and ‘self.
It has been argued that the characteristics that are traditionally associated with the 
individual - identity, unity, and autonomy - can be traced back to Kant’s discussion of the 
subject as the centre of reference of his theory of understanding and the unity of diversity 
represented by the empirical world. I have argued that these ideas still influence 
perceptions of the individual in the life sciences, as illustrated by reference to changing 
subjectivities, the gene and system as privileged individual forms, and notions of networks 
and pathways. I have argued that Nietzsche’s ideas in relation to the living represent an
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alternative to Kant by focusing on self-overcoming rather than self-preservation. These 
ideas influenced both Goldstein’s and Canguilhem’s accounts of individuality in the life 
sciences.
Canguilhem’s discussion of individuality as a problem in his essay ‘La theorie cellulaire ’ is 
usually associated with the description of the individual as an ontological form. However, I 
have discussed three - less explored - aspects of Canguilhem’s discussion that reveal how 
he proposes a different notion of individuality. First, the individual represents a 
discontinuous continuity; something that individuates in different forms but represents an 
enduring philosophical question. Second, Canguilhem reveals how the imagery of the cell 
influenced and reinforced a particular representation of the individual. The connection 
between the biological individuality of the organism and the emergence of the autonomous 
individual in eighteenth-century philosophy and political theory shows how the focus on 
the individual as privileged centre of reference is itself representative of a certain rationality 
or normative preference. Third, he describes the problem of individuality as indivisible, 
thereby indicating that the individual cannot be grasped through the traditional framework 
of whole and parts.
The idea of the individual as process has been further explored by reference to Simondon’s 
discussion of individuation as a temporal process, Foucault’s description of the relation of 
self to self, and the autopoietic system as a process of differentiation. The contemporary 
life sciences that focus on individuation as a process without recourse to the notion of an 
ontological entity can benefit from Canguilhem’s discussion of individuality as a problem. 
His discussion also reveals the normative assumptions that are implicit in any theory that 
focuses on the individual as centre of reference. In the next Chapter, the concept of 
information is addressed that has been associated with so many transformations in the life 
sciences - including the transformation of the notion of the individual.
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5. I n fo rm a tio n
p a r t i
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Information in contemporary biology
The notion of information, characterized mostly by its different meanings and 
employments, had a significant influence on the life and social sciences during the 
second half of the twentieth century. Many believe that this notion has transformed 
traditional understandings of knowledge, power, economy, and critique.1 However, the 
notion of information seems to have run out of steam. Some of the consequences of its 
use in the life sciences, for example the introduction of the distinction between ‘genetic 
information’ and environment as well as its role as a disputed metaphor, have called its 
productivity into question.
Why would it be useful to return to this concept? And why would we do that through 
Canguilhem’s work? It is generally believed that he largely disregarded the notion, that 
he misunderstood it, or that he equated it with Aristotle’s idea of form (understood as an 
unchanging pattern or teleological principle).4 I argue that Canguilhem’s ideas on 
information are useful when understood within the context of his engagement with 
modem rationality and the relation between knowledge and life that defines it.
Kant regarded knowledge or understanding and living processes as distinct processes 
that were subject to different principles and regimes (see Chapter 2). Canguilhem 
refocuses the debate by suggesting that the Kantian distinction between knowledge and 
life is undermined by the introduction of the notion of information into the life sciences. 
This notion of information does not necessarily facilitate control over living processes,
1 See, e.g., Lyotard (1979); Kay (2000); Castells (1996), (1997), and (1998); Lash (2002).
2 N. Rose (2007), p. 47; Rabinow & Caduff (2006), p. 330.
3 Griffiths (2001).
4 N. Rose (1998), p. 162; Lecourt (1998), p. 223.
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as is usually suggested, but complicates the notions of knowledge and control 
themselves.
To a certain extent, the question of control necessarily emerges in relation to the 
sciences.5 However, the theory of cybernetics - as it emerged during the Second World 
War - transformed what was once meant by both information and control. Galison 
observes that Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, emphasized ‘the dual aspect of 
information’.6 Information was no longer regarded as part of a ‘knowledge-gathering 
exercise’ but as part of the constitution and functioning of ‘control systems’ that could 
be either animate or inanimate. Cybernetics represented, as Kay suggests
a new form o f technological epistemology. Its central notion was that problems o f control and 
communication engineering were inseparable -  communication and control being two faces o f  
the same coin -  and centered on the fundamental notion o f the message, a discrete or continuous 
sequence o f  measurable events disrupted in time. Control qua feedback was nothing but the 
sending of messages that affect behavior.
Although the conception of control in cybernetics may have been initially inspired by a 
traditional desire to create scientific order out of natural chaos,8 the idea of control itself 
did not signify control that is exercised ‘over’ living processes. Rather, it involved the 
functioning and predictability of systems themselves. The notions of control and 
information no longer had the same meaning as they did before: ‘control was abstracted 
and diffused: it was not a thing but a manifestation; not a mode of decision making but 
a process pervading the whole system.’9
It is often suggested that the introduction of the notion of information into the life 
sciences gives rise to new ways of knowing and controlling living processes, whether 
such control takes a legal form (through property mechanisms), a political form 
(through policy interventions), a scientific form (through informatic databases), or an 
economic form (through the capitalization of biological ‘products’).10 The concept of 
information in the life sciences would give rise to a new form of ‘biopolitics’ (see para.
1.1.2 below).11
5 Rheinberger (1997a), p. 102.
6 Galison (1994), p. 256.
7 Kay (2000), p. 84-85.
8 Galison (1994), p. 266.
9 Kay (2000), p. 85-86.
10 Eisenberg (2002); Jasanoff (2005); Thacker (2004); Parry (2004a) and Sunder Rajan (2006).
11 See Foucault (1997), p. 216; Foucault (1998), p. 139 on the original idea o f ‘biopolitics’.
182
I argue that such an association of information with an, often conceptually simplistic, 
notion of control is not particularly productive. It does not take account of the 
transformations that both notions have undergone and the way in which information and 
control are implicated in each other. Rather, such ideas rely on two assumptions that 
may no longer be valid.
First, most inquiries focus on the form/matter distinction. Information is often 
associated with Aristotelian form; it is, then, suggested that information makes control 
of the very essence or ‘form’ of living processes possible. I argue that Aristotle 
elaborated the notion of form precisely in order to challenge the form/matter distinction, 
thereby indicating a slippage between the ancient idea of form and the modem idea of 
information.
Second, the understanding of control remains locked in a Kantian metaphysics - or
19‘horizon logique’ - with its distinctions between concept and life, norm and fact. This 
means that control is represented as a power that is exercised over living processes. 
Such an idea does not take into account how information and control are already 
implicated in the exercise of knowing life.
In this Chapter, I draw mainly on Kay’s exploration of the concept of information in the 
life sciences because in my view it constitutes the most sophisticated account of its 
emergence and particular use in this field.13 Kay associates the emergence of the 
concept of ‘information’ with the evolution of technology and the elaboration of 
information and communication theories after the Second World War14 and indicates 
how the notions of information and control are inextricably linked.
1.1.2 Information and control
The reason for the particular convergence between information technology or 
communication sciences and contemporary biology has been explained through the idea 
that both
12 Canguilhem (2002), p. 343: ‘The logical horizon, according to Kant, is the circumscription o f a 
territory through a conceptual point of view.’ (My translation).
13 Kay (2000).
14 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 91-102.
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are constructed by a common move - the translation o f the world into a problem o f coding, a 
search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all 
heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment and exchange.
What seems to be at issue is a causal relationship between an increased fragmentation of 
living processes and an increased possibility of control.
The traditional conceptualization of the organism as an individual whole seems to have 
given way to the transformation of living processes into ‘a mutable, sortable, 
comparable set of elements, a living body figures in bioinformatics as a somewhat 
abstract relational entity, potentially open to many different determinations.’16 Living 
processes in such technological forms are characterized by their potential to ‘move,
1 7modify, recombine’, which - it has been argued - makes it easier for them to be 
controlled and manipulated.
The question that is asked is: how does this new perception of living processes as
I fiinformation affect previous understandings of control? This apparently does not take 
into account the question that was addressed by cybernetics, namely, how can the 
relation between both notions be understood and reconceptualized so as to shed light on 
the purposeful behaviour of systems? Many inquiries focus instead on the movement, 
mobility, and acceleration with which living processes have come to be associated.19 
This affects the traditional understanding, as discussed by Kay, of control as 
centralized. Foucault, of course, describes a similar transition from a form of power 
that is localizable in the sovereign to a form of ‘biopower’ that is perhaps ubiquitous but 
not localizable in a traditional sense.21
The distinctive feature of the movement that is now associated with living processes is, 
arguably, that it is ‘lateral’ rather than ‘linear’.22 Although these terms are seemingly 
attributed directly to such processes or their movement, Pottage observes how the
,5Haraway (1991), p. 164.
16 Mackenzie (2003), p. 317.
17 Parry (2004a), p. xix.
18 Helmreich (2003), pp. 341-342.
19 See ibid., pp. 342 and 352 on the importance o f the notion o f ‘transfer’ in contemporary biology; 
McKenzie (2006).
20 See, e.g., Kay (2000), p. 5: ‘The genetic code became the site o f life’s command and control.’
21 I argue in Chapter 6, para. 2.2.3, that the difference between forms o f power described by Foucault is 
not limited to location.
22 Pottage (2006), p. 139; Helmreich (2003); McKenzie (2003), p. 321.
184
distinction between ‘linearity’ and ‘laterality’ is drawn within discourse. It represents a 
certain ‘mode of articulation’ that gives rise to ‘productive tensions’; for example, when 
there is a discordance between lateral description and linear modes of representation.23 
This seems to evoke a potentiality that is, then, associated with the living processes 
described.
Informatics, to some extent, can be regarded as the original ‘methodology’ of the 
exercise of power over life because such power has always relied on the generation, 
accumulation, and processing of knowledge regarding living processes.24 However, the 
increased possibility of knowing and controlling living processes through technologies 
that enable their isolation, combination, and manipulation is said to give rise to a new 
form of ‘biopower’ or ‘biopolitics’.25
Although it is not entirely clear what this new incarnation of biopower would consist of, 
or what its consequences would be, the most commonly held view seems to be that 
informatics not only facilitates but intensifies the exercise of power over life. As Kay 
suggests: ‘genetic information signifie[s] an emergent form of ‘biopower’: the material 
control of life would now be supplemented by the promise of controlling its form and 
logos, its information’.26
However, the suggestion that a new sort of ‘biopower’ has emerged can itself be 
questioned in various ways. For example, the concept of information was - arguably - 
not the first to hold out the promise of the possibility of knowing and controlling living 
processes. Other (and earlier) notions signifying biological specificity, such as 
organization, to some extent held out the same promise (see para. 2.2.3 below).27 
Moreover, although bioinformatics is often represented as somehow disrupting 
biological processes in an effort to maximize the movement of ‘bits’ of information, 
genetic information ‘may itself not be behaving in a predictable generation-to- 
generation way’.28 In other words, informatics - and technology generally - does not
23 Pottage (2006), pp. 140 and 143.
24 Thacker (2005), p. 25.
25 Kay (2000), p. xvi and p. 3; Helmreich (2003), p. 341 and p. 352.
26 Kay (2000), p. 3; I argue (Chapter 6, para. 2.2.3) that the understanding o f biopower as power ‘over’ 
life is mistaken.
27 Ibid., p. 47.
28 Helmreich (2003), p. 343.
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exclusively intervene, manipulate, and control but also facilitates the visualization and
9Qrepresentation of living processes and how they function.
1.2 The different forms of Aristotelian form
1.2.1 Aristotle’s idea o f form
The notion of information as it was used in the life sciences in the latter half of the 
twentieth century is often regarded as a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s idea of form. 
‘Form’ has always been a complex and historically varying notion with different
TOimplications in relation to the organic and inorganic. The notion itself is often used to 
determine this very distinction. Aris totle elaborated his idea of a material form in 
reaction to two competing ideas: those of the philosophers who solely focused on matter 
and ignored the role of form altogether, and - more importantly - Plato’s ideas on the 
distinction between form and matter.31
Plato introduced a separation between ideal or transcendent forms (‘Ideas’) and the 
material world. I shall not discuss Plato’s philosophy here. It suffices to say that 
Aristotle thought it impossible that the material world was a reflection of, or was shaped 
by, ideal forms while such forms were themselves regarded as ‘unchanging and at rest, 
in a transcendent world remote from the world of sense and hence unable to affect it’.32 
He observed that ‘it would seem to be impossible that the substance should exist apart 
from that of which it is the substance; so how would the Forms, being the substances of 
things, exist apart from them?’33
It should be pointed out that Aristotle, perhaps confusingly, regarded form as 
substance.34 There is a significant difference between substance and matter in 
Aristotelian philosophy. Simply put: matter is that of which things are made up, while
29 Ibid., p. 345.
30 Emerton (1984), p. 13, refers to a ‘flux o f form’; Emerton does not address organic form specifically.
31 Ibid., p. 49.
32 Ibid.
33 Aristotle (1998), pp. 34-35: Book Alpha [991b].
34 Aristotle (1986), p. 131: although the association of substance with form may seem counterintuitive 
today, H. Lawson-Tancred (translator) notes that Aristotle’s predecessors and contemporaries generally 
held such a ‘materialist-substantialist’ view.
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substance is the specific organization (or form) that makes something into what it is.35 
Aristotle’s idea of form as substance has lead to considerable criticism from those who 
regard such an idea as an impossible conundrum. Descartes, for example, did not seem 
to think much of this particular idea of form:
[F]or the schoolman the true reality is neither form nor matter, but the physical composite bom 
of form and matter, which alone deserves the name o f substance ... The scholastic conception of 
a distinct notion not corresponding to any separate reality has no meaning for Cartesianism, and 
this is why Descartes always criticizes substantial forms as if  forms were substances ... 
Scholastic substantial form translated into Cartesian thought is not merely a complementary 
principle ... but an immaterial substance. It is hardly surprising that Descartes ... felt horror ... 
for such a monster.36
Although Aristotle seemingly sustained Plato’s dualism between form and matter by 
distinguishing the two notions, his alternative was in fact much more complex. He 
rejected Plato’s suggestion that the form has an ideal quality and instead introduced 
form ‘into’ matter. However, this does not mean that form is an inherent pattern in 
matter. Rather, form and matter are no longer considered as two entirely different states 
or manifestations of an entity. They are regarded as cooperating notions that together 
signify a process of formation. This not only means that form becomes a changing and 
dynamic principle rather than an unchanging pattern or an ideal form, but that matter is 
no longer regarded as a passive substance on which a certain form is imposed. As 
Bensaude-Vincent observes:
Instead o f being exterior, transcendent or primary, the principle o f intelligibility (archU) is 
incorporated in nature, immanent ... The tradition that has emptied matter o f its purposes in 
order to transfer all information to the exterior is so strong that we tend to think o f substance as 
passive, like a base or a limit. Well, what we can rediscover with Aristotle is precisely a 
remarkable attempt to make matter dynamic, in the precise sense o f the Greek term dunamis, that 
is to say ‘puissance’.37
This aspect of Aristotle’s thought often goes unrecognized; it is assumed that he 
proposed a rigid distinction between form and matter where the former was regarded as 
being imposed on the latter. However, whereas Plato’s philosophy is characterized by 
the dualism of an Idea and its material reflection or manifestation, Aristotle thought in 
terms of a process of formation that disables this dualism.39 Form and matter can no
35 Aristotle (1998), p. 240: Book Eta 3 [1043b.
36 Emerton (1984), p. 127, citing E. Gilson.
37 Bensaude-Vincent (1998), p. 80 (my translation).
38 Simondon (1964) criticizes the ‘hylomorphic’ model o f Aristotle; Deleuze & Guattari (1999), pp. 408 
and 411 refer to a ‘a life proper to matter’ or a ‘material vitalism’ without recognizing that it was Aristotle 
himself who ‘vitalized’ matter.
39 Bensaude-Vincent (1998), p. 263.
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longer be easily distinguished because they both represent stages in a temporal process 
of the translation of potentiality into actuality.40
Emerton observes how Aristotle, ‘by ... drawing together various strands of meaning - 
substance, causality, teleology, actuality and potentiality, logical definition - ... made 
the concept of form into a powerful, flexible, and universally applicable explanatory 
tool’.41 Aristotle himself deployed form in different ways and described it in various 
terms.42 Of these various meanings the most essential is - arguably - that of a process of 
generation and translation of potentiality.
1,2,2 Form as an active principle
Aristotle believed that ‘form ... is a kind of power immersed in matter’.43 The idea of 
‘power’ is understood here as ‘puissance’: an as yet unrealized or unactualized potential 
rather than the traditional idea of power as sovereign and authoritative (‘pouvoiri).AA It 
is this idea of form as potential or as a productive force that perhaps inspired 
Nietzsche’s idea of life as ‘will to power’ and, subsequently, Canguilhem’s idea of 
‘vital normativity’ and Foucault’s idea of ‘biopower’ (see Chapter 6).
In his later work, Aristotle associated his alternative to Plato’s idea of form with the 
notion of the ‘soul’. He described the soul as form but not a form that is separate from, 
or preformed in, matter. Rather, he observed that ‘change and growth too are in virtue of 
the soul’ 45 One of the faculties of the soul is its ‘motivating capacity’; the way in which 
it produces movement. This is attributed to ‘orexis’, often translated as ‘desire’ but 
understood differently from today’s common sense notion of the term.46 The soul, 
therefore, represents a much more active principle than Plato’s idea of form. However, 
Emerton observes how Aristotle’s association of form with the ‘soul’ probably gave rise 
to the misunderstanding that form was elevated over matter, thereby bringing Aristotle’s
40 Aristotle (1998), p. 250: Book Eta 6 [1045b]: ‘the last matter and the shape-form are the same thing and 
a unity, the one potentiality the other in actuality’.
41 Emerton (1984), p. 63.
42 Ibid., p. 48.
43 Ibid., p. 50.
44 Lash (2006), p. 324.
45 Aristotle (1986), Book II para. 415b, p. 166.
46 Ibid., p. 211 (translator’s note).
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thought closer to that of Plato.47 Aristotle’s notion of form has traditionally become 
associated with purposiveness and teleology.48
Aristotle’s idea of form is one of the four ‘causes’ that he described and, arguably, the 
one that has been most influential in the life sciences. Heidegger notes that these four 
causes together signify a ‘bringing-forth’ or a process of ‘poiesis\ 49 Bensaude-Vincente 
observes that it is Aristotle’s four causes together that are relevant to the modem notion 
of information, rather than merely the formal cause understood as an imposition of form 
on matter:
[I]f Aristotle’s Physique has any pertinence today, is it not because it distinguishes several
notions that together vaguely recover the concept o f ‘information’? This term appeals to us
because it corresponds at the same time to the form that can be defined by its contours (eidos), to
the form that results from a process o f production (morphU), to a ‘puissance’ or a seed, or in
general to an agent or even to an adaptation to a certain usage that Aristotle calls telos, end. In
short, information is much more than the imposition o f a form; in a way, it deploys the four 
50causes.
If information is identified with a form that is predominantly characterized through its 
distinction from matter, rather than through the role it plays in a process of ‘bringing- 
forth’, then its potential remains limited. More importantly, Aristotle himself did not 
separate form from matter or elevate one above the other. Such a separation was 
subsequently read into his work by commentators, either for theological reasons or 
because Aristotle’s own association of form with the soul seemed to suggest such a 
distinction.51 However, Aristotle’s concern was precisely to challenge the distinction 
between form and matter introduced by Plato.
Although Aristotle’s form is usually represented as a singular idea, Bensaude-Vincent 
observes how it provides us with different concepts - or with a ‘toolbox’ of concepts - 
that allow us to think beyond the form/matter distinction:
[B]y substituting a regime o f dichotomies by a regime o f the pluralism o f  causes and modalities, 
by supposing a ‘close to being’ between being and nothingness, by emphasizing the reality o f the 
virtual, Aristotle has provided us with a set o f concepts, a toolbox, to liberate ourselves from the
47 Emerton (1984), p. 57.
48 See para. 2.2.2 below and Chapter 2, para. 2.1.1, on Kant’s idea o f a ‘purposiveness without purpose’ 
as an alternative to traditional teleology; Zuckert (2007), p. 15.
49 Heidegger (1977), p. 10.
50 Bensaude-Vincent (1998), pp. 262-263 (my translation).
51 Emerton (1984), p. 57.
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‘savage logics’ that would seek to explain all o f nature and technology with the help o f only two
52concepts, matter and form.
It is undoubtedly the deceptive simplicity of the concept of form, together with its - less 
apparent - richness and diversity that makes it such an influential concept. Although 
Aristotle’s notion of form has often been criticized or dismissed, it has remained highly 
influential.53
1.2.3 B u ff on fs ‘moule intei'ieur*
The modem notion of information was not the first influential reincarnation of 
Aristotle’s idea of form. Buffon elaborated, in his ‘Histoire naturelle generate et 
particuliere’ of 1749, the concept of the ‘moule interieur\ He explained this idea as 
follows:
[T]he body o f an animal is a sort o f internal mould (‘moule inUrieur’), in which the matter that
contributes to its growth forms and assimilates itself to the whole ... It therefore seems certain to
us that the body o f the animal or plant is an internal mould that has a constant form but whose
mass and volume can augment proportionally. That the growth or, if you like, the development
o f the animal or plant is only realized through the extension o f this mould in all its exterior and
interior dimensions; that such extension is realized through the introduction o f a secondary and
external matter which penetrates into the interior, which becomes similar to the form and
54identical to the matter o f the mould.
Although this ‘internal mould’ seemed to represent a sort of ‘plastic’ form - as Lamarck, 
and later Nietzsche, would say - 55 that shaped matter from within, Buffon in fact 
regarded the ‘mould’ as a Newtonian force of attraction ‘similar to those that accounted 
for the formation of crystals and chemical bonding’.56 The idea of the ‘mould’ 
functioned in conjunction with another concept: that of the ‘organic molecules’ 
(‘molecules organiques’). Buffon regarded the latter as the material elements out of 
which all living processes are made up. He regarded these elements as being organized
52 Bensaude-Vincent (1998), p. 261 (my translation).
53 Ibid., p. 73; Emerton (1984), pp. 60-61.
54 Canguilhem (2003), p. 67, citing Buffon (my translation).
55 Nietzsche (1983), p. 62: ‘I mean by plastic power the capacity to develop out o f oneself in one’s own 
way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what 
has been lost, to recreate broken moulds’; Deleuze (1983), p. 42: ‘Nietzsche critics Darwin for 
interpreting evolution and chance within evolution in an entirely reactive way. He admires Lamarck 
because Lamarck foretold the existence of a truly active plastic force , primary in relation to adaptations: a 
force o f metamorphosis.’
56 Sloan (2002), p. 234.
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or structured through the ‘action’ of the ‘internal mould’.57 It was the ‘mould’ as a force 
of attraction that gathered the ‘organic molecules’ and made them obey to ‘a kind of law 
of morphological constancy’, as Canguilhem observes.58
Buffon’s idea of an internal form or ‘mould’ was primarily meant to account for 
morphological individuality; as Canguilhem says, to ‘explain that a specific form 
persists through this incessant whirlwind that is life’.59 However, Buffon did not regard 
the ‘mould’ as limiting living processes to a certain kind of form. Rather, the ‘mould’ - 
understood as an active principle or Newtonian force - enabled the generation of a 
variety of different individual forms. As Buffon observed, ‘with this single resource and 
subject, nature can vary its works to infinity’.60 Canguilhem deduces from Buffon’s 
statement that the individual form is only a product or consequence rather than a 
principle:
[N]ature is brought back to the identity o f an element - ‘one single resource and subject’ - whose 
coherence with itself produces the appearance o f diversity - ‘ nature can vary its works to 
infinity’. The life o f an individual, animal or plant, is therefore a consequence and not a 
principle, a product and not an essence.61
Buffon attributed almost every biological process imaginable to the interaction between 
his two concepts of the ‘mould’ and the ‘molecules’. Together these concepts explained 
- according to him - organization, growth, ‘and the perpetuation of the species through 
time by means of the self-replicating powers of the moule’.62
The influence of Buffon’s concept of the ‘moule interieur’ is evidenced by references to 
it by Kant63 and by the inspiration it provided, according to Canguilhem, for some of the 
concepts and terms used by Claude Bernard. According to Canguilhem, the ‘internal 
mould’ functioned as ‘a logic intermediary’ between the Aristotelian idea of form and 
Bernard’s 'idee directrice’ 64 He believed that some of Bernard’s concepts could, in 
turn, be regarded as preceding the modem notion of information:
57 Ibid.
58 Canguilhem (2003), p. 67 (my translation).
59 Canguilhem (2002), p. 357 (my translation); see also Canguilhem (2003), p. 72.
60 Canguilhem (2003), p. 69, citing Buffon. (my translation).
61 Ibid., p. 70 (my translation).
62 Sloan (2002), p. 234.
63 Ibid., p. 237: Kant said ‘[t]he internal molds [innerlich Formen] o f Herr Buffon ... according to the 
opinion o f Herr Maupertuis, are either as unintelligible as the thing [Sache] itself, or imagined as entirely 
arbitrary’.
64 Canguilhem (2003), p. 67 (my translation).
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[I]f genetic information can define the code o f  protein synthesis, then we can argue that 
Bernard’s terms of 'consigne', ‘idee directrice', dessin vital', ‘preordonnance vitale', ‘plan 
vitale', 'sens des phenomenes', are just so many attempts to designate - by a convergence of 
metaphors - an advanced biological fact, in a way before it was discovered.65
Although Canguilhem loosely traced this path from Aristotle’s idea of form through 
Buffon’s concept of the ‘moule interieur’ and Bernard’s idea of a ‘plan vitale’ to the 
modem notion of information, he believed that it was impossible to equate modem 
concepts with previously elaborated ones. This is because concepts are particular to the 
historical period in which they arise and to the problem that they envelop (see Chapter 
1, para. 2.1.3). However, this does not preclude that some concepts are ‘theoretically 
polyvalent’.66 Moreover, although concepts cannot be equated there may still be an 
affinity between ideas, even if such ideas were elaborated in different times and under 
different circumstances.
PART II
2.1 Two lines of inquiry
2.1,1 Information as metaphor
Much has been written on the role of analogy and metaphor in the life sciences in 
general and, more specifically, on the notion of information as metaphor.67 The role of 
information as one of the organizing principles of the life sciences in the latter half of
ASthe twentieth century can be understood from the following observation by Jacob:
[Hjeredity is described today in terms o f information, messages and code ... What are 
transmitted from generation to generation are the ‘instructions’ specifying the molecular 
structures: the architectural plans o f the future organism. They are also the means o f executing 
these plans and o f coordinating the activities o f the system ... The organism thus becomes the 
realization o f a programme prescribed by its heredity. The intention o f a psyche has been 
replaced by the translation o f a message. The living being does indeed represent the execution of 
a plan, but not one conceived in any mind. It strives towards a goal, but not one chosen by any
65 Bernard (1966), pp. 12-13 (Preface by Canguilhem, my translation). Canguilhem points out that 
Bernard used concepts that were informed by a ‘psychological’ notion o f information in order to describe 
processes that are now addressed by reference to a ‘physical’ concept o f information.
66 Canguilhem (1977), p. 6.
67 See, e.g., Fox Keller (1995) and (2002); Kay (2000).
68 Rheinberger & Gaudilltere (2004), p. 1.
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will. The aim is to prepare an identical programme for the following generations. The aim is to 
reproduce.69
This captures the generalized sense of information as something that is transmitted 
through generations and represents or contains the prerequisites for the formation of an 
organism. The question is whether information should be regarded as a metaphor or 
whether it should be ‘taken literally’, in the sense that hereditary material is regarded as 
carrying information. Information would, then, be regarded in a semantic sense as being 
associated with meaning.70
The contrary view is that information can only be a metaphor. The notion of 
‘information’ is thought to be used solely in order to render the workings of ‘nature’ 
understandable by imposing a certain model on a process to which that model is perhaps 
analogous, but not literally applicable. The debate then turns to the question of whether 
this particular metaphor is productive or not. It has been argued that information as 
metaphor is not particularly suited to the task, because it does not clearly refer to - or 
correspond with - anything; it has been called a ‘metaphor of a metaphor and thus a
71signifier without a referent’.
While its popularity and use spread rapidly, it was never entirely clear what the term 
‘genetic information’ precisely referred to. Such information was understood to be 
located in - or carried by - genetic material. This material was regarded as somehow 
embodying ‘meaningful’ instructions for protein coding, so that it was possible for these 
instructions to be ‘misunderstood’ (resulting in ‘unintended’ consequences such as 
mutations that cause hereditary disease).72
Such use of the notion of information introduced a distinction between genetic material 
and environment. Whereas the former was regarded as either containing or producing 
‘information’, the latter was regarded as receiving or expressing it. Moreover, the idea 
of genetic information gave rise to the thought that ‘causal power and information are 
carried in the DNA, and living things are created by an outward.flow of causality and
69 Jacob (1976), pp. 1-2.
70 Griffiths (2001), p. 397.
71 Kay (2000), p. 2.
72 Canguilhem (1978), p. 172, observes: ‘there is no interpretation which does not involve a possible 
mistake’.
73 Griffiths (2001), p. 406.
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form from the nucleus’,74 thereby assuming the importance of a specific centre of 
reference.
These distinctions were subsequently challenged by assertions that ‘[a]ny defensible 
definition of information in developmental biology is equally applicable to genetic and 
non-genetic causal factors in development’.75 However, although the notion of 
information was now used in equal measure with regard to hereditary material and 
environment, the idea of a non-genetic information ‘remain[ed] underspecified’.76 It 
gave rise to the impression that information was something to be acquired from the 
environment by an organism.
Varela, one of the founders of autopoietic theory, argues that the idea of information as 
something that exists ‘in’ the environment is unproductive. Rather, information emerges 
from the process of differentiation between organism and environment.77 Oyama, with 
reference to Bateson, also points out that information can be regarded as ‘a difference
•  78that makes a difference’. She observes: ‘Developmental interactants are
“informational” not by “carrying” context-independent messages about phenotypes, but
by having an impact on ontogenetic processes - by making a difference.’79
The confusion over the character of the modem notion of ‘information’, and over what 
it refers to as a metaphor, can be partly attributed to its complicated relation to meaning. 
As Kay points out, in the mathematical theory of communication information was 
regarded as relating to a process of selection rather than as an ontological entity that 
could be communicated or as something that was semantically meaningful. However, 
the significance of this concept of information could partly be attributed to the way in 
which it capitalized on the common sense understanding of information:
[I]nformation theory metaphorizes the conventional notion o f information by borrowing the 
semiotics o f human language to describe highly technical, restrictive, and nonhuman processes
... The notions o f information, its storage and transfer, conjured compelling and deceptively
accessible imagery of communications that swiftly reshaped scientific and popular 
representations o f nature and society.80
74 Oyama (2000), p. 47.
75 Griffiths (2001), p. 396.
76 Oyama (2000), p. 194.
77 Varela (1991), p. 87.
78 Oyama (2000), p. 67, referring to Bateson (2000), p. 318.
79 Oyama (2000), p. 67.
80 Kay (2000), p. 21.
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While the difference between its technical and semantic use may complicate the 
character of the concept of ‘information’, it is undoubtedly also this ambiguity that 
makes the notion so productive.
Depending on one’s view of how a metaphor functions, the concept of information can
• SI •be regarded as a mere figure of speech or as a theoretical concept in itself. According 
to Canguilhem, what is distinctive about models and analogies - and, arguably, also 
about metaphors - is how they function by losing their specificity and by giving rise to a 
new object of understanding: ‘A model only reveals its productivity in its own 
impoverishment. It must lose its specific originality in order to enter into a new 
generality together with that to which it corresponds.’
In other words, information should not be regarded as a notion that is directly applicable 
to a biological entity or process. Rather, the use of information as metaphor gives rise to 
a new idea that cannot be equated with either a biological process or with the traditional 
understanding of information. Canguilhem observes that ‘we could say that the model
M  jm
prophesizesy meaning that a model or metaphor ‘points beyond itself to 
interpretations that were not previously imagined or even considered. It does so not by 
corresponding to the object or process that it refers to but through a kind of lateral 
engagement with it. Canguilhem observes:
[A] good hypothesis is not always the one that rapidly leads to its own confirmation, that makes 
it possible to apply the description o f a phenomena to an explanatory schema during the first 
attempt. It is the one that obliges the researcher, because o f an unforeseen discordance between 
explanation and description, to either correct the description or to re-structure the explanatory 
schema. Can we not similarly say that, in biology, the models that have a chance to become the 
best ones are those that slow down our latent precipitation to assimilate the organic to its 
model?85
The notion of information is productive not because it is an adequate metaphor but 
because of the difficulty of direct correspondence; because it ‘slows us down’ and 
makes us think.
81 Griffiths (2001), p. 395, citing Sarkar: ‘It is little more than a metaphor that masquerades as a 
theoretical concept’.
82 Canguilhem (2002), p. 313 (my translation).
83 Ibid, p. 316 (my translation).
84 Pottage (2006), p. 139: used in relation to ‘laterality’.
85 Canguilhem (2002), p. 315 (my translation).
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It is probably precisely because of the difficulty of correspondence that the notion of 
genetic information has ‘served as a discursive link between these two previously
a s  • • r •
distant fields [of molecular genetics and biochemistry]’ and as an ‘interdisciplinary 
and cultural medium of exchange’.87 Canguilhem observes, with regard to the 
‘discovery’ of DNA, that different disciplines not only communicate with each other 
with regard to a certain object of study but that an object of study actually emerges
oo
through such communication between disciplines. Although the notion of information 
was initially regarded as mere metaphor or analogy, it subsequently turned into an 
object of study in its own right.
This seems to indicate that what is at issue is not so much the productivity of a single 
metaphor or entity, but a process of translation. As Pottage observes: ‘“Information” is 
the same and yet always different.’89 Rheinberger suggests that representation 
necessarily involves a series of translations,90 referring to Latour who observes how an 
object of inquiry is kept ‘constant’, perhaps paradoxically, through a series of 
translations and transformations:
[A]cts o f reference are all the more assured since they rely not so much on resemblance as on a 
regulated series o f transformations, transmutations, and translations. A thing can remain more 
durable and be transported farther and more quickly if  it continues to undergo transformations at 
each stage o f this long cascade. It seems that reference is not simply the act o f pointing or a way 
o f keeping, on the outside, some material guarantee for the truth o f a statement; rather it is our 
way o f keeping something constant through a series o f  transformations ... What a beautiful 
move, apparently sacrificing resemblance at each stage onl^to settle again on the same meaning, 
which remains intact through sets of rapid transformations.
Not speaking specifically about the notion of information, Latour notes how ‘transfers 
of /^formation never occur except through subtle and multiple Malformations’.92 
Perhaps the notion of information has remained ‘constant’ and has been so effective in 
stimulating communication between disciplines because it is such a ‘translatable’ 
notion. The question that arises, and that is rarely addressed, is: what changes does the 
notion of information undergo in these processes of translation? Here, the focus is
86 Kay (2000), p. 3.
87 Ibid., p. 29.
88 Canguilhem (1988), p. 117: it concerns the constitution o f ‘a “new scientific object,” what I might call 
a “polyscientific” or “interscientific” object, by which I mean not an object treated by more than one 
discipline but one constructed as the explicit result o f collaboration among several disciplines’.
89 Pottage (2006), p. 156.
90 Rheinberger (1997a), p. 102.
91 Latour (1999), p. 58.
92 Ibid., p. 298.
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mainly on the slippage between a certain interpretation of Aristotle’s form and the 
modem notion of information.
2.1.2 Form abstractedfrom matter
Kant believed that the distinction between form and matter organizes all thinking: 
‘These two concepts underlie all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with 
all employment of the understanding. The one (matter) signifies the determinable in 
general, the other (form) its determination.’93 In fact, Kant’s theory of understanding 
was organized by reference to this distinction: a priori forms and empirical matter.94 
Perhaps it is, therefore, unavoidable that the notion of information in relation to living 
processes has also been determined by this distinction. Information has been 
represented, at least to a certain extent, as being theoretically opposed to the notion of 
material environment or embodiment.95
The relation between matter and information is usually envisaged on the basis of a 
seemingly irreparable divorce. Information is regarded as the end product of a 
progressive process of abstraction that continuously refers to an original state where no 
such abstraction has yet taken place. Genetic information is described as almost entirely 
distinguished from the matter from which it is thought to be derived or in which it is 
‘embodied’. Information is regarded as something that exists prior to, and separate 
from, its expression or instantiation.96 The focus then shifts to the ways in which this 
information can be accessed and transported.
Living processes - in their ‘informational forms’ - are regarded as ‘free from material 
constraints, without particular instantiation [they are] free to travel across time and
07space’. Once abstracted from matter, they are regarded as ‘highly mobile’. The 
significance of matter is recognised only to the extent that the information derived from 
it necessarily refers back to the material substrate in order to produce knowledge. Some 
have described the effects on living processes of their material environments, such as -
93 Emerton (1984), p. 20, citing Kant.
94 Gutting (2005b), p. 5.
95 See, e.g., Parry (2004a); Hayles (1999); Thacker (2005).
96 Oyama (1985), p. 12; Hayles (1999), p. 13, notes how the idea o f ‘disembodied information becomes 
the ultimate Platonic Form’.
97 Parry (2004), p. xix.
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for example - the computer. However, even if the materiality of a particular 
technological medium is recognized, the representation of information as abstracted 
from matter is itself not questioned.
The distinction between form and matter necessarily leads to a focus on the manner in 
which transition from one state to another takes place. Such transition is usually 
regarded as progressive and as moving from one clearly defined stage (material) to 
another (immaterial).99 New technologies are regarded as playing a role in this transition 
by “‘stripping down” these commodities or resources to what might be thought of as 
their bare informational essentials’.100 However, the impossibility of tracing this process 
of abstraction and distinguishing the material or informational state in any meaningful 
way leads to confusion over what the notion of information itself represents.101
The idea of information as disembodied was reinforced in Shannon’s mathematical 
theory of communication and Wiener’s cybernetic theory. Their representation of 
information as distinguished from matter perpetuated the idea of ‘a kind of bodiless 
fluid that could flow between different substrates without loss of meaning or form’.102 
Whereas the individual form had previously been identified through the ‘identity of 
matter’, Wiener believed that the individual was now represented through a ‘continuity 
of pattern’. It was, he suggested, the ‘memory of the form that is perpetuated during cell 
division and genetic transmission’.103
The distinction between form and matter is not necessarily unproductive; reference has - 
for example - been made to the productivity of a ‘dialectic of materiality’.104 In fact, 
critics of this distinction tend to rely on the same dualistic scheme. Rather than 
privileging form, the importance of - a sometimes reconceptualized - matter is often 
emphasized.105 It is argued that privileging form over matter disregards the many ways 
in which matter gives rise to information and gives it its meaning.106 The idea that the
98 Hayles (2005); Thacker (2004).
99 Parry (2004), pp. 65-66.
100 Ibid., p. xviii.
101 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
102 Hayles (1999), p. xi.
103 Kay (2000), p. 89.
104 Sunder Rajan (2006), p. 15.
105 See Lloyd (1996) for a feminist critique of the form/matter distinction; Hayles (2005), pp. 2-3, argues 
for a different conception o f materiality as ‘an emergent property created through dynamic interactions 
between physical characteristics and signifying strategies’; Oyama (1985), p. 22.
106 See, e.g., Hayles (2005), p. 210.
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twentieth century was characterized by ‘dematerialization’ has also been disputed: the 
transition from a material to an informational world is not so much a real consequence
1 (Y1of technology as a ‘normative imperative’ of innovation. The emphasis on the notion 
of information in relation to living processes has been regarded as a way to facilitate the 
commodification of such processes.108
In conclusion, it can be argued that most references to information in the life sciences 
rely on the distinction between form and matter. Information is usually associated with 
Aristotle’s idea of form. However, that original idea was not characterized by the 
form/matter distinction. In fact, Aristotle elaborated it to challenge that distinction. By 
associating or identifying the modem notion of information with a superficial 
understanding of Aristotle’s form, the multifaceted nature and productive character of 
the latter is lost. As a consequence, the notion of information remains conceptually 
simplistic and its productivity as a concept becomes questionable.
2.2 From form to information
2,2.1 Form as information
How has form become associated with information and what has it come to signify? 
Information has come to be regarded by many as the ‘modem agent’ of form.109 Kay 
provides a good illustration of how information has been associated with Aristotle’s 
idea of form. When Delbruck accepted the Nobel Prize, he said that it was Aristotle who 
first discovered DNA. According to him, Aristotle first developed the idea of a form 
‘stored’ in matter that ‘acts, creates form and development, and is not changed in the 
process’.110 Delbruck likened DNA to Aristotle’s idea of the soul as the principle of 
movement that itself remains unchanged: ‘genetic information, qua DNA, was both the 
origin and universal agent of all life (proteins) - the Aristotelian prime mover’.111
107 Bensaude (1998), pp. 27 and 249.
108 Sunder Rajan (2006), p. 16.
109 Oyama (1985), p. 27.
110 Kay (2000), p. 38, citing Delbriick.
Ibid., p. 30.
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Form is presented here as a persistent pattern that is transmitted through generations. 
When information is regarded as form in this way, the probable result is a kind of 
modem preformationism. As Oyama observes:
[W]hat is central to preformationist thought is not the literal presence o f fully formed creatures in 
germ cells, but rather a way o f thinking about development - development as revelation o f 
preformed essence rather than as contingent series o f constructive interactions, transformations, 
and emergences. It is a way o f thinking that makes real development irrelevant because the basic 
‘information’, or form, is there from the beginning, a legacy from our ancestors.112
The identification of information with an interpretation of Aristotelian form as an 
unchanging pattern disregards the way in which Aristotle’s form formed part of a 
process of generation and actualization of potentiality. Oyama observes:
[F]orm emerges in successive interactions. Far from being imposed on matter by some agent, it 
is a function o f the reactivity o f matter at many hierarchical levels, and o f the responsiveness of  
those interactions to each other.113
Oyama’s statement is meant as a critique of the traditional notion of form. Her own 
description of form is surprisingly close to Aristotle’s original idea. It is not so much the 
identification of the modem notion of information with Aristotle’s form that is the 
problem; it is the misinterpretation of Aristotle’s form as an imposition on matter. His 
original idea of form complements, rather than clashes with, the description of 
development as a contingent and material process of emergence.
2,2.2 Form without purpose
Aristotle’s idea of form is often regarded as teleological in the sense that it represents 
that which causes an organism to become what it - potentially - is. The modem notion 
of information is usually associated with this teleological idea of form. It is regarded as 
a form or pattern that is inherent in matter, transferred across generations, and that 
causes an organism to develop in a certain way. The idea of teleology in relation to 
living processes is usually identified with a notion of purpose that has taken many 
different forms over the years.
112 Oyama (2000), p. 136; see also Oyama (1985), p. 2.
1,3 Oyama (1985), p. 22.
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Foucault describes how, in the eighteenth century, living beings were divided into 
categories of species and genera. What defined this period was the reliance on 
continuity, order, and a kind of formalism in relation to living processes rather than a 
notion of purpose or finality.114 It could be argued that the identification of the modem 
notion of information with Aristotelian form signifies a return to the association of 
living processes with purpose. If information signifies a return to purpose then the 
question is: what kind of purpose?
Rather than associating purpose with the traditional teleological notion of form, it can 
also be regarded as signifying a process that lacks a predetermined end. Information 
has, for example, been regarded as a process of ‘in-forming’.115 However, rather than 
regarding such a process as indicative of a vital or teleological force, it can be regarded 
as a process of self-generation. This could be explained with reference to the idea of 
‘purposiveness without purpose’ (see Chapter 2, para. 2.1.1) that Kant proposed in order 
to question the productivity of traditional teleology as a way of understanding the 
organization of living processes.
Kant believed that it was mistaken to attribute teleology or a purpose to nature. For him, 
living processes represented first and foremost a problem for knowledge that could 
addressed through his paradoxical idea of a purposiveness that lacked purpose. An 
organism could only be regarded as a process that included its own cause and effect and 
did not have a predetermined purpose.116 This meant that a purpose could be attributed 
to it by a subject who seeks to understand the organism.
Aristotle’s idea of form may actually be more similar to Kant’s ideas than one would 
expect. An organism can be identified with the principle of its own organization or 
formation, at least for the purpose of understanding it. This principle, or ‘form’ as 
Aristotle called it, represents a process of self-generation or actualization of potentiality 
that is not predetermined. Canguilhem describes such an idea of non-teleological 
purpose as a ‘possible, operative finality’ rather than ontological finality (see para. 3.1.1
117below). This means that purpose does not function as a principle of formation with a
1.4 Foucault (2004), p. 160.
1.5 Oyama (1985), p. 12.
116 Kant (1987), p. 249, section 64, para. 370.
1,7 Canguilhem (1978), p. 175.
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certain goal or end, but that generation comes about through the difference between 
what an organism is and what it can be.
The idea that an organism or system represents its own purpose was taken up again in 
the twentieth century by cybernetics and autopoietic theory. Wiener, Bigelow, and 
Rosenblueth proposed a new idea of purpose or teleology that was ‘equally applicable 
to living organisms and machines’; the idea of purpose was now included in a ‘uniform 
behavioristic analysis’.118 Although this notion seemingly resembled traditional 
teleology because it regarded purpose as the central organizing feature of systems,119 
this ‘definition of purposefulness that was built purely on the culmination of a sequence 
of events’120 was - at least for some critics - ‘both so all-encompassing as to rule out 
nothing and so devoid of content that it had no overlap with any common meaning of 
the term.’121
In autopoietic theory purpose is represented as ‘purposeless’, as in Kant’s work. This 
means that purpose is not attributed to living processes or the process of autopoiesis 
itself but forms part of the domain of the observer who describes the living system and 
seeks to understand it (see Chapter 3, para. 3.1.1). Nevertheless, the cybernetic 
understanding of purpose is recovered in the description of the self-generative character 
of systems.
2.2.3 Form as organization
Kay describes how, although the idea of information already existed for a long time in
relation to intelligence and education, it was only in the twentieth century that
information came to be divorced from meaning. It came ‘to signify purely syntactic
arrangements of symbols (“logical instruction to select”) suited for electronic
* 100communications’ in Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication. It was only 
after the Second World War that information came to be regarded as a scientific concept
1,8 Galison (1994), p. 245.
119 Kay (2000), p. 81: ‘The term servomechanisms, or self-correcting negative feedback, came to 
designate machine -  living or inanimate -  with intrinsic purposeful behavior.’
120 Galison (1994), p. 249.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., p. 20.
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in itself. Although the impression may be prevalent that the notion of information 
was introduced into the life sciences at the time of the ‘discovery’ of DNA, it was 
already used in research before that time.124
According to Kay, before the introduction of information into the life sciences ‘what 
had been transferred across biological space and time earlier was biological and 
chemical specificity’. She believes that information became a metaphor for 
specificity or that it somehow came to replace that notion. Howeve r, biological 
specificity is itself a very general and vague notion. Much like information, it only 
obtained ‘a particular technical meaning, conceptual coherence, and material potency’ at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.127
Although the notions of specificity and information perhaps fulfilled a similar role in 
the life sciences, the two notions cannot be identified. Not only because they emerged at 
different points in time, but because there is - as Kay argues - a ‘categorical difference 
between the two: specificity denoting material and structural properties; information 
denoting nonmaterial attributes, such as soul, potentialities, and form (telos), previously 
captured by the notion of organization and plan (logos)’.128 Because of its similar 
connotation with immateriality, organization can also be regarded as a conceptual 
predecessor to the modem notion of information in the life sciences. The idea that living 
processes, at a certain moment in time, become characterized by their organization was 
also explored by Foucault who described it as the hidden characteristic that links all 
living processes and distinguishes them as such.129
2.2.4 Information and individuation
The idea of information has not merely been regarded as a metaphor or an entity, but 
has also been associated with the emergence and organization of processes. 
Nevertheless, the notion of information hardly seems to play any role in autopoietic
123 Ibid., p. 77.
124 Ibid., p. 78.
125 Ibid., p. 328.
126 Ibid., pp. 2, 5 and 41-42.
127 Ibid., p. 42.
128 Ibid., p. 328; Kay, ibid., p. 41, observes: ‘Specificity was the Aristotelian material cause ... 
Information was the Aristotelian form ... Specificity corresponded to body, information to soul.’
129 Foucault (2004), p. 250.
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theory; a theory that mainly focuses on the organization and individuation of living 
systems. It has been argued that
one could say either that information does not exist in this paradigm or that it has sunk so 
deeply into the system as to become indistinguishable from the organizational properties 
defining the system as such.130
This suggestion is confirmed by Varela who observes:
[T]o assume in these fields that information is some thing that is transmitted, that symbols are
things that can be taken at face value, or that purposes and goals are made clear by the systems
themselves is all, it seems to me, nonsense ... Information, sensu strictu, does not exist. Nor do,
131by the way, the laws of nature.
Varela refers to a particular interpretation of the notion of information as something that 
is transmitted and that represents an ontological entity. However, it could be argued that 
information becomes relevant when it is regarded as forming part of the process of the 
differentiation of systems. In other words, when it is regarded - as Bateson says - as ‘a
1 'I'}difference which makes a difference’. As Varela observes:
[A]lthough it is clear that we describe an X that perturbs from the organism’s exteriority, X is
not information. In fact, for the organism it only is a that, a something, a basic stuff to in-form
from its own perspective. In physical terms there is stuff, but it is for nobody. Once there is body
- even in this minimal form - it becomes in-formed for a self, in the reciprocal dialectics I have
just explicated. Such in-formation is never a phantom signification or information bit, waiting to
be harvested by a system. It is a presentation, an occasion for coupling, and it is in this entre-
133deux that signification arises.
Simondon did not develop his ideas on information in any detail but did attribute a 
significant role to it in relation to the process of individuation in biology.134 He 
understood individuation as a temporal process of emergence of individual and 
environment (see Chapter 4, para. 4.1.1). Simondon emphasized that information should 
not be related to the distinction between form and matter. In fact, he made a point of 
criticizing the ‘hylemorphism’ - attributed to Aristotle - by saying that it only retains 
two extreme forms of a process. Information, according to him, is characterized by how 
it ‘does not wish to become either form or matter’.135 He believed that the significance
130 Hayles (1999), p. 11.
131 Ibid., p. 155, citing Varela.
132 Oyama (2000), p. 67, referring to Bateson (2000), p. 318.
133 Varela (1991), p. 87.
134 Barth616my (2005), p. 139, notes that Simondon does not show how his notion o f information escapes 
the Aristotelian hylomorphism that he criticizes.
135 Simondon (1964), p. 301 (my translation).
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of information lies in the fact that it is a ‘requirement of individuation’; that which is 
necessary for the formation of an individual.136 He observes that it represents ‘that 
through which a being conditions itself in a certain way’.137
PART III
3.1 Canguilhem and information
3.1.1 A return to Aristotelian form?
Canguilhem observed in an essay, published in the Revue de Metaphysique et de 
Morale, that not many articles had been published in the Revue on the philosophy of 
biology. He sought to counter this apparent lack of interest and asked whether it had not 
been reasonable, rather than rational, at the beginning of the twentieth century to
1<JO
‘resuscitate’ the Aristotelian concepts of ‘puissance’ and form by ‘reinventing them’.
His association of Aristotle’s idea of form with potential (‘puissance’) is significant. 
When the notions of form and information are characterized by reference to the 
form/matter distinction then it becomes difficult to distinguish any normative project in 
their use. How did Canguilhem understand the notion of information in the life sciences 
and how does his discussion of it reveal his own normative project?
Canguilhem addresses the notion of information in contemporary biology only in his
1 - IQ
later work. Most commentators believe that he does not elaborate much on the 
significance of the notion or on how it affected his own previously elaborated concepts 
of individuality and normativity in the life sciences. Rather, he seems to impose an idea 
of form that he previously associated with the individual on the modem notion of 
information without considering the difference between these notions and without 
elaborating on the consequences of such a difference.140
136 Ibid., p. 15 (my translation).
137 Ibid., p. 288 (my translation).
138 Canguilhem (1947), p. 323 (my translation).
139 Most notably Canguilhem (2002), pp. 358-364.
140 Lecourt (1998), p. 223.
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For example, he previously observed that the individual form was indivisible (see 
Chapter 4, para. 3.2.4)141 and later notes with regard to the notion of information in the 
life sciences that ‘it must not be forgotten that information theory cannot be broken 
down’.142 Lecourt takes this as proof that Canguilhem merely ‘transferred’ concepts. 
Canguilhem seems to regard the notion of information, understood as life’s ‘code’ or 
concept, as a vindication of his own ideas on the relation between knowledge and life. 
Lecourt argues:
[I]n his own way, Canguilhem is saluting, by simply transferring his concepts, the latest 
developments in the theory of genetic codes. They seem to have realized, in ways that seemed to 
him impossible, the project he outlined in 1943! Hence the strangely disabused but triumphant 
tone in which he demonstrates that the ‘concept’ is inscribed within ‘life’ in the form o f a 
code.143
Canguilhem observes: ‘To say that biological heredity is a communication of 
information is, in a way, to return to Aristotelianism if it is an admission that there is a 
logos, inscribed, conserved, and transmitted in the “v/va/tf”.’144 Lecourt deduces from 
this observation that Canguilhem equated the modem notion of information with 
Aristotelian form, understood as a pattern that is inherent in life. He summarizes his 
criticism of Canguilhem’s discussion on information as follows:
[Information, with its discrete structure, replaces the signifying totality of form, but the 
signifying end can again be glimpsed in the primal signification. Ultimately, Canguilhem is 
celebrating Aristotle’s victory. Although the demands o f ‘vitalism’ should have alerted him to 
this, the ontology with which he burdened it suddenly carries him away, and in his jubilation he 
forgets his own critique o f  Aristotelian biology. No doubt he attached too much importance to 
the formalist version of ‘code’ to which molecular biology almost surrendered in the mid-
It is certainly true that Canguilhem’s work is influenced by Aristotle; he recognizes this 
influence many times. However, Canguilhem does not regard information or form as a 
pattern that is somehow inherent in life’s processes. Nor does he regard information as a 
vital or teleological principle that ‘inform[s] the formless’.146 Canguilhem, furthermore, 
observes that the idea of a final cause - as it is usually understood - is impossible with 
regard to living processes:
141 Canguilhem (2003), p. 78.
142 Cainguilhem (1978), p. 172; Canguilhem (2006), p. 209: ‘on ne doit pas oublier que la theorie de 
I'information ne se divise pas'.
143 Lecourt (1998), p. 223.
144 Canguilhem (2002), p. 362 (my translation).
145 Lecourt (1998), p. 223.
146 Oyama (1985), p. 3.
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[A]gainst finality one has always invoked life’s failures, the disharmony o f organisms, or the 
rivalry o f living species, macroscopic or microscopic. But if these facts represent objections to a 
real, ontological finality, they run counter to arguments supporting a possible, operative finality. 
If there were a perfect, finished finality, a complete system o f relations o f organic agreement, the 
very concept o f finality would have no meaning as a concept, as a plan and model for thinking 
about life, for the simple reason that there would be no grounds for thought, no grounds for 
thinking in the absence of all disparity between possible organization and real organization. The 
thought o f finality expresses the limitation o f life’s finality. If this concept has a meaning, it is 
because it is the concept of a meaning, the concept o f a possible, and thus not guaranteed, 
organization.147
This means that Aristotle’s idea of form as a teleological principle is necessarily limited 
and incomplete; otherwise the idea of teleology itself would have no purpose. If there 
was no difference between the possibility and the reality of an organism, then there 
would be no need for a concept of teleology. Its incompleteness, therefore, does not 
render teleology useless. In fact, it reveals the ‘purpose of purpose’: the original idea of 
a final cause was effective precisely because it signified possibility rather than 
preformation.
Canguilhem also observes how Aristotle’s idea of a final cause is a highly technical and 
specialized principle that relies on the differentiation of functions within organisms. 
According to him, Aristotle could not have conceived of the high degree of pluripotency 
and indeterminacy that characterizes thought on generation and development in 
contemporary biology.148
However, this does not mean that Aristotle’s ideas have nothing to contribute to the 
contemporary life sciences. Canguilhem, for example, often refers to the idea that living 
processes represent at the same time ‘formation of forms’ and ‘informed matter’.149 The 
former indicates that life consists of continuous processes of formation and that it does 
not exist outside of such processes. In other words, life does not exist prior to - or apart 
from - its material instantiations.150 The expression that life is ‘informed matter’ is a 
reference to Aristotle’s idea that life is matter that cannot be understood through its 
composition or structure but only through its substance or form (understood as processes 
of formation).151
147 Canguilhem (1978), p. 175.
148 Canguilhem (2002), p. 322.
149 Canguilhem (2003), p. 14 (my translation).
150 Canguilhem (2002), p. 354.
151 Aristotle (1998), Book Eta 3, para. 1043b, pp. 240-241.
207
3.2 Information and (knowledge of life9
3.2.1 The problem o f knowing life
I argue that Canguilhem regards the notion of information in the life sciences as a
productive idea through which to address the problem of knowing life. Foucault
describes how the knowledge of life only became a question or problem at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Before that time, living processes were classified
hierarchically and - although organisms were identified and differentiated - there was no
1real preoccupation with knowing the living as living. I have argued (see Chapter 2) 
that Kant formulated most clearly the idea that living processes represent a problem for 
understanding and that they are, in fact, characterized by this problematic relation to 
knowledge.
1 5^Canguilhem published a collection of essays entitled ‘La connaissance de la vie'; the 
problem of the knowledge of life informs all these essays. However, Canguilhem 
directly addresses the relation between knowledge and life - or between concept and life 
- in another essay entitled ‘Le concept et la vie\ 154 He asks the question:
[D]o we proceed, in the knowledge o f life, from intelligence to life or do we rather move from 
life to intelligence? In the first case, how does intelligence find life? In the second case, how can 
it miss life? And finally, if  the concept were to be life itself, one would need to ask whether or 
not it is an apt instrument to provide us with ‘access to intelligence’. 155
Canguilhem was probably inspired by Nietzsche who formulated the same problem in a 
strikingly similar way:
[I]s life to dominate knowledge and science, or is knowledge to dominate life? Which o f these 
two forces is the higher and more decisive? There can be no doubt: life is the higher, the 
dominating force, for knowledge which annihilated life would have annihilated itself with it. 
Knowledge presupposes life and thus has in the preservation o f life the same interest as any 
creature has in its own continued existence.156
Deleuze explains how
Nietzsche often takes knowledge to task for its claim to be opposed to life, to measure and judge 
life, for seeing itself as an end ... Knowledge is opposed to life, but because it expresses a life
152 Foucault (2004), pp. 139 and 173.
153 Canguilhem (2003).
154 Canguilhem (2002), pp. 335-364.
155 Ibid, p. 335 (my translation).
156 Nietzsche (1983), p. 121.
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which contradicts life, a reactive life which finds in knowledge a means o f preserving and 
glorifying its type.157
Canguilhem follows Nietzsche in his discussion of the knowledge of life as a problem 
without, however, explicitly referring to him (see Chapter 1, para. 1.3.3).
It has been suggested that two phases can be distinguished in Canguilhem’s thought 
with regard to the relation between knowledge and life. In his earlier work, he focuses 
on the ways in which life can - or cannot - be an ‘object of (scientific) knowledge’, 
while in his later work he addresses the notion of information as the concept in (and of) 
life. Gayon suggests that Canguilhem’s references to ‘knowledge and life’, 
‘knowledge of life’, and ‘concept of life’ are ambiguous and inconsistent.159
However, I argue that this ambiguity is not accidental. The use of a particular 
expression is intentional and serves a purpose. Each of these expressions signifies an 
important theoretical difference. For example, the title of Canguilhem’s books - ‘La 
connaissance de la vie’ - explicitly plays on the difference between knowledge about 
life and knowledge o f  life. Canguilhem suggests that the knowledge of life makes 
knowledge about life possible,160 but does not turn the former into the latter. Simply put: 
knowledge about life is scientific or analytic knowledge, whereas knowledge of life is 
knowledge as a technique of living.
Foucault regards ‘Le concept et la vie’ as Canguilhem’s most complex and thought 
provoking essay and hints at its significance in the last essay that he published before 
his death.161 However, he does not explore in much detail how Canguilhem uses the 
notion of information in order to question the traditional relation between knowledge 
and life that Kant established.
It is important to note that Canguilhem regards information not as a metaphor but as a 
concept. He does not regard it as a preliminary stage in the process of knowing, nor
157 Deleuze (1983), p. 100.
158 Gayon (1998), p. 320.
159 Ibid.
160 Canguilhem (2003), p. 16.
161 Foucault (1985); Agamben (1999), p. 220: it was the last essay for which Foucault gave his consent 
for publication.
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does he take the notion of information ‘literally’ - as has been suggested.162 Canguilhem 
observes:
[A]t the moment, the language o f the theory of language and of the theory o f communication is 
being used. Message, information, program, code, instruction, decoding, these are the new 
concepts o f the knowledge of life. But, would we not protest that these concepts are, in the end, 
imported metaphors like those metaphors through the convergence o f which Claude Bernard 
sought to remedy the lack of an adequate concept? Apparently yes, in fact no. Because that 
which guarantees the theoretical efficacy or cognitive value o f a concept is its function as an 
operator ( ‘ operateur')}^
He describes the concept of information primarily through its function as an ‘operator’; 
not as an analytical tool that is used to acquire knowledge but as something that has the 
potential to transform the idea of knowledge itself.
I argue that Canguilhem regards the notion of information in the life sciences as 
significant because it implies that the process of knowing and the process of living 
concern the same ‘formation of forms’: concepts and ‘vivants’. As a consequence of the 
notion of information, knowledge and life are no longer necessarily regarded as distinct 
processes that are subject to different regimes - as Kant proposed. Canguilhem’s idea 
that knowledge is one of life’s techniques and even its main expression (perhaps due to 
his bias as a philosopher) is almost identical to Nietzsche’s idea that, as Deleuze 
formulates it, ‘Life [is] the active force of thought, but thought ... the affirmative 
power of life.’164
It could be argued that Canguilhem, through his focus on concepts, elevates knowledge 
over life in the same way as Kant did. However, it is - in fact - the other way around: 
Canguilhem regards knowledge as a biological process and as a particular technique of 
living. Foucault describes this idea by observing that the concept is ‘one of the modes of 
this information which every living being levies on his environment and by means of 
which, on the other hand, he structures his environment’.165 He describes how 
Canguilhem regards the conception of concepts as a technique of living:
[F]orming concepts is one way o f living, not of killing life ; it is one way o f living in complete 
mobility and not immobilizing life ; it is showing, among these millions o f living beings who
162 N. Rose (1998), p. 162.
163 Canguilhem (2002), p. 360 (my translation).
164 Deleuze (1983), p. 101.
165 Foucault (1978), p. xviii.
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inform their environment and are informed from it outwards, an innovation which will be judged 
trifling or substantial as you w il l: a very particular type o f information.166
Goldstein, probably influenced by Nietzsche, also comes to the conclusion - before 
Canguilhem - that knowing can only be regarded as a process of living:
[I]t became increasingly clear to me that ... this occurrence can only be understood when one 
observes that our manner of knowing is essentially related to the structure o f biological 
functioning itself; that biological knowledge is only possible when it is itself recognized as a 
form o f biological functioning. In other words, when between the ideas o f the researcher and 
observed reality exists an adequacy like between the organism and its world.167
It was, of course, precisely this correspondence between the knowing subject and the 
world surrounding that subject that Kant struggled to explain. Kant, however, did not 
come to the same conclusion as Goldstein, Nietzsche, and Canguilhem. He could only 
represent the process of understanding as a biological process by analogy. Representing 
such a process as a biological reality would undermine his efforts to establish principles 
of understanding that were a priori, i.e. not derived from experience.
3,2,2 Using Aristotle to criticize Kant
I have argued (see Chapter 2) that Kant established the fundamental conditions of 
knowledge in relation to living processes. The relation between knowledge and life he 
set out represents the foundation that supports the whole structure of his system of 
reason. I argue that in his discussions on the relation between knowledge and life, 
particularly in ‘Le concept et la vie% Canguilhem is trying to ‘deconstruct’ (through
1 f i  o
critiquing the Critique) the particular metaphysics that Kant established. Canguilhem 
is questioning the way in which the relation between knowledge and life has been 
conceived for over two centuries.
In order to perform this task, Canguilhem turns to a philosophical heavyweight - 
Aristotle - for support. He observes that Aristotle initially did not separate knowledge 
from life:
167 Goldstein (1963), p. 2 (my translation).
168 Canguilhem (1976), p. 71: Canguilhem does not employ the more fashionable method of  
‘deconstruction’ as it has become known through philosophers such as Derrida. Rather, he uses Kant’s 
own critical method against himself.
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th[e] soul is also the form o f the lvivant\ It is at once life’s reality, ousia, and its definition, 
logos. The concept of the ‘vivant’ is therefore, in the end, according to Aristotle, the ‘vivan/’ 
itself.169
Some commentators have argued that Canguilhem’s observation represents a simple 
identification of the concept and life that necessarily results in a ‘theoretical short- 
circuit’.170 In other words, identifying life and concept through the notion of a ‘concept 
of life’ does not solve the problem of the relation between knowledge and life; it 
circumvents the question altogether.
However, Canguilhem goes on to discuss how Aristotle’s inability to include the 
‘conception of concepts’ within the techniques of living lead him to ultimately 
introduce a distinction between knowledge and life:
[T]he Aristotelian theory of the active intellect, a pure form without organic support, operates a
rupture between intelligence and life and introduces from outside ... as if  through a door ... the
non-natural or transcendent power that make the essential forms that realize individual beings
intelligible. In this way, this theory turns the conception o f concepts either into a matter that is
171non-human or, if it is still a human matter, one that is elevated above life.
Canguilhem subsequently turns to another, more recent, authority: Hegel. He uses 
Hegel in order to follow through on Aristotle’s original idea that knowledge and life 
cannot be distinguished because they form part of the same process of the ‘formation of 
forms’. Canguilhem believes that it is much more productive to focus on a German 
philosopher, such as Hegel, rather than on a French philosopher such as Bergson. The 
latter does not specifically address the relation between knowledge and life because he 
does not philosophize about life through concepts.172 Canguilhem believes that Hegel is 
ultimately more faithful to Aristotle than Aristotle himself because he observes that 
‘Life is the immediate unity of the concept to its reality, without the concept
171distinguishing itself from it.’
Although Hegel’s ideas provide Canguilhem with a satisfactory answer, i.e. the 
distinction between knowledge and life that Kant had introduced was undermined, it 
gives rise to a different problem. If knowledge and life, or life and concept, can no 
longer be - conceptually - distinguished then how is a knowledge of life possible?
169 Canguilhem (2002), p. 336 (my translation).
170 Lecourt (1975), p. 185; N. Rose (1998), p. 164.
171 Canguilhem (2002), p. 337 (my translation).
172 Ibid., p. 348.
173 Ibid., p. 345, citing Hegel (my translation).
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Canguilhem answers this question by relying on his own idea of the vitality of concepts 
(see Chapter 1, para. 2.1.3):
[I]n any case, Hegel must be asked the question o f knowing, if  it is true that concept and reality 
immediately coincide in life, how a knowledge o f  life through concepts is possible at the level o f 
science. The answer is, obviously, that knowledge can only organise itself through the life o f the 
concept itself.174
Canguilhem traces, in his own work, the ‘life of a concept’ because such a life envelops 
many other forms of life (such as that of instruments, scientists, organisms, and 
philosophers).
Canguilhem uses Aristotle and Hegel in order to criticize Kant. I argue that Kant’s 
theory of understanding represents the standard or norm from which Canguilhem seeks 
to distinguish his own ideas. The problem of knowing life, arguably, forms the 
motivation for both Kant’s and Canguilhem’s work. However, the relation between 
knowledge and life that Kant proposed in order to ‘solve’ this problem, according to 
Canguilhem, only exacerbated it. Kant’s theory of understanding ‘intellectualized’ 
understanding. Canguilhem believes that understanding should not be regarded as a 
purely cognitive activity of ‘savoir’ that consists of thinking the world as exterior to 
itself.
As opposed to Kant, Canguilhem also does not believe that the transcendental 
conditions of understanding determine the possibility of science in general - and biology 
in particular. Rather, he believes that knowledge is only possible through living;175 
especially the knowledge of living processes. This idea represents an alternative to the 
thought that knowledge requires some distance from its object of study in order to 
function. However, Canguilhem argues that knowledge at a distance cannot possibly 
understand living processes. It is not the transcendent categories of understanding that 
make knowledge of living processes possible but these processes themselves.176
174 Ibid., p. 346 (my translation).
175 Maturana & Varela (1992), p. 11, pick up on this idea and suggest ‘seeing cognition not as a 
representation o f the world “out there,” but rather as an ongoing bringing forth o f a world through the 
process o f living itself.
176 Canguilhem (2003), p. 16.
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In his most outspoken comments on Kant’s work, Canguilhem observes that the 
distance introduced by Kant between knowledge and life represents the ‘limit’ (or 
limitation) of his Copemican revolution:
[I]t seems to me to confirm the resistance o f the thing, not to knowledge, but to a theory o f
knowledge that proceeds from knowledge to the thing. This is, in Kant, the limit o f  the
Copemican revolution. The Copemican revolution is inoperative when there is no longer an
177identity between the conditions of experience and the conditions o f possibility o f experience. 
(Emphasis added).
It is the character of living processes themselves that reveals this limit of Kant’s theory 
of understanding:
[T]he transcendental Analytic revealed the conditions o f possibility o f knowledge o f nature in
general and found a limit in the fact that life is not only nature in the sense o f '‘nature naturee’
178but also nature in the sense of'nature naturante\
I have argued (see Chapter 2) that this is probably the reason why Kant excludes living 
processes, as well as aesthetic judgment, from his theory of understanding.
Canguilhem observes how it was Kant’s own description of living processes as self- 
organizing, and as their own cause and effect, that invalidated his ideas on a priori 
knowledge with regard to living processes:
[A]n organized being is a being that is at once its own cause and effect, that organizes itself and 
reproduces its organization, that forms and repeats itself, in conformity with a type, and whose 
teleological structure - where parts relate to each other controlled by a whole - is evidence o f the 
non-mechanical causality o f a concept. We do not have any a priori knowledge o f this sort o f 
causality. These forces that are forms and these forms that are forces are precisely o f nature, they 
are precisely in nature, but we do not know it through understanding, we observe it through 
experience. This is why the idea o f a natural end, which is the same idea as that of a self- 
constructing organism, is not a category in Kant but a regulatory idea whose application can only 
take place through maxims. In conclusion, Kant does not admit the identification o f the logical 
horizon o f the naturalists and that which we could call the poietic horizon o f the ‘nature 
naturante\ 179
Kant recognized the contingency and diversity of living processes and their resistance to 
his own theory of understanding. However, rather than theorize this contingency 
further, he sought to contain it by making it understandable through his idea of the 
‘unity of diversity’. The question remains what would have happened to his theory of 
understanding if he would have included the contingency of living processes within it.
177 Canguilhem (2002), p. 351 (my translation).
178 Ibid., p. 352 (my translation).
179 Ibid., pp. 344-345 (my translation).
Canguilhem addresses this question implicitly by attributing a central role to ‘error’ in 
his own discussions on knowledge.
3.2.3 Knowledge and error
The idea that the process of living transforms traditional accounts of knowledge was 
already proposed by Nietzsche. The contingency of living implies that error plays a 
more important role than truth; or, rather, that the notion of truth itself needs to be 
reconsidered. Nietzsche observes: ‘Truth is the kind of error without which a certain 
species of life could not live.’180 Bachelard similarly observed: ‘The problem of error 
seems to me to come before the problem of truth, or rather, I have found no possible 
solution to the problem of truth other than dispelling finer and finer errors.’181
Bachelard integrated the idea of error into his thoughts on scientific knowledge through 
his notion of the ‘epistemological obstacle’.182 These obstacles are ideas that may have 
been useful in previous times in relation to specific problems but that have come to 
hinder knowledge formation.183 Bachelard suggests that one important source of such 
obstacles is traditional philosophy with ‘its tendency to canonize as necessary truths the 
contingent features of one historical period of thought’.184 The epistemological obstacle 
is, therefore, a critical instrument. At the same time, it reveals - what Lecourt calls - “‘a
toe
resistance of thought to thought’” .
Canguilhem addresses how Bachelard exposed the ‘tenacity of errors’ within the history 
of science. More importantly, Bachelard reveals that the reason for this tenacity of error 
must be sought within knowledge itself.186 However, although he describes how 
epistemological obstacles function and intervene in the process of knowing, Bachelard’s 
work does not answer the question of the ‘formation’ of epistemological obstacles. In 
other words, the question of ‘what necessity is there in the fact that epistemological
1 87obstacles are always being formed and reformed?’
180 Nietzsche (1968), p. 272.
181 Lecourt (1975), p. 54, citing Bachelard.
182 See Gutting (1989), p. 16.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid., p. 17.
185 Lecourt (1975), p. 135, citing Bachelard.
186 Canguilhem (2002), p. 176.
187 Lecourt (1975), p. 136.
215
I believe that this is the question that Canguilhem seeks to answer. He further refines 
the notion of the epistemological obstacle by regarding it not so much as restricting the 
progress of knowledge but as playing an important, and inevitable, role in the 
generation of knowledge. He does this by exploring the role of error in relation to the 
knowledge of life. Drawing on research into hereditary disease, he explains how the 
idea of error in relation to the life sciences first emerged when Sir Garrod used the term 
‘inborn errors’ in 1909 in order to describe a disease of the metabolism.189
The introduction of the notion of information into the life sciences seems to reinforce 
the significance of the idea of error in relation to the living:
[IJnsofar as the fundamental concepts o f the biochemistry o f amino acids and macromolecules 
are concepts borrowed from information theory, such as code or message; and insofar as the 
structures o f the matter of life are linear structures, the negative o f order is inversion, the 
negative o f sequence is confusion, and the substitution o f one arrangement for another is
The notion of information, when associated with meaning, seems to evoke the 
possibility of error. As Canguilhem observes: ‘there is no interpretation which does not 
involve a possible mistake’.191 He anticipates the criticism that his association of living 
processes with error suggests the attribution of a certain capacity for knowledge to 
living processes themselves.192 However, he argues - despite such criticism - that the 
notions of information and error are equally applicable to the process of living and the 
process of knowing:
[B]ut it must not be forgotten that information theory cannot be broken down, and that it
concerns knowledge itself as well as its objects, matter or life. In this sense to know is to be
informed, to learn to decipher or decode. There is then no difference between the error o f life and
the error o f thought, between the errors o f informing and informed information. The first
193furnishes the key to the second.
188 Cf. Gutting (1989), p. 41.
189 Canguilhem (1978), p. 171.
190 Ibid., p. 172.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid., Canguilhem observes: ‘It would be very tempting to denounce an identification o f thought and 
nature, to protest that the steps of thought are ascribed to nature, that error is characteristic o f judgment, 
that nature can be a witness, but never a judge, etc.’
193 Ibid., pp. 172-173.
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Both knowledge and life are defined through error, rectification, and mutation. 
Canguilhem points out that errors should not be regarded as mistakes or as exceptions to 
a rule. Rather, they represent each time a specific response to a situation.194
It has been argued that the idea of error only arises in relation to processes with a certain 
end.195 However, for Canguilhem error is not indicative of the teleological character of 
living processes as traditionally understood. Rather, it indicates the contingency and 
uncertainty that characterizes the process of living. The ‘formation of forms’ is not a 
process that moves progressively. However, error only gives rise to a temporary 
‘impasse’ that is subsequently overcome.196
The notions of error and information reveal something about the process of knowing, as 
it is traditionally understood, and about the subject of knowledge. Canguilhem argues 
that if the principles of knowing life can be found in the process of living, rather than in 
a priori forms, then the process of knowing through analytic categories represents a 
certain dissatisfaction. In other words, if we can know life through living then why 
would we seek to know it in any other way? He observes:
[M]ust we admit that man has become what he is through mutation, through a hereditary error?
Life would then have created, through error, this ‘vivanf that is capable o f error ... Man makes
mistakes because he does not know where to place himself. Man makes mistakes when he does
not place himself in the right environment to receive the particular information that he seeks. But
also, it is through this displacement that he receives information or by displacing, through all
sorts o f techniques, ... objects in relation to each other and this entirety in relation to him.
Knowledge is, then, a restless search for the greatest quantity and the greatest variety of
information. As a consequence, to be a subject o f knowledge, if the a priori is in things, if the
concept is in life, is merely to be dissatisfied with the meaning found. Subjectivity is, therefore,
only dissatisfaction. But that perhaps is life itself. Contemporary biology, read in a certain way,
197is a kind o f philosophy o f life.
In this statement, Canguilhem plays on the ambiguity of the word ‘erre f in French as 
signifying both error and displacement. The significance of the latter is explored by
1 ORBadiou. However, arguably more interesting than the association of error with 
displacement or movement is the idea that error lies at the heart of knowledge because it 
is in reaction to error that concepts are formulated. Error is, therefore, the conditio sine
194 Canguilhem (1998), p. 120.
195 Bensaude-Vincent (1998), p. 76.
196 Canguilhem (2002), p. 364.
197 Ibid. (my translation).
198 Badiou (1998a), pp. 231-233.
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qua non of knowledge and understanding that remained largely hidden from view in 
Kant’s work.
The implications of Canguilhem’s focus on error in relation to knowledge are addressed 
by Foucault:
if we admit that the concept is the answer that life itself gives to this chance, it must be that error 
is at the root of what makes human thought and its history. The opposition o f true and false, the 
values we attribute to both, the effects o f power that different societies and different institutions 
link to this division -  even all this is perhaps only the latest response to this possibility o f error, 
which is intrinsic to life.1"
Foucault explicitl y asks the question that remains mostly implicit in Canguilhem’s 
discussion on error: ‘Is it that the entire theory of the subject must not be reformulated 
since knowledge, rather than opening itself up to the truth of the world, is rooted in the 
‘errors’ of life?’200 Agamben, who seems to - mistakenly - attribute the ideas on the role 
of error in relation to knowledge and life to Foucault rather than Canguilhem, observes: 
‘It is clear that what is at issue in Foucault is not simply an epistemological adjustment 
but, rather, another dislocation of the theory of knowledge, one that opens onto entirely 
unexplored terrain.’201
I argue that Canguilhem’s attribution of a central role to error in relation to knowledge 
and life is a way of criticizing the particular relation between knowledge and life that 
has become characteristic of modernity. By introducing the notion of error, he 
recognizes the contingency of living processes that Kant sought to exclude from his 
theory of understanding. It is no longer necessary to ‘unify’ the ‘diversity’ of such 
processes in order to make them intelligible. Rather, it is error and contingency itself 
that represents the condition of possibility of knowledge and understanding. I argue that 
Canguilhem’s idea of ‘vital normativity’ (see Chapter 6) expresses this idea of error or 
contingency of living processes. The normative in relation to the living can no longer be 
understood as a standard or rule by which the living is judged. Rather, normativity 
represents the contingent techniques of living that make resistance to such norms of 
judgment possible.
199 Foucault (1978), p. xix.
200 Ibid., p. xx [sic].
201 Agamben (1999), p. 221.
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CONCLUSION
Much has been written about how a particular notion of information has shaped research 
and discourse in both the life and social sciences during the latter half of the twentieth 
century. The notion now seems to have lost some of its appeal, at least in the life 
sciences, for various reasons - for example, because of the continuous confusion over its 
character and meaning and because it has been regarded as introducing an untenable 
distinction between genetic material and environment. It has been argued that, although 
the modem notion of information is usually associated with an Aristotelian idea of 
form, such association is not necessarily plausible. It tends to rely on an oversimplified 
notion of Aristotelian form as an unchanging pattern that is abstracted from matter. It 
has been argued that Aristotle’s notion of form itself has many forms. However, its 
most characteristic aspect is that it represents an active principle or process of formation 
and actualization of potentiality that was intended to challenge the dualism of form and 
matter elaborated by Plato.
Canguilhem does not focus, with regard to the use of the notion of information in 
contemporary biology, on the distinction between form and matter. Rather, I have 
argued that he believes that information as a concept has the potential to transform the 
relation between knowledge and life that characterized modem rationality. Rather than 
assuming the separation of knowledge or understanding and living processes, as Kant 
proposed, Canguilhem uses the notion of information to suggest that knowledge is a 
form - or technique - of life. The concept of information sheds light on the problem of 
knowing life that motivates both Kant’s and Canguilhem’s work.
The introduction of information in the life sciences is often associated with the 
emergence of new ways of knowing and controlling living processes. It has been argued 
that a new kind of ‘biopower’ emerges when living processes are themselves defined by 
their mobility and movement. Canguilhem’s idea of ‘vital normativity’, that inspired 
Foucault’s notion of ‘biopower’, is influenced - I will argue - by Kant’s ideas on the 
normative in relation to living processes and Nietzsche’s idea of life as a manifestation 
of ‘will to power’. This idea of normativity and its potential significance for the 
contemporary life and social sciences is explored in the next Chapter.
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6. N o r m a tiv ity
p a r t  I
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 The special status o f normativity
In the preceding chapters, Canguilhem’s engagement with modem rationality - and 
specifically with the relation between knowledge and life that informs that rationality - has 
been addressed with reference to the concepts of environment, individual, and information. 
However, the most well-known - and arguably also the most misunderstood - of 
Canguilhem’s ideas has yet to be addressed. What role should be accorded to his idea of 
‘normativity’ and how should this idea be understood in the contemporary life and social 
sciences?
Canguilhem’s idea o f ‘biological normativity’1 or ‘vital normativity’2 is generally regarded 
as obsolete. It is thought to describe the ontology of living processes and has been 
associated with vitalism, a mode of thought that has become largely irrelevant in the
•j
contemporary life sciences. Moreover, the distinction between the normal and pathological 
- by reference to which Canguilhem elaborated his notion of normativity - has allegedly 
been complicated by notions such as risk, mutation, and enhancement.4 Canguilhem’s 
peculiar notion of normativity is said to be significant merely because it inspired Foucault’s 
notion of ‘biopower’.5
I argue that Canguilhem’s ideas on normativity remain relevant to the contemporary life 
and social sciences. However, such relevance can only be grasped by taking the history of 
the notion into account and by understanding the role it was originally meant to fulfil. In
1 Canguilhem (1978), p. 70.
2 Ibid., p. 76.
3 N. Rose (1998), p. 164: ‘As Lecourt argued twenty-five years ago, there is undoubtedly something o f an 
epistemological short-cut in the way in which Canguilhem appears to derive the normativity of the discourses 
and practices o f the life sciences directly from the ontological normativity o f the living being.’; Lecourt 
(1975), p. 185: ‘a theoretical “short-circuit”’.
4 N. Rose (2001), p. 7.
5 Foucault (1998), p. 140.
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other words, it is impossible to discuss Canguilhem’s notion of ‘normativity’ without 
inquiring into what this idea was meant to critique. A better understanding of the notion 
also points to a more sophisticated grasp of Foucault’s idea o f ‘biopower’.
Why is the idea of normativity regarded as Canguilhem’s main contribution to the 
philosophy and history of science? Such a role cannot solely be explained by the fact that it 
was the first significant idea that Canguilhem elaborated, in his thesis on medicine in 
1943,6 at a time when normative questions regarding the living were fraught with difficulty. 
The special status of normativity can be explained by reference to Canguilhem’s discussion 
of Kant’s ‘logical horizon’ which means that ‘a concept is only analyzed through 
concepts’.7 Canguilhem referred to this ‘brilliant text’ of Kant but believed that it was 
necessary to ‘break’ the vicious character of Kant’s conceptual circularity.8
Canguilhem’s notion of normativity, like the notion of the ‘vivanf that expresses this 
normativity, cannot be conceptualized by reference to other concepts. This is because his 
idea of normativity not only informs the concepts that have been discussed in previous 
chapters, but - more importantly -  it is employed by Canguilhem to make a philosophical 
statement about the ‘conception of concepts’.9 It does not primarily describe the originality 
or ontology of living processes, as is commonly argued; rather, it envelops and expresses 
Canguilhem’s critique of Critique - his engagement with modem rationality - in one 
‘operative notion’.10
I argue that his idea of normativity is significant for the social sciences because, although 
he discussed vital normativity with regard to living processes, he in fact devised a new 
theoretical instrument. Traditional connotations of normativity with morality and with the 
distinction between norm and fact - as well as later associations of normativity with 
normalization and control - have overshadowed the original intention and significance of 
Canguilhem’s notion of normativity. This chapter seeks to recover that meaning and 
potential by inquiring into the genealogy of the idea of a biological normativity.
6 Canguilhem (2006).
7 Canguilhem (2002), p. 343.
8 Ibid., pp. 343-344.
9 Ibid., p. 344.
10 Maturana & Varela (1980), p. 96, use this term in relation to unity (and its distinction).
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PART II
2.1 The genealogy of ‘vital normativity’
2.1.1 Kant and the normative
In order to understand Canguilhem’s notion of normativity it is necessary to return to its 
two main influences. Although the notion has also been associated with Aristotle’s idea of 
form (see Chapter 5), I argue that it was perhaps more directly influenced by the ideas on 
norms and living processes of Kant and Nietzsche respectively. Apart from his discussion 
of norms in relation to morality, which is not addressed here, Kant discussed normativity 
specifically with regard to living processes through the idea of the ‘lawlikeness of the 
contingent’ (see Chapter 2).11
Kant did not attribute purposiveness or ‘lawlikeness’ to living processes themselves. 
Rather, these notions merely enable humans to judge - rather than understand - living 
processes. Without this principle there was no way in which the empirically diverse living 
processes could be unified in order to make them intelligible. The ‘lawlikeness of the 
contingent’ is, therefore, a cognitive tool that does not claim any validity with regard to 
organisms themselves. It merely provides us with an idea of how organisms ‘should’ 
function so that it becomes possible to judge these organisms as normal or pathological in 
relation to their ‘concept’.12
At the same time, Kant proposed that self-generation is characteristic of living processes. 
Each living process is its own cause and effect.13 It seems, therefore, as if there are two 
kinds of norms at work with regard to living processes in Kant’s work. One is the norm 
through which a human subject judges a living process and the other is a norm expressed 
by the self-generation of living processes themselves. The norm understood as self- 
generation and self-organization of the living cannot be equated with the moral or 
subjective norm that is used in order to judge or cognize this process of self-generation.
" Kant (1987), p. 405, section VI, para. 217’: ‘purposiveness is a lawfulness that [something] contingent 
[may] have [insofar] as [it] is contingent’.
12 Ginsborg (2001), p. 249.
iy Kant (1987), p. 249, section 64, para. 371: ‘with regard to its species the tree produces itself... it is both 
cause and effect, both generating itself and being generated by itself ceaselessly’.
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These two different ideas of normativity seem to be at odds with each other and remain 
more or less separate in Kant’s theory. It should be pointed out that Kant himself did not 
refer to the normativity of living processes as such, but only referred more generally to the 
‘diversity’ of empirical laws that characterize the living. Nevertheless, Kant’s ideas 
potentially gave rise to the notion of an ‘immanent normativity’14 of the living that has 
arguably served as inspiration for theories of autopoiesis. Such theories distinguish the 
autopoietic process from external judgment or observation15 and, therefore, mirror the two 
different levels of normativity that can be found in Kant.
It could be argued that Kant did not wish to recognize normativity at the level of the living 
process because he was concerned with understanding and cognition rather than with the 
world of experience. However, recognition of an immanent normativity of living processes 
would also have resulted in the impossibility of the unification of diversity necessary for 
judgment.16 Norms, understood as the rules or principles that are employed by a subject in 
order to make knowledge or judgment possible, represent the main instruments of modem 
rationality. When normativity is associated with living processes, however, it becomes 
rationality’s ‘blind spot’.17
2,1.2 Nietzsche and normativity
Nietzsche sought to criticize Kant’s rationalism by exploring the idea of the living as value 
rather than as object of evaluation or judgment. It sometimes goes unnoticed that one of the 
greatest challenges for, and influences on, Nietzsche was Kant: ‘For Nietzsche, as for 
Hegel, Kant is the philosopher with whom one must come to terms. One must either 
become a Kantian, or, starting from a Kantian foundation, think one’s way out of
1 XKantianism.’ As a young man, Nietzsche wrote: ‘Kant, Schopenhauer, and this book of 
Lange’s - 1 don’t need anything else.’19 Only much later did Nietzsche describe Kant as 
‘that most deformed concept-cripple of all time’.20 However, it was undoubtedly through 
Kant’s influence that Nietzsche began to think about the particularity of living processes. In
14 Zammito (2006), p. 753; Ibid., p. 760, referring to Ginsborg’s interpretation o f Kant’s ‘lawlikeness’.
15 Maturana & Varela (1980), p. 78.
16 Cf. Zuckert (2007), pp. 25 and 48: the contingency and diversity of living processes represents a ‘threat’ to 
Kant’s system o f reason.
17 Maturana & Varela (1992), p. 19. See also Chapter 3, para. 3.1.1.
18 Kevin Hill (2003), p. 6.
19 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
20 Ibid., p. 24.
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1867, he wrote the outline for a doctoral dissertation provisionally entitled ‘The Concept of 
the Organic since Kant’.21
In the excerpts that remain, Nietzsche argues - much like Kant - that organisms do not exist 
as individual ‘wholes’ but that they are merely represented as such in order to make them 
intelligible. He observes that the ‘organism [does] not belong to the thing in itself. The
99organism is form. If we abstract away the form, it is a multiplicity’. Similarly to Kant, he 
argues that it is impossible to know or understand living processes. However, the important 
difference between Nietzsche and Kant is that Nietzsche believed that such processes are 
not merely objects of our knowledge or judgment. As Kevin Hill points out: ‘Nietzsche 
cannot put aside the vitalist intimation that in being a living being, something felt, some
9^power or “life force”, operates in him and through him.’
Nietzsche regarded his own work as a critical engagement with Kantian Critique. As 
Deleuze observes:
[0]ne o f the principle motifs o f Nietzsche’s work is that Kant had not carried out a true critique 
because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms o f values. And what has happened 
in modem philosophy is that the theory o f values has given rise to a new conformism and new forms 
of submission.24
According to Nietzsche, Kant’s philosophy resulted in a situation where one ‘moves in the 
indifferent element of the valuable in itself or the valuable for all’.25 Nietzsche argues 
against those ‘who remove values from criticism, contenting themselves with producing 
inventories of existing values or with criticizing things in the name of established values’, 
but also against those ‘who criticize, or respect, values by deriving them from simple
96facts’. He demonstrated how Kant’s representation of principles of understanding as a 
priori meant that the human creation and normative inspiration of such principles goes
97unquestioned. As Deleuze explains, herein lies the productivity of Nietzsche’s ‘reversal of 
values’:
21 Ibid., p. 83; see also pp. 84-85 for the outline o f Nietzsche’s thesis.
22 Ibid., p. 89.
23 Ibid., p. 93.
24 Deleuze (1983), p. 1.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 2: In order to remedy this, Nietzsche creates the idea o f ‘genealogy’ as signifying ‘both the value of  
origin and the origin o f values’.
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[I]n fact, the notion of value implies a critical reversal. On the one hand, values appear or are given 
as principles: and evaluation presupposes values on the basis o f which phenomena are appraised. 
But, on the other hand and more profoundly, it is values which presuppose evaluations, ‘perspectives 
of appraisal’, from which their own value is derived. The problem o f critique is that o f the value o f 
values, o f the evaluation from which their value arises, thus the problem of their creation.
Nietzsche’s focus on the creation and normative origin of values gives rise to subsequent 
interpretations of the norm as ‘productive’. In other words, a norm is not a pre-existing or a 
priori principle that represents a standard or an ideal by reference to which things can be 
judged. Rather, the norm is itself generated by value and, in turn, gives rise to values. 
Nietzsche believed that he, more than anyone else, was capable of addressing values and 
normativity because of the unique perspective that his own illness provided him with:
[T]o be able to look out from the optic o f sickness towards healthier concepts and values, and again 
the other way around, to look down from the fullness and self-assurance o f the rich life into the 
secret work o f the instinct of decadence, that was my longest training, my genuine experience, if I 
became the master o f anything, it was this. I have a hand for switchingperspectives: the first reason 
why a ‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps for me alone.
Nietzsche addresses, in the citation above, the heterogeneity of normality and pathology 
that Canguilhem subsequently explored (see para. 3.1.1 below). He also suggests that the 
distinction between health and sickness, or the normal and the pathological, is a question of 
value that is only determined by the living itself. No value can be attributed to life by 
reference to an existing norm, nor can value be derived from life itself. These themes later 
inform Canguilhem’s notion of vital normativity. As Badiou explains:
Nietzsche emphasizes that life produces deviations from values, it is an evaluating ‘puissance’ and
an active divergence. But, in itself, it is impossible to evaluate and neutralize. The value o f life, says
30Nietzsche, cannot be valued.
Life, therefore, does not represent a standard of evaluation or an absolute value in itself - an 
idea that is often associated with vitalism. Rather, the value of life can only be evaluated by 
the particular life that leads it. Similarly, Canguilhem’s notion of normativity does not 
represent a value in itself but a capacity to - as Nietzsche calls it - ‘switch perspectives’ or 
challenge established norms of evaluation and institute new ones. This means that the 
emphasis shifts from a focus on the norm as rule or standard and the conformation to, or 
deviation from, such a rule to the values that underlie norms and that make norms emerge 
and proliferate.
28 Ibid., p. 1.
29 Nietzsche (2005), p. 76; Deleuze (2001), p. 58.
30 Badiou (1998b), p. 66 (my translation).
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2.1,3 Nietzsche and life as ‘will to power’
The influence of Nietzsche’s ideas on Canguilhem’s work is obvious but has not been 
explored in any detail. Canguilhem himself only refers to Nietzsche a few times in his work 
and when he does he sometimes represents Nietzsche’s ideas as contrary to his own (see 
Chapter 1, para. 1.3.3).31 Nevertheless, his notion of ‘vital normativity’ perhaps most 
closely resembles Nietzsche’s idea of life as a manifestation of ‘will to power’. Although 
the connotation of power is only recovered by Foucault in his notion of ‘biopower’, 
Canguilhem draws on Nietzsche’s idea of ‘will to power’ in order to explain how living
i t
processes can be characterized by their ‘dynamic polarity’ (‘polarite dynamique’) and 
self-overcoming rather than by their self-preservation.
Nietzsche’s philosophy is influenced by his reference to a kind of organic ‘will to power’ 
that ‘suffuses his argument with a biological ethos’.34 For Nietzsche, Kant’s focus on 
reason and morality disguises an underlying truth that can only be found in the process of 
living.35 This is why Nietszche suggests that ‘moral values are illusory values compared 
with physiological values’. Bergson was undoubtedly influenced by Nietzsche’s work 
when he observed:
[L]et us then give the word biology the very wide meaning it should have, and will perhaps have one 
day, and let us say in conclusion that all morality, be it pressure or aspiration, is in essence 
biological.37
However, there is an important difference between Nietzsche’s original proposition and 
Bergson’s subsequent observation. Nietzsche did not propose some sort of physiological 
morality but a questioning of Kantian morality through physiology. Another question is 
whether Nietzsche, through such questioning, only achieved a different kind of 
‘moralism’.38
31 Stiegler(2001),p. 85.
32 Nietzsche (1968), pp. 332-333: ‘The victorious concept “force”, by means o f which our physicists have 
created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate 
as “will to power”’.
33 Canguilhem (1978), p. 70; Canguilhem (2006), p. 77, uses this term most frequently to describe living 
processes.
54 Tauber (1994), p. 250.
35 Ibid., p. 259.
36 Ibid., p. 250, citing Nietzsche.
37 G. Rose, (1984), p. 95 and 94, citing Spencer: ‘morality is essentially one with physical truth - is, in fact, a 
species o f transcendental physiology’.
3* Ibid., p. 71.
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It is necessary to clarify briefly what Nietzsche means by the notion of ‘will to power’. For 
Nietzsche, all activity - including living - signifies a certain striving for power. This 
means that the activity of life does not merely consist of adaptation to exterior 
circumstances or to a presupposed environment: ‘life is not the adaptation of inner 
circumstances to outer ones, but will to power, which, working from within, incorporates 
and subdues more and more of that which is “outside”’.40 Nietzsche, who frequently refers 
to Newton’s physics in his work, associates his idea of ‘will to power’ with Newton’s 
notion o f ‘force’ (even if this notion remains largely undefined in Newton - see Chapter 3, 
para. 2.1.2).41
Life or living cannot be equated with the will to power. Rather, life should be regarded as 
one of its manifestations: ‘life is merely a special case of the will to power; - it is quite 
arbitrary to assert that everything strives to enter into this form of the will to power’.42 The 
idea of life as a productive force means that it cannot be turned into an absolute value, an 
ideology, or a standard of evaluation. Nietzsche observes: ‘life is only a means to 
something; it is the expression of forms of the growth of power’.43
The ‘will’ that Nietzsche refers to in the notion of ‘will to power’ does not refer to an 
intentional or conscious act of willing by a subject.44 It does not designate a will that wishes 
for power because that would indicate a lack and turn the will to power into a reactive 
rather than an active force. This idea, arguably, also motivates Foucault’s later 
differentiation of biopower from sovereign power. As Deleuze observes, the will to power 
‘is not that which the will wants, but that which wants in the will’ 45 In other words, the will 
has no object other than itself; it represents its own motivation.
Nietzsche observes that ‘there is absolutely no other kind of causality than that of will upon 
win’ 46 jcjea 0f  6wjii Up0n or force upon force,47 indicates a certain dynamic or 
polarity:
39 Nietzsche (1968), p. 347: ‘What is “active”? - reaching out for power.’
40 Ibid., p. 361.
41 Ibid., pp. 332-333.
42 Ibid., p. 369.
43 Ibid., p. 375.
44 Ibid., pp. 353 and 369.
45 Deleuze (2001), p. 73.
46 Nietzsche (1968), p. 347.
47 Deleuze (1999), p. 59, discussing Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault’s idea o f power (citing Foucault): 
‘force has no object other than that o f other forces, and no being other than that o f relation : it is “an action 
upon an action, on existing actions, or on those which may arise in the present or future”; it is “a set o f actions 
upon other actions’” ; See also Pottage (1998b).
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[I]t is necessary to measure the meaning o f all these ‘ideal drives’ against life to grasp what this 
antagonism really is: the struggle o f sickly, despairing life that cleaves to a beyond, with healthier, 
more stupid and mendacious, richer, less degenerate life. Therefore it is not ‘truth’ in struggle with 
life but one kind of life in struggle with another.’48
This idea of life as struggle or polarity is reflected in Canguilhem’s notion of ‘vital 
normativity’. Whereas the norm in Kant represents a rather static rule or principle that 
makes understanding or judgment possible, Canguilhem observes that ‘the normal is not a 
static or peaceful, but a dynamic and polemical concept’.49 The idea of the ‘norm’ or 
‘normativity’ necessarily represents value and evaluation. This also means that the notion 
o f ‘vital normativity’ itself represents a normative project and expresses Canguilhem’s own 
‘“vital” politics’.50 Otherwise, this notion of normativity would merely provide an 
alternative principle of judgment to that of Kant; it would be synonymous with, or merely 
describe, the empirical diversity of singular living processes and would, therefore, lack 
critical power.51
2.2 Traditional interpretations of the normative
2.2.1 The distinction between norm andfact
Before we address the way in which Canguilhem elaborated the notion of normativity, it is 
important to discuss the traditional interpretation of the normative so that Canguilhem’s 
notion can subsequently be contrasted with it. Perhaps the most common understanding of 
‘normativity’ is determined by the distinction between norm and fact. This distinction was 
consolidated by Kant’s separation of understanding and experience.
The focus on the diversity of ‘biological facts’ that emerge from recent techniques of 
visualization and isolation seems to confirm the distinction between norm and fact in 
relation to living processes. The adherence to this distinction not only prevents inquiries 
into the values that motivate representations of the biological as factual but also gives rise 
to an attitude of ‘c'est ainsi\ i.e. a tacit acceptance of existence in relation to the
48 Nietzsche (1968), pp. 323-324.
49 Canguilhem (1978), p. 146.
50 N. Rose (2001), p. 1, uses this term.
51 Macherey (1998), p. 76.
52 Pottage (2002), p. 289: the relation between biological fact and legal norm becomes more complicated.
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biological.53 Canguilhem would perhaps say that it signifies the return to a situation where 
living processes are regarded as having no ‘ontological originality’ and as not ‘pos[ing] any 
special theoretical problem’.54
The emergence or construction of facts, particularly with regard to the physical and 
chemical sciences, has been the subject of some discussion.55 However, the idea of a 
‘biological fact’ gives rise to a different question, namely, how might such a facticity of 
vitality be imagined? Whereas in physics a fact is mostly associated with a ‘cognitive 
construct’, facticity in the life sciences is associated - perhaps paradoxically - with the 
normative.56
It has been suggested that it is this question of the facticity of vitality that animates 
Canguilhem’s notion of normativity.57 However, the particular factual status of living 
processes does not call into question the traditional distinction between facts and norms 
itself. Rather, it ‘copies’ that distinction over into life.58 It can be safely assumed that 
Canguilhem did not rely on the distinction between fact and norm in his elaboration of the 
notion of ‘vital normativity’. Indeed, it was this very distinction that he sought to 
undermine.
2.2.2 Normativity as control
The distinction between norm and fact determines many interpretations of the normative. 
However, normativity in relation to living processes is also often associated with control. It 
has been suggested, with reference to the distinction between normality and pathology that 
Canguilhem addressed, that the contemporary life sciences are less concerned with ‘the 
poles of illness and health’ and more concerned ‘with our growing capacities to control,
53 Dagognet(1997), p. 70: Dagognet argues that Canguilhem’s discussion on cellular theory seems to negate 
his own ideas on normativity through - what Dagognet calls - ‘mere microscopic facticity: c ’est aim ?  (my 
translation).
54 Canguilhem (1947), p. 324 (my translation).
55 See, e.g., Fleck (1979); Latour & Woolgar (1986), p. 235, on the construction and ‘stabilisation’ o f facts; 
ibid., pp. 174-175, on the inherent ambiguity o f facts; ibid., p. 64 on the role o f instruments in fact 
construction.
56 Gayon (2005), p. 57; ibid, p. 56: Bergson emphasized this difference between physical and biological facts 
and suggested that the latter seem to derive their ‘facticity’ from nature and from the self-containment that 
characterizes the organic in general.
57 Ibid., p. 57.
58 Pottage (2002), p. 292.
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manage, engineer, reshape, and modulate the very vital capacities of human beings as 
living creatures’.59
Rose - for example - observes that the ‘binary distinction’60 between the normal and 
pathological in medicine is no longer relevant in an era that deals primarily with 
enhancement, mutation, risk, and susceptibility rather than the correction of abnormality or 
the restoration of illness and pathology.61 The notion of ‘risk’ is regarded as escaping the
C*\
logic of the normal and the pathological altogether. I argue that risk is itself a normative 
evaluation in relation to the same distinction.
The focus on risk or susceptibility can also be regarded as a ‘rapid extension of the 
pathological’64 rather than as a manifestation of an entirely new regime, thereby making 
Canguilhem’s original ideas more, rather than less, relevant. The implication of such an 
extension of the pathological will not be discussed in further detail here. It should be 
pointed out that Canguilhem primarily uses the distinction between the normal and the 
pathological in order to elaborate a new notion of normativity.
Rose suggests that we have entered into an age o f‘biological control’ where ‘contemporary 
medical technologies do not seek merely to cure diseases once they have manifested 
themselves, but to control the vital processes of the body and mind’. 65 The 
‘molecularization’ of life facilitates such control now that ‘intervention is no longer 
constrained by the normativity of a given vital order’.66 Since Canguilhem’s idea of vital 
normativity is thought to express such an organic order at a time when fragmented 
processes disprove its existence, normativity is regarded as obsolete. Vital norms that were 
previously regarded as ‘inescapable’ in the sense that they were thought of as ‘inscribed in
( \ 7the laws of organic life’ now ‘appear open to alteration’.
59 N. Rose (2007), p. 3.
60 Ibid., p. 70.
61 N. Rose (2001), pp. 7 and 11.
62 N. Rose (2007), p. 84.
63 See, e.g., Bayatrizi (2008), p. 139: ‘The construction o f these risk categories constitutes a norm-establishing
practice in that high-risk groups are defined as those in which the actual mortality rate deviates from the
“normal” mortality rate in the standard population.’ See also Arendt (1998), p. 41.
64 Gros (1993), p. 104, citing Limoges (my translation).
65 N. Rose (2007), p. 16.
66 Ibid., p. 14.
67 Ibid., pp. 17 and 81.
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This idea of an organic order seems to be mostly derived from medicine, the traditional
68purpose of which is the restoration of a certain normative - or ‘healthy’ - state. It could be 
argued that Canguilhem’s focus on medicine necessarily limits his conception of 
normativity. Medicine represents, as Rheinberger argues, a somewhat ‘peculiar cultural 
formation’ with its own epistemology and normativity that centres around the maintenance 
of integrity rather than transgression or enhancement.69 However, Canguilhem does not 
undertake a philosophy of medicine in the traditional sense. Rather, like Bachelard before 
him, he uses medicine and the life sciences in order to probe philosophical questions and 
investigate ‘preserved problems’ (see Chapter 1, para. 2.1.4).
According to Rose, the significance of Canguilhem’s original notion o f‘normativity’ lies in 
the way in which it anticipates Foucault’s discussion about judgments on normality and 
‘normalization’:
[I]t becomes clear that normativity no longer can be understood in terms o f the self-regulation o f a 
vital order - if it ever was. Normativity now becomes a matter o f normality, o f social and moral 
judgments about whether particular lives are worth living. This opens up the normativity o f life for 
experimentation and manipulation: the therapeutic maximization o f ‘quality o f life’ in the name of 
normality.70
He also notes how
the productivity o f Canguilhem’s reflections on norms in life lies less in his insistence on the vitality
o f life than in the light that it sheds on the character o f those other norms that traverse our culture -
71the norms o f intelligence, o f mental functioning, o f normality itself.
However, I argue that Canguilhem devised the notion o f ‘normativity’ precisely to reveal - 
and get away from - the particular Kantian idea of the norm as judgment of the living and 
as standard for correction.
These comments, furthermore, suggest that it is impossible for the living to escape 
normalization once biological normativity is recognized as a concept; normativity is 
regarded as something that is ‘in’ living processes, that can be seized upon and - in turn - 
applied ‘to’ it. I argue that such a ‘normalizing of normativity’ neutralizes the critical 
potential of Canguilhem’s original notion of vital normativity and of Foucault’s subsequent
68 Ibid., p. 81.
69 Rheinberger (1995), pp. 250-251.
70 N. Rose (1998), p. 165.
71 Ibid., p. 164.
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idea o f ‘biopower’. This interpretation often goes hand in hand with the understanding of 
‘biopower’ as a power that is exercised ‘over’ life.
2.2.3 * Biopower ’ as power over life
The few references to ‘biopower’ or ‘biopolitics’ in relation to living processes in 
contemporary biology remain sketchy.72 Most merely suggest that informatically 
fragmented and mobilized biological entities provide a greater possibility for control and 
manipulation of such entities (see Chapter 5, para. 1.1.2). The interpretation of the 
normative as control, or as the exercise of power over life, is perhaps facilitated by a 
particular interpretation of Foucault’s idea of ‘biopower’.
Foucault argues that modernity is characterized by a specific kind of power. He calls this 
‘biopower’ and distinguishes it from the traditional idea of power as exercised by a 
sovereign over his subjects that characterized the Middle Ages. Sovereign power was 
concentrated in the authority and person of the sovereign who decided on life and death. 
Biopower signifies a different form of power that is more concerned with ‘making’ live 
(“faire” vivre’) and ‘letting’ die (“ ‘laisser” mourir’) rather than the ‘making die’ and 
‘letting live’ that characterized the power of the sovereign.74
However, the most important - but more implicit - characteristic of ‘biopower’ that 
Foucault describes seems to have been lost in most interpretations of the notion. The kind 
of power that he discusses is not so much wielded ‘over’ or applied ‘to’ the living by a 
subject of authority, such as a sovereign, or by any other subject. Foucault refers to 
sovereign power as a power that is exercised ‘over’ life and is precisely concerned with the 
subsequent transformation of this idea of power.75 ‘Biopower’, instead, concerns the 
actualization or operation of power as manifested through certain techniques of living. It, 
therefore, bears more resemblance to Nietzsche’s idea o f‘will to power’ and Canguilhem’s 
‘vital normativity’.
72 See, e.g., Helmreich (2003), p. 352; Kay (2000), p. 3.
73 Foucault (1998), pp. 135-145.
74 Foucault (1997), p. 214.
75 Foucault (1998), p. 139.
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Most interpretations of Foucault’s idea of ‘biopower’, however, do not engage much with 
the history of this idea and this - 1 argue - affects how biopower has come to be conceived. 
It is often regarded as involving a relocation, dispersion, or distribution of power from a 
sovereign to various individuals or experts. For example, reference is made by Rose to a
nr
kind of ‘pastoral power’ that is not administered by the State but by a variety of actors.
Such an interpretation, I argue, misses out on how Foucault intended to conceive of an 
entirely different kind of power. The intention was to transform the notion of power as such 
or, at least, to describe how this notion was transformed by modernity. The idea of a 
dispersion or displacement of power concerns the exercise or delegation of power rather 
than the idea of power itself. In fact, the idea of ‘pastoral power’ relies on the traditional 
idea of sovereign power; power that is exercised by subjects ‘over’ life. I believe that this 
misinterpretation of the notion of ‘biopower’ may have something to do with a confusion 
between this notion and another Foucauldian idea, that of ‘govemmentality’. More 
specifically, the idea of govemmentality interpreted in a rather sterile manner as concerning 
‘the multiplicity of forms and sources of authority’.77
When biopower is regarded as a power that is exercised ‘over’ life,78 this inevitably gives 
rise to a confusion of sovereign power and biopower. It turns biopower, in Nietzsche’s 
words, into a reactive force rather than an active or productive one. It also means that the 
transformation of the notion of power as such, which was Foucault’s main concern, goes 
unrecognized. What happens when life becomes subject? What happens when life is no 
longer regarded as merely the object of knowledge and power? These are the questions that 
represent a persistent theme in the work of Nietzsche, Canguilhem, and Foucault. They 
were concerned with how traditional notions of power or knowledge might be changed by 
regarding them primarily as processes or techniques of life.
It has been argued that Nietzsche’s thoughts on power can be distinguished, in this regard, 
from those of Foucault:
[Pjower for Foucault is an object for analysis, whereas for Nietzsche power is the true subject - the 
protagonist o f  his inquiry. For Foucault power is but a means to define the self, and therefore it 
cannot constitute the se lf  s very basis, as in Nietzsche’s understanding. Consequently their
76 N. Rose (2001), p. 9.
77 Rabinow & Rose (2006), p. 200.
78 N. Rose (2007), p. 52: ‘In volume 1 of The History o f  Sexuality, Foucault proposed a now familiar bipolar 
diagram o f biopower, or power over life.’
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respective conceptualizations o f power and o f the body as the expression (Nietzsche) or object 
(Foucault) o f power project divergent avenues o f thought.79
Although Foucault’s earlier work on normalization and the disciplining of bodies can 
perhaps be regarded as objectifying life,80 his discussion of ‘biopower’ closely resembles 
Nietszche’s idea of life as a manifestation o f ‘will to power’. The body, any living process, 
is not so much an object of power but a manifestation and an expression of it. The 
understanding of ‘biopower’ as a power that is exercised ‘over’ life and that implies
o 1
correction and control perhaps indicates a confusion with Foucault’s earlier work.
Since the history of the notion of biopower is not recognized, power is represented in a 
rather one dimensional way as control. Reference is made to a ‘contemporary logics of 
control’.82 This notion of control, which is often associated with the concept of information 
(see Chapter 5), comes to inform all aspects of inquiry into the effects of the contemporary
life sciences: the formation of subjectivities, the molecularization of processes and entities,
0-1
new forms of expertise, and the emergence of bioeconomics. Meanwhile, the 
representation of control is conceptually simplistic; its techniques and programs are 
represented as ways of executing, exercising, or applying power rather than as forming part 
of the very constitution of such power.
Rose suggests that ‘biopower is more a perspective than a concept’ because ‘it brings into 
view a whole range of more or less rationalized attempts by different authorities to 
intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence’.84 Although I disagree with this 
interpretation of biopower, it is certainly true that biopower - much like Canguilhem’s 
normativity - is not really a ‘concept among concepts’.85 However, I argue that it is more 
than a ‘perspective’; it is a critique of Critique.
I believe that biopower was conceived by Foucault with more or less the same motivation 
as Canguilhem’s vital normativity. It was intended to conceive of the way in which 
knowledge and power are transformed through the processes that characterize the
79 Tauber (1994), p. 272.
80 Foucault (1995).
81 See, e.g., Tauber (1994), p. 273: ‘Foucault analyzes power as a societal weapon to establish hegemony over 
the individual’s body, action, and thought. In this scheme the body becomes an object, and power becomes 
the means o f control.’
82 N. Rose (2001), p. 9.
83 See, generally, Rose (2007).
84 Ibid., p. 54.
85 Canguilhem (2002), p. 344.
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predicaments of life: the acting, selecting, preferring techniques that are not employed by a 
subject but give rise to all sorts of forms, including the subject. It does not concern a power 
or control in the traditional sense that is exercised over life by certain authorities, 
individuals, experts, or collectives. Biopower signifies an entirely different notion of power 
where power, knowledge, and life are implicated in each other rather than subject or object 
of one another.
PART III
3.1 The history of ‘vital normativity’
3.1.1 The normal and pathological
Canguilhem began his inquiry into the normal and the pathological by asking why the 
concept around which medicine is organized and on which its therapeutic purpose relies, 
namely normality and the restoration of the normal, goes unquestioned. The notion of the 
‘normal’ in medicine is as fundamental as it is undertheorized. In order to remedy this 
situation, Canguilhem started with an inquiry into the assertion that has dominated 
medicine since the nineteenth century, namely that ‘pathological phenomena are identical 
to corresponding normal phenomena save for quantitative variations’.86 He questioned this 
idea of the homogeneity of the normal and the pathological.
Canguilhem revealed how the idea of such a homogeneity and continuity of living 
processes only recently emerged by contrasting it with two previous ideas. The first is the 
‘ontological’ idea of illness that emerged, according to him, at the time of Pasteur’s
• J17‘discovery’ of microbes. This idea relies on a representation of illness as something 
identifiable that either enters or leaves the body and results in a different state of that body. 
The therapeutic aim of medicine is then regarded as the restoration of a previous situation 
through the identification and localization of this alien entity. The second idea goes back to 
ancient Greece where illness was represented as something that could not be localized,
86 Canguilhem (1978), p. 8.
87 Ibid., p. 11.
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because it represented a disharmony or disequilibrium between different forces in the body. 
As opposed to the ontological idea of illness, this idea represents illness as dynamic.88
Canguilhem points out that neither of these ideas assumes the homogeneity of the normal 
and the pathological. Both ideas represent illness as a ‘polemical’ situation, as he calls it. 
The first through the image of the battle between the body and a foreign intruder and the
on
second through the image of a battle between different forces within the body. 
Canguilhem retains from this discussion the idea of the ‘ dynamic polarity ’ of life to which 
he frequently refers and which characterizes his idea of ‘vital normativity’.90 Both ideas, 
furthermore, propose that the states of normality and pathology differ qualitatively rather 
than quantitatively.
The idea that the normal and pathological states are quantitively rather than qualitatively 
different was generally accepted in the nineteenth century.91 Living processes were 
regarded as remaining essentially identical throughout time; it was only a difference in 
degree that resulted in illness. Such an idea has as its consequence that illness as a state in 
itself is not recognized and there are only gradations of health. Canguilhem argues that this 
identity between the normal and pathological was advocated by Comte, who further 
developed the ideas of Broussais on the relation between pathology and physiology.92
Canguilhem points out the difficulty that lies at the heart of the identification of the normal 
and the pathological and demonstrates how Broussais, Comte, and Bernard, while 
emphasizing homogeneity and only quantitative difference between the normal and the 
pathological, in fact rely on qualitative arguments. For example, all three refer to a loss of 
harmony when describing the pathological state, while this is very much a qualitative 
notion or, as Canguilhem says, ‘a qualitative and polyvalent concept, still more aesthetic 
and moral than scientific’.93 He, furthermore, observes that
the vagueness o f the notions o f excess and deficiency and their implicit qualitative and normative 
character is even more noticeable, scarcely hidden under their metrical pretensions. Excess or 
deficiency exist in relation to a scale deemed valid and suitable -  hence in relation to a norm. To 
define the abnormal as too much or too little is to recognize the normative character o f the so-called
88 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
89 Ibid., p. 12.
90 Ibid., p. 13.
91 Ibid., p. 14.
92 Ibid., p. 17; Ibid., p. 141: It is interesting to note that Canguilhem refers to Kant who said that in fact 
pathology gave rise to physiology rather than the other way around.
93 Ibid., p. 21.
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normal state. This normal or physiological state is no longer simply a disposition which can be 
revealed and explained as a fact, but a manifestation of an attachment to some value.94
The impossibility of separating the quantitative and the qualitative, or the norm as standard 
and the norm as value, signifies the inherent ambiguity of the notion of the norm. For 
example, physiological constants are regarded as normal in a statistical and descriptive 
sense but also in a therapeutic and normative sense.95 Canguilhem regards this ambiguity of 
the norm as productive: ‘this ambiguity is certainly instructive in that it reveals that the 
problem itself persists at the heart of the solution presumably given to it’.96
3.1.2 The ambiguity o f the normative
An important aspect of Canguilhem’s discussion of normativity is the ambiguity that has 
traditionally been associated with the idea of the norm or the normal.97 The meanings 
attributed to the idea of the norm have varied over time and differ according to context. The 
norm was, for example, in antiquity associated with architecture and geometry and referred 
to an instrument used to draw straight lines and angles.98 Only later was the idea of the 
norm equated with the rule and with that which makes evaluation possible. From the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the use of words referring to the norm proliferated so 
that - in French - words emerged such as ‘normalite', ‘normative',an d  ‘normalisation' , 
arguably signifying an ‘extension of the norm’s domain’.99
The norm came to be associated with the idea of a statistical average or standard through 
Quetelet’s creation of a formula, through a ‘blending of traits’, which resulted in the idea of 
the ‘average man’.100 The norm as average made it possible to individualize by reference to 
this norm. Quetelet’s motivation for the elaboration of the idea of the average man was 
political and social rather than scientific. His creation represented ‘a physical manifestation 
of the new political regime of the Juste M ilieu... and of the democratization of society after 
the fall of the Ancien Regime.'101 Quetelet observed:
94 Ibid., p. 23.
95 Ibid., p. 68.
96 Ibid., p. 36.
97 Ibid., p. 69.
98 Ewald (1990), p. 139.
99 Ibid., p. 140.
100 Ibid., p. 144; Canguilhem (1978), pp. 89-91.
101 Matthews David (2006), p. 143.
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[T]his determination o f the average man is not merely a matter o f speculative curiosity; it may be of
the most important service to the science o f man and the social system ... The average man, indeed,
102is in a nation what the centre o f gravity is in a body.
The differing interpretations of the norm as middle or centre, rule, and standard or average 
express the ambiguity that defines the character of the norm: it represents at the same time 
fact and evaluation. It could be argued that it is this ambiguity within the norm that, when it 
is externalized, gives rise to a rather rigid distinction between norm and fact.
3.1.3 A biological concept o f the norm
If it was the ideas of Kant and Nietzsche, respectively, that influenced the substance of 
Canguilhem’s idea of a vital normativity, I argue that it was Goldstein who inspired 
Canguilhem to undertake the elaboration of a notion of the norm in relation to living 
processes. Goldstein had previously discussed the difference between the normal and the 
pathological in his own work and came to the conclusion that there was no satisfactory 
concept of the norm in relation to living processes. He observed that there are two main 
concepts of the norm: the ‘idealistic norm concept’ and the ‘statistical concept of the
_  5 103norm .
Neither of these concepts is of any use for the life sciences. The former because ‘its frame 
of reference is not oriented on any reality but, rather, would have to justify itself in 
reality’.104 It also fails to account for the specific individual form because it represents an 
ideal standard. The latter cannot do justice to the individual living process because it 
represents an average. According to Goldstein, what is required is a concept of the norm 
that is ‘generally valid’, that can - nevertheless - account for the individual form, and that - 
at the same time - ‘should avoid the “subjective”’.105
I argue that Canguilhem’s idea of ‘vital normativity’ was intended to fulfil these almost 
impossible demands; it was intended to meet all three requirements. The notion of vital 
normativity is universally valid since it is applicable to all living processes without
102 Ibid.
103 Goldstein (1995), p. 325.
104 Ibid.
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exception. It, furthermore, operates at the level of the individual and can be regarded as the 
process that gives rise to the individual form as such. However, at the same time, it is not a 
norm that is employed by a subject as a standard of judgment or as a principle of 
understanding. Canguilhem’s vital normativity represents the individual norm that 
Goldstein suggested the life sciences needed, but that he did not elaborate himself. The 
notion implies, as it did in Goldstein’s work, that an individual cannot be regarded as 
normal or pathological with regard to an average or an ideal standard but only with regard 
to itself.106
3.2 Canguilhem’s ‘vital normativity’
3.2.1 Normativity as *technique ’ of living
Kant referred to the Tawlikeness’ of the contingent in order to emphasize that the empirical 
diversity of living processes, even if described by reference to Taws of nature’,107 could not 
be regarded as governed by rules or principles (of understanding). He did not claim 
anything regarding the nature of living processes but merely addressed the question if, and 
how, they could be understood. Canguilhem’s idea of vital normativity is often regarded as 
describing the ontology of living processes. It is believed that he confused the distinction 
between norm and fact; he allegedly attributed normative status to factual living processes. 
Is Canguilhem directly attributing normativity to living processes? And if so, how might 
such a normativity be imagined?
Canguilhem’s idea of normativity preserves an implicit reference to the traditional idea of 
the normative. However, I argue that it departs from such an idea in two important ways. 
First, it does not rely on the distinction between norm and fact. Second, Canguilhem’s 
notion of normativity is not moral or ethical. I believe that Canguilhem draws on 
Nietzsche’s idea of life as manifestation of an active and productive force and Kant’s 
implicit suggestion of an immanent normativity of living processes that escapes principles 
of understanding. Canguilhem’s idea of normativity, understood as techniques of living, 
does not merely propose a specifically biological concept of normativity. It introduces a 
completely different idea of the normative.
106 Ibid., p. 329; Canguilhem (1978), p. 78.
107 Kant uses the terms Maws o f nature’ and ‘empirical laws’ (see Chapter 2, citations in paras. 1.2.1; 2.1.1; 
2 .2 . 1).
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Canguilhem explains his idea of normativity as follows, referring to an article in 
‘ Vocabulaire philosophique’ which
seems to assume that value can be attributed to a biological fact only by ‘him who speaks’, 
obviously a man. We, on the other hand, think that the fact that a living man reacts to a lesion, 
infection, functional anarchy by means o f a disease, expresses the fundamental fact that life is not 
indifferent to the conditions in which it is possible, that life is polarity and thereby even an 
unconscious position of value; in short, life is in fact a normative activity.
Normative, in philosophy, means every judgment which evaluates or qualifies a fact in relation to a
norm, but this mode of judgment is essentially subordinate to that which establishes norms.
Normative, in the fullest sense of the word, is that which establishes norms. And it is in this sense
that we plan to talk about biological normativity. We think that we are as careful as anyone as far as
the tendency to fall into anthropomorphism is concerned. We do not ascribe a human content to vital
norms but we do ask ourself how normativity essential to human consciousness would be explained
108if  it did not in some way exist in embryo in life.
Whereas Kant addressed the normativity of living processes primarily through the 
understanding and judgment of a subject, Canguilhem erases the subject from the equation 
and regards the human or the subject itself as a living process whose manner of living - or 
particular technique of life - consists of the way in which it engages with its environment 
through concepts.109
It is apparent from Canguilhem’s explanation of his notion of normativity that it does not 
concern an anthropomorphic idea of the norm.110 The idea of the norm as rule or principle 
facilitating understanding and judgment by a subject is revealed as merely one of the 
manifestations of a normativity that characterizes all living processes. This is an example of 
Canguilhem’s particular method of a ‘reversion’ through which he changes the assumed 
order of things (see Chapter 1, para. 2.1.5).
Canguilhem uses this method in order to remedy, what Bergson calls, an ‘illusion of 
retroactivity’.111 Bergson demonstrates how a particular kind of reason tends to reason 
‘backwards’ - as it were - from the human subject and, therefore, necessarily results in 
anthropomorphism. Canguilhem believes that many of our terms and expressions in 
relation to life reveal such an ‘illusion of retroactivity’ and that this ‘illusion’ determines
108 Canguilhem (1978), p. 70; Canguilhem (2006), p. 77, ‘engerme dans la vie’ (was translated as ‘in embryo 
in life’).
109 Foucault (1985), p. 12.
110 Canguilhem (1978), p. 4: Canguilhem notes in the Preface to the second edition that Bounoure (Faculty of
Sciences at the University of Strasbourg) suggested - in response to the first edition of ‘Le normal et le 
pathologique’ - that Canguilhem’s idea o f vital normativity can be regarded as a projection on nature o f the 
human need to reach beyond itself.
1,1 Ibid., p. 72.
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our entire conception of the relation between the human and the vital. He gives the 
following example:
[T]he expressions ‘natural selection’ and ‘natural medicinal activity’ have one drawback in that they 
seem to set vital techniques within the framework o f human techniques when it is the opposite which 
seems true. All human technique, including that o f life, is set within life, that is, within an activity of 
information and assimilation o f  material. It is not because human technique is normative that vital 
technique is judged such by comparison. Because life is activity o f information and assimilation it is 
the root o f all technical activity ( ‘activite technique’) .J 12
When Canguilhem describes life as lying at the root of all ‘activite technique ’, he does not 
mean technological activity in the modem sense of the word.113 Rather, he implies that the 
process of living represents a series of ‘techniques' that include human activities but that 
have - mistakenly - come to be defined as such.
The idea of life as processes or techniques, rather than as a value in itself, was explored by 
Nietzsche who observed that ‘life is only a means to something; it is the expression of 
forms of the growth of power’.114 This does not mean that Canguilhem attributes no value 
to life; it just means that normativity does not represent ‘the’ value of life but the particular 
ways of confronting specific situations (a different ‘value’ is attributed each time). The idea 
of life as ‘techniques’ can be understood through Foucault’s use of the term; techniques are 
practices that do not, in and of themselves, involve any ‘moral reflection or prescription’.115
Rather, such techniques constitute the practices of living: the acting, selecting, informing 
that is necessary to confront the predicaments of life. As Canguilhem observes: ‘even for an 
amoeba, living means preference and exclusion.’116 Such practices are not predetermined 
but are actualized each time, as Macherey says: ‘Norms have no reality outside of the 
concrete action through which they effect and affirm their normative value against the 
obstacles that oppose this action.’117 It concerns ‘the concrete movement of norms as vital
|  1 Q
schemes that are in search of the conditions of their realisation’.
1.2 Ibid.; Canguilhem (2006), p. 80.
1.3 Canguilhem (2003), pp. 129-164: Canguilhem explores this fundamental question through the familiar 
analogy between machine and organism.
114 Nietzsche (1968), p. 375.
1.5 Foucault (1990), p. 3 (in a different context); Foucault (1998), p. 141, on ‘techniques o f power’; Foucault 
(1992), p. 11, on ‘techniques of the se lf.
1.6 Canguilhem (1978), p. 76.
1.7 Macherey (1998), p. 83 (my translation).
1.8 Ibid., p. 74 (my translation).
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In what sense, then, are these techniques normative? They are not normative in a traditional 
sense that value is attached to them by a subject. Rather, they are normative in the sense 
that, as Canguilhem observes, ‘life is not indifferent to the conditions in which it is 
possible’.119 In other words, techniques of living are neither random nor predetermined but 
are driven by the particular necessities of living at a particular time and in a particular 
context. Normativity, therefore, signifies a potential; it cannot be equated with an 
individual living being. Any ‘ vivant’ only ‘exists’ in the processes or techniques of living.
Normativity is often described as being ‘immanent’ in living processes. This is often 
understood as meaning that norms are ‘in’ life and can be extracted from it. However, 
normativity is not a quality or quantity of life but a ‘capacite5,21 to confront the 
predicaments of life. To suggest that normativity is always already actualized in living 
processes would take away the dynamic of the idea. As Macherey observes:
[T]he reference to vital norms obviously raises a problem: if these norms are interpreted as
manifestations o f a ‘puissance’ that is already entirely substantially constituted, then the dynamic
that drives these norms is - in a way - halted, fixed in its origins where its successive manifestations
are already prefigured; there would be no point then in speaking o f the dynamic o f  life, but only of a
dynamic o f its manifestations, to which this metaphysical entity called ‘life’ would lend its support a 
. . 122 priori.
The idea of normativity as potential that is not yet actualized implies a certain measure of 
contingency and possibility of change (of a normative order). Normativity is not contingent 
because - as Kant suggested - a norm is always exercised by a particular subject but 
because a norm represents the possibility of its own replacement:
[T]he norm, by devaluing everything that the reference to it prohibits from being considered normal,
creates on its own the possibility of an inversion o f terms. A norm offers itself as a possible mode of
unifying diversity, resolving a difference ( ‘resorption d ’une difference’), settling a disagreement
Creglement d'un differ end). But to offer oneself is not to impose oneself. Unlike a law o f nature, a
norm does not necessitate its effect. That is to say, a norm has no significance as norm pure and
simple. Because we are dealing with possibility only, that possibility o f reference and regulation123which the norm offers leaves room for another possibility, which can only be its opposite.
Nietzsche’s influence, especially his ideas on the ‘reversal of values’ and life as ‘self­
overcoming’,124 is perhaps most apparent here. Following Nietzsche, Goldstein - and 
Canguilhem after him - argues that in illness an organism does not seek to restore a
1,9 Canguilhem (1978), p. 70.
120 Rose (1998), p. 164
121 Benmakhlouf (2008), p. 63.
122 Macherey (1998), p. 74 (my translation).
123 Canguilhem (1978), p. 146-147; Canguilhem (2006), p. 177.
124 Nietzsche (1971), p. 124; Deleuze (1983), p. 1.
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previous state of health or normality. Rather, there is a ‘reappearance of order’. This 
means that illness or pathology does not represent a ‘residue’ of the normal but a different 
way of living.126 Canguilhem describes a healthy ‘normativity’ as ‘the possibility of 
transcending the norm, which defines the momentary normal, the possibility of tolerating 
infractions of the habitual norm and instituting new norms in new situations’.127 It 
represents the potential to institute new norms and challenge existing normative regimes.
Since the normativity of living processes implies continuous transformation this means that 
the idea of deviation or exception from a rule or norm is not applicable to such processes. 
Canguilhem prefers to speak of infractions - rather than exceptions - that are, moreover, 
prior to the norm (rather than the other way around).128 The living process cannot 
accommodate the idea of the exception because ‘there is no room for fixed rules or norms, 
nothing from which an exception might be taken. All settlement is provisional, and the 
fundamental fact is the experience of particular disruptions and adaptations.129
When Canguilhem’s idea of normativity is read primarily in light of his, and Foucault’s, 
subsequent discussions on normalization130 then the critical potential of this idea - and its 
dynamic or polemical character - is lost. It could, then, be said that normativity is 
normalized. Canguilhem associated the notion of normativity with the potential to change 
and challenge existing regimes and, therefore, with some sort of resistance or resilience. 
However, when normativity is - for example - regarded as the organization or function of 
an organism there seems to be no ‘escape’ from the norm.131 Canguilhem’s idea of 
normativity indicates that there is no escape from normativity in the sense that there is no 
escape from the continuous demise and emergence of norms; any normative order is only 
temporary.
3.2.2 Social and vital norms
In his thesis on the normal and pathological, Canguilhem addresses biological normativity. 
Although there are implicit references to social understandings of the normative these do
125 Goldstein (1995), p. 333.
126 Canguilhem (1978), p. 110, citing Goldstein.
127 Ibid., p. 115.
128 Ibid., p. 123.
129 Norris (2007), p. 33.
130 N. Rose (1998), p. 164.
131 Huneman (2006), pp. 657-658.
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not appear to form his main object of inquiry. Nevertheless, in the second edition of his 
book he added a short essay entitled ‘du social au vital*.132 In it, he addresses some 
questions that his thesis gave rise to regarding the relation - or distinction - between vital 
norms and social norms. This essay has perhaps mainly attracted attention because of 
Foucault’s references to it (see para. 4.1.1 below). It also ‘allowed for [Canguilhem’s] 
assimilation, together with Michel Foucault, within a sociological critique of normalizing
1 'X'Xsocial control’.
Many have interpreted Canguilhem’s essay as a discussion of a ‘fundamental distinction’ 
and ‘a more or less complete opposition’ between social and vital norms.134 Its relevance 
has partly been attributed to a recent confusion between these two ‘types’ of norms, for 
example in relation to enhancement where ‘error [is] open to correction in the name of a 
social, not a vital, norm of health’. However, there seems to be some uncertainty about 
where the productivity of Canguilhem’s ideas can be found. Is it in the idea of ‘vital 
normativity’ as such, in the inspiration that it provides for subsequent discussions on social 
norms and normalization, or in the distinction between ‘social’ and ‘vital’ norms itself?1361 
believe that this uncertainty is partly the result of a misinterpretation of Canguilhem’s 
discussion on vital and social norms.
Canguilhem discusses the distinction between the social and the vital partly by reference to 
the difference in organization of society and organism.137 However, I argue that this 
distinction is not what is most interesting about his essay. Canguilhem’s discussion on 
social and vital norms should be regarded as an effort to refine his ideas on normativity and 
to spell out the consequences of a project of rationalization. Let us return to Canguilhem 
himself in order to clarify this.
In the Preface to the additional essays contained in the second edition of ‘Le normal et le 
pathologique\ he explains his intentions with regard to the discussion on social and vital 
norms : ‘it is only to clarify the specific meaning of vital norms by comparing them with 
social norms. It is with the organism in view that I am allowing myself some forays into
132 Canguilhem (2006), pp. 175-191; Canguilhem (1978), pp. 145-158.
133 N. Rose (1998), p. 157.
134 Ibid., pp. 157 and 164.
135 N. Rose (2001), p. 19.
136 See, e.g., N. Rose (1998), pp. 158 and 164: Rose changes positions on this question.
137 Canguilhem (2006), pp. 186-191.
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society.’138 However, in the first edition of his thesis Canguilhem already refers to the 
relation between social and vital norms.
He argues that some phenomena, like height and even death, can be regarded as social and 
vital at the same time. For example, the average life span can be regarded as a social and
1 'IQbiological phenomena because it includes the actions of man upon himself. The social 
and the vital continuously refer to, and inform, each other. As Canguilhem observes: ‘in the 
human species, statistical frequency expresses not only vital but also social normativity. A 
human trait would not be normal because frequent but frequent because normal, that is, 
normative in one given kind of life’.140
What function does this discussion of the mutual information of social and vital norms 
perform? Macherey suggests that Canguilhem ‘gives a dynamic to the notion of the norm 
from within; this is precisely what is at issue in the shift from a doctrine of the normal to a 
doctrine of the normative’.141 He notes that what gives normativity its dynamic character is 
how it articulates the implication of the social in the vital.142 What determines the 
normative character of normativity is the ‘historical-social’ structuring of life ‘in relation to 
its power to produce norms and not only submit to them’.143
By playing with accepted notions of the normal and the normative, or the social and the 
vital, Canguilhem suggests a kind of ‘double action’ of the norm that drives his notion of 
normativity. Normativity, although - I argued - initially elaborated by reference to 
Goldstein’s idea of the individual norm, cannot be regarded solely by reference to an 
organic individual. Canguilhem suggested - for example - before such statements became 
fashionable, that ‘the human body is in one sense a product of social activity’.144
The idea of the relation between the social and the vital as one of ‘norm upon norm’ 
resembles Nietzsche’s ideas of a ‘will upon will’.145 It does not simply mean the imposition 
of one ‘type’ of norm over the other but signifies the way in which the effects of norms
138 Canguilhem (1978), p. 142.
139 Ibid., pp. 91-92.
140 Ibid., p. 91.
141 Macherey (1998), p. 74 (my translation).
142 Macherey (1998), p. 76.
143 Ibid., p. 78 (my translation).
144 Canguilhem (1978), p. 91.
145 Nietzsche (1968), p. 347.
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contribute to, and intervene, in the production of norms.146 As Macherey puts it, norms are 
at the same time ‘normees et normantes’, 147  This is probably a reference to Canguilhem’s 
own statement that ‘life is not only nature in the sense of “nature naturee” but also nature 
in the sense of “nature naturante”\ m  It is this double identity of life and the norm, as that 
which is not just subjected or evaluated but is productive, that Canguilhem’s idea of 
normativity envelops.
The double identity of the norm does not mean that biological normativity necessarily 
becomes socially normalized. In other words, it is not the case that - because the vital and 
the social are implicated in the idea of normativity - such normativity is necessarily subject 
to a particular exercise of the norm with regard to the living. It is only when the social and 
vital are regarded as radically separate that the living is understood merely as an object of 
judgment or understanding.
This is where the critical character of normativity is revealed. It challenges the traditional 
idea of the norm as standard or ideal by which life or lived experience is judged. 
Normalization appears as a consequence of a project o f ‘rationalization’ that relies on such 
a traditional idea of the normative.149 Canguilhem observes, apparently referring to Kant, 
that ‘a norm offers itself as a possible mode of unifying diversity, resolving a difference 
(‘resorption d'une difference’), settling a disagreement (‘reglement d ’un differencT) '\]50
[A] norm, or rule, is what can be used to right, to square, to straighten. To set a norm (normer), to 
normalize, is to impose a requirement on an existence (‘une exigence a une existence’), a given 
whose variety, disparity, with regard to the requirement, present themselves as a hostile, even more 
than an unknown, indeterminant.151
It is this critical aspect of normativity that appears in Canguilhem’s discussion on social 
and vital norms that Foucault picks up on in his work on normalization.
146 Macherey (1998), p. 77.
147 Ibid., p. 78.
148 Canguilhem (2002), p. 352; See also Canguilhem (1976).
149 Canguilhem (1978), p. 145.
150 Ibid., p. 147.
151 Ibid., p. 146.; Canguilhem (2006), p. 177.
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PART IV
4.1 Normativity: ‘biopower’ and ‘contingency’
4.1.1 Foucault's *biopower'
The most important influence of Canguilhem on the work of Foucault is believed to be his 
work on the normal and the pathological. Foucault elaborated his ideas on normalization by 
reference to this work. Foucault himself described Canguilhem’s influence in one of his 
lectures on the ‘abnormal’:
[A] few words more, if you will allow me a few minutes. I would like to say this, I would like to 
refer you to a text that is found in the second edition o f Georges Canguilhem’s book On the Normal 
and the Pathological (starting on page 145). In this text on the norm and normalization, there is a set 
of ideas that seem to me to be both historically and methodologically fruitful. First o f all, 
Canguilhem refers to the development in the eighteenth century o f a general process o f social, 
political, and technical normalization that takes effect in the domain o f education, with the school; in 
medicine, with hospital organization; and also in the domain o f industrial production. The army 
could no doubt be added to this list. So we have a general process o f normalization during the 
eighteenth century and the multiplication o f its effects regarding childhood, the army, production, 
and so forth.152
He goes on to say:
[I]n the same text there is also the important idea that the norm is not at all defined as a natural law 
but rather by the exacting and coercive role it can perform in the domains in which it is applied. The 
norm consequently lays claim to power. The norm is not simply and not even a principle o f  
intelligibility; it is an element on the basis o f which a certain exercise o f power is founded and 
legitimized. Canguilhem calls it a polemical concept. Perhaps we could say it is a political concept. 
In any case - and this is the third important idea - the norm brings with it a principle o f both 
qualification and correction. The norm’s function is not to exclude and reject. Rather, it is always 
linked to a positive technique o f intervention and transformation, to a sort o f normative project. It is
this set o f ideas, this simultaneously positive, technical, and political conception o f normalization
153that I would like to try to put to work historically. (Emphasis added)
Foucault identifies the particular character of Canguilhem’s idea of the norm and the way 
in which it differs from traditional interpretations: the norm is not a principle of 
intelligibility or a natural law. These were the only two ways in which the normative was 
conceived of by Kant in relation to living processes and the empirical world generally; as 
the a priori principle by which the world could be understood or as a diversity of empirical 
laws.
152 Foucault (2003), p. 49.
153 Ibid., p. 50.
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Although Foucault recognizes the active or positive aspects of normativity that Canguilhem 
describes, he returns in his work to the idea of the norm as that which is used to ‘qualify, 
measure, appraise, and hierarchize’154 thereby representing the norm as being ‘among the 
arts of judgment’.155 Rouse observes:
Foucault most often discussed normalization as a technique o f power, but its epistemic implications 
emerged clearly in his account. Normalizing judgment produced: ‘a whole range o f degrees of 
normality indicating membership of a homogeneous social body but also playing a part in 
classification, hierarchization and the distribution of rank. In a sense, the power o f normalization 
imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine 
levels, to fix specialties and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another’.156
Foucault’s account of the normative and normalization is arguably more about the 
judgment of normality and the control made possible by such judgment than about the idea 
of a normativity that challenges and escapes judgment - as, I have argued, Canguilhem 
proposes.
To some extent, Canguilhem’s own focus on the centrality of error and the ‘existential 
priority’157 of the abnormal with regard to living processes invites the idea of normalization 
as correction. Leblanc observes that ‘the primary role of the abnormal ... invites the 
requirement of correction. The norm becomes a principle of correction, of rectification or 
of assimilation’. However, Canguilhem regarded normalization as a process that is 
inherently ‘anthropological’ or ‘cultural’159 as opposed to normativity, which he associated 
with life in general rather than with human existence.
It could be argued that Foucault’s earlier focus on norms and normalization as ‘technical’ 
or ‘political’ concepts is farther removed from the more polemical idea of the norm that 
both Nietzsche and Canguilhem propose. Gillian Rose, for example, observes how 
Foucault’s representation of ‘right as technique, law as normalization, punishment as 
control ... translates] what he takes to be political concepts ... into neutral, scientific 
concepts’.160 Foucault’s suggestion, in the citation above, that Canguilhem’s ‘polemical’ 
idea of the norm can also be regarded as a ‘political’ notion is significant in this regard. 
Rather than providing the idea of normalization with additional critical potential, its
154 Foucault (1998), p. 144.
155 Ewald (1990), p. 139.
156 Rouse (1994), p. 98, citing Foucault.
157 Canguilhem (1978), p. 149.
158 Leblanc (1998), p. 19 (my translation).
159 Canguilhem (1978), p. 147.
160 G. Rose (1984), p. 192, referring to Foucault’s particular sociological thought.
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representation as a ‘political’ notion arguably weakens the association with power, 
resistance, and the change of order that both Nietzsche’s idea of ‘will to power’ and 
Canguilhem’s ‘vital normativity’ express.
Since most attention has been paid to the influence of Canguilhem’s work on Foucault’s 
ideas on normalization, the influence of his notion o f ‘vital normativity’ on Foucault’s idea 
of ‘biopower’ is often overlooked. I argue that in his notion of ‘biopower’, Foucault 
recaptures the normative commitment that gave rise to the elaboration of Canguilhem’s 
original idea of normativity: a commitment to challenge the applicability of a certain type 
of rationality to life and the recognition of the potential of life to transform traditional 
understandings of knowledge and power. As Deleuze observes with regard to Foucault’s 
notion o f ‘biopower’:
[L]ife becomes resistance to power when power takes life as its object. Here again, the two 
operations belong to the same horizon... When power becomes bio-power, resistance becomes the 
power o f life, a vital power that cannot be confined within species, environment or the paths o f a 
particular diagram.16
Whereas in Foucault’s previous work the emphasis seemed to be on norms and rules 
imposed by institutions on life and perpetuated by certain practices, the emphasis has now 
shifted to the idea of power as techniques of life that resist the traditional imposition of 
norms by a subject. In Foucault’s later work, normalization is represented more as a 
consequence rather than as the main object of inquiry. The main object of inquiry is the 
transformation of power, or the emergence of a different kind of power, that has as its 
consequence a shift from a primarily repressive regime of sovereign authority and juridical 
rule to a productive regime of norms and normalization.
4.1.2 Normativity and contingency
Canguilhem’s notion of normativity seems radically contingent. Normativity can neither be 
equated with the organization of living processes nor with their functioning; the techniques 
of living are themselves functionally contingent in the sense that all operations are 
themselves continuously subject to change. Canguilhem also emphasizes the centrality of 
error in relation to living processes, which implies a continuous correction and rectification. 
It means that all solutions to the problems that are thrown up by the predicaments of living
161 Deleuze (1999), p. 77.
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are necessarily provisional. The association of normativity with contingency is also present, 
if implicitly, in Foucault’s idea of biopower because power is not concentrated in - or 
exercised by - a person but emerges from ‘actions upon actions’.
Canguilhem’s idea of normativity as contingency may seem like a useful theoretical 
instrument for the contemporary life sciences with their frequent, although often undefined 
and implicit, references to emergence and contingency. It has, for example, been noted that 
the contemporary life sciences can be characterized by how ‘the biological ... has, in a 
sense, become a wholly contingent condition’.163 This implies that living processes have 
only recently become contingent, or at least more contingent than they were before, 
because of technological developments that allow for their fragmentation and mobilization. 
However, the association of living processes with contingency is not distinctive of the 
twentieth or twenty-first century. In order to assess the productivity of Canguilhem’s idea 
of normativity it is necessary to put the idea of ‘contingency’ into context.
Kant characterized living processes by reference to the contingency and diversity of natural 
laws. He argued that in order for contingency to be understood as such, i.e. as contingent, it 
was necessary to unify empirical diversity.164 The contingency of living processes could 
only be made intelligible by regarding organisms as ‘unities of diversity’ and by reference 
to the principle of a ‘lawlikeness of the contingent’ (see Chapter 2). Although this 
paradoxical principle of the ‘lawlikeness of the contingent’ seems to straddle norm and 
fact, Kant regarded the realm of understanding and experience as radically separate.
Canguilhem points out, probably with Kant in mind, that the representation of living 
processes as initially ‘lawless’ - or as a diversity that borders on chaos - has a specific aim. 
Kant’s introduction of a systematic theory that relies on rules and principles brings order to 
this chaos. It empowers human subjects and makes it possible for them to judge, 
manipulate, and intervene in living processes. Canguilhem observes:
[T]he instability o f things has as its correlative the impotence of man. The image of chaos is that o f a 
denied regularity, as that of the golden age is that o f wild [sauvage] regularity. Chaos and golden 
age are the mythical terms o f the fundamental normative relation.165
162 Pottage (1998b), p. 4.
163 Franklin (2003), p. 100.
164 See Zuckert (2007), pp. 13-14.
165 Canguilhem (1978), p. 148.
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It is this empirical chaos that necessitates a systematic notion of reason and of the 
normative. The idea of chaos without regularity, or the empirical diversity of nature without 
unification, anticipates regularization or unification. Since such chaos will never cease to 
proliferate, the traditional notion of the normative continues to hold sway. However, 
Canguilhem believes that such a ‘regularite sauvage’ is ultimately doomed for mediocrity; 
it cannot be maintained without being tested and challenged.166
Whereas Kant regarded his own system of understanding as constantly under threat from 
‘ontic complexity’ or the empirical diversity of living processes, what seems to define 
contemporary biology is the embrace of such contingency and diversity (at least 
epistemologically).167 As Jacob observed, ‘it is ... on contingency that the unity of 
explanation is based today’. It should, of course, be pointed out that there are many 
understandings of ‘contingency’. It can, for example, be understood as epistemic, 
ontological, or more generally as a notion that signifies how traditional terms - such as 
‘action’ and ‘causality’ - are no longer valid.169 Kant’s references to contingency cannot 
necessarily be equated with contemporary references to contingency or ‘complexity’.
Nevertheless, Canguilhem’s notion of vital normativity may be useful because it identifies 
the contingency of living processes epistemologically. The notion of a biological 
normativity provides an alternative to Kant’s idea of the subjection or unification of the 
diversity of living processes to a principle of ‘lawlikeness’ in order to make them 
intelligible. It represents the idea that contingency is not necessarily something that can be 
made intelligible through unification, as Kant suggested. Rather, the notion of normativity 
suggests that living processes cannot be grasped by Kant’s system of understanding and 
judgment at all.
166 Ibid.: ‘the order o f the golden age cannot last because wild regularity is mediocrity ; the satisfactions there 
are modest - aurea mediocritas ... Where a rule is obeyed without awareness o f a possible transcendence, all 
enjoyment is simple. But can one simply enjoy the value o f the rule itself? In order to truly enjoy the value o f  
the rule, the value o f regulation, the value o f valorization, the rule must be subjected to the test o f dispute’.
167 Rheinberger (1997b), p. S247: ‘If ontic complexity has to be reduced in order to make experimental 
research possible, this very complexity is epistemically retained.’
168 Jacob (1976), p. 323.
169 See Oyama (2000), p. 116, for the difference between ontological contingency (‘causal dependency’) and 
epistemological contingency ( ‘unpredictability’); Pottage (1998b), p. 17: ‘Because contingency excludes any 
model of hierarchy, or centre and periphery, and because it disqualifies structures and subjects (or any form of 
master-principle), as appropriate units o f theoretical analysis, the anchoring points o f causal analysis are 
dissolved.’
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I do not argue that a general shift can be perceived in contemporary biology from regularity 
to irregularity or contingency;170 or to a kind of ‘irregularity without a concept’ or 
‘multiplicity without a rule’.171 Too much focus on contingency or on what could be called 
the ‘lawlessness of the contingent’ would obscure the fact that living processes are not 
‘lawless’. They are contingent mainly by reference to the norms, laws, or regularity 
imposed by a subject. Canguilhem suggests that living processes are very much driven by 
regularities; he cites I. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire: ‘there are no organic formations which are 
not subject to laws; and the word disorder, taken in its real sense, would not be applicable 
to any productions of nature.’172 Living processes are not defined by their disorder; that
|  n'l
which is regarded as disorder is merely the substitution of a previous order.
Luhmann, like Foucault,174 interprets the growing reliance on contingency as a 
characteristic of modernity.175 Although references to contingency often imply a ‘break’ 
from a rationality based on principles and rules, objects and subjects, Luhmann notes: ‘The 
reference to contingency is so instinctive that it is a part of any search for necessity, for 
validity a priori, for inviolate values.’ Contingency, then, emerges not so much as a 
‘new’ theoretical form but as a logical correlate of a rationality that is at least two centuries 
old.
Foucault and Luhmann approach the idea of contingency differently. The former does not 
focus on the form of contingency as such - although it arguably informs his discussions on
1 77power - but believes that what characterizes modernity is a certain ‘attitude’ adopted 
towards contingency.178 Luhmann, like Foucault, does not attach any kind of value 
judgment to the modem reliance on contingency. He asks the more practical question: ‘is 
there a theory that can make use of the concept of contingency?’1791 argue that Luhmann’s 
own systems theory is meant to provide the affirmative answer to this question. What
170 Cf. Rheinberger (1997a), p. 16: ‘The concept o f heredity did not result from a growing attention to mere 
similarities between parents and offspring, from an obsession o f the scientific mind with regularity at the 
expense of contingency and complexity.’
171 G. Rose (1984), p. 2, referring to Deleuze’s idea o f ‘repetition’ and Foucault’s idea of ‘power’, 
respectively.
172 Canguilhem (1978), p. 74.
173 Ibid., p. 113.
174 Foucault (1984), p. 39, referring to Baudelaire who defined modernity as ‘the ephemeral, the fleeting, the 
contingent’.
175 Luhmann (1998), p. 44.
176 Ibid.
177 Pottage (1998b), p. 4.
178 Foucault (1984), p. 39, referring to Baudelaire: ‘But, for him, being modem does not lie in recognizing and 
accepting this perpetual movement; on the contrary, it lies in adopting a certain attitude with respect to this 
movement.’ Foucault describes this ‘attitude’ as ‘a mode o f relating to contemporary reality’ or an ‘ethos’.
179 Luhmann (1998), p. 46; see also Pottage (1998b), p. 2.
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makes it possible for Luhmann to shift from a focus on ontology and ‘substance’ to
‘emergence’ is the idea that structures and processes ‘produce themselves out of their own
contingency’.180 The emergence of systems or processes presupposes the production and
• 101
reduction of complexity (see Chapter 3 on the role played by ‘environment’).
Luhmann’s description of the emergence and operations of systems is similar to 
Canguilhem’s description of normativity in relation to the living: both represent techniques 
of continuous production and transformation. It could be argued that Canguilhem’s 
‘normativity’ is Luhmann’s ‘differentiation’; that which continuously gives rise to new 
articulations of the distinction between organism - or system - and environment. As Pottage 
observes:
[T]he ‘being’ o f systems is therefore processual in the sense that they exist only in and through the
operations that articulate their elements. These operations are continually renewed; they articulate
events, elements that become fully saturated, and die away with each operation, remaining only as a
prompting memory for future operations ... In this way the system reproduces itself from operation 182to operation.
In Luhmann’s work, contingency is not only temporal because operations operate in time
and normative orders appear and disappear, it is also epistemic because operations cannot
1 81be predicted. He defines contingency as that which is ‘neither necessary nor impossible.’ 
Since contingency cannot be grasped by a binary logic that relies on the ontology of 
‘being/non-being’, a ‘third value of undeterminability’ is introduced.184
The introduction of undeterminability into a theory that relies on time results in a focus on 
probability. Luhmann observes, ‘ [i]n the dimension of time, the present refers to a future 
that only exists as what is probable or improbable .. .The present can calculate a future that 
can always turn out otherwise.’185 The contingency that the notion of probability represents 
is explained by Luhmann, without direct reference to Canguilhem, by reference to the 
improbability of normality:
[W]hat is at issue here is ... first and foremost an analytic interest: to break through the illusion o f  
normality ... The methodological recipe for this is to seek theories that can succeed in explaining the 
normal as improbable. From the functionalistic perspective, this can occur with the help o f problem
180 Pottage (1998b), p. 3.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid., p. 4.
,83 Luhmann (1998), p. 45.
184 Ibid., p.46.
185 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
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formulations that make it possible to represent the normal experiential contents o f the life world as 
an already-successful solution to the problem, but one that could also, perhaps, be otherwise.186
Although Luhmann’s description of the operations of systems and their temporal 
transformations is reminiscent of Canguilhem’s description of normativity in terms of 
techniques of living, Luhmann shies away from using the concept of the norm or 
normativity in relation to contingency. He proposes to accept the notion of the norm only in 
a ‘theoretically secondary, derivative position’.187 This does not mean that norms are 
socially insignificant; it just means that they should not be used for ‘norm-immanent 
generalizations’.188
By not attributing primary theoretical significance to the norm or normativity, Luhmann 
seeks to distinguish himself from traditional social theory that relies on ‘normative 
presuppositions’ to explain social order.189 He, therefore, espouses a traditional idea of the 
normative. Canguilhem’s idea of normativity as contingent techniques that are ad hoc and 
productive represents an alternative to such traditional ideas. Normativity becomes an 
epistemological instrument. It is not merely a ‘concept of contingency’190 but accounts for 
the ‘conception of concepts’.191 The difference between Luhmann and Canguilhem is that, 
whereas the former seeks to propose a theory in which a concept of contingency might be 
useful, Canguilhem recognizes that any concept of contingency is only truly useful when it 
is divorced from a theory that generalizes or rationalizes it.
CONCLUSION
The normative in relation to the life sciences is usually understood as moral judgment; it is 
largely determined by the distinction between norm and fact. I have argued that, although 
Canguilhem’s notion of ‘vital normativity’ is often regarded as obsolete, this notion has 
contemporary significance for the life and social sciences. It is usually understood as a 
vitalist principle that describes the ontology of the living. However, its original significance 
can only be understood when the history of the notion is taken into account.
186 Luhmann (1996), p. 114.
187 Ibid., p. 325.
188 Ibid., p. 326.
189 Ibid., p. 325.
190 Luhmann (1998), p. 46.
191 Canguilhem (2002), p. 344.
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I have argued that the main inspirations for Canguilhem’s notion of normativity were 
Kant’s views on the normative in relation to living processes and Nietzsche’s idea o f ‘will 
to power’. I have argued that Canguilhem elaborated his notion of the normative in 
response to Goldstein’s suggestion that no specific concept of the norm exists in relation to 
living processes. Canguilhem developed his idea of biological normativity by reference to 
the distinction between the normal and the pathological in medicine and by relying on the 
inherent ambiguity of the norm.
He developed an entirely new idea of the normative by representing normativity as the 
contingent ‘techniques' of living that defy the application or imposition of a norm to the 
living by a subject. Foucault recovered this idea of the techniques or power of life in his 
notion of ‘biopower’. I have argued that biopower does not signify a way of exercising 
power ‘over’ life, but represents Foucault’s effort to think how taking life into account 
transforms traditional notions of knowledge and power. This project was previously 
undertaken by Nietzsche and Canguilhem.
I have contrasted the contingency of Canguilhem’s notion of normativity with Luhmann’s 
systems theory, which relies on a similar contingency. Luhmann observed how contingency 
is an essential aspect of modem rationality. However, Kant believed that the contingency of 
living processes could only be made intelligible as such by unifying that contingency. I 
have argued that Canguilhem’s notion of normativity cannot be unified into a ‘concept of 
contingency’ but represents a useful theoretical instrument at a time when the 
contemporary life sciences seem to embrace the epistemological contingency and 
complexity of living processes.
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7. C o n clu sio n
The rapid developments in the life sciences seem to concentrate the focus of most inquiries 
in the social sciences on keeping up with such developments; on trying to understand them 
and describe them correctly. This means that a certain kind of theorizing has been lost or 
has come to be regarded as obsolete. Canguilhem’s work, written in a different style and in 
a different period, no longer seems very relevant for the contemporary life sciences.
I have argued that Canguilhem’s work is useful for both the life and social sciences because 
he asks some particularly pertinent questions. I have argued that the significance of his 
work must be sought in how he engages with modem rationality; with the particular 
‘metaphysics’ that grounds the contemporary life and social sciences. My intention has not 
been to evaluate this rationality but merely to understand how it has been constituted and 
what the role of the life sciences has been in such constitution.
The productivity of Canguilhem’s work lies, more specifically, in his inquiry into concepts 
that he sometimes refers to as ‘categories’. They could also be called paradigms or ‘second- 
order’ concepts. I have argued that what is at issue is not necessarily a crossing over of 
concepts from the social to the vital, or the other way around. Rather, these concepts 
migrate regardless of boundaries; epistemological or otherwise. They represent some of the 
basic epistemological or discursive forms that are characteristic of the kind of rationality 
that Canguilhem seeks to question.
Apart from the traditional features of concepts, such as their indeterminacy and mobility, 
what characterizes Canguilhem’s focus on concepts is that he regards them as ‘preserved 
problems’. His intention is to unpack, reveal, and open up a problem; not to solve it. He 
inquires into what makes a problem durable and at the same time malleable enough to 
transform each time. Canguilhem reveals that an important aspect of concepts is their 
vitality; the way in which they evolve and mutate. A concept cannot merely be understood 
as an instrument of reason or understanding. It is not just a cognitive operator, but 
integrates values. An inquiry into concepts, therefore, necessarily reveals a normative 
project.
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The metaphysics of modem rationality, I have argued, is constituted partly through Kant’s 
architecture of a particular relation between knowledge and life. Although this foundation 
may be presupposed by contemporary inquiries, it is productive to recognize this heritage 
in order to identify how certain problems or questions persist in the life sciences. The 
question that Canguilhem asks, and that already represented a theme in Nietzsche’s work, 
is: what happens when life becomes subject? In other words, what happens to this 
constitution of modem rationality when life is introduced into - rather than divorced from - 
the processes of knowledge and power?
I have chosen to focus on Canguilhem’s engagement with various German philosophers 
and scientists (or scientist-philosphers) rather than with the more familiar French 
predecessors and contemporaries. This particular influence on Canguilhem - and on other 
French philosophers - has not been sufficiently explored; I believe that it is crucial to 
understand what Canguilhem was doing. His engagement can be called ‘lateral’ and his 
references often remain implicit. However, I have argued that Canguilhem’s work can be 
read in some ways as a critique of Critique. I have referred to Foucault’s work mainly in 
order to explore his suggestion that Canguilhem should be read as engaging with modem 
rationality.
Many inquiries in the social sciences in relation to the life sciences start from a certain 
assumption, namely, that at a certain point in time a transition took place that made life 
relevant to processes of knowledge or that living processes somehow became political. 
Although Foucault alluded to this transition, he did not explore it in much detail. I have 
argued that this transition can be associated with the particular way in which Kant included 
living processes in his theory of understanding by excluding them, thereby establishing a 
relation between knowledge and life that continues to haunt the life and social sciences.
Although it is surely impossible to identify modem rationality by reference to one 
particular point in time or one single occurrence, Kant’s elaboration of his first and third 
Critique established a relation that has - arguably - become characteristic of modem 
rationality. I have argued that Kant includes living processes into his theory of reason 
through his epigenesis analogy but that he subsequently excludes such processes through 
his idea of a lawlikeness of the contingent. The latter was intended to, paradoxically, 
conceptualize the diverse as diverse by regarding it as a unity. This figure of the ‘unity of
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diversity’ was, I have argued, a predecessor of the ‘unitas multiplex' that is used by 
Luhmann in order to conceptualize heterogeneous processes of differentiation.
The exclusion - through inclusion - of life from knowledge represented, I have argued, 
Kant’s negotiation of the historicity and vitality of his a priori. Canguilhem believes that 
the exclusion of living processes from understanding reveals the limits of Kant’s critical 
project. In any case, ever since Kant, life has come to be regarded as at the same time the 
limit and condition of possibility of knowledge.
The first concept that was addressed in order to explore Canguilhem’s engagement with 
modem rationality was the notion of environment or ‘milieu’. In contemporary biology the 
idea of environment is being reconceptualised but many proceed by dismissing the 
traditional concept of environment altogether. Canguilhem asks the question what role is 
left for the notion of environment when the life sciences traditionally focus on the 
individual. However, rather than dismiss the notion he believes that it has come to 
constitute a ‘category of contemporary thought’. He does not assume the traditional, and 
arguably less productive, interpretations of environment as location, resource, or term in a 
relationship. Rather, I have argued that he turns the environment into a ‘category’ in order 
to explore what it does as a figure of thought.
Canguilhem notes that a biological concept of environment does not exist. The concept of 
environment first emerged in Newton’s physics. He returns to Newton’s original idea of 
‘milieu’ as medium in order to reveal its productive ambiguity. I have argued that aether, 
conceived as milieu, was employed by Newton in order to introduce dynamics into 
traditional mechanical philosophy. The milieu made his idea of forces and action at a 
distance possible. It unseated the privileged role of the individual particle in motion. It was, 
as Canguilhem points out, - ironically - biology rather than physics that turned the 
environment into a static space or a ‘physical fact’.
Another important reconceptualization of environment was Bernard’s notion of the internal 
milieu. This idea recovered the ambiguity of Newton’s original notion of milieu. It was 
used by Bernard in order to explain his idea of the ‘double condition of existence’ and the 
self-regulation of living processes. As Canguilhem notes, the notion of the internal milieu 
‘broke’ the circularity of the perception of the organism by reference to the whole/part 
distinction. Von Uexkiill’s idea of Umwelt represented another innovation of the concept of
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environment. It was not regarded as a location but as a network or interconnection of 
various signals and perceptual cues.
I have argued that Luhmann’s use of environment in his social theory was influenced, at 
least to some extent, by Canguilhem’s discussion of ‘milieu’. The central role that is 
attributed to the environment in Luhmann’s theory made it possible for him to shift from a 
focus on ontologies to a focus on processes of differentiation. It makes his idea of the 
autopoietic reproduction of systems as ‘subject-free’ action possible. Here, the notion of 
environment again recovers its original ambiguity and association with action that is not 
directly attributable to a centre. I have argued that the environment remains a purposefully 
vague notion in Luhmann’s work in order to fulfil its function as a non-foundational 
presupposition.
I have argued that Canguilhem regarded the changing role of the environment as indicative 
of, and corresponding with, a shift in rationalities; from a vision of the world where man is 
at the centre of the cosmos to man being at the centre of his own understanding. As 
Canguilhem observes, the focus on ‘milieu’ indicates that man - as centre - is but one 
milieu among many. The focus on environment, if it is not regarded as location or resource, 
makes it possible to question privileged centres of reference and introduces a certain 
measure of contingency. It, therefore, opens up the possibility of a different rationality.
The next concept that I have addressed was that of individuality in the life sciences. The 
individual represents the traditional focus of inquiry in the life and social sciences. 
Recently, the individual seems to have disappeared through technological developments. 
However, at the same time individuality recurs as a question through references to various 
processes of individuation. The theoretical question posed by the focus on individuality in 
the life and social sciences is largely left unaddressed.
I have argued that Canguilhem’s discussion of the history of the concept of the cell does 
not concern an inquiry into the ontology of the individual. In other words, his main concern 
is not, as has been suggested, to assess what counts as an individual form in the life 
sciences. Rather, I argued that Canguilhem uses the history of the concept of the cell in 
order to inquire into, what he called, the ‘problem of individuality’. The cell as individual 
form represents at the same time a manifestation of individuality and it provides the
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possibility of inquiring into the wider historical and social problematic that individuality 
represents.
Not much attention has been given to the various aspects of individuality that Canguilhem 
discussed. For example, he described the individual as emerging from a long-running 
debate about continuity and discontinuity in the life sciences. The idea of the individual as 
a ‘discontinuous continuity’ explains how individuality always seems to extend beyond the 
individual form and how it re-emerges in various guises. Canguilhem, furthermore, 
addresses the imagery associated with the cell in order to reveal the emotions and affections 
that determine the idea of the individual. His alternative reading of the emergence of the 
individual in political philosophy, as a cooperative effort rather than as a singular entity, 
reveals that the focus on individuality is indicative of certain normative assumptions and of 
a commitment to a particular kind of rationality or ideology.
I contrasted Kant’s association of individuality with unity, identity, and autonomy with 
Nietzsche’s idea of a process of self-overcoming. More recent interpretations of 
individuality as process were discussed by reference to Simondon’s inquiry into processes 
of individuation in the life and physical sciences, Foucault’s elaboration of individuality as 
the form of the ‘rapport a so i\ and Luhmann’s idea of individuality as the distinction of 
unity or differentiation. Such ideas on individuality and its inherent transformation seem to 
represent manifestations, as well as criticisms, of modem rationality and its continuous 
focus on the individual form.
Canguilhem’s discussion of the ‘problem of individuality’, and of the individual as a form 
that migrates across disciplines, regains relevance at a time when individual entities and 
processes seem to proliferate and the privileged individual of the gene is replaced by 
notions such as system, network, and pathway; all of which challenge and perpetuate the 
problem of individuality in the life sciences.
The next concept that I have addressed was that of information. This was a prominent 
notion in the life and social sciences a few decades ago and many substantial changes have 
been attributed to it. However, its productivity as a metaphor has been questioned as well as 
the way in which it helped to consolidate some perhaps unhelpful distinctions - such as 
individual/environment and form/matter. The introduction of the notion of information into 
the life sciences has also been associated with new ways of controlling living processes. I
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have argued that, although Canguilhem’s discussion on information is usually dismissed as 
largely irrelevant, it forms an important part of his engagement with modem rationality. He 
employs the idea specifically in order to reconceptualize the relation between knowledge 
and life that Kant established.
In order to contrast Canguilhem’s ideas with the most common discussions of the concept 
of information in the life sciences, I have first described how many rely on the form/matter 
distinction and regard information as a reincarnation of Aristotelian form. However, it often 
goes unnoticed that Aristotle elaborated his notion of form precisely in order to challenge 
the form/matter distinction. The fact that his idea of form has been appropriated by almost 
everyone shows that the Aristotelian form has many forms.
Canguilhem seems to adopt Aristotle’s idea of form understood as an active principle and a 
process of actualization of potentiality. He believes that the notion of information can be 
used to illustrate that the process of knowing is a technique of living, thereby undermining 
the distinction between the two regimes of understanding and experience that Kant 
established. The notion of information also realizes the shared project of Bachelard and 
Canguilhem to reveal how error - rather than truth - lies at the heart of knowledge.
Finally, I have addressed Canguilhem’s idea of normativity. This idea is mostly regarded as 
describing the organic ontology of living beings and is often regarded as having become 
obsolete. I have argued that Canguilhem elaborated his idea of a biological normativity 
following Goldstein’s complaint that there was nothing besides the traditional idealistic and 
statistical concept of the norm in relation to living processes and that both these concepts 
were inadequate.
Canguilhem elaborates his notion of normativity in relation to the distinction between the 
normal and pathological that had previously occupied Goldstein. He uses the inherent 
ambiguity of the norm in order to elaborate an entirely new idea of the normative. I have 
argued that he used Kant’s implicit suggestion of an immanent normativity of the living as 
well as Nietzsche’s idea of life as a manifestation o f ‘will to power’ as inspiration for his 
notion o f ‘vital normativity’.
I have argued that Canguilhem’s normativity is not moral or ethical and cannot be 
understood with reference to the distinction between norm and fact. Rather, normativity is
261
understood as the techniques of living that imply a certain resistance to the traditional idea 
of the norm as judgment exercised by a subject over living processes. Canguilhem’s idea of 
normativity reveals how normalization is a consequence of a particular project of 
rationalization. Although the notion of normativity is not a moral notion, it expresses 
Canguilhem’s normative project of questioning modem rationality. I have also argued that 
his notion of normativity can be regarded as a helpful theoretical instrument or 
epistemological figure to think about the contingency of living processes. As opposed to 
Kant’s idea of the ‘unity of diversity’, the notion of normativity indicates that it is no longer 
necessary to unity the contingency of living processes in order for such contingency to be 
understood.
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